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Abstract
This is a history of the ideas of German legal historian Franz Wieacker. The 
broader aim of this study is to analyze the intellectual context in which Wieack-
er’s texts were situated, thus the German legal scientific discourse from 1933 to 
1968. In this study Franz Wieacker’s texts are analyzed in the light of his corre-
spondence and the broader social historical change of the twentieth century Ger-
many. The study concentrates on the intertwinement of his scientific works with 
the contemporary society, as well as on the development of his personal percep-
tion of continuity and meaning in history. 
The theoretical framework of this study derives from conceptual history and 
hermeneutics of historiography. As objects of analyze I have picked two con-
cepts which Franz Wieacker often utilized in illuminating European legal histo-
ry: Rechtsbewusstsein (legal consciousness) and Rechtsgewissen (legal con-
science). These concepts were the key terms in his attempt to analyze the themes 
of justice and the rule of law in European history. In concrete terms, the change 
in the meanings of Wieacker’s concepts Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein 
is being tracked in reference to paradigmatic changes in continental legal science 
and social historical development of Germany.
The analysis conducted in this dissertation proves Franz Wieacker’s continu-
ous and firm belief in the necessity of the distinct social position of legal scholars 
in society. The prestigious status of the ‘juridical estate’ was a premise for social 
justice. Furthermore, Wieacker’s view on society was shaped by his uncondition-
al trust on the values concerning learnedness and higher education. This precon-
ception was due to his upbringing and attachment to the values of Weimar Re-
public Bildungsbürgertum, ‘learned bourgeoisie’.
As a result, in the later scientific production of Franz Wieacker, the themes of 
‘communality’ as the context of legal scholarship and ‘elastic creativity’ as the 
aim of legal science were significantly important. Wieacker explained the diverse 
social breaches and recent crises of Germany through a vast narrative of Europe-
an legal culture, which he constructed with the means of concepts. Despite the 
radical changes brought about the National Socialist seizure of power of 1933 
and the end of the Second World War in 1945, the core of his scholarly identity 
remained the same from Weimar to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Acknowledgements
There are numerous people who have not only supported, but enabled the finish-
ing of this study. Here I can only thank a few. First, I am indebted to professor 
Kaius Tuori. He gave me the opportunity to concentrate solely on this project for 
a period of four straight years. He encouraged me, commented on my texts and, 
in the end, supervised that I was on schedule. I am most grateful for all his sup-
port.
I want to thank professor Udi Greenberg for giving me the opportunity to ben-
efit from his ability to conclude, question and advice. His help is evident in the 
text and argument of this book, but will most probably reflect to the further pro-
jects as well. I am indebted to professors Michael Stolleis and Heikki Pihla-
jamäki for their patient and constructive comments, which I tried to integrate into 
this book. I am happy that they were willing to share their knowledge on the 
German legal history with me, and gave me a chance to improve this work. 
The project ‘Re-inventing the Foundations of European Legal Culture 1934–
1964’ was my academic home from the autumn of 2013 to summer 2017. Thank 
you Tommaso Beggio, Heta Björklund, Jacob Giltaj, Magdalena Kmak and Kai-
us Tuori for your company, support, and constructive criticism. The project pro-
vided me the perfect academic setting for writing my book, but at least as signif-
icant are the memories of our common work, conference trips, and your friend-
ship.
During the majority of this project I had the pleasure to work in the Center for 
European Studies at the University of Helsinki. I am grateful to Juhana Aunesluo-
ma, Leena Malkki, Timo Miettinen, Johanna Rainio-Niemi, Suvi Kansikas, Kari 
Möttölä, Timo Pankakoski and Lotta Lounasmeri for providing such warm and 
relaxed premises. Thank you great colleagues at the Centre of Excellence in Law, 
Identity and the European  Narratives (EuroStorie)! It is a pleasure working with 
you all and I am looking forward to our future projects! Michael Stolleis, 
Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Detlef Liebs, Laurens Winkel, Franz-Stefan Meissel and 
Geoffrey MacCormack provided me an insight to the multifaceted world of Ger-
man legal scholarship in the latter half of the twentieth century, of which I am 
deeply indebted. Their thoughts and remarks have contributed significantly to the 
outlook of this study. Kalle Pihlainen and Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen introduced me 
VIII Acknowledgements
to the theoretical world of historiography. Juha Siltala and Marja Jalava showed 
me that researching historiography was about people, flesh and blood, and 
convinced me that the study of historical scholarship was both interesting and 
important. Peter Fritzsche reminded me of what is truly meaningful in academic 
work. In the guidance of Martin Burke, Jani Marjanen and Johan Strang, I was 
able to balance between theory and practice. 
The rich and innovative language of Franz Wieacker’s letters is written down 
with a virtually incomprehensible handwriting. Furthermore, the texts and mes-
sage of the transcribed letters, in addition to some quotes from his scientific texts, 
had to be translated in English. A task which would have been insurmountable 
for me, if it had not been Jörg Schöpper, Heike Wessling, Markus Köhler, Salla 
Huikuri and Saara Uvanto who contributed to the transcriptions and translations 
of Wieacker’s texts. Their help was decisive, but the flaws are naturally my own. 
Heta Björklund’s editing skills and Mark Shackleton’s proofreading were a 
priceless aid. Thank you Hadle Andersen, Tuomas Tepora, Tomi Ranta mäki and 
Ville Yliaska for the conversations which might have seemed casual, but, with 
respect to research process, were vital. With Anette Alén-Savikko I was able to 
maintain a down-to-earth view on academic life, and a hope that, in the end, 
everything will go just fine. Jaakko Taipale. Our common journey from the ware-
houses of Ruokakesko, from the tough streets of Hakunila to the calm atmos-
phere of the University of Helsinki could be a subject of another study. Thank 
you my friend.
This has been a time consuming project. Often an extra hour for researching 
and writing was an hour away from what one understands to be the most impor-
tant thing, but keeps on forgetting. I cannot thank enough my parents Arto and 
Paula for all their support. One of the good sides of this project was the fact that 
I came to realize how much your presence means to me. Salla, Thank you for 
everything. I could have not done it without you, but I would also be lost without 
you. My kids Jonatan, Ronja, Elia and Amos continue to give me more than I 
could have ever imagined. Maybe someday I will be able to help them as much 
as they have helped me. This book is, however, dedicated to my sisters, Elina, 
Jenni and Johanna who taught me, and still remind me, what is the value of sim-




The research leading to these results has received funding from the European 
Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
(FP7/2007–2013) / ERC grant agreement n°313100, and from academy of Fin-
land funded Centre of Excellence in Law, Identity and the European Narratives, 
funding decision number 312154.

Contents
Abstract   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  V
Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VII
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
1. Historical background for the research and research questions . . . .  7
2. Previous studies  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  19
3. Theory and Methodology:  
Deconstructing the historiographical act  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
a) The emotional-intellectual entanglement: Cognitive bases  
of historical vision  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  30
b) Historiography as an affective practice and the historical vision  
in action   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
4. Structure and Methods   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
II. The biographical background of Franz Wieacker  
in the collapsing bourgeois society before 1934   . . . . . .  53
1. Bildung and Stand in the early twentieth century Germany   . . . . .  54
2. The ‘war generation’: Franz Wieacker and the social history of  
German legal scholarship  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  59
III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human  
awareness  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  65
1. Language in Rechtsbewusstsein: The scientific horizon and  
the previous tradition of the concept  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
2. Culture in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945: The breakdown of the  
Weimar Republic and National Socialism in academia and legal  
science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
3. Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945: Personal redefinition  
of Bildung and Stand  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
XII Contents
a) The late 1930s and war as Erlebnis   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  99
4. The concept of property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  114
5. Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein (1944):  
The historicization of the relation between mentality and law  .  .  .  .  124
6. Culture in Rechtsbewusstsein 1945–1968: Explaining ‘Point Zero,’  
the defensive battle of the German academia . . . . . . . . . . . . .  135
7. Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1945–1968: The experiences of  
disorder, scarcity and dislocation  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  145
a) Wieacker’s hearing and the conclusions derived . . . . . . . . . .  148
b) Bildung and Stand in the social reality of the Federal Republic . .  152
8. Vulgarismus und Klassizismus (1955):  
Rechtsbewusstsein and the collapsed legal order  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  162
IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history  
and in legal science  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  177
1. Language in Rechtsgewissen: The preceding and contemporary  
philosophical approaches  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  178
2. Culture in Rechtsgewissen 1933–1945: The contested Kameradschaft  
in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  185
3. Affections in Rechtsgewissen 1933–1945: Wieacker’s community  
and legal wisdom   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  195
a) Creative legal thinking as ‘conscience’: The War and the  
dissolution of the Kameradschaft   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  205
4. ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ (1939): The historical paragon of  
community and creativity  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  216
5. The articles on legal education: Conscience in contemporary  
legal praxis   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  229
6. Culture in Rechtsgewissen 1945–1968: Abstract guilt  . . . . . . . .  239
7. Affections in Rechtsgewissen 1945–1968: The community and  
creativity in the Federal Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  248
a) The guild of scholars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  252
b) The Damascus of 1968 and the conscience of a scholar . . . . . .  258
8. Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1967):  
Rechtsgewissen and the modern state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  267
V. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  281
XIIIContents
VI. Bibliography  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  291
The unpublished sources:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  307
a) The letters from Franz Wieacker to other scholars:  . . . . . . . .  307
b) The reports and manuscripts of Franz Wieacker, the letters of other 
scholars, newspaper articles: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  307
Index of Names   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  309
Index of Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  311

I. Introduction
This book is about the German legal historian Franz Wieacker1 and the body of 
scientific writings2 he produced during the years from 1933 to 1968. I study 
1 Comprehensive biographies on Franz Wieacker include Okko Behrends, ‘Franz Wieacker 
5.8.1908–17.2.1994,’ in Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische 
Abteilung, 112 (1995), XIII–LXII., Joseph Georg Wolff, ‘Franz Wieacker (5. August 1908– 
17. Februar 1994),’ in Stefan Grundmann (ed.), Deutschsprachige Zivilrechtslehrer des 20. 
Jahrhunderts in Berichten ihrer Schüler. Eine Ideengeschichte in Einzeldarstellungen. Bd.  1. 
Berlin, de Gruyter 2007, 73–86., Detlef Liebs, ‘Franz Wieacker (1908 bis 1994) – Leben und 
Werk,’ in Okko Behrends & Eva Schumann (eds.), Franz Wieacker: Historiker des modernen 
Privatrechts. Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag 2010, 23–48; So far the most thorough intellectual 
history of Wieacker is Viktor Winkler, Der Kampf gegen die Rechtswissenschaft. Franz 
Wieackers “Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit” und die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft des 20. 
Jahrhunderts. Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovac 2014. The above-mentioned Franz Wieacker: His-
toriker des modernen Privatrechts by Behrends & Schumann includes eight illuminating arti-
cles, from which the most relevant with respect to this work are Martin Avenarius, ‘Verwissen-
schaftlichung als “sinnhafter” Kern der Rezeption: eine Konsequenz aus Wieackers rechtshis-
torischer Hermeneutik’ (119–180), Joachim Rückert, ‘Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit: 
Genese und Zukunft eines Faches?’ (75–118), and Hans-Peter Haferkamp, ‘Positivismen als 
Ordnungsbegriffe einer Privatrechtsgeschichte des 19.Jahrhunderts’ (181–212). Articles con-
cerning Wieacker’s methodology include Joachim Rückert, ‘Geschichte des Privatrechts als 
Apologie des Juristen – Franz Wieacker zum Gedächtnis,’ In Quaderni Fiorentini per la storia 
del pensiero giuridico modern 24 (1995), 531–562., Martin Avenarius, ‘Universelle Hermeneu-
tik und Praxis des Rechtshistoriker und Juristen. Die Entwicklung ihres Verhältnisses im Lichte 
der Diskussion zwischen Gadamer und Wieacker,’ in Juristische Hermeneutik zwischen Ver-
gangenheit und Zukunft. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2013, 59–103., and Marion 
Träger, ‘Methode und Zivilrecht bei Franz Wieacker (1908–1994),’ in Joachim Rückert & Ralf 
Seinecke (eds.), Methodik des Zivilrechts – von Savigny bis Teubner, 2. Auflage 2012, 235–
260.
2 Among the most renowned monographs of Wieacker published during 1933–1968 are 
Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Ent-
wicklung. (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1952), and its second revised edition from 
1967 (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), which has been translated into English by Tony 
Weir: A History of Private Law in Europe: With Particular Reference to Germany. (Oxford, 
Oxford UP 1995), also Textstufen klassischer Juristen (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 
1960). Article collections include Vom römischen Recht. Wirklichkeit und Überlieferung (Leip-
zig, Koehler & Amelang 1944) and Gründer und Bewahrer. Rechtslehrer der neueren deutschen 
Privatrechtsgeschichte (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1959). A comprehensive collec-
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changes in Wieacker’s ideas, and the way these are reflected in his legal histori-
cal texts. Wieacker’s legal historical works constituted an influential and essen-
tial contribution to contemporary knowledge of European jurisprudence in the 
past. Therefore, a larger task for this study, in which I utilize Wieacker’s case, is 
to analyze the pre- and post-Second World War turmoil of German legal history 
– the scientific context in which Wieacker’s texts were situated – and the manner 
in which common experiences shape historiography. 
In order to scrutinize a change in the ideas of an individual scholar, I focus my 
study on concepts which are related to the themes of justice and the rule of law. 
I take these concepts more as mobile and transparent explications of ideas than 
practical models of jurisprudence. Thus, my starting point is the history of ideas 
– and following Jürgen Kocka’s elaboration – I believe that scholarly thinking 
always appears in relation to actions and social circumstances.3 In order to study 
the thinking or ideas of a given scholar, one needs to concentrate on the wider 
systemic triangle, where the ideas are influenced by the social situation and be-
havior. Conversely, the ideas of a given scholar cannot be distinguished from his 
actions, and the actions and thoughts together have an effect on the reality he 
lives in.4 In a way, I study Franz Wieacker’s texts like he himself studied legal 
tion of Wieacker’s 1930s and 1940s articles are being compiled in Christian Wollschläger (ed.), 
Franz Wieacker. Zivilistische Schriften (1934–1942). Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann 
2000. Outside the above-mentioned works, the texts which will be elaborately analyzed in this 
book include: Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein. Leipzig, Johann Am-
brosius Barth, 1944; Vulgarismus und Klassizismus im Recht der Spätantike, Heidelberg, Carl 
Winter Universitätäsverlag 1955; ‘Ursprünge und Elemente des europäischen Rechtbewusst-
seins,’ in Martin Göhring (ed.), Europa, Erbe und Aufgabe. Internationaler Gelehrtenkongress 
Mainz 1955. Wiesbaden 1956. S.105–119; ‘Vom Römischen Juristen,’ in Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Staatswissenschaft 99 (1939), 440–463; ‘Der Standort der römischen Rechtgeschichte 
in der deutschen Gegenwart,’ in Deutsches Recht 12 (1942), 49–55; ‘Die Stellung der römi-
schen Rechtsgesichte in der heutigen Rechtsausbildung,’ in Zeitschrift der Akademie für 
Deutsches Recht 6 (1939), 403–406; ‘Die Fortwirkung der antiken Rechtskulturen in der eu-
ropäischen Welt,’ in Vom Recht. Hannover, Niedersächsische zentrale für Politische Bildung 
1963. A complete bibliography of Wieacker’s works can be found in Okko Behrends, ‘Biblio-
graphie der Schriften Franz Wieackers,’ in Zeitschrift der Savigny–Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 
112 (1995), 744–769.
3 Jürgen Kocka, ‘Sozialgeschichte zwischen Strukturgeschichte und Erfahrungsgeschichte,’ 
in Wolfgang Schieder & Volker Sellin (eds.), Sozialgeschichte in Deutschland, Bd 1, Göttin-
gen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1986, 67–88. Or as Quentin Skinner puts it, ideas reflect the 
larger domains of beliefs and desires in society. Quentin Skinner, ‘Motives, Intentions and In-
terpretations,’ in James Tully, Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critiques. 
Princeton, Princeton UP 1988, 231–258.
4 According to Aviezer Tucker, the history of historiography should concentrate both on 
published texts (the superstucture) and on the research process (the infrastructure). Aviezer 
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history: I emphasize the “material” conditions of the author, and analyze how 
these premises shape the meaning of his text.5
In Central Europe, the era from 1933 to 1968 was a turbulent, politically load-
ed, and even disturbing time. War, violence and scarcity, and on the other hand a 
sense of unity and meaningful national destiny generated strong emotional expe-
riences also among the academics of the time. National Socialism demolished 
the previous practices of administration and law, challenging the contemporary 
ideas on subjective rights, communality and justice. After the Second World War, 
German society was physically in ruins, but also faced with an inevitable rethink-
ing of the ideologies and values which defined the national community. Demar-
cation between individuality and social pressure, common values and personal 
space were topics which defined public discussion and identity in one way or 
another, not only in Germany, but throughout Europe.6 Thus, common explana-
tions of the world of human affairs became more fragile and possibly incompat-
ible with the experiences individuals faced in their everyday lives. In the face of 
this ontological crisis, legal historiography, from its part, also had to provide 
answers to the questions of continuity and meaning not only in the realm of ab-
stract history, but with respect to the essence of contemporary society. Franz 
Wieacker wrote some of his most influential works during this ideological tur-
moil and social disarray. Thus, an analysis of his academic works, which were 
written amidst changing norms and tumbling common assumptions, has to take 
this ambiguity not only into account but as a starting point. 
An academic historical text is produced in a dialogue about the past between 
the author and his cultural meanings, where neither the culturally constructed 
meanings nor the identity of a scholar are rigid, permanent or emotion-free ele-
ments (let alone the entity of “the past”). 7 Consequently, I argue that historiogra-
Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography. Cambridge, Cambridge 
UP 2004, 6–8.
5 e.g. Wieacker, Zum System des deutschen Vermögensrechts. Erwägungen und Vorschläge. 
Leipzig, Leipziger rechtswissenschaftliche Studien 126 1941, 5–13; Wieacker, Die Fortwirkung 
der antiken Rechtskultur, 81; cf. Florian Meinel, Der Jurist in der industriellen Gesellschaft. 
Ernst Forsthoff und seine Zeit. Berlin, Akademie Verlag 2012, 200–205.
6 About the breaches and continuities in the public levels of German society in connection 
to identity formation (e.g. upbringing, masculinity or communality), see e.g. Georg C. Mosse, 
The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity. New York, Oxford UP 1996, 155–
180; Ute Frevert, ‘Vertrauen – eine historische Spurensuche,’ in Ute Frevert (ed.), Vertrauen. 
Historische Annäherungen. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2003, 7–66; and Andrew 
Donson, Youth in the Fatherless Land: War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 
1914–1918. Cambridge, Harvard UP 2010.
7 To say this in a slightly different way, historiography can be studied as an aesthetic entity. 
The aesthetics of historiography is a vast field which is being studied by numerous scholars. 
Here my theoretical approach is close to Hayden White’s theories, at least in the way that I am 
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phy, in addition to researching past sources and weighing them against a philos-
ophy or methodology, as a representation also deals with the socially experi-
enced emotions which its writer confronts in his surroundings as a member of a 
community. Franz Wieacker wrote not only about “the past” of the phenomena of 
the rule of law and justice, but concurrently conceptualized and commented on 
contemporary social and political events he witnessed at first hand, and which 
somehow affected the ideas of German rule of law and justice. In this book I 
concentrate on this intertwinement of the personal view, cultural change and sci-
entific tradition in Wieacker’s production. 
I argue that the ‘intertwinement’ inside the historical text reveals itself in the 
metaphors and concepts used by the historian, and focusing on them enables me 
to grasp this complicated level in historiography. Despite the claims of historical 
scholarship, historians are not exceptionally able to discern between their subject 
matter, outer public influence, and personal orientation in their works. Rather, 
and this is often the case, historical writing resembles more a semi-conscious 
process, where the author’s ideas of significance are weighed against what one 
believes to be the socially acknowledged meaning. By semi-conscious I mean 
that usually for historians the process appears as if it is guided by the automatic, 
axiomatic and unquestionable principles of a methodology or paradigmatic truth, 
even though this process has rarely been explicated or even given much cogni-
tive effort. Such principles seem to be attributed with affective meaning, and they 
are “true” because other options are perceived as untenable. As a finished aes-
thetic entity, a history, a narrative of and for a community, is “correct” because 
there cannot be other options. 
I take as my starting point a conceptual historical approach in which concepts 
and metaphors are perceived as flexible and contested symbols in communal 
meaning production.8 These terms and sayings manage to include the various and 
interested in the actual writing process of history (cf. Hayden White, ‘The Practical Past,’ in 
Historein 10 (2010), 10–19). I have also been influenced by Frank Ankersmit’s analysis of the 
relation between the feeling and expression of the temporal (see Frank Ankersmit, Meaning, 
Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation. Ithaca, Cornell UP 2012, and ‘Historical 
Experience Beyond the Linguistic Turn,’ in Nancy Partner & Sarah Foot (ed.), The SAGE 
Handbook of Historical Theory. Los Angeles, SAGE 2013, 424–438). Nevertheless, in many 
cases I have found it useful to borrow from and refer to theorists of aesthetics such as Arthur C. 
Danto and Hans-Georg Gadamer, who, with different emphasis, illuminate the interplay of the 
subjective and object in cultural reproduction.
8 See e.g. Reinhard Koselleck, Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik 
der politischen und sozialen Sprache. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag 2006; Jan Ifversen, 
‘About Key Concepts and How to Study Them,’ in Contributions to the History of Concepts 
6 (2011):1, 65–88.
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even contradictory opinions on the phenomenon they signify.9 In other words, 
concepts and metaphors are the mediums which deliver the experience of the 
writer to the receiving end. They help, on the one hand, historians to present 
personal and credible arguments on a contested subject to a wider audience and, 
on the other hand, the wider audience to understand historians’ claims at a per-
sonal level. To focus on the linguistic mediums, and perceive historical writing 
as a dialogue, enables the researcher to take into account the concurrent impacts 
of personal view, public influence and scientific tradition in the legal historio-
graphical texts under scrutiny. 
Such a stance is helpful especially when studying the continuities and discon-
tinuities embedded in a given historiographical culture. Franz Wieacker, among 
many other legal scientists, wrote of matters which were anchored in concrete 
reality, such as ‘property’ and ‘education.’ Amidst the social and political turbu-
lence of early twentieth-century Europe, the actual circumstances defining these 
entities changed rapidly, and so did the common meanings which were associat-
ed with them, as well as Wieacker’s view on those phenomena. However, this 
study is not about tracking developments in legal definitions, since that was not 
the manner in which Franz Wieacker himself understood legal historical change. 
For him, legal historical analysis should not focus on legal language concerning 
“things,” but on the mentality, perceptions and valuations related to those 
“things,” and their change in time. To Wieacker, “things” were always mere 
(though important) particles of a wider cultural understanding regarding the rule 
of law and justice, and, in the end, a temporal change in those entities should be 
the primary interest of a legal historian.10 
Wieacker explicated the abstractions of justice and people’s understanding of 
the rule of law with the concepts of Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein, ‘le-
gal conscience’ and ‘legal consciousness.’11 Embedded in these two concepts 
were the common meanings which the contemporary time gave to “things,” but 
9 I, however, go even further than traditional Begriffsgeschichte in holding that concepts 
and metaphors are perfect and elemental cognitive tools in connecting the domains of the writ-
er and his or her audience in the field of history. cf. George Lakoff & Mark Johnsen, Metaphors 
We Live By. London: Chicago UP 2003; Gilles Fauconnier & Mark Turner, The Way We Think: 
Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities. New York, Basic Books 2002.
Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge, Garden City, Anchor Books 1966.
10 See e.g. Franz Wieacker, ‘Entwicklungstufen des römischen Eigentums,’ in Helmut 
Berve (ed.), Das Neue Bild der Antike. Leipzig, Koehler & Amelang 1942, 156: “Die Art, wie 
eine Rechtswissenschaft das Eigentum bestimmt, kennzeichnet ihr Verhältnis zur sozialen 
Wirklichkeit und die Eigenart ihres Denkstils.”
11 A more detailed definition of the concepts of Rechtbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen will 
be given in the methods chapter. 
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moreover, they also included the accumulated knowledge of preceding scientific 
tradition, and the personal valuations of the scholar utilizing them. Rechtsbe-
wusstsein and Rechtsgewissen were frequently and widely used terms in German 
legal science from the 1930s to the 1960s, and they played a significant part in 
Wieacker’s legal historical texts, but moreover, these concepts were tools with 
which Wieacker – and indeed many other legal scientists too – perceived his so-
ciety and its change in time. 
Concentrating on these two concepts and by following the lines of my theoret-
ical framework, an intellectual historical study of a culture of writing about the 
past through the character of Franz Wieacker can be made. It also provides a 
stance in which the experience and historical view of Franz Wieacker are not 
unconditionally attached to the general historical development of Germany nor 
tied to the narrative of German legal scholarship. However, acknowledging the 
dialogical nature of historiography and the communal bind which concepts carry 
with them, necessarily places Wieacker within a certain group of scholars. His 
personal view of contemporary society was not a closed creed, but an evolving 
stance, which he and his circle of friends reflected. So, while studying the ideas 
in Wieacker’s texts, I argue that I can comment on the assumptions, explanations 
and ideologies of a group (a community) of people, rather than on the mere axi-
oms of one particular scholar. The research interest of this study, therefore, is 
concerned with the continuities and discontinuities in this culture of writing 
about the past.12 
This study analyses the ideas of a scholar, and concurrently his relation to 
politics, the ideal of social good and the morality of science. Thus, and in addi-
tion, it also contributes to an understanding of Franz Wieacker’s intellectual con-
text. I study how a community of scholars once saw the definition of the abstrac-
tions of social justice and rule of law in the European framework as their own 
projects. Their definitions were transformed by the common experiences they 
faced, and the virtues appreciated by this material community characterized the 
12 Here I lean on scholars like Axel Honneth (The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recog-
nition. Cambridge UK, Polity Press 2014, especially 201–216) and David Carr (Experience 
and History. Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World. New York, Oxford UP 
2014), but also on classic social psychological studies, which insist that the interaction between 
the public and private spheres of society can be examined through the concept of a group. A 
group is an intermediary tool, concept and forum between the individual and society. (See e.g. 
Philip E. Converse, ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,’ in Critical Review, 18 
(1964), 1–74; Henry Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 
1981). Similarly, “culture” according to Benedict Anderson, is not the body of people sharing 
a language or ethnic origin, but the values to which an individual is attached and can perceive 
in concrete terms (Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. London, Verso 2006, 1–65).
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form of the justice and rule of law they represented. In distinction to previous 
studies I am able to tie Franz Wieacker’s understanding of the relation between 
scientific knowledge and society to the worldview of this legal scientific commu-
nity. Wieacker’s personal understanding of morality and justice in society and the 
corresponding beliefs of his closest colleagues were built upon similar premises. 
The intertwinement of this shared belief, social change, and cumulative learned-
ness in scientific tradition shaped Wieacker’s academic texts from the 1930s to 
the 1970s. The continuities and discontinuities in the ideas embedded in that 
body of scientific writings affect even today our common understanding of Euro-
pean legal heritage and the ideas of justice and the rule of law in continental legal 
history.
1. Historical background for the research and research questions
Franz Wieacker was a Romanist and legal historian, and sometimes it is hard to 
say which came first. He did not write solely on matters concerning Roman law 
and its heritage in the modern German (and European) legal system, for his texts 
contributed to discussions about legal hermeneutics, property and work law, as 
well as methodological questions, both before and after the Second World War.13 
In all these subfields of legal discipline, his writings either clarified or re-inter-
preted the existing body of knowledge. In his scientific texts, through those dec-
ades, the target was always the existing law, and he actively tried to have an ef-
fect on contemporary jurisprudence, judicature and even legislation. If there is a 
concise theme inside Wieacker’s scientific works, it must be the question of jus-
tice, namely the problem of a just interpretation. “To search for the timeless idea 
of justice” from the history of European legal tradition is the research task that 
Wieacker explicitly formulated for himself in the first pages of his classic book 
Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1952).14 Wieacker’s ideas on the history and 
practice of that justice are groundbreaking and are still influential today. He was 
one of the most influential legal historians of twentieth-century Germany, and 
13 Marion Träger, ‘Methode und Zivilrecht bei Franz Wieacker (1908–1994),’ in Joachim 
Rückert, Ralf Seinecke, Methodik des Zivilrechts – von Savigny bis Teubner, 2. Auflage 2012, 
235. 
14 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 8: “[Rechtsgeschichte ist] Geschichte schlecht-
hin, gesehen unter dem übergeschichtlichen Gesichtspunkt der Rechtsidee und der Rechtser-
fahrung.”
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analyzing his texts means scrutinizing a theory which many other scholars have 
taken as a starting point or comparative model in their respective works.15
In the 1930s Wieacker established his status among the leading young legal 
scholars in Germany. He started his academic career as a scholar of Roman law, 
but soon moved on to more contemporary themes, and was renowned especially 
for his work on property law. Wieacker’s works had an effect not only in giving 
a sophisticated and appropriate elaboration of the phenomenon of ownership in 
law, but through his writings he indirectly supported the National Socialist inten-
tions to bend jurisprudence so that it echoed the fascist political ideology.16 After 
the war, Wieacker’s influence was again dual. His texts which concerned legal 
interpretation, and especially his thorough History of Private Law in Europe 
(Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit) , shaped the way in which continental legal 
scholars perceived the study of law. However, Wieacker’s input on the larger 
paradigmatic shift when continental legal history started to emphasize continui-
ties and kinship between the Roman legal tradition and European, namely United 
European, law, was also decisive.
The time frame of my study (1933–1968) takes us from the beginning of the 
Third Reich to the early Berlin Wall years and the student riots of the late 1960s. 
This frame leaves out some significant work Franz Wieacker produced and rules 
out a detailed study of the development of his scientific stance as a whole. I argue 
for this framing on the basis of the coincidence of several important events in the 
personal and public spheres of the scholar under scrutiny, in both the starting and 
end point of my time frame. In 1933 not only did Nazis seize power in Germany, 
but Franz Wieacker also took the first steps in his academic career.17 In the 1960s 
the Berlin Wall was erected, Konrad Adenauer left his position, student riots es-
calated in 1968, and West Germany had to face its Nazi past in an unprecedented 
manner.18 In 1967 the second revised edition of Franz Wieacker’s magnum opus 
Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit was published. In this volume Wieacker con-
cluded the results of his scholarly work of the last decades, and in a much more 
direct manner than in the first edition of 1952 he extended his analysis to the 
fields of historical meaning and interpretation. For Wieacker the late 1960s was 
15 See e.g. Winkler 2014, 1–2; Dieter Simon, ‘Franz Wieacker,’ in Rechtshistorisches Jour-
nal 13(1994), 1–4.
16 See Wolf 2007, 77 and Wieacker’s influence on the 1937 reform of matrimonial law.
17 Wieacker completed his doctoral dissertation in 1932 with the book Lex commissoria. 
Erfüllungszwang und Widerruf im römischen Kaufrecht. (Berlin, J. Springer 1932), and started 
to gain a good reputation among legal scholars towards the end of the decade. Liebs 2010, 
34–35.
18 Dirk A. Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York, Cambridge UP 2006, 
8–9.
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an era of rethinking, not only in the scientific sense, but also with regard to his 
personal history. This becomes evident in the publication of the revised version 
of his 1935 article Wandlungen in Eigentumsverfassungen.19 1968 marked the 
ending of an era both to Wieacker personally and in more general terms to the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Since it would be impossible to cover Wieacker’s 
whole career in this study, I consider the boundaries I have placed to be justified. 
In this study I take Franz Wieacker’s personal history and scholarly identity to 
be deeply intertwined with the more general social and scientific destinies of 
Germany, and argue that this connection is also evident in the ideas of his aca-
demic texts.20 My purpose, however, is not to offer social historically derived 
causal explanations of the ideas of a single individual. Both before and after the 
Second World War, the view that Franz Wieacker had on society cannot be 
straightforwardly equated with any particular ideology, but it is obvious that the 
shifts in the material conditions and changes in the political sphere of the society 
were reflected in his works. Moreover, even the intellectual atmosphere, or 
“public opinion” if one prefers, itself is a very complex and multileveled phe-
nomenon.
For example, National Socialism was neither a monolithic nor a completely 
thought out plan of actions for the German people. Rather, from the beginning it 
constituted two competing discourses: the harsh anti-Semitism of the NSDAP, 
and disguised ethnic fundamentalism directed towards “ordinary” Germans. No 
one had absolute mastery over this ideology. In other words, “National Social-
ism” was defined (one could say constructed) in interactive situations in the con-
text of old clubs, committees, classes, gatherings, informal chats between neigh-
bors, friends and relatives, etc., namely wherever people shared their experiences 
of recent social events.21 Nevertheless, behind the communal meaning construc-
tion of the 1930s was the National Socialist party’s ruthless greed for power. The 
unusual nature and success of the fascist revolution was due to its capability to 
persuade the old networks of the Republic to redefine themselves as National 
Socialist.22 The Nazi demagogues utilized common emotions or intentions like 
political opportunism, fear, nationalistic euphoria or the mere wish to have an 
19 Both the original article ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935] and “Wandlun-
gen der Eigentumsverfassung” revisited’ [1976/77], can be found in Christian Wollschläger 
(ed.), Franz Wieacker. Zivilistische Schriften (1934–1942). Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
Klostermann 2000, 9–108; 475–491. 
20 Cf. Mark Bevir, ‘Mind and Method in the History of Ideas,’ in History & Theory 36 
(1997): 2, 167–168.
21 Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge, Harvard UP 2003.
22 Thomas Rohrkrämer, A Single Communal Faith? The German Right from Conservatism 
to National Socialism. New York, Berghahn Books 2007.
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effect on one’s local environment. They created an atmosphere and social possi-
bilities where individuals motivated by those feelings could take a lead in stabi-
lized or totally new, freshly established, networks and groups. These new cham-
pions of the “movement” were provided with the vocabulary and concepts of 
National Socialism, which they then interpreted in their own context and preached 
in their communities. The task of this standardized vocabulary and language was 
to disguise the harsh takeover of communal networks and present it as a strong 
and unified, unprecedented uprising of the Volk.23 
Academia and jurisprudence were by no means immune to this phenomenon. 
The emphasis on Führerprinzip, enthusiastic but irrelevant deployment of the 
fashionable rhetoric and outright racist remarks in academic texts, were common 
traits in the legal scientific works following the National Socialist Machtergrei-
fung [seizure of power].24 The National Socialist revolution, however, did not as 
such change legal historical methodology. Of course, if one wanted to obtain 
grants, be promoted or even keep one’s job, the research topics, questions and 
results had to follow a certain pattern. But this “paradigmatic change,” like every 
other change, left free space for scholars to express themselves as scientists. 25 
Despite the seemingly harsh demands of the National Socialist state on academic 
life, and especially on those studying Roman law, the party for the most part let 
the learned be, possibly because the Nazis were just not very interested in human 
sciences.26 The majority of German scholars did not feel that they were involved 
in a theatrical pseudo-scientific game; it was relatively easy to contribute to the 
introduction of the “legal renewal,” at least on the level of rhetoric, and ignore 
the already visible and alarming signs of injustice. 
23 Koonz’s account of Martin Heidegger as a new herald of the idée, gives an example how 
scientific language was jumbled with the new vocabulary as a nonsense, which power lied not 
in its verbal reasoning or deduction (which it didn’t have), but in the ruthless and overwhelming 
message of fundamental change. Koontz 2003, 46–56; Stolleis writes of ”centralized regulation 
of language”. Michael Stolleis, Law under the Swastika. Studies in Legal History in Nazi Ger-
many. Chigago, Chigago UP 1998, 12, 15, 45.
24 About the lack of “legal philosophy” in National Socialistic law see Stolleis 1998, 20–21, 
also 35, 98; See also Bernd Rüthers, Die Unbegrenzte Auslegung. Zum Wandel der Privat-
rechts ordnung im Nationalsozialismus. 7. Auflage. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2012, 91–111.
25 Karen Schönwälder shows how historians absorbed new vocabulary to old scientific 
models and analyzed for example foreign policy from the same ground as before, now only in 
a more aggressive way. Karen Schönwälder, Historiker und Politik. Geschichtswissenschaft im 
Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt, Campus Verlag 1997; cf. Stolleis 1998, 95–105; Georg G. Ig-
gers, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Kritik der traditionellen Geschichtsauffasung von 
Herder bis zu Gegenwart. Wien, Böhlau 1997, 320–328.
26 Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Die heutige Rechtsmissbrauchslehre: Ergebnis nationalsozialis-
tischen Rechtsdenkens?. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag 1995. 
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The relation between scholarly ideas and both the social and scientific beliefs 
of the time was by no means a simple, causal or unidirectional one.27 Before the 
Second World War, and despite the fact that many scholars found the public men-
tality following the fascists’ accession to be empowering, it was common among 
academic circles to look down at, silently disdain, or fear the vulgar Nazis. The 
academic stance towards National Socialist politics was fused with the experi-
ence of the generational revolution, which overshadowed the social perception of 
young scholars.28 Nevertheless, fascist rhetoric was commonly used in academic 
works, and scholars utilized the positive chance to see the emerging historical 
force as a guiding light to clarify unsolved episodes of the past.29 
Consequently, in 1945 most Germans had to face what Peter Fritzsche calls an 
“abyss” of emotions.30 Worry, victimization, scarcity, shame and cynicism exist-
ed alongside of the need to hold on to what one had possibly achieved during the 
previous years. For many, Germany’s defeat came close to being a traumatic 
experience as it destroyed and removed symbols and structures which had previ-
ously represented emotions and ideas which were important with respect to one’s 
own narrative and life as a member of a group. Now societal change affected 
everyday practices with respect to nutrition, work and safety.31 Besides, where 
27 “Their [lawyers’] motivations for later affirmation were complex and diverse. The sys-
tematic conservatism of lawyers in supporting the rulers on the basis of legality does not suffice 
to explain the motivations behind their sometimes enthusiastic advocacy. Hope for an end to 
the permanent crisis of the Weimar system was coupled with relief at the demise of an unpop-
ular republic. Often, National Socialism was misunderstood to be a conservative movement. 
On top of everything else, the coming generation expected it to provide career opportunities 
and soon filled the positions of the numerous professionals driven out by the Law to Restore the 
Professional Civil Service [Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums],” Reinhard 
Mehring, ‘Introduction,’ in Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink (ed.), Weimar. A Jurispru-
dence of Crisis. Berkeley, University of California Press 2000, 314.
28 E.g. Michael Wildt, An Uncompromising Generation: The Nazi Leadership of the Reich 
Security Main Office. Madison, Wisconsin UP 2009, 37–80; Mark Roseman, ‘Introduction: 
generation conflict and German history 1770–1968,’ in Mark Roseman (ed.), Generations in 
Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770–1968. Cambridge, Cam-
bridge UP, 1–40.
29 Outline article about the subject, see Winfried Schulze, Gerd Helm & Thomas Ott, 
‘Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus: Beobachtungen und Überlegungen zu einer De-
batte,’ in Winfried Schulze & Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds.), with the assistance of Gerd Helm & 
Thomas Ott, Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Verlag 
1999; also Stolleis 1998, 55–56, 61.
30 Peter Fritzsche, Life and Death in the Third Reich. Cambridge, Harvard UP 2008, 13–14.
31 Brown et. al found that the harsher the conditions with respect to everyday routines get, 
the more traumatic and dominating the memory of those times will become (Norman R. Brown, 
Tia G.B. Hansen, Peter J. Lee, Sarah A. Vanderveen & Fredrick G. Conrad, ‘Historically De-
fined Autobiographical Periods: Their Origins and Implications,’ in Dorthe Berntsen & David 
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there was a continuum in conservative lifestyle from Weimar to the Nazi regime, 
the end of the Second World War in Germany also meant, to a degree, an end to 
a certain nationalistic ideology. Many (especially those who had foreign con-
tacts, like scholars) faced outside pressure to explain one’s, in retrospective pos-
sibly questionable, actions during the recent decade. The moral condemnation of 
the winners and the revealed horrors of the Nazi regime, also comprised a serious 
dilemma to the individual ethic. The almost inconceivable National Socialist 
crime against humanity did not fit into and was not acceptable in any historical 
explanation.32 As a participant (or even as a silent supporter) of a social phenom-
enon which had committed such crimes, how could one define oneself as a mor-
al agent following certain rules or aspiring to certain righteous goals? 
Again, explanations were constructed within networks. However, in many 
cases there was no revolution in communal or local networks, and the people 
who were in charge during the wartime were able to keep their positions.33 The 
allied countries were mostly interested in either exploiting the rich coal resources 
of Germany or worried about the relational power hierarchies within their own, 
slowly eroding coalition. For Germany, the ultimatum to immediately switch 
from a fascist nation to a country like its liberal western victors, was a mission 
impossible with respect to at least scientific tradition and common culture.34 The 
existing social structures, the few which still worked after the total defeat, large-
ly concentrated on mere survival and did not prioritize distinguishing themselves 
from the legacy of the previous years. Universities were among those strong-
holds where the former supporters of the National Socialist regime maintained 
their posts. Only a few scholars eventually lost their place within the academia 
due to their co-operation with the Nazis.35 In academia the emotional re-catego-
rization met with the negative challenge to rewrite history, since the fashionable 
concepts of the preceding decades, utilized to make sense of the past and present, 
C. Rubin, Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches. Cambridge, 
Cambridge UP 2012, 160–180). 
32 Iggers 1997, 318–319; Moses 2007, 15–36, 50–54.
33 On the significance of informal collectives in the German recovering process, see  Thomas 
Kühne, Kameradschaft. Die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhun-
dert. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2005, 209–252; cf. Wildt 2009, 377–403.
34 Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–
1949. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 1996.
35 Schulze, Helm & Ott 1999; Steven P. Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and 
Denazification of a German University. Cambridge, Harvard UP 2002, 146–176; Michael Stol-
leis, ‘Prologue: Reluctance to Glance in the Mirror. The Changing Face of German Jurispru-
dence after 1933 and post-1945,’ in Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, The Darker 
Legacies of Law in Europe and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal Traditions, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2003
131. Historical background for the research and research questions
had been steered towards following the fascist vision of the world.36 There was 
an unbridgeable gap between one’s experiences and the language that was used 
to make sense of social and legal phenomena. Yet, the immediate past had to be 
articulated and rationalized, and in a way which explained the unacceptable in 
one’s society as well as within the self. At first glance, the explanative act was 
paradoxically conducted by means of the old concepts, metaphors and philo-
sophical constructions which were used to back up a National Socialist regime. 
In the field of legal science, there is hardly a decisive paradigmatic rift be-
tween the discourses of the Third Reich and those of post-War Germany. With 
respect to methodology, one cannot distinguish any clear change which would 
have occurred on account of some war-related turn in the intellectual atmos-
phere.37 However, it is obvious, and as I intend to show, that scholars did reflect 
their personal past and the new situation in their networks. At first glance this 
reflection seems to remain outside the textual level of their works. Visible in 
them is only the “communicative silence” deployed with regard to the Nazi 
years, the emphasis on natural law and away from Germanistic explanations.38 
Widely acknowledged in recent elaborations, however, is the “rise” of Roman 
law as a source and a stable ground in reconstructing the European legal culture. 
According to Michael Stolleis, this was due to the more “untainted” status of 
Roman law, since Nazis originally, in their Party program, had announced their 
repulsion towards it.39 After 1945 scholars like Franz Wieacker and Helmut Co-
ing explicitly argued on behalf of the shared European legal culture built upon 
the foundations of the law of the Late Roman Republic. This stream of thought 
became dominant, was later developed by, for example, Raoul C. Caenegem and 
Peter Stein, and has retained its status well up to our own days.40 
An important feature of the explanations about the essence of Nazi Germany 
and the academia within it, as well as the concept of European legal culture built 
36 Stolleis 1998, 10, 25–26.
37 Rüthers 2012, 485–504.
38 Herman Lübbe, ‘Der Nationalsozialismus im politischen Bewusstsein der Gegenwart,’ in 
Martin Broszat, Ulrich Dübber & Walther Hofer (eds.), Deutschlands Weg in die Diktatur. In-
ternationale Konferenz zur nationalsozialistischen Machtübernahme im Reichstagsgebäude zu 
Berlin. Referate und Diskussionen. Ein Protokoll. Berlin, Siedler Verlag 1983, 329–349; Lena 
Foljanty, Recht oder Gesetz. Juristische Identität und Autorität in den Naturrechtsdebatten der 
Nachkriegszeit. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013, 343–373.
39 Michael Stolleis, ‘Die Rechtsgeschichte im Nationalsozialismus: Umrisse eines wissen-
schaftsgeschichtlichen Themas,’ in Michael Stolleis & Dieter Simon, Rechtsgeschichte im Na-
tionalsozialismus: Beiträge zur Geschichte einer Disziplin. Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr 1989, 5–6.
40 Raoul C. von Caenegem, ‘History of European Civil Procedure,’ in International Ency-
clopedia of Comparative Law XVI, Chapter 2, 1973; Peter Stein, Roman Law in European 
History. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 1999.
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on Roman law, is that not only were they reconstructed in retrospective, but also 
mostly by people who had to reevaluate the stance they themselves had taken 
during the Nazi regime. Today, few, if any, claim that German scholars managed 
to maintain their strictly objective handling of the subject matter both before and 
after the Second World War, free of outside interference, and thus produced tex-
tual presentations only about and solely on legal science. Rather, the opposite 
view, emphasizing the deep and effective relation between the scientific and the 
political spheres during the Third Reich, as well as the apologetic tone after the 
War, appears to be more like the paradigmatic truth. 41 In the 1950s, while look-
ing back to the 1930s, it was almost impossible for scholars to deploy the same 
methodological requirements they were supposed to use in their research in ana-
lyzing their own part in the intellectual life of the Third Reich. Such a demand 
for objectivity on behalf of later generations is in fact very unfair, since, as I in-
tend to show, it would have required scholars from the 1950s to reject the very 
principles that keep personal and social identities together and enable historical 
writing, namely a trust in the congruity between the individual and communal 
narratives and a certainty in one’s ability to interpret temporal phenomena. 
The change in the premises which defined the work of a historian from the 
1930s to the 1970s has been explicated by Franz Wieacker himself, when in 1976 
he rewrote his old article ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ from 1935. In 
the original article Wieacker wrote:
The suprapersonal collective which the authority of the peasant is executed for is the blood 
bond collective of the peasant’s House (not the nuclear family). The House is the sphere of 
people’s order where the property of entailed estate is connected with it. This order is not based 
on abstract legal entities, but on the connection of concrete individuals by a blood-relation-
ship.42 
The rhetoric and style of the texts belongs unmistakably to the National Socialist 
culture. Emphasizing the ‘blood-bind’ and the entity of the ‘people’ as principles 
defining the individual’s position towards the state, were clichés in the legal sci-
41 At the level of public and explicit evaluations, very few paid any attention to the co-op-
eration between academia and the National Socialists (Mehring 2000, 315). However, in the 
private sphere, legal scientists acknowledged that the scholarly world had played its part in 
strengthening and justifying the violent exclusion and destruction of an entire people, not only 
inside academia but with respect to public opinion (see e.g. Meinel 2012, 240). On present 
elaborations on the responsibility theme, see Stolleis 2003, 1–18.
42 “Der überpersonliche Verband, für den die Befugnisse des Bauern ausgeüpt warden, ist 
der Blutsverband des Bauerngeschlechtes (nicht der Kleinfamilie). Das Geschlecht ist der 
Kreis der Volksordnung, in dem das Erbhofeigentum mit ihr zusammenhängt. Diese Ordnung 
gründet sich nicht auf abstrakte Rechtssubjekte, sondern auf der Verbindung konkreter Perso-
nen durch einen Blutszusammenhang.”, Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ 
[1935], 80–81. 
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ence following the National Socialist Machtergreifung. Later Wieacker revisited 
the article from the perspective of democratic society. In 1976 he wrote:
Although it [the original article] contains no word that the young author did not believe […] 
and although its contents manifest that it cannot condone the oppression and breaches of law of 
the regime in its continued path given its intentions and effects, today the author must never-
theless reproach it for the illusion that the new regime at that time had as its goal a just […] new 
order for the make-up of society and property in a modern industrial nation. […] I believe that 
the phrasing avoids opportunistic expressions and any disparagement of the ideological adver-
saries and tendencies opposed to the rulers of that time, besides conscious and recognizable 
distancing from party-official complaining about those who think differently [.]43
There is no doubt that Wieacker in 1976 saw his old article as incorrect, and in 
the light of succeeding historical development, unethical. Nevertheless, even if 
one believes – as I do – that Wieacker sincerely tried to review his earlier world-
view, comparison of those two articles does not comprehensively answer ques-
tions concerning historiography’s relation to the society and tradition in which it 
is being contextualized. Further, the dilemma of continuity continues. Wieack-
er’s revisiting verifies that there was a change in his legal historiography – and in 
the premises that affected his representations – but neither Wieacker nor a con-
temporary reader can point out a simple factor or factors to explain the change. 
Wieacker insisted that the original article was not mere ‘opportunism.’ He did not 
write ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ in order to improve his own posi-
tion within the Third Reich or to make an impression on the political and scien-
tific leaders. Rather, the article was the result of a belief in a certain social reality 
and development which had led to that situation.44 How did the original ‘belief’ 
become constituted, and when and why did the ‘belief’ in the nature of social 
reality transform to what it was in 1976? Moreover, Wieacker proposes that some 
43 “Obwohl sie kein Wort enthält, an das der junge Autor nicht glaubte […] und obwohl ihr 
Inhalt ergibt, dass sie nach Absicht und Wirkung die Unterdrückungen und Rechtsbrüche des 
Regimes in seinem weiteren Fortgang nicht ermutigen konnte, muss der Vf. ihr heute doch die 
Illusion vorhalten, das neue Regime habe es damals ernstlich und verantwortlich auf eine ge-
rechte […] Neuordnung der Sozial- und Besitzverfassung einer modernen Industrienation ab-
gesehen. […] Der Stil hält sich zwar wie ich denke, von opportunistischen Phrasen frei, und 
meidet – übrigens in bewusster und erkennbarer Distanzierung von der parteioffiziösen Be-
schimp fung der Andersdenken – jegliche Herabsetzung der weltanschaulichen Gegner und Ge-
genrichtungen der damaligen Machthaber [.]”, Wieacker, ‘“Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfas-
sung” revisited’ [1976/77], 475–477; In this work I often (obviously) use straight quotations 
from Wieacker‘s writings, either from published works or letters. If the quotes are short, I have 
not set them apart from the existing text, but  marked them with double quotation marks. The 
source of the reference is then usually placed at the end of the sentence. If a given quote is then 
further used in the text, it is marked with single quotation marks, enabling a flexible analysis of 
the key-terms and themes which characterized Wieacker‘s texts.
44 Cf. Behrends 1995, XXIII.
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structures in his thinking and valuations have remained the same, although he has 
‘matured’ and currently lives in a totally different ideological environment. What 
were those principles and why did they stay with him? There were continuities 
and discontinuities in Wieacker’s historiographical culture, and although they 
most certainly relate to changes in the epistemological bases guiding the work of 
a legal historian, shifts in the political atmosphere in which he lived and in the 
material conditions of society, none of them alone provides an adequate explana-
tion of the historiographical change.
In deconstructing the textual meaning which Franz Wieacker exhibited in his 
time and society, one needs to take into account two fundamental difficulties in 
the history of ideas. They are, namely, the problem of discerning individual agen-
cy and thinking from conceptual expressions, and a more general question of 
understanding scientific texts from another time and culture. First, it is very dif-
ficult to define the space for a subjective agency inside a historical situation and 
scientific discourse. In other words, how committed were German scholars in the 
1930s to Nazism, and how ardently did they try to make sense of the(ir) past in 
the 1950s? The expressions which we nowadays categorize as fascist or belong-
ing to some other ideological family, were once fashionable and widely used, 
even if individual authors who used them necessarily did not adhere to the ideol-
ogy with which the concepts have later been associated. The primary sources of 
intellectual history, the scientific texts themselves, do not differentiate between 
the ideological, opportunistic, or social reasons behind the intentions and textual 
decisions, and the motivational force which connected the scholars to national-
ism before and de-nazification after the Second World War remains ambiguous. 
If one is committed to a legal or intellectual historical study of the academic texts 
of past generations, and simultaneously acknowledges the influence of the “out-
er-scientific” forces in the object of one’s study, it is necessary to weigh the ef-
fects of an author’s personality, scientific discourse and the historical situation 
within those texts. It would be a naïve and not very solid argument to assert that 
the pre-war works of a given historian were thoroughly “wrong” if the author has 
shown some support for fascist ideas, but that orientation nevertheless comprises 
a dilemma when studying the later works of that very same writer. 
A much deployed (self-)explanation in clarifying the changing of meanings in 
a historian’s texts, is to point to societal reasons, especially on social pressure or 
public influence. This view not only makes it impossible to discriminate any 
historical presentation, but it also simply transfers the original dilemma to a dif-
ferent place. If the differences between histories of a given historian are ex-
plained on the grounds of nationalism, one is entitled to ask why scholars were 
oversensitive to nationalism, but immune to other ideologies. After all, according 
to the self-proclaimed rationalism of social sciences, researchers should be able 
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to exclude the influence of current public opinion from their methodologically 
attuned research machinery. Consequently, and with respect to Wieacker, this 
problem expresses itself as a difficulty in grasping his sincerity while deploying 
a certain rhetoric, and the extent to which he believed that those politically load-
ed terms did depict reality in a truthful way. 
For example, during the 1930s and early 40s Wieacker utilized the concepts of 
Weltreich [empire] and Konkrete Ordnung [concrete order], confident in their 
ability to represent reality, but after 1945, like every other respected legal schol-
ar, he ceased to use them on account of their fascist connotations. He also de-
ployed a concept like Rechtsbewusstsein to argue in support of the jurisprudence 
prevailing in the Third Reich, and in the post-Second World War society he used 
the same concept to highlight the innate and perennial failure of the fascist legal 
system.45
It is obvious that the meanings to which these concepts referred in Wieacker’s 
texts changed during the time he utilized them. The relations between concepts, 
contexts and discussions drastically altered from the 1930s to the 1970s, but to 
plausibly explain why, when, and how is a very complex matter. It is evident, 
nevertheless, that the referred meanings where not consistent; the exact connota-
tions of a given concept in Wieacker’s body of scientific writings varied in time, 
and to investigate the causes and bases of this variation is a task which is far from 
simple. 
Second, how is one supposed to provide a solid analysis of a legal historical 
text from the 1930s or 1950s if the meaning of that representation changes ac-
cording to the stance the researcher has to the circumstances which define the 
text under scrutiny? In another words, analyzing German legal science before 
and after the Second World War inevitably leads to comparisons between the 
values of the researcher and the objects of his study. In order to understand Franz 
Wieacker’s ideas, one has to make an attempt to identify with his – and his clos-
est colleagues’ – worldviews, but how does one maintain a distance and avoid a 
concluding verdict? From our perspective, the state of German legal science in 
the late 1930s and some choices which Wieacker did in that context were simply 
morally wrong, but merely announcing that does not add any scientific value to 
one’s study, nor does it treat the people of the past in an ethical way.46 Although, 
45 On ‘Konkrete Ordnung,’ see Franz Wieacker, ‘Zum Wandel der Eigentumsverfassung’ 
[1934], in Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 6. On ‘Weltreich,’ see Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 25.8.1942. 
NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg. On Rechtsbe-
wusstein during the Second World War, see Wieacker, ‘Das römische Recht und das deutsche 
Rechtsbewusstsein’ 1944, and after 1945, see Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 323.
46 Here we are, of course, talking about a fundamental philosophical problem, the topic of a 
multitude of scholarly works, which usually and cordially agree on the impossibility of ad-
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and especially, with respect to fascism we can make moral judgments on rep-
resentations, it is impossible by means of a retrospective analysis to draw a line 
exactly where and to what extent Wieacker ‘erred’ and where he ‘succeeded’ in 
his ‘search for the timeless idea of justice.’ We can explicitly compare his works 
on our current idea of justice and seek plausible differences, but that would not 
be a historical study of ideas. It is not possible to perfectly repeat the historical 
situation which the scholars faced before and after the Second World War, and 
then causally derive the meaning of a given text from this reenactment. Rather, a 
researcher’s view, including my own, on the meaning of a text under scrutiny is 
in many respects predetermined by his own historical situation. This said, to in-
vestigate the above-mentioned themes in different historical situations remains 
fundamentally important in research in the history of ideas. Embedded within 
these dilemmas are the principles of the scientific pursuit of truth and justice/in-
justice, and to seek for a presentation of them, despite their ungraspable nature, 
should constitute a norm for self-understanding in the human sciences. 
In this study I do not aim for an over-encompassing answer to the questions of 
truth or justice, but I do intend to show that an adequate analysis of a representa-
tion in history, such as a legal historical work of the 1930s or 1950s needs to take 
into account the affective side and level in the text one tries to study. One has to 
consider the intertwining of the personal and public spheres in historical rep-
resentations, where the personal sphere cannot be perceived as clear-cut, invari-
able or even primarily rational. 
The questions and preconceptions which guide my work are: 
1. How did Franz Wieacker perceive the political and social changes of his soci-
ety, and why did he believe some of them were just and some were unaccept-
able?
2. What were the continuities and discontinuities in the historiography of 
Wieacker, and with what kind of shared worldview or culture did he situate his 
historical vision?
3. By what means did Wieacker explicate his belief in the “truthfulness” of some 
historical development as well as the continuities/discontinuities in his histo-
riographical culture at the level of text?
dressing this question exhaustively; cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. 2nd rev. edi-
tion. Trans. Joel Weisheimer and Donald G.Marshall. New York: Continuum 2000, 277–284. 
With respect to National Socialism and Holocaust, see e.g. Dominick LaCapra, Writing Histo-
ry, Writing Trauma. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP 2001, 1–43; Hayden White, ‘Writing in the 
Middle Voice,’ in Hayden White, The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and 
Theory, 1957–2007. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2010: 255–262.
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2. Previous studies
Legal science both before and after the Second World War as well as Wieacker’s 
personal stance within it, have been dealt with in various studies. None of these 
works, however, shares the research approach I have chosen in my analysis, or 
leans on similar source material. I have divided the existing research literature on 
Franz Wieacker which I have utilized in my study into two categories in order to 
highlight the added value of my elaboration with respect to the previous research.
The starting point for the studies on the history of legal science in Germany is 
usually found, in one way or the other, in the works of Michael Stolleis.47 Stol-
leis’s reviews on the jurisprudence of the twentieth century remain a major 
achievement, but do not concentrate very deeply on single cases, at least not in 
Franz Wieacker’s case. In addition, in them, as well as in Bernd Rüthers’s books, 
the emphasis is on the twisted legal system and its later reconstruction as a 
whole.48 The authors concentrate more on the discontinuities and continuities of 
the structures than with identities. Since the primary focus of this book is on one 
scholar, I also need to utilize more narrowly focused works.
With respect to the individual position of Wieacker within the historical con-
text, Detlef Liebs, Okko Behrends and Joseph Georg Wolff have provided very 
detailed and sophisticated biographies of Franz Wieacker.49 They all studied un-
der the guidance of Wieacker, and thus possess a first-hand experience of his 
personality and character. The biographies they have written present an invalua-
ble aid in my attempt to scrutinize the ideas in Franz Wieacker’s texts. My study 
is, however, in a different situation with regard to their works, since I have been 
able to utilize a large portion of the correspondence between Wieacker and his 
close friends stretching from 1930s to 1970s. Over one hundred and fifty letters 
from Wieacker to, for example, Gerard Dulckeit, Ernst Forsthoff, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Karl Larenz, Erich Rothacker, Salvatore Ricco-
bono, Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend, Werner Weber and Erik Wolf provide a rich 
body of primary sources which previous writers have not been able to use. The 
Franz Wieacker whom his former students knew was a middle-aged professor 
who had already done his work in explaining the shifting social surroundings and 
his own place as an individual within them. The correspondence, however, offers 
an insight into the evolving identity of a scholar, constructed within the trans-
forming social surroundings. Thus, I do not have to rely on the memory of those 
surroundings or inductions from general historical representation. In a way, the 
47 See e.g. Michael Stolleis, Gemeinwohlformen im nationalsozialistischen Recht. Berlin, 
J. Schweitzer Verlag 1974, and Stolleis 1989; 1998; 2000.
48 Rüthers 2012.
49 Behrends 1995; Liebs 2010; Wolff 2007.
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acquaintance of Wieacker’s students with their teacher starts where Wieacker’s 
correspondence ends. I believe the information provided by the letters gives me 
a firm ground for bringing the “personal sphere” into the research process when 
investigating Franz Wieacker’s academic texts. 
Probably due to the scarcity of good contemporary primary sources, the expla-
nations for the acts and motives of Franz Wieacker have more or less inclined to 
approach one or the other extremes; either they emphasize the consequence of 
overwhelming nationalism in society or they point to individual and opportunis-
tic motivations.50 I aim for an analysis which does not lean too heavily either on 
individualistic and opportunistic motives or explanations which sideline the im-
pact of subjective agency when referring to overwhelming collective ideologies. 
In analyzing the interpretative act and dialogue within historiography, exploring 
the personal voice of Franz Wieacker is a necessity. In his letters Wieacker re-
flects upon his position vis-à-vis contemporary political and social events, but 
also, and more often, in relation to philosophies and theoretical constructions 
concerning legal science. Thus, through these letters it is possible to deduce the 
actual affective relationship which Wieacker had to the social world and academ-
ic ideas in his time. 
In addition, and with respect to the research interest of this study, which I 
briefly sketched in the Introduction, the letters reveal the fundamental signifi-
cance which Wieacker gave to his in-group. From his correspondence it is easy 
to both track down this loose group of friends and colleagues, and consequently 
observe how the contemporary social and scientific events were being processed 
within this circle. One can contextualize Wieacker’s scholarly works within a 
shared matrix of social meanings and preconceptions. If Wieacker is studied as a 
representative of the culture of a group of scholars and the focus is on his inter-
action with others in a network which was facing similar emotional, social and 
political ruptures, research has something new to offer to legal history.51 Hence, 
the correspondence enables me to analyze Wieacker’s texts in a way that has not 
50 The opportunistic explanation is given by Mathias Schmoeckel, Auf der Suche nach der 
verlorenen Ordnung. Köln, Böhlau 2005, 454. According to Ralf Frassek, Wieacker was, 
among the young scholars of the so-called Kieler Schule, with “great enthusiasm” and “encour-
aged by the new rulers” involved in politicizing legal science. Ralf Frassek, ‘Wege zur nation-
alsozialistischen “Rechtserneuerung” – Wissenschaft zwischen “Gleichschaltung” und 
Konkurrenzkampf,’ in Von den Leges Barbarorum bis zum ius barbarum des Nationalsozialis-
mus. Festschrift für Hermann Nehlsen zum 70. Geburtstag. Köln, Böhlau 2008. Okko Behrends 
refers to the “illusion” which Wieacker, according to his ‘“Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfas-
sung” revisited [1976/77]’, had about the social political aims of the Nazis. Behrends 1995. 
Both Behrends and Detlef Liebs also point to Wieacker’s young age during the Machtergrei-
fung. Liebs 2010, 26.
51 Cf. Stolleis 1998, 40–41: “Although it is true that scholars make their decisions as indi-
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previously been possible. His correspondence can be systematically studied as a 
result of an ongoing dialogue between an author and his social surroundings, 
where the obvious yet indefinite influences of personal worldview, scientific tra-
dition and public opinion in historical writing are given the attention and impor-
tance they deserve. 
In his dissertation Viktor Winkler presents a thorough and successful analysis 
of the academic influences that shaped Wieacker’s perception of, and claims 
about, history.52 Winkler also, for the first time, utilizes primary sources as letters 
and contemporary reports when interpreting the scientific meaning of Wieacker’s 
production. Winkler is able to bypass the petpeeve of the previous studies on 
Wieacker, namely the tendency to reduce Wieacker’s person and context as a 
grace note to his classics. In admitting the effect of the biographical factors in 
Wieacker’s legal history, Winkler draws a compelling and realistic picture on the 
ideas behind the text. Hence, Winkler’s book gives a fresh view on Wieacker’s 
writings and relates his texts to other contemporary legal histories and philoso-
phies. Nevertheless, Winkler does not utilize Wieacker’s corespondance in a 
large scale but concentrates on few letters from 1930s and 40s and does not tie 
“case Wieacker” to any comprehensive theory of historical writing. I claim that 
Winkler’s argument can be taken further in order to comprehensively answer 
why Franz Wieacker chose to assimilate and use the theories he allegedly did. I 
argue that in order to reach an adequate understanding of the intentions of a writ-
er, one needs to study the systemic interaction of not only ideas but also social 
emotions and practices in which that given writer participated.
The second category consists of the works of Joachim Rückert and Martin 
Avenarius.53 Joachim Rückert has elaborated how Wieacker used history in order 
to explain phenomenon in his recent past. Martin Avenarius has successfully 
analyzed the peculiar methodology of Franz Wieacker and placed it within the 
field of twentieth-century legal history and science. In this sense, Wieacker truly 
was an exceptional scholar since he impressively applied methods and sources 
from intellectual history and Geistesgeschicht to legal study. My attempt is not to 
study Wieacker in this respect. Rather, I focus on the way he constructed and 
utilized the mentalities he saw as forces in historical development.54 In other 
viduals, from a greater distance one can also see that they show a relatively uniform behavior 
as a group, and this allows us to make general observations.”
52 Winkler 2014.
53 See Rückert 1995; Avenarius 2010; 2013.
54 Cf. Franz Wieacker, ‘Privatrechtsgesetzgebung und politische Grundordnung im römi-
schen Freistaat,’ Die Antike 16 (1940), 176: “[D]ie Geschichte ist nicht die Lehrmeisterin der 
Politik und die Rechtsgeschichte insbesondere keine illustrierte Unterweisung für Rechtspoli-
tik […] Die Offenbarung der Rechtsgeschichte spricht vielmehr nur Urgestalten des menschli-
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words, I am not studying the legal scientist Franz Wieacker as an intellectual 
historian, but instead Franz Wieacker, a historian of ideas, as a legal scholar. 
Wieacker held that the study of ideas and patterns of thought of past people 
gave as valuable information about legal history as did the scrutiny of the insti-
tutions and legal statutes of the past. Ways of thinking influenced and explained 
human behavior. This tendency was also characteristic of his work in general, 
and was a feature which separated him from the majority of the field.55 In illumi-
nating and describing these influential mentalities he borrowed concepts from 
legal historians and philosophers of nineteenth-century German idealism. With 
the help of these concepts and abstractions he both explained past events and 
action, but also connected them to recent social phenomena. These concepts 
comprised a point of comparison from where the movement in history could be 
explained. To Wieacker, the words depicting different modes of legal thinking 
were not just analytical tools in the categorizing attempt of a scholar. They were 
displayed and used as affirmative depictions, organic subfields of the legal sys-
tem, and moral and educational entities affecting the everyday reality of the peo-
ple. This method was a truthful way to analyze the inconsistencies of legal sys-
tems and the social reality (Wirklichkeit).56 
It is the connection of Wieacker’s works to the political and social spheres of 
society, including both continuities and discontinuities that I intend to study. 
While doing so, a comparison of scientific representations needs to be deepened 
to involve the practices which the historian under study has participated in and 
his personal experience of the social change needs to be charted. A change in the 
ideas of an individual scholar or a scholarly culture does not restrict itself to a 
mere re-transformation of representations. Thus, in order to study conceptual 
change, one has to track the change in the identity or identities of the scholars 
under scrutiny. This is even more so when one is researching the intellectual 
history of early twentieth-century Germany, when the scientific community, 
along with society as a whole, faced unprecedented material turbulence. 
Thomas Duve has explained changes in European legal historiography after 
the Second World War, using Wieacker as an example. The changes, he argues, 
derive mainly from the central European (German) desire to detach itself from 
previous Nazi theories, the narrow borders of the discipline of legal history al-
chen Zusammenlebens im Recht aus […] dass nur die Jurisprudenz Leben hat, die, wie die 
altrömische, dem Lebensgefühl, dem Stil und den sozialen Erfahrungen der Nation Stimme 
gibt.”
55 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 7–8; cf. Avenarius 2010, 146; Michael Stolleis, 
‘Methode der Rechtsgeschichte,’ in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte. Band 3. 
Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag 2016, 1475–1483.
56 Cf. Franz Wieacker, Rudolf von Jhering. Leipzig, Koehler & Amelang 1942, 15, 20.
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ready at the beginning of nineteenth century, the influence of two new-found 
theorists (Max Weber and Arnold Toynbee), and a certain degree of political 
opportunism.57 These reasons are very likely true, but only present a partial pic-
ture. In Duve’s account it seems as if researchers made a mutual rational decision 
to change scientific paradigm to emphasize common European roots. Duve’s ar-
ticle also leaves unanswered why precisely Weber and Toynbee were employed 
and how political opportunism revealed itself in historiography. Scholars are not 
and were not blotting paper, soaking up wandering ideas. Assimilating and ac-
cepting an idea always requires rethinking. 
If the breach between National Socialist and Eurocentric legal history is seen 
entirely as an academic change with respect to research questions and theoretical 
bases, the affective and personal level of historiography is easily diminished. 
Many scholars felt genuinely inspired amidst the general euphoria during the 
Nazi seizure of power. This emotion of belonging, expressed in different ways, 
substantially affected scholarly texts in the 1930s. Furthermore, it is relevant to 
ask to what extent the post-war turn towards the heritage of Roman law in Euro-
pean legal culture was due to the affective need to find a replacement for that 
genuine experience of true communality. As much as the German legal historians 
of the 1950s attempted to review the meaning given to the national (and Europe-
an) past, they were at the same time explaining the events they had confronted 
both as individuals and as a group of legal scientists. This also worked vice versa. 
Wieacker’s and his contemporaries’ scholarly works had implications in the real 
world. If scientific paradigms are perceived as entirely value- and emotion-free, 
thoroughly rational cognitive constructs, science becomes an isolated playground 
in which scholars do not have to care about ethics or the consequences of their 
thoughts and teaching.58 
Merely adopting the idea that historiography evolves consistently with histor-
ical and political changes, is not, however, as such a sufficient point of departure 
for a study of the history of ideas. Placing a speech by Hitler next to a contempo-
rary legal historical text and scrutinizing their similarities and differences does 
not necessarily bring about scientifically valid information. One needs to take 
into account, for example, the particular way that academic histories are written. 
57 Thomas Duve, ‘European Legal History – Concepts, Methods, Challenges,’ in Entangle-
ments in Legal History: Conceptual Approaches. Band 1. Frankfurt am Main, Max Planck In-
stitute for European Legal History 2014, 44–48.
58 This is the central theme in Dominick LaCapra’s work and from this problem he derives 
his demand for paying attention to mechanisms of working through and acting-out in historio-
graphical texts (LaCapra 2001, 1–43). On concrete examples of the effects of legal scientific 
works, see Herlinde Paul-Studer & Julian Fink (eds.), Rechtfertigung des Unrechts. Das Re-
chtsdenken im National-Sozialismus in Originaltexten. Berlin, Suhrkamp 2014.
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Furthermore, when comparing a speech by Hitler and a history – and if it is a 
presupposition of this study that the particular history was indeed affected by the 
speech – it seems almost impossible to determine to what extent the latter was 
influenced by the Führer’s infamous presentation. It is hard not to fall into an 
either/or way of thinking, where the historical text is explained either as an intel-
lectual heir of the speech, or as being completely free of its sphere of influence. 
Finally, (and if one still assumes some sort of relation between the two rep-
resentations), how does the speech explain the nature of the historical text? Did 
the author absorb the doctrines of the speech into his personal worldview and 
began to see the past accordingly, thus writing a biased history? Or was it that the 
social reality, the community where the writing was being conducted, was so 
defined by the speech (or vice versa) that the historian automatically had to direct 
his research questions and task along its lines? The similarities could also remain 
solely on the technical level of the text. Possibly, the contemporary language, 
with respect to both scientific concepts and fashionable expressions, was simply 
contaminated by the rhetoric of the speech, preventing the scholar from express-
ing his argument in any other way? 
Franz Wieacker’s historical texts were not produced in a mechanical relation 
to the ‘political sphere’ of Germany or legal historical tradition. Political changes 
and scientific ideas did influence his texts, but they were always adjusted to his 
moral standpoints about society, his personal understanding of historical devel-
opment, and his idea of the role of science in relation to the national and public 
good. Previous studies on Franz Wieacker’s works and his scholarly persona 
agree that Wieacker’s engagement with the politics of legal science was at times 
quite exceptional, and his ability to conceptualize the legal spheres of justice and 
rule of law highly unusual. Without doubt the change in his intellectual context 
– from a participant in a fascist research group to a prestigious figure in an “un-
tainted” academic discipline – as well as the lasting influence which he has had 
on continental legal science, indicate that a straightforward categorization of his 
scholarly endeavours is fruitless. Thus, a study which aims at analyzing a change 
in his ideas has to define carefully what the intertwinement of the public and 
private sphere in legal science and historiography actually means, both in gener-
al and with respect to Franz Wieacker’s texts.
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3. Theory and Methodology:  
Deconstructing the historiographical act
Academic historiography as a way of writing has its own rules and norms which 
separate it from fiction or pure propaganda, and it cannot be straightforwardly 
analyzed as a literary endeavor or a self-reflexive report about the relationship 
between the community and the scholar.59 The economic and political circum-
stances create a framework in which the scientist works, and the traditions and 
scientific authorities that he leans on, mold the research questions and view.60 But 
even for established research the past is absent. It is gone, impossible to submit 
to personal inspection. The power of historiography lies in its ability to bind 
large-scale events – noticeable in space and time – and people’s personal narra-
tives in an explanatory way.61 This makes the past’s representations such influen-
tial and moldable discourses in our society. “Absence” can become a canvas 
where elements (hopes, emotions, motives and rhetorical explanatory tools) from 
our time are projected.62 
When writing history, historians aim at interpreting ‘the past’ in a way that 
distinguishes their work from previous elaborations, but also and always the in-
tention is to shape the meanings given to ‘the past’ in a way that has an actual 
effect on their contemporary circumstances. Thus, Franz Wieacker not only stud-
ied the past, but through writing history proactively wanted to influence his soci-
ety. But, if one studies the ‘desired effect’ of a given historian, it is not necessar-
ily accurate to equate his intentions either with any particular policy of his time 
or with the scientific tradition which preceded his representations. Franz Wieack-
er’s historical representations were more or less contiguous with the current po-
59 After decades of arguing the mainstream perspective is that historiography is not compa-
rable to historical fiction, and academic historical writing is directed by its own principles. 
Thus, the “truth claim” it states about history must be taken to have a different value than, for 
example, the “truth” of a historical novel. In short, academic historiographical studies are not 
first and foremost narratives, but justified, dialogic presentations of the past. Historical philos-
ophers such as Richard Evans have moved the focus from historical “accuracy” to historiogra-
phy’s “validity.” Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History. London, Granta Books 2012. See also 
John H. Zammito, ‘Post-Positivist Realism: Regrounding Representation,’ in Partner & Foot 
(ed.) 2013.
60 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods, and New Directions in the Study of 
Modern History. New York, Longman 1991, 144–145.
61 Eelco Runia parallels individuals’ and societies’ need to give meaning to a ‘sublime’ 
event by placing it next to previous episodes. He cites Ranke: “[Historians try] to bring recent 
history into harmony with what happened before.” Runia 2007, 319.
62 See e.g. LaCapra 2001, 22–24, 27, 52–53, 78–82, 195, 218–219; LaCapra 2009, 91–96; 
Tuori 2006, 71–72, 96–99, 182–184, 252–253, 256. 
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litical atmosphere and were related to the tradition of legal history, but always 
reflected most the principles of his scholarly identity.63 
So Franz Wieacker’s texts embedded both an affective level (a desire towards 
an ideal kind of society) and an attempt to have an effect on his contemporary 
circumstances (to steer society towards that desirable end), but not in a straight-
forward way. To Wieacker, the core of any legal system relied on people’s 
thoughts, thinking and mentalities.64 In Wieacker’s legal historical studies the 
timeless values of justice and the rule of law were described as concrete histori-
cal processes and structures. The fundamental quest for the legal historian was to 
understand the underlying streams of thought, give a proper reading of them, 
and, in representing their development and state as properly as possible, influ-
ence the essence of the contemporary forms of justice and the rule of law.65 The 
past and present were connected in a living bind. The thoughts, beliefs, patterns 
and valuations concerning law had their own, distinctive rhythm, and the princi-
ples of this way of seeing the world had been adjusted and were adjusted to the 
shifting historical circumstances.66 Franz Wieacker did not believe that the past 
could be replicated in the present, but maintained that studying the origins of 
current legal thinking could offer more ethical foundations on contemporary 
practices dealing with morality, justice and values.67 
Franz Wieacker’s legal historical works, like modern historiography in gener-
al, can be seen as an affective practice to build a figural worldview. By means of 
historiography, Wieacker intended to explain his own experiences as resulting 
from and relating to a wider meaning, namely the narrative of German and Euro-
63 This identity, however, was not a restricted individual fantasy, but a worldview which 
was shared by a group of close colleagues, and it sometimes transformed asynchronically ac-
cording to public opinion and changing scientific paradigms. On ‘scholarly identity’ see Jorma 
Kalela, ‘Jatkomenoinen uudistaminen. Politiikka historiassa ja historiantutkimuksessa,’ in His-
toriallinen Aikakauskirja 103 (2005):3, 294–297; Slavoj Zizek, Organs without Bodies: 
Deleuze and Consequences. London, Routledge 2004, ix.
64 See e.g. Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht 1952, 10.
65 Wieacker 1952, 8: “Wir verstehen Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit als Geschichte des 
Rechtsdenkens und seiner Wirkungen auf die Wirklichkeit der modernen Gesellschaft.”
66 Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe. Oxford, Oxford UP 1995, 4: “The 
‘developments’ of doctrines are really only developments in people’s consciousness, in the 
convictions and practices of existing legal communities, and we think that doctrine has its own 
history only because the communication of doctrine between past and present is continuous.”
67 Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 483: “[T]he legal scholar and legal historian 
have a task to perform, namely to preserve as if they were iron rations the invaluable stock of 
solutions which have been offered in the past, so that the future generations do not have to learn 
them from scratch. In this sense […] there is very little in past thinking about law and justice 
[…] from which lessons cannot be learnt for justice in the future.”
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pean thinking. 68 In other words, Franz Wieacker wrote to clarify both his own 
experience of the world and that of his audience. When he argued that the undis-
tinct social and political phenomena of his time had their analogical counterparts 
and roots in the past, he – intentionally and inadvertently – constructed the real-
ity of his contemporary world. In a compelling scholarly work like Privatrechts-
geschichte der Neuzeit, his experience and explanation of the temporal became a 
shareable historical idea. 
Obviously, historiography in general, and Franz Wieacker’s texts in particular, 
possess other, equally important dimensions, which serve the needs of construct-
ing a modern society. Academic historiography still needs to have and still does 
have its reference to actual events. It is established around true depictions about 
the past, but as a narrative or an illustration of the past it also negotiates with 
motives beyond or on top of normative prescriptions about the world.69 Via the 
process of historical writing, the subject matter of the historian turns into a com-
pelling, coherent and prestigious claim about the past. Within the practice of 
historiography, the historian’s experience and explanation of the temporal be-
comes an understandable, shareable and effective historical idea. The rules and 
conventions guiding the writing process in academic historiography shape his 
representation of the past into an understandable poetic reconstruction. This his-
toriographical form can be called and analysed as a figura,70 a narrative,71 or as a 
historical metaphor.72
We encounter Franz Wieacker’s powerful representations about the European 
legal history, such as Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, as figuras, narratives or 
historical metaphors. As aesthetic illustrations of the past they enable reader to 
68 The way in which Franz Wieacker used historiography to give meaning to his personal 
experiences as well as to uncertain contemporary perceptions of the meaning of the world of 
social affairs has been noticed by recent intellectual history, but it has not been systematically 
addressed to elaborate the structures guiding his attempt; cf. Rückert 1995.
69 If written history is analyzed only as normative claims, and its evaluation only considers 
the epistemic bases and ‘rational’ connections it has to its contemporary society, some consti-
tutive parts in its essence are neglected. How could one, then, explain the feeling of the “de-
pressing vanity of historical meaning” which seems to take place when historiography’s possi-
bility to reach an objective past becomes more and more questionable? Why in a time of crisis 
and blurred collective values does history “rush in”? See Alun Munslow, ‘Editorial,’ in Rethink-
ing History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 17 (2013):4, 435–436, and Rik Peters, ‘Actes 
de Présence: Presence in Fascist Political Culture,’ in History and Theory 45 (2006), 362–374. 
See also Kalle Pihlainen, ‘Rereading Narrative Constructivism,’ in Rethinking History: The 
Journal of Theory and Practice 17 (2013):4, 509–527; Michael Roper, ‘Psychoanalysis and the 





attune themselves to the past; a written event of the past continues to live in a 
reader’s personal world of experiences, it is supplemented, and it reaches its 
fulfillment in one’s narrative identity where similar experiences, memories, and 
schemas, are recollected to support the proposed temporal order.73 Hence histo-
riography becomes ‘a natural truth,’ which covers and evades the irrationality 
and detachedness of a temporal experience. Wieacker’s texts were written both 
to clarify the experience-world of the historian, but also to fit the historical rep-
resentation to the world view of the audience, and further to steer it in a desired 
direction. In his representation, Wieacker’s endeavor was to produce an episte-
mologically resilient claim, but also an emotionally coherent one. Borrowing the 
words of Marci Shore, Wieacker works were “emotional-intellectually entan-
gled” and enhanced “necessary contingency.”74 
In this historiographical study – and in order to deep interpret Franz Wieack-
er’s texts – I question the division between “public” and “private,” common 
opinion and personal view, in writing history. I assert that such a division is, if 
not non-existent, often at least insignificant, since not even a historian can un-
derstand historical change without comparing it to his or her personal experi-
ence. Historians construct their narrative within the framework of scientific tra-
dition and on the bases of their subject matter, but interpret the tradition and 
subject matter through their personal, and learned experience. Thus, I claim that 
(a) Historians use their scholarly identity as a tool and an interpretative sphere to 
understand the past. This tool is usually called a vision, sense or touch 
(Geschichtsauffasung).75 Franz Wieacker preferred (reife) Erfahrung, ‘(mature) 
73 Cf. Eelco Runia, ‘Burying the Dead: Creating the Past,’ in History and Theory 46 (2007), 
319, 323.
74 Marci Shore, ‘Can We See Ideas?: On Evocation, Experience and Empathy,’ in Darrin M. 
McMahon & Samuel Moyn, Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History. New York, 
Oxford UP 2014, 198–200.
75 Hayden White considers the figural worldview a preconfiguration of temporality, allow-
ing one to build a narrative order to the past, where previous actions and intentions seem to 
reach their ‘fulfillment’ in the later events of history. Hayden White, ‘Auerbach’s Literary His-
tory: Figural Causation and Modernist Historicism,’ in Seth Lerer (ed.), Literary History and 
the Challenge of Philology: The Legacy of Erich Auerbach. Stanford, Stanford UP 1996, 124–
139. Cf. Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, ‘Leopold Ranke’s Archival Turn: Location and Evidence 
in Modern Historiography,’ Modern Intellectual History, 5 (2008):3, 425–453; Torbjörn Gus-
tafsson Chorell, ‘Desire for the Past?’ in Rethinking History, The Journal of Theory and Prac-
tice 19, (2015):4, 569–582. Different conceptualizations of this mental tool express a close re-
lationship with the affective sensations of one’s body; astonishingly many historians from dif-
ferent times and cultures have articulated their research attitude with words suggesting physical 
involvement. See e.g. Pentti Renvall, Historiantutkimuksen työmenetelmät. Porvoo, WSOY 
1946: “In history, one sees himself in others.” This “seeing” – placing oneself in history, an 
endeavor to understand and feel intentions and presence of the people in the past – is a multi-
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experience.’76 Wieacker was a historian to the core; he was always inclined to 
see social phenomena in their temporal context. Thus, in the following text when 
I write about Wieacker’s scholarly identity I often use the term ‘historical vi-
sion.’ It underscores the fact that the affective, personal level in Wieacker’s 
works was obtained by identifying with the past, historical world. It is also es-
sential to mention that I do not perceive Wieackers’ historical vision as a rigid 
dogma, personality trait nor individual fantasy. His historical vision evolved 
over time, and it changed due to social and ideological transitions, which were 
assimilated and understood as a member in a group of colleagues. 
level process. Cf. Emily Robinson, ‘Touching the Void: Affective History and the Impossible,’ 
in Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 14 (2010):4, 503–520. In addition I 
approach this mental tool from the bases of cognitive psychology. It allows me to understand 
the historiographical act of Franz Wieacker from the point of view of obtaining confidence over 
temporal change and constructing meaning in historical time. The ‘historical vision’ or ‘mature 
experience’ are not merely invented conceptualizations, but applications of the human way to 
discern significance from the undirected flow of time. According to a substantial body of re-
search conducted in cognitive sciences, achieving meaning in the temporal world is based on a 
constant act of interpretation, in which an individual in accordance with his culture and person-
al narrative absorbs emotions and information about his understanding of the world. See e.g. 
Dorthe Berntsen and David C. Rubin, ‘Understanding Autobiographical Memory: An Ecolog-
ical Theory,’ in Berntsen & Rubin (ed.), Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories 
and Approaches. New York, Cambridge UP 2012, 334, 336–341.
76 Franz Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 2: “This means that the legal historian 
needs to have a personal experience of law before he is capable of even recognizing among his 
data those which relate to the past experience of law.” See also Wieacker, ‘Apologie der Re-
chtsgeschichte,’ in Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 227, heft ½. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht 1975, 107: “Die besondere Art, in der Rechtshistoriker diese Realität ‘bearbeitet’, 
d. h. auswählt und interpretiert, ist durch seine eigene (und also zugleich gesamtmenschliche) 
Erfahrung von ‘Recht’ schlechthin konstitutiert – welches also selbst als dauerndes Constitu-
tiens aller menschlichen Gesellschaften erscheint (ohne diese Vorgriff könnte es freilich 
Rechts geschichte nicht geben).” Cf. Avenarius 2010, 122: “Ihren Grundannahmen gemäss 
sucht Wieacker aus seiner eigenen Erfahrung mit dem Recht auf vergangene Erfahrung mit 
demselben zu schliessen.” The scholarly tool of ‘experience’ grew with the identity of the re-
searcher, it was an accumulative feature, thus some ‘experiences’ were more ‘mature’ than 
others. See e.g. Franz Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit der deutschen Bodenrechtswissenschaft 
der Gegenwart [1942],’ in Christian Wollschläger (ed.), Zivilistische Schriften, 457: “reife Er-
fahrung”. Also Wieacker, ‘Rudolph Von Jhering (1818–1892),’ in Gründer und Bewahrer. 
Rechtsl ehrer der neueren deutschen Privatrechtsgeschichte. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht 1959, 202. In this Wieacker describes the change in Rudolph Von Jhering’s “Anscha-
uungsvermögen” [capacity of intuitive vision]: “der Reifende vom wachsenden Erfah rungs-
stoff meist von der inneren Erfahrung zur äusseren, von der Phantasie zur Welt, vom Traum zur 
Tat geführt wird.” On the other hand, in hindsight, Wieacker described his 1930s texts as “im-
mature” (unreife), Wieacker ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ Revisited [1976/77],’ in 
Christian Wollschläger (ed.), Zivilistische schriften, 475.
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Franz Wieacker utilized his historical vision to deal confidently with temporal 
change and to construct meaning in historical time, but in a way that his reading 
audience could understand and attune themselves to his narrative. His works 
were not mere self-reflexion, but historiography, which inspired generations of 
scholars and laymen to appreciate the exceptional development, significant fea-
tures and particular nature of the European past. They were epistemologically 
“correct” but from the point of view of the reading audience they carried along 
with them an understandable, persuasive historical meaning. Thus, I assert that 
(b) The extent to which Wieacker used his historical vision, as well as the actual 
places within the chain of argument where he utilized this vision, are revealed 
through concepts and metaphors. The concepts and metaphors within historio-
graphy work as cognitive tools, which connect the personal worlds and experi-
ences of the writer and reader. They enable “a representation of the past” to be 
transformed into “our history.” It becomes figura, a semantically structured cog-
nitive means, which is used to emphasize congruence and bring confidence 
amidst and in time.77
a) The emotional-intellectual entanglement:  
Cognitive bases of historical vision
There is a level of personal insight as well as a reference to current, common 
opinions in every historical study. These traits are usually hidden in language, 
through generalizations, concepts, juxtapositions and other rhetorical means typ-
ical for historical writing. This domain can be called the aesthetic level of histor-
ical writing.78 In historiographical work, the aesthetics is comprised of axiomatic 
rules, the “un-written” part of a scholarly work, which define the reasonings and 
choices of a researcher’s writing process. 79 They are rarely explicated and re-
main invisible under the surface level of the text, but nevertheless they form a 
77 See Ville Erkkilä, ‘Time, Identity, and History: On the Cognitive Psychology and Figural 
Practice of Historiography,’ in Rethinking History. The Journal of Theory and Practice 19 
(2015): 4, 602–620.
78 Tracking the aesthetic in scholarly work can begin by distinguishing the descriptive and 
prescriptive statements of given historiographical work (Stolleis 1998, 39), but my aim is to 
show that such a distinction in the end is not sufficient since aesthetics (however descriptive it 
might seem) also takes a normative stance while illuminating the past (cf. Ankersmit 2012). 
79 The concept is Frank Ankersmit’s (Frank Ankersmit, Sublime Historical Experience. 
Stanford, Stanford UP 2005). It is a part of the research process in which the scholar is in im-
aginative dialogue with his public about how the concepts and chains of reasoning which he 
uses, adjust to public history, e.g. to the vision the public holds of history. However, these 
processes are largely disguised, and reasoning chains which affect a composition are hidden 
from the reader’s sight. See also Ankersmit 2012. On the imaginative dialogue between the 
scholar and his/her audience, see Jonathan Gorman, ‘History as a Fiction: The Pragmatic 
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foundation for the historiography of an individual historian. To put it another 
way, it is the level which is preconceived by the researcher’s scholarly identity.
According to Arthur C. Danto, analysis of the aesthetics of a cultural product 
should be divided into two parts: surface analysis and deep interpretation.80 
When scrutinizing the surface intentions of a text, one concentrates on the con-
scious references that the author of that particular text has made and connected 
to his or her work. Consequently, a deep interpretation means tracking those 
links which define the view of an author outside the articulated process that 
guides his or her text. For example, one can argue (and it has been argued by 
Franz Wieacker) that Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s legal theory was at the surface 
level an endeavor to historicize the study of law in society, but in a more hidden 
way and possibly unconsciously his writings were guided by his reluctance and 
distrust of social change in contemporary society.81 This preconception shaped 
the meaning of Savigny’s texts; it appeared and can be read on the aesthetic lev-
el of his works. Underneath the explicit references of Savigny’s works lay his 
scholarly identity, which defined his stance and approach towards the historical 
subject matter and research questions. Wieacker put this mental working model 
into words as follows: 
The legal historian’s attitude to his subject matter is akin to that of the individual reflecting on 
his own past behavior, who asks “How did this come about?”, “How did we fare in the situa-
tion?”; the historian should similarly feel that the answer is significant to him personally.82
So, it is worthwhile to analyze the aesthetics of Wieacker’s works, since he him-
self saw it as not only possible, but important to study the intertwinement of 
personal experience, tradition and one’s subject matter in legal history. In order 
to make a deep interpretation of a historiographical text – to track the historical 
vision of its author – one has to make an attempt to understand the larger world-
view of the historian and find the structures of thinking that this particular re-
searcher does not actively reflect or question, but takes them as axiomatic rules 
of the social world and of human behavior. In other words, analyzing the aesthet-
ic level of historiography means addressing the interpretative space of a given 
historian, where the demands of the social context, personal valuations and the 
requirements of epistemological coherence in a historical representation merge. 
It was this space which Wieacker called ‘mature experience’. 83 Scholarly identi-
Truth,’ in Alexander Lyon Macfie (ed.), The Fiction of History. London, Routledge 2015, 15–
16.
80 A.C.Danto, After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History. New York, 
Princeton UP 1997.
81 Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 304–306.
82 Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 3.
83 Cf. fn.  76.
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ty, no matter how learned it might be and cultivated with abstract knowledge, is, 
nevertheless, an affective identity. The self-image of a scholar is no more ration-
al nor immune to beliefs, emotions and presuppositions than any other self im-
age. Rather, scholarly identities too, are worldviews where emotional and intel-
lectual domains of human understanding intertwine, combine together, and 
co-operate.
Many cognitive theories hold that the concept of a human being, our under-
standing of ourselves, is based on memory and response. The self-image of a 
person consists of a cumulative number of memories, experiences, and learned 
ways of acting, which are stored and organized in that person’s autobiographical 
memory. This accumulated data about human interaction comprises the person’s 
social agency, the actions and thoughts of which loosely follow a certain pattern. 
In short, we are narrative creatures. The ‘self’ is a story constructed on the bases 
of distinguished memories and schemas, where previous experiences seem to 
verify one’s interpretation of the present and open up new perspectives and pos-
sibilities for an individual.84 
The narrative self-image is molded in constant interaction with other people, 
and in a way it comes to life when it is translated into words and shared with 
others. Our identity is tested through joint reminiscences with other people, cre-
ating a cycle whereby one’s personal experience is shaped by others and a joint 
understanding of such cultural phenomena lives and develops through single in-
terpretations. 85 In order to maintain a confident and stable identity one needs to 
find congruence between socially appreciated values and one’s autobiographical 
narrative.86 It is this congruence between a confident self-image and socially 
appreciated meaning that people try to reach in social interaction. The ways to 
achieve compatibility between a personal narrative identity and a historical 
meaning (a publically held master narrative about the nature of the world) in or-
84 Cf. D.L. Schacter, ‘The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psychology and Cognitive 
Neuroscience,’ in American Psychologist 54 (1999), 182–203; Martin A. Conway, ‘Memory 
and the Self,’ in Journal of Memory and Language 53 (2005), 597.
85 Louis Cozolino, The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain. New 
York, W. W. Norton & Company 2010, 207–208; Tillmann Habermas, ‘Identity, Emotion, and 
the Social Matrix of Autobiographical Memory: A Psychoanalytic Narrative View,’ in Berntsen 
& Rubin (ed.) 2012, 35–36.
86 Thus, a cycle of identity formation is also about compatibility between one’s autobio-
graphical narrative or the internal model of emotions and language, and the cultural idea of 
‘significance’ as it displays itself in communication within social occasions and cultural traits. 
H.R. Markus & S. Kitayma, ‘Cultures and Selves: A Cycle of Mutual Constitution,’ in Perspec-
tives on Psychological Science 5 (2010), 421; S.A. White, ‘Learning to Communicate,’ in Cur-
rent Opinion in Neurobiology 11 (2001), 510–520.
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der to achieve confidence concerning the bases of one’s subjectivity, varies de-
pending on culture and place.87
To sum up, there is no stable ground for the ‘I,’ and it is instead created in 
constant interaction and revised to fit a changing environment. If surety in its 
continuity for some reason ceases to exist, the identity of a person is felt to dis-
solve, since each and every new event will appear to be a challenge to one’s 
identity. The premise for a temporal ‘I’ is the certainty of a capability to create 
schemas and bind emotions to an autobiographical narrative which gives rise to 
the understanding, direction and meaning of the ‘self’ moving in time.88 In fact, 
it is the certainty of both a personal life script but also its counterpart, a cultural-
ly upheld ‘significance’ in history, which need to be reached in order to gain in-
dividual sense of meaningfulness to one’s personal narrative, to the story of ‘I’ 
among others.89 
A breach or a blow to a personal ability to create temporal order can be called 
a trauma. A trauma challenges the presumption of the stability and continuity of 
one’s identity. It shatters the predictable and secure cultural norms of behavior. 
Thus, it paralyzes the individual skill to bind and divide things into past, present 
and future. One starts to see its echoes in upcoming events and in interaction, and 
it corrupts the new phenomena with a feeling of strangeness (unheimlich) or 
uncategorized anxiety.90 The explanation given to the world we live in might be 
strong, but it is built on sand. The collapsing of the order people have adopted for 
the events which influence their daily routines, otherwise blurred in unrestricted 
eternity, is a constantly hovering possibility which is evaded by reproducing and 
strengthening the explanations they have come up with.91
87 Becoming a competent subject thus means participating in an ever-evolving network of 
activities and practices, where “sociality” is not only “comprised of normative order, rational 
agents, discourses, intersubjectivity or material structures” but also of evolving patterns of 
doings, “which carry their agents and are at the same time carried (out) by them.” Andreas 
Reckwitz, ‘Affective Spaces: A Praxeological Outlook,’ in Rethinking History: The Journal of 
Theory and Practice 16 (2012):2, 248.
88 See e.g. Cozolino 2010, 151–161.
89 Robyn Fivush, ‘Subjective Perspective and Personal Timeline in the Development of 
Autobiographical Memory,’ in Berntsen & Rubin 2012, 239.
90 For Robert Stolorow, a trauma is a change in one’s worldview or Weltanschauung; It 
turns the familiar into something strange and threatening (Robert D. Stolorow, Trauma and 
Human Existence: Autobiographical, Psychoanalytic, and Philosophical Reflections. New 
York, Routledge 2007, 13–16). Stolorow uses Freud’s concept of unheimlich, as does Domin-
ick LaCapra (LaCapra, Dominick LaCapra, History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence. 
Ithaca, Cornell UP 2009, 85–89); cf. Cozolino 2010, 265–268. 
91 “For whenever and wherever we engage with life in its details, it is undeniable that we 
and those close to us experience injustice on a daily basis. To be able to bear with equanimity 
what happens both generally and to us personally we need to have an intimation of a plan for 
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The possibility of an all-shattering trauma is, however, tangible with respect to 
the collective life as well. The same need for an explanatory ‘plan’ also involves 
social entities, which also face the futile task of finding solid and sustainable 
explanations.92 How should one compare and evaluate experiences if the order 
and hierarchy they are given, which distinguishes or merges them into other 
events, proves to be inaccurate? How can we (as a collective) make sense of 
temporality if everything is in constant change, and more importantly and devas-
tatingly, when no one is outside this same tide as an observer?93 To avoid both 
collective and personal trauma at all cost is a human way to enable one’s basic 
social life. To build figural relationships between phenomena distinct in temporal 
dimension is our way to make the world a more comprehensible and easier space 
to conduct social action.94 These relationships provide the scale and measure for 
personal earthly tragedies by revealing the absolute idea of sacrifice and sorrow. 
If it is to be removed, a structural ontological similarity between a personal pain 
and a transcendental model of sorrow vanishes, and some aspects of the cultural 
sense of being understood and accepted are lost. This absence of a scale with 
which to measure one’s experiences, and consequently the horror of an undirect-
ed flow of time, is avoided by cultural means like historical writing. 
Historians rarely write about their own scholarly identity – the unquestionable 
principles, fears, dogmatic theoretical axioms and desires in their historical 
works. Often, however, they comment on the identities of other (past) scholars. 
It is not far-fetched to claim that at the same time, in an indirect way, they expli-
the sake of which and in the light of whose fulfillment chaos becomes a matter of order.” Erich 
Auerbach, ‘Vico and Herder,’ in James I. Porter (ed.), Time, History, Literature: Selected Es-
says of Erich Auerbach. Princeton, Princeton UP, 11.
92 Rik Peters (Peters 2006, 373) finds this ‘horror of historicity’, in Fascist Italy but also in 
present modern societies, which are inspired by the changeability of the world, where nothing 
is absolutely given: “At the same time, the belief that reality is history is the most uncanny 
[unheimlich] awareness humans can have. For how can we live in a world in which nothing is 
given, no principles, no truths, no fixed points, in a world in which historicity in itself is not 
given, but always appears as a construction of our own?” 
93 Hayden White concludes on Auerbach’s thoughts: “Indeed, if, in many respects, Mimesis 
is ultimately the story of how Western literature came to grasp historicity as humanity’s distinc-
tive mode of being in the world, this mode of being in the world is represented as one in which 
individuals, events, institutions, and (obviously) discourses are apprehended as bearing a dis-
tinctively figural relationship to one another.” White 1996, 137; cf. David Carr, Time, Narrative 
and History. Indianapolis, Indiana UP 1986.
94 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity:Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. 
Cambridge, Polity Press 1991, 35–69; White 1996, 133–134, 137.
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cate their own historical vision.95 Similarly, Franz Wieacker wrote about the 
emotional presuppositions which guided the work of Rudolf Jhering: 
[A]s he matured, he turned from intellectual fantasy to social realism. These feelings were in 
tune with the times. Jhering’s personal experience was characteristic not just of his fellow ju-
rists but of all his contemporaries; most original thinkers of the mid-century felt the joy or 
horror of waking up, of turning from dream to action. All Jhering’s subsequent work must be 
seen in the light of this Damascus.96 
Jhering faced the ‘experience of waking up,’ that is, the explanation he had given 
to the world of social affairs was not in accordance with reality. The scale which 
he had used to measure experiences was no longer valid. Nevertheless, through a 
process of ‘maturation’ Jhering was able to overcome that ontological breach and 
produce textual works in which his vision of historical meaning was congruent 
with the needs of his time. This process was not merely a rational decision to 
shift one’s scientific view. Wieacker describes it through a metaphorical refer-
ence to the abrupt revelation which Apostle Paul experienced on the road to Da-
mascus. So, to Wieacker, the mental tool which legal historians utilize in their 
works is not comprised solely of “epistemological rules” and “norms,” for this 
worldview is more close to identity. It was just as much based on an affective 
understanding of the world of social affairs.
b) Historiography as an affective practice and the historical vision in action
In the previous section we saw that when a historian writes history, frames out 
the temporal experience from time, plots it, and links this historical idea to his/
her culture, the writing process from the beginning is a mixture in which “objec-
tive and subjective dimensions are always already intertwined and perpetually 
interact with each other.”97 In the research process a scholar is in a dialogue with 
the historical sources and cultural truth as defined by the scientific community. 
Writing on the other hand means adjusting one’s scientific questioning and prior-
ities to the public “need” for historical results and persuading people to under-
stand and uphold the importance of this viewpoint and research.98 In order to 
95 Such a method was emblematic e.g. to Carl Schmitt in his quest to illuminate German 
legal history. Mehring 2014.
96 Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 356.
97 Benno Gammerl, ‘Emotional Styles – Concepts and Challenges,’ in Rethinking History: 
The Journal of Theory and Practice 16 (2012):2, 168, cf. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative 
Vol.  1. Chicago, Chicago UP 1990, 82–87, 229; Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Vol.  2. Chi-
cago, Chicago UP 1990, 92–96.
98 This distinction between researching and writing history is indeed an important feature 
for my study. To many scholars, writing history is more a task of adjusting, choosing and de-
ciding about source material and putting one’s experience and vision into words. Jorma Kalela 
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make the past relevant to one’s audience, a historian needs to link the phenomena 
he is studying to contemporary society. He has to translate bygone events and 
adjust them to our perception of the world. In short, historiography is juxtaposing 
phenomena from one’s time to (allegedly) similar events in the past through lan-
guage.99 
Within this process, however, a historian faces the unavoidable gap between 
the past historical experience and the present one. This constitutive gap in histo-
riography has also been articulated as an incongruity between language and real-
ity, or the distance between historical experience and writing.100 Where should 
one place “the glossators” of our culture? How should one consider such expres-
sions as “the enthusiasm brought about by the Industrial Revolution” or “the 
conservative worldview of the 19th-century liberalists”? The historical traces that 
encouraged historians to assume that such phenomena existed, have to be linked 
to other events and be supplied with cause and consequence in order to be under-
standable.101 While interpreting sources through one’s historical vision, research-
ers come to fulfill the incomplete presentation with “other accepted facts” from 
their society or personal history, thus allowing them to give a coherent rep-
resentation of history.102 In their attempt to fill this gap between the reality of a 
historical event and an understandable elaboration of it, historians deploy the 
tool of historical vision, but in such a way that the reader understands their per-
sonal interpretation of these historical events. Historical vision has to function in 
a way that it mediates between the experience of a historian and the experiences 
of the reading audience. This underlines the fact that in the realm of academic 
historiography, historical vision is not an individual fantasy but is connected to a 
scholarly identity, which in turn is tied to the vocabulary provided by tradition 
and by scientific paradigms.103 The individual scholarly ‘experience’ or ‘vision’ 
talks about reconstruction and argumentation. Jorma Kalela, Making History: The Historian 
and Uses of the Past. New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2012, 132–145; cf. Tosh 1991, 1–2, 26–
27. 
99 Tosh 1991, 38–40; Kalela 2012, 94.
100 See Ankersmit 2012, 59–64.
101 Robinson 2010, 504.
102 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Vol.  2 1990, 155; Or in other words, historians use the 
same emotional styles that they apply in their personal lives to create narratives in and about 
the past. Gammerl 2012.
103 Jorma Kalela asserts (Kalela 2005, 294–297) that every scholar has “one’s thing” which 
they keep working on throughout their writings. This “thing” is a group of conditions for cog-
nition, a collection of very personal opinions which are not necessarily associated with any 
scientific school or political stance of a scholar. They still nevertheless frame research and form 
a base for a vision that connects the scientific works of a researcher. “One’s thing” is divided 
into three levels. 1. The ontological level of defining mechanisms behind recent and distant 
societal changes. It holds the scholar’s answers to the questions concerning what exists? The 
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is translated into concepts and expressions which are emblematic of academic 
historical writing, and are familiar both to the historian and to his audience.104
As a result, the actual work of the historical vision – bridging the gap between 
the past historical experience and the present one as well as overcoming the oth-
erness of the past – on the level of the text is performed with the help of estab-
lished linguistic tools, such as narratives, metaphors or concepts.105 The argu-
ment behind this book is that historical narratives, metaphors, and concepts, ‘the 
bridging tools’ deployed by the practice of historiography are not only linguistic 
structures, but cognitive means in conceptualizing the world of experiences. In 
this way history is made shareable and accessible to other people in a way which 
mediates emotional coherence and continuity, confidence rather than incoher-
ence.106 Narratives, metaphors and concepts are means to express history as a 
meaningful and substantive part of people’s lives.107
To Reinhart Koselleck, the normative vocabulary of society, that is concepts, 
have been constructed through time. 108 A single concept evolves through inter-
answers provide an explanation to an ontological structure of the world; the future as derived 
from past and present; an outline understanding of historical development and its presence in 
thebscholar’s time 2. The in-group level of shared fears, desires and moral principles, in other 
words, the researcher’s moral standpoints about society. According to Kalela, the researcher’s 
intention in all of his works is to defend some statement or proposal about the moral condition 
of society, present or forthcoming; the distinguishing of ideal, acceptable and disapproved be-
havior as constructed in the networks of friends, family, and academic colleagues. 3. The scien-
tific level of heretical and respected methods in history as well as the role of science in relation 
to the national and public good. For the scholar himself, what is the nature of his pursuit? What 
kind of means is he ready to employ in analyzing reality? 
104 Wieacker himself rejected the idea that concepts could be straightforwardly applied from 
one culture to another. Rather, the meaning which the concepts embedded had to be translated 
into terms prevailing in the receiving culture: “Perhaps the genetic model of modern biology is 
the most appropriate model for the historian of the effect of the ancient civilization on its 
daughter culture in Europe, for it sees the transmission of life from generation to generation in 
terms of information: living forms reproduce themselves by means of genetic information, 
which like a matrix engenders and builds new organisms with the same or similar form.” 
Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 26.
105 Cf. Ankersmit 2012, 76, 218–219.
106 Cf. Raymond W. Gibbs, ‘Metaphor and Thought: The State of the Art,’ in Raymond W 
Gibbs (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. New York, Cambridge UP 
2008, 3; cf. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Vol.  2 1990, 7–9, 16–30. In historiography, nar-
ratives very often emerge as a natural, organic development, and the denial or ignoring of other 
possibilities give them somehow a natural, rather than a (re)constructed and man-made, appear-
ance.
107 Barbara Dancygier & Eve Sweetser, Figurative Language. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 
2014, 8: “Figurative language usages appear to be pervasive in all languages – and the reason 
is apparently that they reflect patterns of human cognition.” 
108 Koselleck distinguishes certain ground concepts (Grundbegriffe) from other normative 
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twinement with social structures, and it is used in different contexts, thus it em-
beds layers of meanings and contains a metahistorical meaning. As a result, a 
concept can be utilized in different contexts, but although it might be used to 
explicate a restricted actual phenomenon, it also manifests meanings beyond the 
temporal and spatial frames of the phenomenon it explicates. Concepts utilize the 
abstract past in their task of signifying concrete, everyday events. 109 Conceptual 
historical theories assert that concepts hold within the commending and con-
demning meaning of language. Concepts reflect the social reality – they are the 
normative vocabulary of society – but they also concurrently categorize this re-
ality from the stance of the one who utilizes the normative vocabulary. 110 How a 
concept is used in a given time and context should be of prior importance in 
every conceptual analysis. For example, Volksgemeinschaft was not only a word 
for a certain social constellation. While it was used, it also defined a right kind of 
social being, as well as its opposite, and the tension between these two positions. 
Thus, Volksgemeinschaft as a word and a concept was a symbol for social change, 
activity and values. 
It is important to emphasize that this work does not analyze jurisprudential 
concepts, but concepts utilized in historical writing. The usage and purpose of 
both linguistic tools - jurisprudential and historical concepts – is to create analo-
gies and gather a phenomenon under a textual device, but historical concepts 
embed a meaning of temporality and existence in time.111 Furthermore, whereas 
vocabulary. For criticism on the elevation of concepts above ordinary language use, see Mi-
chael Stolleis, Rechtsgeschichte schreiben. Rekonstruktion, Erzählung, Fiktion? Baden-Baden 
2008, 15.
109 To Koselleck, concepts bear both diachronic and synchronic meanings (Reinhart Kosel-
leck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,’ in Contributions to the 
History of Concepts 6 (2011):1, 30–31). With ‘synchronic meanings’ he asserts that in concep-
tualization the past is brought on board in explicating a current, actual phenomenon. It is the 
“contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous” (“Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen.” Ko-
selleck 2011, 17).
110 Both Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck emphasize the connection between con-
ceptual history and the study of social structures. E.g. Koselleck 2011, 18: “[C]oncepts are 
discussed according to their sociopolitical rather than their linguistic function.” To Skinner, 
significant social structures are essentially rhetorical and refer to values and norms. See e.g. 
Quentin Skinner, ‘Rhetoric and Conceptual Change,’ in Kari Palonen (ed.), Finnish Yearbook 
of Political Thought 1999, 60–73. 
111 Wieacker explicitly rejected the priority of jurisprudential concepts, and a continuous 
fight against Begriffjurisprudenz is a foundational theme in his works stretching from the 1930s 
to the late 1960s (see Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung revisited,’ [1976/77] 
476). Nevertheless, he did conceptualize history, but called his terms “types” of European his-
tory (see Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 6 fn.  9). Accordingly, Rechtsbewusstsein 
and Rechtsgewissen were not jurisprudential concepts, but were terms used in elaborating the 
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Reinhart Koselleck was mostly interested in the way concepts were used in po-
litical language, this study focuses on the theme of how concepts are used in the 
legal historical texts of an individual scholar. As a result, I will have to take into 
account the distinct manner of writing scientific historiography. In other words, 
while analyzing the use of concepts in a given body of legal historical texts, one 
has to acknowledge the instructional influence of the historiography preceding 
the body of texts under scrutiny. Scientific historiography is always contextual-
ized within a tradition and is related to the arguments of other scholars. 
As a practice within modern society, academic historical writing, nevertheless, 
also serves affective purposes Historiography encourages a trust in cultural and 
individual tools deployed to find and/or create analogies between phenomena 
distinct from each other in chronological measure, thus providing a temporal 
order for unrestricted and unlimited time.112 Historiography makes the ‘I’ more 
grounded in a world of change and in the world of others, not only by producing 
normative information about the world, but also allowing one to create an emo-
tional coherence to time as a subjective experience. 113 One could say that histo-
riography, among other affective practices deployed to come to terms with tem-
porality, is a means to find certainty or confidence in experienced time, to over-
come the otherness of the past.114 It is both written to give meaning to unattached 
temporal events, but also used as a proof of a correct interaction between people 
and their culture. Thus my approach to the concept within historiographical texts 
departs from that of Koselleck’s and Skinner’s with respect to the metaphorical 
relationship between norms and attitudes or experience (cf. Wieacker, ‘A History of Private 
Law’ 1995, 2).
112 Academic historiography possesses the means, or at least has a reputation for possessing 
the means, to mold historical representation in an epistemologically positive direction. See 
Chris Lorenz & Berber Bevernage, Breaking up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Pres-
ent, Past and Future. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2013. On modern communalism 
and historiography, see Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Iden-
tity. Oxford, Oxford UP 2003, 166–179.
113 Runia (2007, 319, 323) elaborates how a “sublime historical event,” either experienced 
or committed, produces hindsight, a need to make a new standpoint habitable or understanda-
ble. It can later turn into an ‘ontological homesickness,’ “a desire to get into contact with the 
numinosity of history.” See also LaCapra 2001, 48–52; cf. Habermas 2012, 46–49.
114 Emily Robinson (2010, 504) vividly expresses how the re-enactment and physical pres-
ence of historical material produces an ambiguous sensation of ‘pastness.’ On the other hand it 
produces an ‘unavoidable awareness of its absence,’ and on the other ‘a feeling of genuineness.’ 
The latter emotion has also been described as ‘credibility,’ ‘firmness’ and ‘emotional knowing.’ 
It seems that it is this feeling about ‘real historical knowledge’ which historians still pursue, 
although the task of writing a totally objective historical representation is widely considered to 
be impossible.
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and interpretative latitude I give to concepts. 115 In its attempt to bind past, present 
and future to a coherent whole, metaphorical means are essential for historical 
writing. 116 
In his 1963 article ‘Die Fortwirkung der antiken Rechtskulturen in der eu-
ropäischen Welt,’ Franz Wieacker attempted to represent the multifaceted phe-
nomenon of the diffusion and reception of Roman law to the later legal cultures 
of Europe. To explicate the complicated phenomenon in a short and textual form 
was difficult,117 so he used metaphors to illuminate the process: “Like the de-
scendents inherit the hereditary factors of their parents, so does the ‘daughter 
culture’ inherit the characteristics of the ‘mother culture.’”118 In another context, 
he described the mentality which had prevailed in German culture towards the 
idea of Rome by referring the historical juxtaposition to a parable in Dos-
toyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, asserting that the idea of Rome has been 
perceived as “the Grand Inquisitor.”119 Furthermore, he pictures the increasing 
awareness of ancient culture in medieval Europe as the growing up of a child: 
“[I]n the same way as individuals come to understand their parents better as they 
115 Despite the fact that Koselleck here and there explicitly labels concepts as metaphors, 
and acknowledged the translational and interpretative performance they involve, he never took 
his analysis further in that direction. Mostly this decision seemed be due to a lack of time and 
resources. See Koselleck 2011, 33–34; also Timo Pankakoski, ‘Carl Schmitt Versus the ‘Inter-
mediate State’: International and Domestic Variants,’ in History of European Ideas 39 (2013):2, 
241–266.
116 Ankersmit (2012), Blumenberg (Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology. 
Ithaca, Cornell UP 2010) and Ricoeur (Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of 
Meaning in Language. Psychology Press 2003) are all interested in the role metaphors play in 
text and especially in historical presentations.
117 Franz Wieacker, ‘Die Fortwirkung der antiken Rechtskulturen in der europäischen Welt,’ 
in Vom Recht. Hannover, Niedersächsische zentrale für Politische Bildung 1963, 82: “Zur Er-
fassung einer rechtsgeschichtlichen Periode müssen wir also ausser den eigentlichen Re-
chtsquellen auch erforschen und verstehen: die Rechtsmetaphysik und die allgemeinen soziale-
thischen Wertvorstellungen einer Epoche, ihre soziale und politische Verfassung; die herkunft 
und die soziale Stellung ihrer Justizfunktionäre sowie die äusseren Formen und die Denkfor-
men des Rechtsunterrichts und der Rechtswissenschaft. Nur so erfasst die rechtsgeschichtliche 
Forschung wirklich das gesamte Gefüge der Wertvorstellungen, sozialen Verhaltensnormen 
und –gewohnheiten, der Machttechniken und der intellektuellen Techniken, die erst in ihrer 
Gesamtheit eine geschichtliche Rechtskultur ausmachen.”
118 ”Wie die Abkömmlinge die Erbfaktoren der Eltern übernähmen, so erbte die ‘Toch-
terkultur’ Eigenschaften der ‘Mutterkultur.’”, Ibid. 80.
119 Franz Wieacker, Vom römischen Staat als Rechtsordnung. Freiburg i. Br. Zähringer 
1949, 6: “Rom hat für Europa allezeit jenes ursprüngliche Wollen ausgedrückt, von dem Dos-
tojevskis Grossinquisitor spricht.”
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themselves mature.”120 Wieacker frequently used metaphors like these in his 
texts.
In this, of course, Wieacker was not alone. Historiography does not juxtapose 
‘true’ phenomena in a loose way, but instead emphasizes the genuine bond and 
similar essence between ‘real’ objects. The figural relations between events, the 
claim that phenomena distinct in chronological time can be labelled under a his-
torical meaning or that a later event can somehow be defined by a former, is 
backed by metaphorical language. A very common metaphorical claim of the 
1930s that “fascist Italy is like ancient Rome” is a temporal, historical argument. 
It puts two social, complex entities in a correlative relation, where the entities of 
both fascist Italy and ancient Rome define and explain each other, and more im-
portantly, fascist Italy is seen as the later fulfillment of ancient Rome, in history 
and in essence. 121 But a metaphorical connection involves an affective sphere. In 
a metaphorical frame, temporally distinct phenomena – which in the case of his-
toriography have been reconstructed from textual traces and as such are without 
emotional content – receive an affective dimension. In other words, in its task to 
bridge the gap between language and reality, historiography also uses emotional 
means when it gives us the feeling of continuity amidst infinitude.122 Conse-
quently, acknowledging the metaphorical aspect enables the researcher of past 
historiography to take into account the affective, personal dimension of figura-
tive language and of historical writing.123 Accordingly, Joanne Bourke argues 
120 Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 18.
121 Cf. Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire. Madison, Longman 1976, 47–48, 
93–94.
122 Cf. Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village 
1294–1324. Bungay, Richard Clay 1984, 338–339: “Today Catharism is no more than a dead 
star, whose cold but fascinating light reaches us now after an eclipse of more than a half a mil-
lennium. But Montaillou itself is much more than a courageous but fleeting deviation. It is the 
factual history of ordinary people. It is Pierre and Béatrice and their love; it is Pierre Maury and 
his flock; it is the breath of life restored through a repressive Latin register that is a monument 
of Occitanian literature. Montaillou is the physical warmth of the ostal, together with the ev-
er-recurring promise of a peasant heaven.” In these metaphors, LeRoy Ladurie places within 
the text elusive feelings of warmth, love and communality which seem to emerge from the 
‘factual’ history of this Occitanian village. LeRoy Ladurie suggests that in the text of Montail-
lou human emotions are translated into action and they emerge as ‘naturally’ placed in this 
written history within their correct premises and conclusions. The presupposition is that when 
one reads Montaillou one can share and embody these emotions by observing the actions of 
past people. 
123 The semantic analysis of metaphors is a rapidly growing discipline, which has benefitted 
substantially from the results and approaches of cognitive sciences. See e.g. Zoltán Kövecses, 
Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling. New York: Cam-
bridge UP 2000; Lakoff & Johnson 2003; Gibbs 2008; Dancygier & Sweetser 2014.
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that metaphors within history and in historical texts need to be studied in terms 
of the domains of language, culture and affections.124 
For example, when Carl Schmitt asserted that in German history “Jews are like 
parasites,”125 his offending metaphor referred implicitly and explicitly to the 
preceding anti-Semitic representations already existing in German culture.126 
Furthermore, the parasite-metaphor exploited the common and current assump-
tions in capitalist society, where individuals whose behavior (especially with re-
spect to work) diverged from the communal average were accused of sucking at 
the fruits of other’s work as well as at the vitality of respectable folk.127 Thus, 
Schmitt’s metaphor was bound to and referred to the domains of common lan-
guage (fashionable expressions and linguistic categorizations used in explaining 
common world) and cultural meanings (traditional anti-Semitism). In addition, 
the metaphor also mediated the affective meanings from the author to the receiv-
ing audience. Parasites can be felt. This metaphor produced a bodily sensation at 
the receiving end. By the means of a metaphor, Schmitt was able to communicate 
his emotional experience of hatred and scorn of Jews to contemporary readers, 
who might not share his antisemitism, but nevertheless understood his emotions, 
since the dread of parasites was and is a basic and common emotion. 
124 Joanna Bourke, ‘Pain: Metaphor, Body, and Culture in Anglo-American Societies be-
tween the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries,’ in Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory 
and Practice 18 (2014):4, 475–498.
125 See Carl Schmitt’s 1936 talk in the ‘Conference for University Legal Teachers,’ where 
he explains the “necessary changes” in scholarly practices concerning citations, research tasks 
and bibliographies (which meant banning anything related to Jews) by means of this metaphor. 
Carl Schmitt, ‘Schlusswort des Reichsgruppenwalters,’ in Das Judentum in der Rechtswissen-
schaft. Ansprachen, Vorträge und Ergebnisse der Tagung der Reichsgruppe Hochschullehrer 
des NSRB am 3. und 4. Oktober 1936. 1. Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft im Kampf gegen den 
jüdischen Geist. Berlin, Deutscher Rechts-Verlag 1936, especially 32.
126 Of course, Schmitt referred first and foremost to Hitler’s rhetoric (see e.g. Adolf Hitler, 
Mein Kampf: “The Jews’ life as a parasite in the body of other nations and states… ,”; “[H]is 
existence as a parasite on other people… ,” quoted in Benjamin C. Sax & Dieter Kuntz, Inside 
Hitler’s Germany: A Documentary History of Life in the Third Reich. Lexington, D.C. Heath 
& Co. 1992, 200). Nevertheless, Hitler was not the first to use this offensive metaphor (cf. Eva 
Holmberg, Jews in the Early Modern English Imagination: A Scattered Nation. Burlington, 
Ashgate 2011, 147). The underlying and very common anti-Semitism of early twentieth-centu-
ry Europe is a widely acknowledged fact (see e.g. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschafts-
geschichte. 3. Band: Von der “Deutschen Doppelrevolution” bis zum Beginn des Ersten Welt-
krieges 1849–1914. München, C.H.Beck 1995, 924–34, 1063–66). The parasite metaphor was 
widely used when abstract prejudices or negative emotions were channeled into discriminating 
and violent social acts.
127 Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism [1920]. Sydney, Resist-
ance Books 1999. See especially chapter VIII, ‘Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism,’ 100–108.
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A semantic analysis of the strategically placed metaphors within the historical 
argumentation, such as the above-mentioned example by Schmitt, nevertheless 
does not quite reach the wider affective practice of historiography, which seeks 
to bring confidence to otherwise irrational or unorganized temporal experience. 
In post-War Germany, scholars often in their correspondence struggled to articu-
late their overflowing emotion of unattachedness. The time seemed to lack mean-
ing, and any actions felt futile. The extent to which historiography was used to 
bring meaning into everyday life was evident and at the same time puzzling.128 
Historiography was utilized in order to evoke an affectively-colored notion of 
continuity and confidence, not only in the abstract historical world, but in the 
experience world of its audience. To address this phenomenon, one needs to ana-
lyze the figural use of history and the historical metaphors it is constituted of. 
Frank Ankersmit (2012) argues that a historical representation as a whole is 
like a metaphor in its three-step reference to the past. What differentiates the 
historical metaphor from other rhetorical concepts is that a historian’s rep-
resentation not only constructs a narrow analogy of a text and reality, but a met-
aphorical connection in history envelops the whole reality surrounding the sourc-
es and subject matter deployed by the historian.129 In historical metaphors, emo-
tions are not only used as fundamental building blocks in constructing the 
represented connection within time, they are also the factors that make the argu-
mentative claim personally recognizable to the audience.130 The coherence which 
a metaphorical connection embeds enables one to emotionally attune to the past; 
a historical account can be assimilated into one’s narrative identity and utilized 
as evidence of a correct interaction between people and their culture.131 The rep-
128 An example of this kind of usage of history is the common phenomenon of “academias” 
established in POW camps after the Second World War. Franz Wieacker, Helmut Coing, Fer-
nand Braudel, among others, lectured about history in these camps. The purpose was to bring 
confidence and comfort to prisoners, whose previous idea of the social world was being demol-
ished in the war. Cf. Liebs 2011, 28–29.
129 Ankersmit 2012, 68–69, 103; Ankersmit’s historical metaphor comes quite close to the 
notion of conceptual metaphor as defined by Zoltan Kövecses (2010), where an abstract con-
ceptual domain (for example ‘real life’) is understood through another more coherent, concrete, 
organization of experience. A conceptual metaphor (such as ‘life is a journey’) is distinguished 
from other, smaller linguistic metaphors (‘He is without direction in life’) which map and make 
use of this more comprehensive discourse in language. Zoltan Kövecses, Metaphor: A Practi-
cal Introduction. New York, Oxford UP 2010, 4–8. 
130 Kövecses argues that in language (as well as in historiographical texts) ‘emotions are 
forces’ (Kövecses 2000, 61–62). 
131 See fn.  122: metaphorical language enables the reader to perceive a historiographical 
argument as a historical metaphor. Thus, Montaillou by LeRoy Ladurie is a representation of 
life in a distant Occitanian village, although ‘life’ is crafted from partial textual sources and 
grafted onto the text. It is such emotions, connected and interpreted as a part of larger cause-ef-
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resentation can arouse an experience in the reader: ‘Think about those people, so 
distant in time but still so recognizable in their being!’ The life in the abstract past 
was like our life. This verbalization of the reader’s undefined senses is something 
that Paul Ricoeur calls ‘the pleasure of recognition.’132 A recognition of similar-
ity, of a congruence between emotional narratives of the historiographical text 
and the autobiographical identity of the reader, not just between detached emo-
tions or cause-effect sequences, will occur as ‘emotional knowledge.’133 
Erich Auerbach calls this comprehensive, temporal metaphor established in 
the realm of history a figura.134 Figura as a linguistic (and emotional) tool has a 
temporal dimension, which produces an affective perspective on history, ena-
bling one to evade ‘the horror of historicity’ and deal with past events like they 
were personal experiences. Figural interpretation withholds the idea of reading a 
script, of seeing the continuity and connection in time and achieving truth. Al-
though figural relationships reveal only a partial truth about the world, they are 
found and constructed in the hope of uncovering a general ontological truth 
about the world people live in.135 To explain history as figurally fulfilling for the 
interpreter conducting it, contained an idea of his or her ‘fixed point’ outside the 
stream of time, from which the world could be commented on ‘seriously’ or with 
‘high style.’136
In ‘Die Fortwirkung der antiken Rechtskulturen in der europäischen Welt,’ 
Wieacker analyzed the problematics of historical continuity. He presented how 
cultural and legal historiography has depicted the idea of a historical heritage and 
 
fect entity, that link us to the metaphor of Ladurie’s book; cf. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis. Darg-
estellte Wirklichkeit in der Abendländischen Literatur, 2. Auflage. Bern, Francke Verlag 1959.
132 See Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Vol.  1 1990, 42, 51, 70–71. In ‘the pleasure of recog-
nition’ the ‘purged emotions’ of the reader and the context of a textual narrative are in congru-
ence and can create a mimetic reproduction of a cultural material.
133 Like Tillman, Habermas (Habermas 2012, 37) states, “[S]ubjectivity and meaning in a 
temporal world, which seemingly lacks any direction, are constituted through ‘motive-conse-
quence links’ that give a sense of agency and direction to a life and help bridge change and 
development in the individual” (emphasis mine).
134 Auerbach 1938.
135 Through figural interpretation one could see the general ontological order (veritas) in a 
particular truth (certum). The figural interpretation of the connection between two events was 
at first a spiritual act, linked to God’s meaning, and later a mode of close reading, with confi-
dence about the “true nature” of the fulfillment [Erfüllung]. Auerbach 1938, 72–74. Similarly, 
Eelco Runia (2007) treats historiography as a “metonym”: as a metaphorical depiction of a 
partial representative of the whole.
136 Auerbach 1959, 547; In the words of Fernand Braudel (Braudel 1982, 23): “To describe, 
analyze, compare and explain usually means standing aside from historical narrative: it means 
ignoring or willfully chopping up the continuous flow of history.”
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‘rebirth’ of an era in the succeeding times by means of such concepts as ‘conti-
nuity,’ ‘reception,’ and ‘renaissance.’137 He concluded that in order to explicate 
the historical meaning of continuity from the world of Antiquity to medieval 
Europe the researcher had to use ‘mediating concepts’ which translate the ‘indef-
initeness’ of the historical reality into a truthful ‘presentation’: “Without such 
concepts [Here Wieacker uses the word Bild (“picture”, image” or “figure”) but 
refers to the above-mentioned concepts and metaphors] the historian of culture 
and legal order cannot subsume and make visible the immense diversity of the 
interaction of effects.”138 The most important feature however in Wieacker’s text 
is the way in which the truthfulness of a given ‘presentation’ is measured: 
The cultural historian will most likely find such a picture [Bild: which again refers either to a 
metaphor or concept] in line with his or her scientific experience of the effects of an older cul-
ture on its following culture.139
Wieacker acknowledges the metaphorical dimension of the ‘mediating’ concepts 
by seeing no distinction between them and metaphors. The problem is not wheth-
er the researcher’s ‘presentation’ mediates affections to the audience, after all the 
‘continuity’ of ancient legal cultures is very much a continuity of “moral and 
intellectual judgements”,140 but whether the given ‘presentation’ is congruent 
with the researcher’s ‘scientific experience,’ that is, his historical vision or schol-
arly identity. In order to mediate the idea of continuity from Antiquity to the 
modern world, which for Wieacker was not only obvious but also a foundational 
feature in European legal history, he relied on ‘concepts’ which were personally 
recognizable to the audience. These concepts had been used before in historiog-
raphy, they were understandable in the light of the common culture in which 
Wieacker wrote, but they also evoked a personal affection for continuity and a 
confidence in the reader. In other words, the linguistic devices Wieacker utilized 
in expressing the idea of continuity and confidence were constructed concurrent-
ly comprising the domains of language, culture and affections.
137 Wieacker, ‘Die Fortwirkung der antiken Rechtskulturen’ 1963, 79.
138 Ibid., 79, 80: “Vermittlungsbegriffen,” “Unbestimmtheit”; 79: “Ohne solche Bilder kann 
der Historiker der Kulturen und Rechtsordnungen die unübersehrbare Vielfalt der Wirkungszu-
sammenhänge vielleicht nicht zusammenfassen und anschaulich machen.”; also 80: “[D]er 
Historiker, der Wirkungszusammenhänge zwischen Kulturen nicht zu erforschen, sondern auch 
darstellen soll, kann auf solche Formeln der Veranschaulichung wohl kaum verzichten,” 
emphasis original.
139 “Ein solches Bild wird der Historiker der Kulturen noch am ehesten im Einklang finden 
mit seiner wissenschaftlichen Erfahrung von den Wirkungen einer älteren Kultur auf ihre Toch-
terkultur.”, Ibid. 80. Emphasis mine.
140 Ibid. 81, “moralischen und intellektuellen Grundwertungen.”
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Such was the case also with the concepts Wieacker used when he described the 
ideas of the common understanding of the rule of law and justice within history. 
These entities he represented using the terms Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechts-
gewissen. 
For reasons of succinctness and readability, I have in this book often used the 
translations ‘legal consciousness’ and ‘legal conscience.’ These concepts were 
key terms in Wieacker’s attempt to analyze and have an effect on legal culture.141 
Semantically, both words are constituted by connecting the German word ‘law’ 
with a term that describes a mental or spiritual action. Thus already in their se-
mantics they bridged the social sphere of norms and individual perception. The 
concepts were established expressions in the tradition of German legal science. 
Not only Wieacker, but also other scholars applied and sometimes redefined 
them, within a similar or slightly different context. In Wieacker’s texts these 
words were not mere meta-level tools. To him, they had an empirical equivalence 
both in the minds of European individuals as well as in the German legal system 
and in correct application of the law. Naturally, Wieacker was not dogmatic in 
using these concepts through his long career, but they did nevertheless always 
express a dual ontology. They illuminated the juridical havoc of modern society 
as well as the persistent mentality inside a European mind. The concepts formed 
a bridge between distinct historical phenomena. Juridical developments inside 
the European continent, separated by time and national cultures, could all be re-
lated to these ways of thinking.142 Using Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen 
as uniting abstractions, he represented the past as an entity which sustained a 
meaning and direction and was significant to people on a personal level.
A preliminary reading of his scientific writings revealed four thematic do-
mains, which not only regularly appeared in connection to the common under-
standing of the rule of law and justice, but remained as significant entities within 
his texts throughout his career, from the 1930s to the 1970s. I have labeled these 
themes Stand, Bildung, Schöpfung and Kameradschaft. It is argued that these 
themes relate to the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen as 
sub-concepts. With their help, through the affective and evaluative tension they 
withheld, a scientific concept, nominally emotion- and value-free tool, was fur-
ther filled with social meanings. Whereas the themes of ‘Perfection through edu-
cation’ (Bildung), and ‘An estate based on abilities’ (Stand) are related to the 
concept of Rechtsbewusstsein,143 Rechtsgewissen was partly defined with the 
141 On Rechtsgewissen see Liebs 2010; on Rechtsbewusstsein see Avenarius 2010.
142 e.g. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 260.
143 I will further elaborate the sub-concepts of Bildung and Stand in chapter II. For now, on 
the relation of Bildung to Rechtsbewusstsein, see e.g. Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 
1955, 55: “allgemein Bildungshöhe” explained the (temporal) success of Eastern Roman “legal 
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help of ‘Scientific creativity’ (Schöpfung) and the ‘In-group of alike’ (Kamerad-
schaft).144
In order to find answers to my research questions, I will focus on the concep-
tual change in the terms Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein. My attempt is 
not to study these concepts per se, but instead the way Wieacker used them. I 
argue that in scrutinizing what these concepts exactly signified in Wieacker’s 
texts and how those meanings changed in time, I am able to clarify Wieacker’s 
view of society – his historical vision – as well as the continuities and disconti-
nuities in his historiography. Along the lines of the above-elaborated theoretical 
stance, I take Wieacker’s Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein to comprise the 
domains of language, culture and affections. In other words, these notions were 
related to the previous scientific tradition (language). The overall social and po-
litical changes in Germany had an effect on their meaning (culture), but these 
changes were always perceived through Franz Wieacker’s historical vision. In 
other words, the domain of culture was always being referred to and compared 
with his scholarly identity, the worldview which he shared with his close col-
leagues (affections), and as a consequence it shaped the meanings of his texts.
culture,” on the one hand, 46: the “juristischen Bildung” explained the continuity from Rome 
to the middle ages in the Western part of the empire; also Wieacker, ‘Rudolph Von Jhering’ 
1959, 200: while overviewing Rudolf von Jhering’s production, Wieacker stated on the inter-
play between Jhering’s personal “vision,” the “social streams of the time” and “legal scientific 
orientation”: “Jherings Bildung zeigt schon etwas von der Rückbildung des Weltbürgertums 
der deutschen klassischen Zeit zum Bourgeois”. On Stand, see e.g. Wieacker, Privatrechts-
geschichte 1952, 92: “Gelehrtenstand [in sixteenth-century Germany]”, and 78: “gelehrten Ju-
ristenstand”; Wieacker, ‘Friedrich Carl Von Savigny’ 1960, 41: “Professorenstand [of nine-
teenth-century Germany].” 
144 Schöpfung and Kameradschaft will be dealt with in depth in chapter IV. For now, on 
Schöpfung, see e.g. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 17: [The European understanding 
of law as] “einer fachlich-geistigen, d. h. im weitesten Sinne wissenscahftlichen Schöpfung”, 
and 18: [Roman law as] “Fachschöpfung”; Wieacker, ‘Der Standort der römischen Recht-
geschichte’ 1942, 55: “[the tradition of Roman law as an exemplary] Rechtsschöpfung”. On 
Kameradschaft: Wieacker uses the term Kameradschaft rarely (see Franz Wieacker, ‘Das Kit-
zeberger Lager junger Rechtslehrer [1936],’ in Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 163: “Kameradschaft-
liche Beziehung”), but Wieacker consistently and explicitly writes on the importance of “com-
munity” in scientific work. I have chosen the term Kameradschaft to represent the emphasis on 
“communality,” because this enables me to better depict the interaction between Wieacker’s 
ideas and social change. Thus, with Kameradschaft I represent the phenomenon which Wieack-
er also called “Gemeinwesen,” “Kreis,” “Genossenschaft” and, most often, “Zunft.” See e.g. 
Wieacker, ‘Friedrich Carl von Savigny’ 1960, 42: “der Juristenzunft [of nineteenth-century 
Germany]”; Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 447: “Gemeinwesen [of Roman Ju-
rists]” and 446: “freie Zunft [of Roman lawyers]”; Wieacker, ‘Das römische Recht und das 
deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein’ 1944, 24: “fachlichen Berufsgemeinschaft.”
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4. Structure and Methods
The previous biographies of Franz Wieacker enable me to construct a chronolog-
ical timeline of the events he encountered in 1933–1968. I will complete the 
picture with respect to the network of friends and phases that have not previous-
ly been sufficiently elaborated, with the information found from his correspond-
ence. So in chapter two “The biographical background of Franz Wieacker in the 
collapsing bourgeois society before 1934,” my attempt is to show the social po-
sition of Franz Wieacker in the fields of his contemporary legal science, higher 
education and German citizenship. 
While analyzing Wieacker’s correspondence I will, indeed I must, follow a 
hermeneutical process as described by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. 
Wieacker was, probably even to a larger extent than his friends, a legal scientist. 
He saw the world as a legal entity. He was also a highly learned scholar. Wieack-
er enjoyed expressing himself with the vocabulary provided by German litera-
ture and humanistic culture. Throughout his career, he searched and experiment-
ed with different ways to address social reality as perfectly as possible.145 Thus it 
is often very difficult for me to examine the meanings and messages in his letters. 
His arguments are frequently so intertwined and cross-referenced to contempo-
rary legal theories, poetry or classical texts that a straightforward thematic read-
ing proves futile. In order to understand Wieacker’s ideas, it is necessary to read 
his letters in a hermeneutical circle: the references and claims found in certain 
letters are compared to secondary research literature or to other works to which 
they refer. The knowledge achieved in this way will be adjusted again to the text 
of the letters in order to further illuminate Wieacker’s ideas, and so on. The aim 
is not to give a final, coherent and single truth about the sayings and claims of 
Wieacker. Rather, I attempt to understand the world he inhabited, to see as far as 
possible the horizon which defined his representations. 
In chapters III and IV I scrutinize the concepts Franz Wieacker used in his 
works. As items for analysis, I have chosen the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein 
[legal consciousness] and Rechtsgewissen [legal conscience]. Although these 
concepts are key terms in Wieacker’s argumentation, he rarely uses them in his 
correspondence. The themes which these concepts signify, however, consistently 
circulate in his letters to colleagues. The values, historical ideas and structures as 
well as interpretations of these entities dominate the discussion in his corre-
spondence, and comprise the domains of his writing for decades. So, in order to 
145 Liebs 2010, 29–30; On textual decisions in my method of analyzing Wieacker’s con-
cepts, see p.  15 f. 43.
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deconstruct the scientific meanings they connote, one needs to study Wieacker’s 
letters and his scientific works side by side. 
The metaphorical emphasis determines the structure of my conceptual analy-
sis in chapters III and IV as follows: (a) I take metaphorical language and con-
cepts to be constituted in and mediated between the domains of language, affec-
tions and culture. Thus concepts need to be studied as consistently and concur-
rently bearing these spheres.146 (b) Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen 
envelope an affective dimension which is a prerequisite for their metaphorical 
function. In short, these terms can be felt, both by the writer applying them and 
the individual reading his text.147 (c) I consider Rechtbewusstsein and Rechtge-
wissen to be comprised of smaller normative terms. These assisting, more social-
ly grounded, concepts within a concept mapped the two basic concepts, which 
were contextualized more often within the domain of scientific language.148 
It is clear that historiography is not just a self-reflexive activity. Historians 
needs to adapt their stance to the frame of a scientific way of writing. The restric-
tions imposed by the tradition, methods and relevant terms have to be addressed 
if one is to write legal history. In the ‘language’ chapter of both concepts, I ana-
lyze the vocabulary Wieacker had at his disposal when expressing the experience 
of the society of his time. Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen were common 
concepts whose meanings were not decided solely by Wieacker. So when scruti-
nizing the meanings that Wieacker applied to history through those concepts, one 
has to take into account (as Wieacker did) the scientific meanings which were 
previously and diachronically stratified in them. In this section I will briefly ana-
lyze the usage of the above-mentioned core concepts by looking at a number of 
renowed classics of legal science and certain legal historians. I assume that the 
vocabulary and argumentation related to Rechtsbwusstsein and Rechtsgewissen 
in their texts plausibly presents the scientific horizon which also defined Wieack-
er’s works. I will also utilize previous historiographical analyses which address 
the academic and jurisprudential diachronic meanings of these concepts. These 
chapters enable me to sketch the scientific requisites and borders which affected 
Franz Wieacker’s aesthetics in his legal historical production. 
In the analysis of the ‘culture’ domain regarding the concepts of Rechtsbe-
wusstsein and Rechtsgewissen, I elaborate the political and social factors affect-
ing society during the emergence of both concepts in Wieacker’s text. With re-
spect to the general mental landscape of Germany between 1933 and 1968, I trust 
to the comprehensive and multifaceted picture provided by secondary research 
146 Cf. Bourke 2014.
147 Cf. Gibbs 2008.
148 Cf. Kövecses 2000.
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literature on social and mental history. I have categorized the vast body of histor-
ical studies with the help of four thematic entities – Bildung [education], Stand 
[estate], Kameradschaft [comradeship] and Schöpfung [creation] – notions I 
have found in Wieacker’s texts. Consequently, from the research literature on 
early twentieth-century German culture, I have picked the works which some-
how concentrate on these four themes. Reading them has allowed me to further 
elucidate the social reality of the concepts used by Franz Wieacker. Furthermore, 
in discussing the secondary research literature, I have given extra weight to those 
historical works which concentrate on contexts which were most familiar to 
Wieacker: academia, formal education, and science politics. Reading research 
literature will, I hope, reveal the diachronic changes within German society: the 
layered meanings in social reality and tensions inside and between fashionable 
slogans and legal historical concepts.
The distinguishing feature of my study, both concerning the conceptual-his-
torical tradition as well as previous legal historical studies on the same subject, 
is the claim that I am able to reconstruct the interpretative sphere of Franz 
Wieacker’s scholarly identity by analyzing the language of his academic works 
and the social reality of early twentieth-century Germany. I intend to track the 
historical vision which he used to evaluate historical subject matter. This is done 
with respect to both central concepts (Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen) in 
the sections devoted to the affective domain (‘affections’). In concrete terms this 
means that I take the conceptualized social meanings I tracked in the preceding 
‘culture’ chapter and compare them to the letters and conversations between 
Wieacker and his colleagues. The aim is to approach an understanding of the 
mentality of his in-group. I analyze how those contemporary phenomena, which 
somehow affected the themes of Bildung, Stand, Schöpfung and Kameradschaft, 
were handled in their discussions. I attempt to show that within this group, 
events were not taken as factors which demanded a reaction or explanation as 
such, but they were interpreted and fitted to a worldview which defined the 
group’s relation to the social reality. Later this collective world view, an interpre-
tative sphere, guided Wieacker’s historical studies and appeared in the aesthetics 
of his works. 
I will conclude the conceptual analysis of both Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbe-
wusstsein in chapters where I elaborate how these concepts were used in practice 
in Wieacker’s legal historical texts. I will scrutinize his works between the 1930s 
and the late 1960s, and study whether there was a conceptual change, and if so, 
what kind of change this was. Thus, in discussing Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechts-
gewissen, the sections ‘language’, ‘culture’, and ‘affections’ focus on the process 
in which Wieacker connected his scholarly identity to the social meanings of his 
time, and in doing so created a historical vision of human affairs. This process 
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enabled him to understand fragmented historical sources as a part, a metonomy, 
of the larger field of human activity.149 I attempt to show how concepts which 
were constructed on the basis of a scholar’s experiences of contemporary society, 
were utilized to make sense of the past. Not only did historical vision act as an 
analytical tool, the analytical process itself was also the object of one’s study. 
Franz Wieacker used the concepts of Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein to 
study the same phenomena these concepts signified in Europe’s legal past. Con-
sequently, the aesthetic dimension in his historiography (largely built up with the 
help of presuppositions, axioms and unconscious references), reflected the con-
temporary time and social surroundings but also became exceptionally personal 
and evident.
149 Cf. Runia 2007.

II. The biographical background of Franz Wieacker  
in the collapsing bourgeois society before 1934
Franz Wieacker was born on 5 August 1908 in Stargard. His father – also called 
Franz Wieacker – worked in courts around Northern Germany, so during his 
early years Franz junior lived in the cities of Stade and Celle before moving at 
the age of 17 to Tübingen to study law.1 Wieacker’s social background and up-
bringing were much like those of his later network of close colleagues.2 He stud-
ied in Stade in a Gymnasium, a humanist-oriented and exclusive form of second-
ary schooling whose students aimed at higher academic education. Wieacker’s 
family was firmly situated in the upper-middle class of German society and was 
(nominally) Protestant. Wieacker remembered the early years with his family as 
being happy, and he was brought up in the middle class traditions of his time. He 
was familiar with classical languages and texts, and was especially fond of Ro-
man law.3 In Tübingen, Wieacker joined the Corps Rhenania, just like his broth-
er and many relatives before him.4 Although the Corps Rhenania was not a Bur-
schenschaft and did not explicitly adhere to militant and nationalistic worldview, 
it was a traditional all-male organization for the sons of bourgeois families. At 
the time it upheld the idea of the nobility of German – which meant conservative 
middle class – values. It is fair to say that Wieacker grew up in a bourgeois envi-
ronment and was effectively initiated into its world views from an early age. 
This background is not without importance with respect to Wieacker’s identity 
as a scholar and the aesthetics of his scientific works. Quite the contrary; through-
out his career Wieacker emphasized the underlining morality of law, and its na-
ture as an embodiment of social values.5 The virtues of responsibility, piety, and 
1 Liebs 2010, 23.
2 Cf. Meinel 2012, 15–16; Alexander Hollerbach, ‘Zu Leben und Werk Erik Wolfs,’ in Erik 
Wolf, Studien zur Geschichte des Rechtsdenkens. Ausgewählte Schriften, Band 3. Frankfurt am 
Main, Vittorio Klostermann 1982, 235–250.
3 Behrends 1995, XVI.
4 Liebs 2010, 23.
5 Wolff 2007, 78: Wieacker understood legal history: “Als Geschichte des verantwortlich 
handelnden Juristen und seiner Anleitung durch die Rechtswissenschaft.”; Also Okko Behrends, 
‘Franz Wieacker. Historiker und Jurist des Privatrechts (5.8.1908 – 17.2.1994),’ In A L’ Europe 
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dignity, which he associated with law and legal scholarship can be traced to the 
world view of the early twentieth-century German middle class, or, to be more 
precise, the ideal type of social upheld by the German Bildungsbürgertum [edu-
cated middle class].6 While one studies the intellectual history of early twenti-
eth-century Germany, it is almost a rule that its scholars originated from a middle 
class environment. Thus, one should not overemphasize the fact that Wieacker 
and all of his associates came from bourgeois families. Nevertheless, since Franz 
Wieacker wrote of justice constructed on the idea of personal property, freedom 
and European virtues, it is vital to acknowledge that these ideas emerged from 
the intellectual atmosphere of the twentieth-century German Bildungsbürgertum. 
Franz Wieacker and his colleagues had been acculturated and socialized to this 
worldview since childhood. This connection is especially important with respect 
to the notions of Bildung and Stand, which Wieacker frequently utilized in his 
texts, and which constructed his idea of Rechtsbewusstsein, the legal conscious-
ness of the people. Thus, I will next elaborate the meanings which Bildung and 
Stand were associated with in early twentieth-century Germany.
1. Bildung and Stand in the early twentieth century Germany
In the German bourgeois ethos, a certain kind of education, Bildung, was both a 
tool and purpose for a successful life, and an individual’s destiny was tied to the 
greater cause of the nation through it.7 Since the state was the provider of aca-
du Troisime Millenaire. Melanges Offerte à Giuseppe Gandolfi. Milano, Dort. A. Giuffré Edi-
tore 2009, 2342–2349; cf. Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 194: Wieacker explains 
his stance on the “old question, ever new, of the purpose of the state and the relation between 
the citizen and his society and the state respectively” by referring to the legal history of Germa-
ny, where different phases are “attempts to revivify in the citizen a sense of personal responsi-
bility for his law. Those who have eyes to see will realize that Germany still has some way to 
go before such a sense of responsibility is revitalized.” Emphasis mine.
6 On Bildungsbürgertum See e.g. Jürgen Kocka, ‘Bürgertum und Bürgerlichkeit als Prob-
leme der deutschen Geschichte vom späten 18. zum frühen 20. Jahrhundert,’ In Jürgen Kocka 
(ed.), Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19 Jahrhundert. Göttingen 1987, 21–63; cf. Franz Wieack-
er, Rudolf Von Jhering. Eine Erinnerung zu Seinem 50.Todestage. Leipzig, Koehler & A. 
Melang 1942, 12–13: Wieacker obviously held in high value the “alten Daseinsform des 
deutschen Weltbürgertums”. Alike Rudolf Von Jhering (according to Wieacker), in the begin-
ning was in touch with the “Bildungsgefüges,” which was “ein breiter, ‘künstlerischer’ Le bens-
zuschnitt die echte, frugale und klare Bildung der klassischen Zeit.”
7 The German bourgeoisie differed a great deal from its British counterpart. German class 
divisions were less defined and often economic reality or social distinctions did not follow the 
boundaries of class division. This however did not mean that they were less influential than 
their Anglo-Saxon counterpart (Jürgen Kocka, ‘Einleitung,’ in Werner Conze & Jürgen Kocka 
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demic education and by far the most important employer of the academically 
educated, these two nineteenth-century innovations, university training and the 
nation state, were connected in the mentality of Bildungsbürgertum.8 In the rhe-
torical sphere, German Bildungsbürgertum was created, upheld and defined 
against other social groups with the help of Bildung.
The “learned bourgeoisie,” Bildungsbürgertum, distinguished itself from the 
workers and craftsmen in emphasizing social mobility and need for higher edu-
cation, but also from the nobility and officers, whom the Bildungsbürgertum saw 
as backward, self-righteous, and tyrannical. In general, the values, beliefs and 
self-understanding associed with Bildungsbürgertum were strengthened and re-
constructed in its own ethos, but also in public discussion, since newspapers, 
publishing houses and learned societies were very much owned, guided and oc-
cupied by middle class agents.9 The concept of Bildungsbürgertum, as well as its 
synonyms, such as Gebildete, learned ones, did not solely mean people who had 
studied a lot or were disposed towards seeing society built upon education, but a 
group of people with a particular social background, standard of living, employ-
ment and common perception of both socially appreciated behavior as well as 
degrading deeds.10
It is not, however, entirely accurate to analyze Bildungsbürgertum as a mono-
lithic whole. There were differences between professions, regional variations, 
asynchronic lines of development, and divergent attitudes with respect to social 
change within the German bourgeoisie. But in general terms, one can attach rel-
ative exclusiveness in education and professions, an ambiguous relation both to 
(Hg.), Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, Teil I: Bildungssystem und Professionalisierung 
in internationalen Vergleichen. Stuttgart 1985, 9–26; David Blackbourn, ‘The German Bour-
geoisie: An Introduction,’ in David Blackbourn & Richard J. Evans, The German Bourgeoisie: 
Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the 
Early Twentieth Century. London, Routledge 1991, 1). The middle class’s work, writings, 
clubs, and participation shaped a people’s mentality or public discussion. Öffentlichkeit was a 
bourgeois invention which they very much wanted to keep their own (Jürgen Habermas, Theo-
rie des kommunikativen Handelns. Bd.  1: Handlungs-rationalität und gesellschaftliche Ration-
alisierung. Frankfurt am Main 1981). The great dispute over the German Sonderweg, was most-
ly a debate about the conditions and opinions of the German middle class, or Bürgertum (Weh-
ler 1995, 482–484).
8 Kocka 1985; Rainer M. Lepsius, ‘Kritik als Beruf. Zur soziologie der Intellektuellen,’ In 
Rainer M. Lepsius (Hg.), Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen. Opladen 1990, 270–285.
9 Habermas 1990.
10 This bourgeois mentality did not remain a dead letter or an abstraction. In early twenti-
eth-century public discourse it was undisputed that middle class values promoted middle class 
action; these values were emblematic to people from middle class origins. Even today, in estab-
lished historical studies, some deeds in the past are interpreted as being caused by the mentali-
ty of the Bildungsbürgertum. Cf. Moses 2006, 74–75; Mehring 2014, 92–93.
56 II. The biographical background of Franz Wieacker
the state and to modernization, and a heritage of values and communality to the 
world view of Bildungsbürgertum.11 The professions provided by public admin-
istration, the church and (higher) education tended to work as reproducers of 
class division, since often – due to a relative social stagnation – sons followed in 
the footsteps of their fathers workwise, and in any case the education required for 
these professions was within reach and was desirable for the children of bour-
geois families. The modernization process offered both possibilities but also ev-
ident threats to the lifestyle of Bildungsbürgertum. Concerning threats, most had 
to do with the (bourgeois) division between “Kulturnation” [cultural nation] and 
“Machtstaat” [power state], where the cultural world of Bildungsbürgertum was 
in perennial (albeit often reconcilable) contradiction with the administrative at-
tempts of the state.12 With respect to actual social changes brought about by 
modernization, mass society and economic development, Bildungsbürgertum 
insisted that the modern challenges should be solved by means of bourgeois val-
ues. In its ethos ‘responsibility’ and ‘communality’ were virtues, which preceded 
administrative alterations, not the other way around. 
As a concept, Bildung was more like an academic subfield, holding many in-
terpretations and views. Although Bildung stood for a state of learnedness, it also 
signified a process where an individual through studying allegedly started to see 
the world in a critical, truthful manner, and emancipated himself [sic] to work on 
behalf of the greater social cause. Naturally, this kind of learning often, but not 
necessarily always, was supposed to take place in universities. It meant more 
than mere training or acquiring some skills in order to manage and find one’s 
place in society, but instead it stood for personal perfection and constant reflec-
tion between I and the other. It signified becoming aware of one’s capabilities 
and fulfilling a personal quest of growing into a thoroughly conscious subject.13 
The idea of “becoming” what one should be presupposes a lack of something 
essential or a state of incompleteness. In the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer: 
Man is characterized by the break with the immediate and the natural that the intellectual, ra-
tional side of his nature demands of him. “In this sphere he is not, by nature, what he should 
be”– and hence he needs Bildung.14
11 Rüdiger Vom Bruch, Bürgerlichkeit, Staat und Kultur im Kaiserreich. Stuttgart, Franz 
Steiner 2005, 75–78.
12 Cf. Klaus Scholder, ‘Vorwort,’ in Klaus Scholder (ed.), Die Mittwochs-Gesellschaft. Pro-
tokolle aus dem geistigen Deutschland 1932–1944. Berlin 1982, 9–47. Scholder’s text also 
offers a first-class example of the distinguished academic application of the worldview of Bil-
dungsbürgertum.
13 Cf. Wilhelm von Humboldt, ‘Theorie der Bildung des Menschen,’ in Andreas Flitner & 
Klaus Giel (eds.), Wilhelm Von Humboldt. Werke in fünf Bänden. Bd.1: Schriften zur Anthro-
pologie und Geschichte. Stuttgart, J.G.Cottasche Buchhandlung 1960, 234–240.
14 Gadamer 2000, 11.
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Bildung was localized in the ever-recurring movement of the spirit. It meant 
distancing oneself from the immediacy of natural life and the mind’s control over 
sensations and irrational stimulus. In short, it meant recognizing oneself in the 
other, and then critically evaluating one’s previous position. Since the Romantic 
Movement, from which the idea of Bildung emerged, also emphasized an aware-
ness of and an emphasis on the historicity of things, the common understanding 
was that ‘elevation’ was best achieved in learning about the past. Especially im-
portant were the high cultures of antiquity, which seemed to carry within them 
the virtues and values relevant for modern society. In them the noble and univer-
sal purpose of the human soul was visible – distant yet learnable. Studying the 
theoretical knowledge of antiquity (its language, art, culture and law) was a pro-
cess of moving towards or becoming what humankind was supposed to be. 
Nevertheless, the concept of Bildung could not float above the social meanings 
of its present society; contemporary social meanings were placed upon it in argu-
ments and discussions, and in expressing goals, emotions and opinions. Like 
other concepts of German idealism, it was read and interpreted as intertwined 
with contemporary social structures.15 Consequently, the original idea of Bildung 
became fused with bourgeois ideas concerning education, personal property and 
social status. It was utilized in discussions concerning the fate and direction of 
the nation state as well as being a value in itself while creating social rankings 
and distinctions. 
Lawyers were an important and active group inside the Bildungsbürgertum. 
Due to the impossibility of drawing sharp class-based divisions both in relation 
to other social groups, as well as inside the educated middle classes themselves, 
the task of self definition needed to be conducted with new concepts. The studies 
and terminology of British and French society could not be straightforwardly 
applied to German society. Hence, lawyers repeatedly and persistently demanded 
acknowledgment as a Stand, an estate.16 In the writings of nineteenth-century 
German lawyers there is a constant need for acknowledgement of the particular 
challenges this profession faced in the young state and industrializing society. In 
juridical self-perception lawyers were an intermediate group between state bu-
reaucracy and the people. Michael John writes: 
15 Kettel and Loader assert that already to Wilhelm von Humboldt: “‘Bildung’ embodied the 
notion that a conjunction of individual self-cultivation, collective cultural achievement, and a 
public order both prosperous and ethical belonged to the natural course of social development.” 
David Kettler & Colin Loader, ‘Weimar Sociology,’ in P.E. Gordon & J.P. McCormick, Weimar 
Thought: A Contested Legacy. Princeton, Princeton UP 2013, 18.
16 Michael John, ‘Between Estate and Profession: Lawyers and the Development of the 
Legal Profession in Nineteenth-Century Germany,’ in Blackbourn & Evans 1991, 163, 170.
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[L]awyers came to see themselves as ‘organs of the administration of justice’, as a Stand whose 
existence and claims to status were justified in terms of an abstract notion of public service. In 
this there were many parallels with the bureaucracy’s self-image as a ‘universal estate’.17 
Lawyers’ working conditions and horizon were bound to the state. By far, most 
of those who were legally trained found a job within the public sector. Thus the 
professional appreciations and commonly upheld virtues were related to this vo-
cational status as “a legal civil servant of the people.”18 The profession was 
unique in its simultaneous universality and exclusiveness both in terms of inter-
national comparison and among other German middle class professions. Contra-
ry to, for example, the British legal class, the work of a lawyer or a judge in 
Germany was officially regulated in a manner that necessitated a state-provided, 
special education.19 The lawyer ‘estate’ was by no means a closed profession. 
Anyone, despite their origin or fortune, could apply. However, one part of this 
universally available education was a relatively long and unpaid practice, which 
a candidate had to conduct in an organization that dealt with legal matters.20 
Usually it meant a commission in an organ of state bureaucracy, where a jurist 
could continue to work, this time with salary, after his graduation. Throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a regular over-supply of the le-
gally trained in comparison to the posts available.21 Thus, the education itself 
posed an obstacle for a wide and socially equal entrance to the lawyer Stand. Not 
many could afford the apprenticeship, especially if the income after graduation 
was insecure, and, in any case, not very generous. 
These particular conditions created a culture which strongly upheld and appre-
ciated self-imposed service over economic gain. The financial conditions of the 
legally trained were of course an important and often referred to matter in the 
publications of jurists, but complaints and expressions of discontent were direct-
17 John 1991, 175.
18 John 1991, 184.
19 Wilhelm Bleek, Von der Kameralausbildung zum Juristenprivileg. Studium, Prüfung und 
Ausbildung der höheren Beamten des allgemeinen Verwaltungsdienstes in Deutschland im 18. 
und 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin, Colloquim Verlag 1972, 50–54. The education of lawyers was 
strongly attached to the Humboldtian tradition, which guaranteed a certain freedom of teach-
ing, and a strong link with philosophical (and later psychological) discourses. F. Ranieri, ‘Ju-
risten für Europa: Wahre und falsche Probleme in der derzeitigen Reformdiskussion zur 
deutschen Juristenausbildung,’ in JZ 52 (1997), 801, 804–805, 807–808.
20 Rüdiger Vom Bruch, Gelehrtenpolitik, Sozialwissenschaften und akademische Diskurse 
in Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner 2006, 377–378; John 1991, 
166.
21 Hannes Siegrist, ‘Bürgerliche Berufe. Die Professionen und das Bürgertum,’ in Hannes 
Siegrist (Hg.), Bürgerliche Berufe: Zur Sozialgeschichte der freien und akademischen Berufe 
im internationalen Vergleich. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1988, 31–32.
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ed to the state, which remained the main source of lawyers’ income. Also, the 
arguments on behalf of more reasonable compensation to the ‘estate’ were based 
on its common neglect of economic profit. Contempt for personal economic gain 
became a virtue, which elevated the jurist Stand above other groups. This same 
criteria was similarly applied in making inner group distinctions. The Winkelad-
vokaten [hedge advocates] were legal advocates who took small cases, which 
lacked any significance in the perspective of the general public or the state, but 
were at least moderately well paid.22 Thus in the jurist self-definition of the nine-
teenth (and early twentieth) century the Stand was distinguished from society, 
and also from other professions in Bildungsbürgertum by the virtue of its inner 
morals, a visible symptom being the disdain shown to money by its members.
2. The ‘war generation’: Franz Wieacker and the social history  
of German legal scholarship
Equipped with the ideological premises elaborated above, Wieacker followed in 
his father’s footsteps and chose a career in law. After Tübingen, Wieacker moved 
to the University of Göttingen, and in 1930 to the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in 
Freiburg.23 During these years Wieacker became acquainted with numerous peo-
ple whose friendship he valued throughout his life. First of all, in Göttingen he 
met Fritz Pringsheim, who as a supervisor and mentor represented an academic 
father figure par excellence to the young Wieacker. In Freiburg Wieacker estab-
lished life-long friendships with Erik Wolf and Ernst Forsthoff, and it was also in 
Freiburg, via Forsthoff’s political activity, that he got in touch with national aca-
demic celebrities like Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger. As the youngest member of 
Forsthoff “circle” Wieacker participated in seminars where the leading young 
conservative revolutionaries analyzed the state of the nation and experimented 
with new ideas.24 In 1932 Wieacker completed his doctoral dissertation with a 
monograph Lex commissoria. Erfüllungszwang und Widerruf im römischen 
Kauf recht and, in October 1933, followed Forsthoff to the University of Frank-
furt.25 During that year National Socialist seized power in Germany and started 
to transform Germany into a totalitarian nation. 
22 John 1991, 183.
23 Liebs 2010, 24.
24 Meinel 2012, 42.
25 Franz Wieacker, Lex commissoria. Erfüllungszwang und Widerruf im römischen Kaufre-
cht. Berlin 1932; On the move to Frankfurt, see Behrends 1995.
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In order to have an insightful picture of Franz Wieacker’s thoughts and actions 
following the political “revolution” of 1933, and also to understand the later de-
velopments in his academic production, one aspect has to be taken into account. 
Franz Wieacker represented the “war generation,” a generation of Germans born 
between 1902 and 1908. Thus to Wieacker, in addition to the ideological premis-
es elaborated in the preceding pages, the generational experience of the First 
World War and its consequences became a basic factor behind his perception of 
society during the interwar years.26 The European nation states had already 
standardized upbringing, education and the media when they engaged them-
selves in a new kind of total war in 1914. The war generation, which was just old 
enough to understand but too young to participate, experienced the events of the 
First World War from the “Heimatfront” [home front]. From this safe distance, 
and innocently unaware of the true horrors of the battlefield, they nevertheless 
with the help of mass-media gained a strong experience of nationalism and were 
aware of the outrageous death-toll. This cohort, protected from the horrors of the 
front, but very open to war propaganda, gained a personal experience of the 
Great War that was often patriotic, dominated by national feeling, and directed 
against outside dangers. 
Ernst Forsthoff, Werner Weber, Erik Wolf, Gerhard Dulckeit, Karl Larenz, 
Friedrich Schaffstein, Hans Welzel, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Wolfgang Siebert, Karl 
Michaelis, Georg Dahm, Martin Busse, Hans Thieme and Franz Wieacker were 
all born between 1902 and 1908, Wieacker being the youngest of this group. Not 
only was the First World War a decisive key experience in their life history, they 
also witnessed at first hand the struggles of the Weimar Republic and the empty 
liberal promises it failed to deliver. They felt the consequences in their own 
everyday reality, in their families and personally as young students. 
There were concrete and indisputable reasons for the feelings of disintegration 
and for suspicions about one’s personal and collective future. Germany had lost 
the war and, it was felt, had been maltreated by the victors and neighboring coun-
tries. The shadow of Bolshevism was a constant reminder of how civic society as 
they knew it could be threatened.27 The social contract between classes, groups 
26 Ulrich Herbert uses the concepts “Kriegsjugendgeneration” or “Generation der Sachlich-
keit”. See Ulrich Herbert, ‘“Generation der Sachlichkeit”. Die völkische Studentenbewegung 
der frühen zwanziger Jahre in Deutschland,’ in Frank Bajohr, Werner Johe & Uwe Lohalm 
(eds.), Zivilisation und Barbarei, Die widersprüchlichen Potentiale der Moderne. Hamburg, 
Hans Christians Verlag 1991, 115–143; cf. Roseman 1995, 27; Donson 2010; Meinel 2012, 
24–27. Even if one rejects the Mannheimian idea of key moments which form the ideologies of 
an entire cohort, it is obvious that this group confronted drastic phenomena, which were ho-
mogenized in an unprecedented way. Cf. Karl Mannheim, ‘Das Problem der Generationen,’ in 
Kölner Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Soziologie 7 (1928), 157–185, 309–330.
27 On the threat of Bolshevism, see Max Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf [1919],’ in Johannes 
612. The ‘war generation’
and parties had lost its legitimacy after the Revolution and Civil War of 1918–19. 
The Reichstag was inefficient and made democracy seem powerless. Violence in 
the streets was more a rule than an exception. Hyperinflation and the Great De-
pression had ruined the possibilities for improved living conditions for millions 
of people.28 
Values which for decades had unified the middle classes even on the level of 
manners and gestures, and which had defined the mental status quo of the Hei-
mat, ceased to have the same significance in the chaotic years immediately after 
the First World War. The bourgeoisie now felt that the norms controlling society 
were artificial, unrelated to the actual needs and goals of the people.29 In short, 
many felt that society, both in everyday practices and with respect to future ex-
pectations, was undergoing a disastrous change and individuals could no longer 
achieve the standards which were previously valued as comprising a good life.30 
Winckelmann (ed.), Max Weber: Gesammelte politische Schriften. Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr 
1988. Weber’s text was originally a talk given at the University of München in 1918, when the 
tension, which later surfaced in the Civil War, already existed and was felt personally by the 
students to whom Weber addressed his speech. On the more undefined fear of Bolshevism 
among the Bildungsbürgertum, see Carl Schmitt, ‘Diktatur,’ in Carl Schmitt, Staat, Grossraum, 
Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916–1969. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1995, 36–37. 
28 Martin H. Geyer, Verkehrte Welt: Revolution, Inflation und Moderne, München 1914–
1924. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1998, 379–405.
29 Geyer 1998, 379–382. This was clearly how Franz Wieacker thought, both in private and 
in his publications. The latter part of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, roughly from the 
French Revolution onwards, is a critical and pessimistic presentation of the development in the 
European legal system and consciousness. Wieacker was not alone in his cultural pessimism. 
Cf. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Welthistorische Perspektiven. Beck 
1923; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticiza-
tions. [1929]. Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1996.). About the degeneration of bour-
geois virtues, see Moses 2006, 79.
30 This was not, however, the whole picture. The end of the Wilhelminian Empire and its 
estate system meant the possibility of social upgrading for a large number of the younger mem-
bers of the lower middle class. (Hans Mommsen, ‘Generationskonflikt und Jugendrevolte in 
der Weimarer Republik,’ in Thomas Koebner, Rolf-Peter Janz & Frank Trommler (eds.), “Mit 
uns zieht die neue Zeit.” Der Mythos Jugend. Frankfurt am Main, 1985, 50–67.) It is probable 
that the deep cultural pessimism, expressed especially in academia, was a symptom of a rela-
tional degradation. Whereas insecure future prospects and unclear economic situation of the 
early twentieth century were nothing new for the tenants and workers, to the bourgeois gener-
ation the degradation of their own economic conditions seemed as the infinite structures of the 
society were shaking. With respect to economic possibilities and secured career options, the 
bourgeoisie found itself on the same level with the lower social classes. Since the vague but 
important notion about the “social quality of life” is constructed in referring the living condi-
tions and future prospects of one’s community to the preceding times, but foremost to other 
social groups, to the young bourgeoisie the social changes of the 1920s and 1930s represented 
a disaster.
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This sense of loss was accompanied by feelings of envy and injustice. As the 
structures of the German way of life collapsed or were dismantled, some individ-
uals seized the moment for personal gain, tearing up the cultural guidelines for 
what had previously been regarded as accepted and decent. In sociological terms, 
the German middle class faced both a generational and a class crisis.
That was especially noticeable with respect to personal property and income. 
The hyperinflation of 1923 cast some into immediate and unexpected poverty, 
while some, widely resented, made a fortune by speculation. Nevertheless, this 
new wealth tended to disappear as quickly as it came.31 The end result, however, 
was a widespread notion that personal property was no longer the anchor it had 
once been. While pursuing the good life, one could not place trust in the person-
al property or wealth of one’s family, nor even the security of a stable income. 
Instead, those who seemed to benefit most from the situation were immoral op-
portunists who ignored traditional values. The winners were those who detached 
themselves from the cultural frame and aimed for their own selfish good, while 
at the same time preventing others from their rightful share. The word egoism 
often occurred in public discussions and in texts.32 It came to mean an attitude 
and acts which despised the common good and instead ruthlessly pursued indi-
vidual gain. To cultural conservatives egoism was a plague of Weimar society, 
which, notwithstanding that it could be linked with socialism or particular per-
sons, lacked an elaborated definition and was often used as a universal curse 
word. 
Thus, the economic turmoil of the 1920s and 30s for the German middle class 
meant an ontological crisis. The bourgeois values of the middle class were bound 
to their personal property, work, accommodation and a secure future.33 The re-
cession and inflation devalued virtues and collectively esteemed symbols of a 
good, respectable life. A common explanation for this crisis in values, whose 
visible symptom was the surrounding economic turmoil, was to blame either so-
cialists or liberals, or both. Bolshevism as an ideology seemed to challenge 
everything the middle classes believed in. It emphasized the importance of eco-
nomics as a predetermining historical force. It was allegedly based on the same 
‘force’ that in modern capitalism had stripped the middle classes of all the things 
that they perceived to be most significant: the social status accrued in service of 
the state, the dignity provided by personal possessions, and formal education as 
31 Wildt 2009, 32–36.
32 Kühne 2005, 55; cf. Hitler’s speeches and the use of the concept of “egoism” in Sax & 
Kuntz 1992, 195, 199.
33 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Mineola, Dover Publica-
tions 2003, 47–78.
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a superior force shaping the destiny of the nation.34 According to the conserva-
tive bourgeoisie, socialism was a misunderstanding of a perennial kind. Bolshe-
vism was an obvious enemy, but since it could not be associated with any con-
crete social group or visible, common symbol, it remained a primitive, undefined 
threat that needed to be stemmed.35 
The educated middle classes had a patronizing attitude on the lower classes, 
which they combined with the demise of nationalist ideology. The nationalism of 
the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century had presented 
the nation as an organic whole.36 The insurmountable cohesive corporation of the 
people was placed on a pedestal labelled the nation. Furthermore, the bright fu-
ture of the nation was defined by its cultural essence, the Geist, which was in the 
possession of, and was formed by, the educated classes. The nation was per-
ceived in relation to and as opposed to other ethnic units.37 This background 
constituted the nationalistic double-bind of the conservative bourgeoisie.38 On 
the one hand, the nation, the unity of the German people, had proved to be a clear 
misconception. Not all German-speaking people respected the national (cultural 
conservative) values, which the cultural elite perceived as foundational. Nor 
34 Thus, Carl Schmitt in his early work Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923) 
writes of two kinds of barbarism which threatened European bourgeois values: liberal democ-
racy, and the dual threat of Russian barbarism combined with Marxism. The latter was an 
anathema “to West European tradition and education [Bildung].” The class-conscious proletar-
iat and the Russian “masses” were both “barbarians”: “Where they have a sense of their own 
power, they proudly call themselves barbarians.” Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political 
Form [1923]. Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group 1996, 38; cf. Roger Woods, The Con-
servative Revolution in the Weimar Republic. London, Macmillan Press 1996; Udi Greenberg, 
The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014.
35 Naturally, the political parties SPD and KPD were associated with Bolshevism, but it was 
somewhat difficult to accuse the socialists of the destruction of the national and personal bases 
for property. In the end, it was the workers who suffered the most from hyperinflation and the 
recession of the early 1930s. Also the conservative and reconciliatory discourse after the Civil 
War was concerned with the souls of the lower classes. If the workers were isolated and overly 
punished for their engagement in socialist movements, they would only be further radicalized, 
which would lead to the accelerating division and weakening of the nation. Cf. Mosse 1991, 
121–132.
36 Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity. Oxford, Oxford 
UP 2003, 195–199.
37 Anderson 2006, 4–8; The First World War was widely welcomed as the initiation rite of 
this unified organic unit (Mosse 1991, 155–162). However, the Civil War and the unstable so-
cial reality of the Weimar Republic smashed this ideal to pieces. Obviously, some parts of the 
population had not shared the romantic ideals that the learned had carefully constructed during 
the fin-de-siècle. 
38 Kühne 2005, 51.
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were all Germans willing to live under the same social norms or prioritize similar 
material or cultural matters that the educated did. On the other hand, the implicit 
theme in German idealism was that truly meaningful artistic and scholarly work 
could only be created in association with the Geist, the national spirit or tradition. 
The necessity of a culturally unified whole was countered by the impossibility of 
gathering all Germans within the same community.
The relational plight to which the post-war years drove the bourgeoisie did not 
mean to them merely economic recession; it meant that social dignity and per-
sonal prospects faced a chaotic future.39 Hyperinflation and recession ate away at 
the certainty of continuity for upper-middle class children; a fixed economic sta-
tus vanished when a salary ceased to be anything more than a provider of subsist-
ence living standards. Universities in Germany were multiplying and growing 
bigger, and the total number of graduates was increasing every year. In addition, 
the new academic fields of economics and the social sciences produced profes-
sionals who were ready to compete for the jobs which had traditionally been the 
domain of jurists. Education no longer had the distinctive meaning that it had 
previously possessed.40 The socially acknowledged status which lawyers as the 
‘organs of the administration of justice’ had had, existed no more. 
Whereas Hitler’s succession has traditionally been explained by the frustration 
of the lower middle classes, I agree with scholars who hold that this view is too 
simplistic. Having said that, this does not eradicate the fact that serious frustra-
tion, disappointment and bitterness existed amongst the bourgeoisie, and on 
some levels the behavior and ideas which those emotions generated, supported 
the rise of the Third Reich. My argument is that Franz Wieacker, along with oth-
er scholars in his circles, experienced firsthand the change in bourgeois ideals 
which were brought about by the social and political developments. Wieacker 
studied the preceding tradition from the perspective of Weimar, as well as reflect-
ed on the explanations other scholars had given about the contemporary world, 
but far from merely repeating these discourses in his writings, he used that mate-
rial as a conceptual resource in expressing his historical vision. This becomes 
evident in his ideas on the rule of law and justice as expressed by the concepts 
Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen.
39 See fn.  180.
40 Wildt 2009, 40–41; cf. Christian Jansen, Vom Gelehrten zum Beamten. Karrierverläufe 
und soziale Lage der Heidelberger Hochschullehrer 1914–1933. Heidelberg, Verlag Das Wun-
derhorn 1992, 10–15.
III. Rechtsbewusstsein:  
The cruel reality and human awareness
In this chapter I scrutinize the ways in which the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein, 
legal consciousness, appeared in Franz Wieacker’s scholarly texts. I analyze the 
ways he defined the concept in congruence with his personal experience of the 
surrounding society, as well as how he used it to explain social phenomena in the 
past. To Franz Wieacker, Rechtsbewusstsein signified a wider mentality prevail-
ing in a given society or constellation, and its study presented a starting point for 
a researcher in his quest for commenting on the rule of law and legal historical 
development. It was a common mental perception of the legal system of his time, 
and as such it was a temporal understanding of the relations between the state, its 
people, and the law. In other words, legal consciousness was the people’s opinion 
on the rule of law. 
This understanding, of course, had to do with the concrete institutions of law 
and jurisprudence. Nevertheless, Wieacker always regarded legal consciousness 
as welling from – and thus it had to be understood in relation to – the social struc-
ture, its distinguishing cultural values and virtues, and the status of an ideal kind 
of education prevailing in society. In his works he emphasized the mental sphere 
of legal systems. Hence, the historiographical concept of Rechtsbewusstsein was 
also comprised of the narrower entities of Stand and Bildung. The treatment and 
value which a given time and society gave to Stand and Bildung, were reflected 
in that society’s legal consciousness. On the other hand, in his own circumstanc-
es, Wieacker believed that German legal consciousness evolved according to the 
changes he experienced as a member of the Juristen-Stand and as a learned 
scholar who was devoted to the task of studying the high spiritual achievements 
of past thinkers, and aware of the value this past knowledge enshrined. 
In analyzing the meaning of the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein in Franz 
Wieacker’s texts, one cannot treat it solely as a legal tool, a fashionable slogan, 
or a personally constructed idea. Rather, the meaning as it emerges in Wieacker’s 
texts, was based on his learnedness in previous legal theories, the prerequisites of 
the current political and social situation, as well as his individual interpretation 
and experience of those two domains – the scholarly tradition and changing so-
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cial circumstances in Germany. Thus I intend to study Wieacker’s idea of Rechts-
bewusstsein –along with the terms which he also used to depict that abstraction 
– as a result of the intertwinement of personal experience, historical develop-
ment, and scientific discourse. My claim is that although Wieacker studied the 
legal consciousness of the past and derived from them his comments on present 
society, in reality his research process was more like a circle. Through his expe-
rience of the contemporary legal consciousness (the current situation regarding 
Stand and Bildung) he perceived the historical events and texts, and then via that 
construction made a claim about the nature of his contemporary society and what 
it should become in the future. 
Since I study Wieacker’s concepts as metaphorical linguistic tools, I have di-
vided the forthcoming analysis into three spheres. The term Rechtsbewusstsein 
was not Wieacker’s own invention. It had been used by earlier legal theorists and 
was an established concept in the legal scientific discourse of twentieth-century 
German jurisprudential vocabulary. Thus, in the forthcoming section on lan-
guage I briefly elaborate the meanings that the concept had, and explore the vo-
cabulary which Wieacker had at his disposal when writing about the past. It also 
illuminates the means by which other scholars studied the past phenomena which 
Wieacker was interested in. 
In the section on culture I analyze the social and political changes which took 
place during the time frame of my study, and which affected the ideas of Stand 
and Bildung. This general historical development overshadowed Wieacker’s un-
derstanding of legal consciousness, but by no means predetermined his thoughts 
and writings. Thus, following the section on culture, I present how Wieacker 
personally conceived the society of his time, and scrutinize how the political and 
social changes were perceived through the shared world view of a group of 
scholars (see III 3. on affections). I show that a scholarly culture of understand-
ing the contemporary world existed. The focus of this scholarship related to na-
tional development, but it also distinguished distinct virtues and valuations. This 
section on the relation between the national and scholarly cultures is mainly con-
cerned with analyzing Franz Wieacker’s correspondence with his friends as well 
as elaborating the meanings that other scholars in his close group of colleagues 
gave to contemporary phenomena. Finally, I compare my results to Wieacker’s 
scholarly texts and clarify how the meanings in the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein 
changed in the course of his career.
The section on language provides the overall historiographical usage of the 
term Rechtsbewusstsein in the discourse of German legal science, and covers the 
period from 1933 to 1968. In order to avoid repetition, and to highlight the con-
ceptual changes in Wieacker’s texts, I have split the timeline into two periods. I 
analyze the general political and social change, the cultural view upheld by 
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Wieacker and his peers, and the change of meanings in Wieacker’s scientific 
texts (in this order) first from 1933 to 1945, and then scrutinize the post-war sit-
uation from 1945 to 1968. In line with the research questions posed at the begin-
ning of this book, the following analysis will focus on these questions: What did 
Rechtsbewusstsein actually signify to Franz Wieacker? In which ways was it re-
lated to the general social and political change of twentieth-century Germany? 
What part did the notions of Stand and Bildung play within the concept? And 
how did the use of the concept in Wieacker’s legal change over time?
1. Language in Rechtsbewusstsein: The scientific horizon and  
the previous tradition of the concept
Bewusstsein has been translated as “consciousness” or “awareness.” These words 
however fall short of the meanings which the German concept connotes. Be-
wusstsein (as well as Gewissen and Schöpfung) carry along with them whole in-
tellectual weight of historism, i.e. the attempt to redefine tradition in the fields of 
social interaction and scholarship. Thus the romantic counter-effect, especially in 
Germany, was to defend the holistic idea of man, society and history. To Hegel 
(as well as Hume, Kant, and Husserl) science and the cultivated mind were to be 
understood as the co-work of the senses and experience, where experience meant 
accumulated and categorized information.1
The concept of Rechtsbewusstsein needs to be analyzed against the idealist 
background as it appeared in Carl Friedrich von Savigny’s texts.2 Savigny as a 
legal theorist belonged to the Romantic counter-movement which questioned the 
enlightened and utilitarian formulations of jurisprudence and justice. The legal 
tradition emerging from the French Revolution, Napoleonic codification, and, for 
example, Jeremy Bentham’s radical philosophy, treated law as an unattached 
system that was legitimate and functional regardless of time and place. 
Savigny emphasized the cultural background and history of a legal system. Far 
from being disconnected rational constructions, legal systems were an organic 
part of the culture and the people whom it served. According to Savigny, laws 
needed to have reference to the sense of justice of a people. This sense, Rechts-
bewusstsein, emerged from the collective experience of the people. Thus, it was 
created over time, it had features which distinguished it from the awareness of 
1 Carr 2014, 8–30.
2 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870–1960. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 2004, 42–46.
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other ethnicities, and it could not be reduced to “mere” reason.3 As such, it also 
represented all the sides we attribute to human behavior, not only the rational, 
easily understandable, goal-directed and clearly articulated visible action, but 
also affect-based, unconscious and malevolent actions. To successfully utilize 
and study law, one had to have an understanding of the social context in which it 
operated, which also meant that a society and its legal consciousness, Rechtsbe-
wusstsein, were in continuous development and the law as well as scholarly pres-
entation about it had to adapt to this process.4 This feature was not only a deci-
sive factor in Savigny’s formulation of the concept, but was closely contingent 
with his view on the world of science in more general terms. To Savigny, the 
political level of society moved fast and often in an opposite direction to the most 
“natural” and beneficiary one from the point of view of people’s consciousness 
of law. In his own time this was concretized in the social reforms of the estate 
system, in education and the economy, and in making administrative rearrange-
ments to actions that were not ethical or just.
The problematic was picked up and further developed by the German free law 
movement, the Freirechtsschule, among whom could be counted Hermann Kan-
torowicz and Eugen Ehrlich. Whereas Savigny was content to describe the divi-
sion and incompatibility between politics and law, between norms and social 
reality, Freirechtsschule wished to challenge the whole education and under-
standing of legal matters in order to have an effect on the political reality. To 
Kantorowicz and Ehrlich, law had distanced itself from the social reality (Wirkli-
chkeit). Codified and parliamentary legislation could not keep up with the social 
changes which people faced in their everyday world. Neither were the traditional 
theories of, for example, the Historical School flexible enough to describe socie-
ty. Thus, legal science’s contribution to society had become insufficient to pro-
vide solutions to the perennial problems of freedom, justice, and authority.5 To 
Ehrlich, law was a social psychological phenomenon, and the state’s legislation 
and norms should not be perceived as the only or most important form of law. In 
order to study the law one had to acknowledge the opinio necessitatis, i.e. the 
belief that an action is carried out as a legal and social obligation.6 Kantorowicz 
3 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts. Vol.  1. [1840]. Aalen 
Scientia 1981, 14–16.
4 Ibid., 45.
5 E. Ehrlich, ‘Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft [1903]’ reprint as ‘Judicial 
Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects,’ in Bruncken & Register (ed.), Science of 
Legal Method. Boston, Boston Book co 1917.
6 To Ehrlich, opinio iuris ac necessitatis was a feeling, awareness or hunch that one needs 
to yield to a behavior dictated by a social norm (e.g. queuing). Usus, the behavior dictated by 
this social norm, is constantly reproduced by the social norm itself. Marc Hertogh, Living Law: 
Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich. Portland, Hart 2009.
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concentrated on the sociological bases of the law within society and tried to his-
toricize its practices. He stressed the significance of a lawyer class and praised 
the values it upheld or should uphold.7
Legal positivism and the jurisprudence of interests acknowledged the same 
dilemma as Savigny and the Freirechtsschule, but took a totally different point of 
departure. In the influential texts of Hans Kelsen, law was firmly separated from 
the realm of commonly appreciated values.8 To legal positivists, law was an 
isolated construction of norms which created a system of its own, and it could 
only be studied and analyzed as such. Furthermore, and according to especially 
Kelsen, legal interpretation had to be conducted from within the hierarchical 
system of law. The meaning of a given norm could only be understood through 
its relation to another, more general and higher norm. The task to understand the 
original intentions of the lawgiver was irrelevant in applying the law, nor was it 
fruitful to scrutinize the variations of a given norm in different circumstances and 
times.9 In later times ‘legal positivism’ became a curseword among legal schol-
ars, since it seemed to allow the fragmentation of a previously coherent legal 
system and consequently led to the legal disarray emblematic of the late Weimar 
Republic.10 During that time the rapidly changing social situation was handled 
– or at least that seemed to be the plan – by giving detailed and incoherent laws 
and in order to extend the government regulation to all possible aspects of social 
interaction. Such a situation was being lambasted by Carl Schmitt as “motor-
ized” legislation.11 
In the 1930s the aversion to legal positivism among legal scholars was wide-
spread. Not only Carl Schmitt, the conservative revolutionaries and the new gen-
eration of National Socialist lawyers, but also other conservative scientists like 
Paul Koschaker attacked the “immoral” theories of legal positivism and the juris-
prudence of interests.12 The combination of failed Weimar legislation and legal 
7 Hermann Kantorowicz, ‘Was ist uns Savigny? [1911],’ in Hermann Kantorowicz, Rechts-
historische Schriften. Karlsruhe, C. F. Müller 1970, 397–417.
8 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik 
[1934]. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2008; Rudolf Stammler, Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte. 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft [1902], Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 
1964.
9 Kelsen 2008.
10 Cf. Schmitt 1996.
11 Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft [1943/44],’ In Verfas sung-
rechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924–1954. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1958. Franz 
Wieacker quoted this metaphor in his Privatrechtsgeschichte, but insisted that it first came from 
Werner Weber. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 330 fn.  4. 
12 See Paul Koschaker, Die Krise des römischen Rechts und die romanistische Rechtswis-
senschaft. München, Beck 1938.
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positivism was one thing, the removal of scholarly interpretation in legal deci-
sions, to which it in practice led, was another. Not only was legal positivism 
perceived as a low point in the long line of legal development where theoretical 
frames and constructions of legal systems subordinated the value of individual 
juridical consideration,13 but also the codification and systemization of law erad-
icated the status of legal interpretation, which had traditionally been in the pos-
session of the class of lawyers.14 When the focus in preserving the legality of the 
nation moved from the judgments and contracts of the legally trained to the ac-
tions of the lawgiver, the parliamentary state, it had consequences for the relative 
social status of the lawyers and judges, but undoubtedly it also awakened many 
serious difficulties considering the applicability of the laws in varying situations. 
To legal scholars the law and reality were still (and possibly even more than ever) 
too separated from each other. 
Thus the task which the legal scholars of the war generation, Franz Wieacker 
included, took over, was to redefine old and invent new conceptual legal tools in 
explicating the common mental space between legislation and the changing so-
cial reality to which it referred. This task necessitated an understanding of what 
society really was, and the kind of pursuits, standards and competing organiza-
tions it was comprised of. Since legislation and legal interpretation were sup-
posed to be grounded on a national awareness of justice, which elements in soci-
ety were the most important, noble and decisive ones with respect to the national 
mentality concerning law and legitimacy? And furthermore, since the national 
legal consciousness was a developing and evolving entity, what particles and 
principles regulated this change, from where did it come and where was it head-
ed? The concept which was supposed to answer and involve the explanations to 
the above questions was named Rechtsbewusstsein.
One cannot gather all the legal scientific streams, schools and thoughts of 
1930s Germany under one banner. The influence of Carl Schmitt’s concrete or-
der-thinking was eminent, as was the conviction that something totally “new” 
was being done in the field of jurisprudence.15 Many scholars of the war genera-
tion, however, were dealing in one way or another with the problem of Rechtsbe-
wusstsein. One reason was the state of legal science, which had to answer the 
misgivings of the previous, positivistic theories, but a more concrete and timely 
13 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 332–339. 
14 John Bell, ‘Continental European Jurisprudence 1850–2000,’ in Michael Lobban & Julia 
Moses, The Impact of Ideas on Legal Development. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 2012, 110.
15 The Kieler Schule called their contributions “Neue Rechtswissenschaft.” Cf. Ernst 
Döhring, ‘Geschichte der Juristischen Fakultät 1665–1965,’ in Karl Jordan & Erich Hofmann 
(Hg.), Geschichte der Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel 1665–1965. Bd 3. Neumünster 
1969, 209–211.
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inducement was the Machtergreifung, the seizure of power, of the National So-
cialist party. The NSDAP announced that it embodied the will of the people, and 
that will should become the guiding principle in all areas of society, including 
law. Thus, young conservative lawyers competed in conceptualizing this will and 
spirit of the people, and tried to define how it should direct jurisprudence, where 
it had emerged and how it could be studied, of what parts it was comprised, and 
in which situations it should be utilized and in what ways. Erik Wolf wrote that 
legal sources and ideals should follow the unity of the “new Rechstbewusst-
sein.”16 Karl Larenz underlined the inevitable unity of norms and “the living or-
der” in the “general consciousness” of the people.17 
Although theorists like Ernst Forsthoff or Carl Schmitt did not use Rechtsbe-
wusstsein as a conceptual tool in describing their theories of legal reasoning until 
their war-time writings, the endeavor to redefine legal thinking in opposition to 
the claims of legal positivism and according to the new political climate pre-
vailed.18 The Rechtsbewusstsein utilized in the writings of 1930s concerning ‘le-
gal renewal’ had similarities with the renewal Savigny had formulated in the 
nineteenth century. Law had to be addressed as an inseparable part of the “peo-
ple,” although the volk of which Savigny and scholars of the ‘legal renewal’ 
wrote about was a different matter.19 For the legal scientist of the 1930s, the 
correct kind of legal thinking that aimed at a just result had to draw its premises 
from actual life, from the values of the people. However, their understanding of 
what “actual life” consisted was heavily influenced by the ongoing political situ-
ation and was not in accordance with empirical social reality in general nor with 
Savigny’s ideas on topic. 
Although it might be possible to analyze the ‘New legal science’, as upheld, 
for example, by the Kieler Schule as a continuation of the older theories of the 
nineteenth century,20 the war generation itself was certain of the radically novel 
16 Quoted in Rüthers 1992, 21.
17 “Die Grundgedanken dieser Gesetze […] sind aber keineswegs vom Gesetzgeber frei 
erfunden oder willkürlich gesetz, sondern von ihm als notwendige Folgerungen aus dem Wesen 
echter Volksgemeinschaft oder dem immanenten Sinngehalt dieser Lebensverhältnisse er-
schaut, ausgesprochen und in das allgemeine Bewusstsein gehoben worden.” Karl Larenz, 
‘Sitt lich keit und Recht [1943],’ in Pauer-Studer & Fink 2014, 208. Emphasis mine.
18 Forsthoff preferred the more multifaceted and sophisticated concept of Daseinvorsorge 
(Meinel 2012, 153–180).
19 Cf. Oliver Lepsius, Die gegensatzaufhebende Begriffsbildung: Methodentwicklungen in 
der Weimarer Republik und ihre Verhältnis zur Ideologisierung der Rechtswissenschaft im Na-
tionalsozialismus. München, C. H. Beck 1994, 14 ff.
20 Okko Behrends, ‘Von der Freirechtschule zum konkreten Ordnungs- und Gestaltungs-
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nature of its work.21 Especially important was to redefine legal concepts so that 
they reflected the ‘völkisch revolution’ and detached the spheres of jurisprudence 
from the false thinking of the previous generations.22 To the conservative young 
lawyers of the ‘New legal science’ the liberal ideas of individual rights and a 
sociality based on compromise were detached from actual reality. Consequently, 
the whole enlightened idea of the liberal state as the provider of just social norms 
had to be rejected, and the relation between people and society had to be under-
stood from the point of view of institutional legal thinking, or concrete order, 
meaning that the tradition and habits of a given group of people were superior to 
any outer interventions of a lawgiver, which referred especially to the parliamen-
tary procedure of the Weimar Republic.23 Thus, a legal system for the future 
needed to be developed and maintained to conform to the actual legal reality of 
the people to whom it related. From these two preceding points emerged the in-
evitable conclusion that an individual could have and should have an inner no-
tion of justice, since he was the one who observed and experienced the reality of 
the ‘concrete order,’ which was in itself comprised by him and his peers. The 
juridical position of an individual was being defined through a “moral bind” he 
or she felt towards the national community. 24 In constructing a legal system and 
analyzing it, it was necessary to take into account this bond between an individ-
ual, his community, and social justice, and furthermore, such a dynamic starting 
point should be embodied in the legal tools and concepts which the ‘New legal 
science’ used.25
denken,’ in Ralf Dreier & Wolfgang Sellert (eds.), Recht und Justiz im “Dritten Reich,” Frank-
furt am Main 1989, 34–79. On Ernst Forsthoff’s work on natural law, see Meinel 2012, 247–
253. 
21 Jörn Eckert, ‘Was war die Kieler Schule?’ in Franz Jürgen Säcker (ed.), Recht und Re-
chtslehre im Nationalsozialismus. Baden-Baden, Nomos 1992, 56–57. 
22 Herlinde Pauer-Studer, ‘Einleitung: Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts. Das Rechtsdenken 
im Nationalsozialismus,’ in Pauer-Studer & Fink 2014, 23; Rüthers 1992, 26.
23 Schmitt 1934. On the diffusion of Schmitt’s concrete-order thinking in jurisprudence, see 
Rüthers 1992, 24–30. 
24 Herlinde Pauer-Studer, ‘“Jenseits vom Chaos und von Interessenkonflikten.” Aspekte der 
Rechtsentwicklung im NS-System der 1930er Jahre,’ in Fritz Bauer Institut Werner Konitzer 
(Hg.), Moralisierung des Rechts. Kontinuitäten und Diskontinuitäten nationalsozialistischer 
Normativität. Jahrbuch 2014 zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust. Frankfurt am Main, 
Campus Verlag 2014, 19–30.
25 Oliver Lepsius, Die gegensatzaufhebende Begriffsbildung. Methodentwicklungen in der 
Weimarer Republik und ihr Verhältnis zur Ideologisierung der Rechtswissenschaft im Natio nal-
sozialismus. München, J.C. Beck 1994.
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Unlike many other concepts which surfaced during the ‘legal renewal’ of the 
1930s, Rechtsbewusstsein remained rather uncontaminated. In the end it was a 
classic legal sociological expression and could be used in the post-Second World 
War German legal scientific vocabulary. Many concepts, such as Konrete Ord-
nung, Erbhof, and Berufstand, had to be silently buried, although the legal ques-
tions they were used to depict might still exist. The significance of the fundamen-
tal dilemma of the distance between reality and norm, was after the Second 
World War more relevant than ever before. The havoc of the German legal sys-
tem in the face of the National Socialist challenge called for healthy and sound 
explanations. Thus, many scholars continued their work on the subject, and some 
stuck to Rechtsbewusstsein as a conceptual vessel in approaching the problem.26 
One of the scholars who adopted Rechtsbewusstsein as a permanent term in his 
scholarly vocabulary was Franz Wieacker. In his post-war works on European 
legal history, the idea of legal consciousness was of fundamental importance, 
although the meaning of the concept had changed from its original usage. I will 
return to this point in the following chapters.
It has been noted that the conceptual core or methodology of German legal 
science altered surprisingly little after the point zero of 1945.27 Thus Rechtsbe-
wusstsein could be used by the same scholars who had used it to back up ‘legal 
renewal’ in order to find a new theoretical framework for a just legal system in 
the Federal Republic, but characteristic to the concept in its post-1945 usage was 
that it now contained religious or metaphysical connotations. 28 Since “heartless” 
and “cold” legal theories were perceived to be a prior reason for the failure of 
jurisprudence, the legal vocabulary of the 1950s and early 1960s leaned heavily 
on mystical or religious grounds.29 Rechtsbewusstsein fitted well to the natural 
law theories so fashionable in 1950s Germany. The usage of the concept seemed 
to enable a way between strict normativism and metaphysical speculation – with-
26 See e.g. Hans Welzel, An den Grenzen des Rechts: Die Frage nach der Rechtsgeltung. 
Wieabaden, Springer 1966, 19: “Es ist ein verhängnisvoller Irrweg gewesen – den zu wieder-
holen nach den Erfahrungen, die wir gemacht haben, unentschuldbar wäre –, dass man die 
soziologische Grundlage der generellen Anerkennung, also die gemeinsame Rechtsüberzeu-
gung, das allgemeine Rechtsbewusstsein u. dgl., zu etwas Normativ-Richtigem, etwas Objektiv 
Gültigem oder Wertvollem, zum ‘objektiven Geist’ emporgesteigert hat” (emphasis mine). 
Forsthoff did not use the concept but continued his work on legal hermeneutics, circling around 
the concept after the Second World War. Meinel 2012, 98.
27 Rüthers 2012, 314–317.
28 See e.g., Walther Schönfeld, Das Rechtsbewusstsein der Langobarden auf Grund ihres 
Edikts. Entwurf einer deutschen Rechtslehre. Weimar 1934, and Grundlegung der Rechtswis-
senschaft. Stuttgart und Köln, Keip 1951; cf. Avenarius 2010, 130–131.
29 Cf. Lena Foljanty, Recht oder Gesetz. Juristische Identität und Autorität in den Natur-
rechts debatten der Nachkriegszeit. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013, especially 23–24.
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out falling for the caveat of an over-rigid theoretical construction – and to main-
tain some sort of contact with the theoretical work carried out during the preced-
ing decades.
This paradigmatic development defined the scientific prerequisites in the 
meaning of the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein. Merely situating Wieacker’s text 
in this framework would not, however, reveal anything from the point of view of 
his historical vision. In order to track the conceptual change in his production and 
study the ideas within them, beside the legal scientific discourse, one needs to 
attach the concurrent political and social development, and scrutinize how 
Wieacker and his group of friends understood it. Hence, in the following chapters 
I concentrate on the social reality of early twentieth-century Germany in general, 
and especially analyze how the domains of Stand and Bildung altered. I also re-
view Franz Wieacker’s personal experience on the changing circumstances 
through his correspondence.
2. Culture in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945:  
The breakdown of the Weimar Republic and National Socialism  
in academia and legal science
To Hitler and the Nazi elite the place of academics and universities was clear 
from the beginning. It has been disputed whether the Nazis had any strategy or 
educational policy,30 but it is clear that they considered higher education in gen-
eral to be degenerate and unmasculine. To National Socialists all training and 
education should proceed from physical attributes and be designed for warfare.31 
The administrative actions of the Third Reich were often confused, overlapping 
and insignificant, but they were carried out in order to fulfill Hitler’s vision of 
education.32 The ultimate purpose for National Socialists policy was to synchro-
30 Aaron F. Kleinberger, ‘Gab es eine nationalsozialistische Hochschulpolitik?’ in Manfred 
Heinemann (ed.), Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich. Teil 2: Hochschule, Erwachsenen-
bildung. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta 1980, 9–30.
31 Ibid., 29; Sax & Kuntz 1992, 309. 
32 “[T]he folkish state must not adjust its entire educational work primarily to the inocula-
tion of mere knowledge, but to the breeding of absolutely healthy bodies. The training of men-
tal abilities is only secondary. And here again, first place must be taken by the development of 
character, especially the promotion of will-power and determination, combined with the train-
ing of joy in responsibility, and only in last place comes scientific schooling […] A people of 
scholars, if they are physically degenerate, weak-willed and cowardly pacifist, will not storm 
the heavens, indeed they will not even be able to safeguard their existence on this earth. In the 
hard struggle of destiny the man who knows least seldom succumbs, but always he who from 
752. Culture in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945
nize, Gleichschaltung, all aspects of society with the Nazi worldview. A holistic 
stance on education was not (and is not) a National Socialist principle. German 
fascists wanted to seize universities, not to decide on the direction of higher ed-
ucation, but in order to silence critical voices, suppress the autonomy of the uni-
versities, and shape German youth to triumph in the inevitable war for survival.33 
To the Nazi elite the only important form of learned knowledge, or academic 
culture, was the code of the military and of war. In their texts ‘education’ [Bil-
dung] was a synonym for arrogant ignorance they pursued to characterize. An 
educated man represented a culture of hierarchy and authority. This culture was 
defined exclusively in terms of relations between men. Thus, Bildung found ex-
pression in inter-male attitudes: “respect,” “reverence,” “courage,” “discipline,” 
“distance,” “obedience,” “integrity,” and above all, “loyalty.”34 Culture and edu-
cation, in this twisted fascist meaning, were significant since they marked the 
essential gap between the masses and the distinguished individual. The latter was 
worthy, the former not. Surprisingly for many commentators, since the idea of 
education upheld by Hitler and the SA could have not been further from the orig-
inal meaning of Bildung, the capture of German academia was an easy one. 
There really was no serious resistance. Fascists like Bernhard Rust, Ernst Krieck 
and Hans Frank quickly took their place as leading officials with respect to na-
tional education, and figures like Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt and Gerhard 
Kittel loyally echoed them and the National Socialist message.35 To translate this 
into contemporary slogans, “thinking with the blood” became curiously synony-
mous with the “concrete order.”36
Since academia did not form a resistant bulwark against the National Socialist 
attempts, the Nazis were able to adjust their ideas on training and learning in 
universities rather early. The first restrictions on higher education were placed in 
April 1933, in order to banish all “foreign” elements, including personnel and 
ideas, from the academic realm. Though the first laws reserved some exceptions 
for war veterans, their implementation meant that the vast majority of teachers 
and students of Jewish descent were dismissed and excluded from the universi-
his knowledge draws the weakest consequences and is most lamentable in transforming them 
into action.” Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 407–12, quoted in Sax & Kuntz 1992, 309.
33 Kleinberger 1980, 90; Koontz 2003, 46–48. 
34 Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies. Volume 2. Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White 
Terror. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press 1989, 46–47. 
35 See Fritzsche 2008, 25–37. Cf. Martin Heidegger, ‘Bekenntnis der Professoren’ [1933]: 
“We see the goal of philosophy in servitude. The Führer has awakened this will in the whole 
nation and has fused it into one single will. No one can be absent on the day when he displays 
his will.” Quoted in Koontz 2003, 46.
36 On the importance of “concrete-order” thinking, see Stolleis 2003; Rüthers 2012, 277–
301.
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ties.37 At the University of Freiburg the purge was conducted by the newly-ap-
pointed rector Martin Heidegger. Kiel University received a dynamic dean in 
K.A.Eckhardt who, in close cooperation with the SA wing of the Nazi party, de-
voted himself to transforming the Kiel faculty of law into a ‘stormtrooper law 
school’ of the Third Reich and its ideologies. In Frankfurt, Ernst Krieck was 
elected the principal of Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität in the spring of 
1933. Krieck was the first university rector to come straight from the ranks of the 
Nazi party, and he immediately started to lecture in support of the “revolution in 
education” and to rearrange the university to meet the standards of the new re-
gime.38 On an ideological and racial level the national Gleichschaltung in univer-
sities was completed between 1933 and 1935, when the Nuremberg laws finally 
cemented the racist doctrines of the NSDAP to the social reality. 
Gleichschaltung was a process which was conducted in the early years of the 
Nazi coup, and Hitler was at this point cautious not to reveal the true destructive 
anti-Semitism of his worldview.39 The very visible grassroot anti-Semitism of the 
NSDAP, mainly evident in the SA and student organizations, did not seem to 
meet with a similar zeal on the administrative and political level.40 This frustrat-
ed hard-core Nazis and members of fascist student organizations, who practical-
ly seized the power in many universities, boycotting the lectures of unwanted 
staff, and threatening, demonstrating against and disrupting the teaching when-
ever it did not conform to their idea of the regime’s official line.41 As a result, in 
1933–1935 there were many people working and studying in the universities, 
who did not fulfill the definition of an “Aryan man,” and who became the target 
of a vigorous bullying campaign by National Socialist organizations. The confu-
37 Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution: 1933–1939. 
London, Phoenix 1998, 17–73; Sax & Kuntz 1992, 140.
38 Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger. Between Good and Evil. London, Harvard UP 
2002; Eckert 1992, 46–55; Grothe 2005, 168–172; Gerhard Muller, Ernst Krieck und die na-
tionalsozialistische Wissenschaftsreform: Motive u. Tendenzen e. Wissenschaftslehre u. Hoch-
schulreform im Dritten Reich Bildungsgeschichte. Weinheim, Beltz 1978.
39 Koontz 2003, 17–45.
40 First of all there were those Jews to whom the April laws of 1933 did not extend, namely 
war veterans, Frontkämpfer, and their families. Additionally, the definition of the “Jude” had 
not yet been implemented (Friedländer 1998, 145–177). There were some active teachers who 
were of distant Jewish origin, who themselves might have thought that this heritage was unim-
portant. Also some parts of the teaching staff lectured, wrote about and supported theories 
which were hostile to the National Socialist worldview. See Wolfgang Ernst, “Fritz Schulz” and 
Tony Honoré, “Fritz Pringsheim” in Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann (ed.), Jurists 
Uprooted: German-Speaking Emigré Lawyers in Twentieth Century Britain. Oxford, Oxford 
UP, 2004, 105–232. 
41 Wildt 2003, 43–55. For the University of Kiel, see Grothe 2005, 170; also Eckert 1992, 
41–43.
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sion between the public statements of the Party, their implementation by the ad-
ministration, and the collective meaning given to fascism, were all part of the 
messy picture of German higher education in the 1930s.42 After the manic and 
concrete actions of 1933, with the purging of libraries and burning of books, the 
Gleichschaltung of schools and universities seemed to grind to a halt in a state of 
administrative and ideological quarreling.43 This feature might also explain why 
some “mistook National Socialism as a conservative movement.”44 The precise 
aim, ideology and policy of the new regime was foggy. Rather, it seemed to be 
constituted of visible individuals whose actions might or might not resemble the 
‘true’ goals of the new political elite. 
The National Socialist bureaucrats responsible for national education attempt-
ed to bring the substance of higher education in line with the party ideology. The 
Nazi Machtergreifung and reformulation of German legal studies occurred at the 
same time, but in the beginning they were unrelated. The new curricula for teach-
ing law at the universities (Studienordnung) was inaugurated in 1935.45 The 
groundwork for the renewal of legal studies and the training of judges had been 
a long process, and the reasons for rearranging the content and focus of the stud-
ies were based on incompatibilty between the education provided and the de-
mands of the jurist’s profession. The widespread general opinion in the discipline 
on the necessity of cultivating an awareness of the historical foundations of law 
and its relation to ‘social reality,’ was translated by Nazi-oriented officials into 
42 This is a feature of Nazi Germany (and any other totalitarian regime). One important 
factor in the successful seizure of power by the National Socialists was the disorganized admin-
istration, where overlapping offices and power-hungry officials fought against each other. This 
state of affairs was maintained by Hitler himself. Views on the intentionality of this chaotic 
administration are divided. (Reinhard Bollmus, ‘Zum Projekt einer nationalsozialistischen Al-
ternativ-Universität: Alfred Rosenbergs “Hohe Schule”,’ in Manfred Heinemann (ed.), Erzie-
hung und Schulung im Dritten Reich. Teil 2: Hochschule, Erwachsenenbildung. Stuttgart, 
Klett-Cotta 1980, 127 fn.  3). Nevertheless, Hitler’s incongruous briefing of subordinates and 
reality-detached rhetoric, enabled him to stay above practical business (Sax & Kuntz 1992, 
165–170). Further it fostered an environment in which the “Nazi ideology” and its implemen-
tation was on many levels created by middle-level functionaries who competed for the favor of 
the Führer or the upper members of the party hierarchy (Koonz 2003, 140). The case of Carl 
Schmitt is illustrative. For many academics he was the personification of the new order in aca-
demia, and his favor was eagerly pursued by many. From his own point of view, he was stuck 
in an endless and bitter battle for power, and in the end he never reached the place beside Hitler 
which he so desperately sought (Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: A Biography, translated by 
Daniel Steuer. Cambridge, Polity Press 2014.). 
43 Koonz 2003, 140.
44 Mehring 2000, 314.
45 Ralf Frassek, ‘Weltanschaulich begründete Reformbestrebungen für das juristische 
Studium in den 30er und 40er Jahren,’ in ZRG GA 111 (1994), 564–591.
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associating legal education with the National Socialist Weltanschauung on the 
nature of social reality.46 As a result, to fascist-minded professors the new Stu-
dien ordnung was an attempt to incorporate National Socialist ideology into prac-
tical legal training.47 National Socialist officials in education took care that the 
new curricula were in keeping with fascist ideas of the superiority of unity and 
power over learnedness. These curricula emphasized the “Neuzeit,” modern 
world, at the expense of the previous focus on German and Roman traditions and 
varying aspects of the national legal system. In brief, the Studienordnung of 1935 
concentrated on the unity of the law, its transformation into a modern phenome-
non, and on the divide between public and private law.48 One could interpret this 
change as a strong attack on Roman law education and tradition in Germany. 
This claim is in a sense true, given the outspoken resentment which the Nazis 
felt towards Roman law. The Party program of the NSDAP, which contained 
overall 25 key points, stated in paragraph 19: “We demand that the Roman law, 
which serves the materialistic world order, shall be replaced by a legal system for 
all Germany.”49 This demand was amplified by many Germanistic scholars, who 
either sincerely perceived Romanist influence as “foreign,” or were ready to 
champion their own field of study at the expense of research on Roman law.50 
Many contemporary scholars, however, saw the “replacement” as merely a rhe-
torical obstacle. The new curricula stressed the importance of assimilating legal 
studies with a personal understanding of the meaning of law. To many scholars 
of Roman law, that had been the true essence of ancient jurisprudence.51 So in a 
way, and according to new Studienordnung, law was again taught as emerging 
from within society, and when legal history managed to retain its place in the 
curricula, many researchers of ancient legal history felt relieved. The initial 
grand announcement of wiping out Roman law was forgotten along with the 
46 Grothe 2005, 191–194.
47 K.A.Eckhardt, ‘Das Studium der Rechtswissenschaft,’ in Carl Schmitt (ed.), Der 
Deutsche Staat der Gegenwart. Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1935; cf. Frassek 1994.
48 Rückert 2010, 77–80.
49 Sax & Kuntz 1992, 72–75. 
50 See e.g. Helmut Nicolai‚‘“Rasse und Recht.” Vortrag gehalten auf dem Deutschen Juris-
tentage des Bundes nationalsozialistischer deutscher Juristen am 2. Oktober 1933 in Leipzig’: 
“Indem wir den ‘totalen’ Staatsgedanken durchführen, tun wir damit nichts anderes, als sowohl 
den liberalen als auch den römischen Rechtsgedanken zu besteitigen und ihn wieder zu erset-
zen durch den deutsch-rechtlichen Gedanken [.],” quoted in Pauer-Studer & Fink 2014, 47; cf. 
Pauer-Studer, ‘“Jenseits vom Chaos und von Interessenkonflikten”’ 2014, 18 fn.  22. 
51 See e.g. Ernst Schönbauer, ‘Vom Bodenrecht zum Bergrecht. Studien zur Geschichte des 
Bergbaurechtes,’ In SZ RA 55 (1935), 183; cf. Winkler 2014 162–172; Franz Wieacker himself 
interpreted §19 of the NSDAP party program to be targeted against the twisted Roman law 
tradition, which had taken place since the Reception of Roman Law in Germany. Wieacker, 
‘Der Standort’ 1939, 55. 
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many other disputes and empty denunciations of the Nazi administration. The 
actual judiciary in the Third Reich, a primary concern of the NSDAP, was syn-
chronized with the fascist principles with more robust actions and arrangements. 
The disfavor of Roman law, however, continued to play a part in academic pow-
er struggles. The persecution of Roman law was an experience felt especially 
among the Romanists, and after the Second World War, the narrative of the un-
tainted core of jurisprudence could be built upon that memory.52 
In 1933, however, it was clear that the new order was hostile to Jews, willing 
to dismantle the traditional sovereignty of the universities, and, at least on the 
rhetorical level, against Roman law. Accordingly, on 26 October 1933 Carl 
Schmitt gave a talk to the German-European Cultural Association about the 
harmful influence of Roman law and the “outsider-race” which cultivated this 
foreign heritage in German society.53 One month later, on 30 November 1933, 
Fritz Pringsheim issued an open letter to Schmitt where he asserted:
As this theme that has already been voiced several times is being received here for the first time 
from a German legal teacher, I may allow myself as a teacher of Roman law these very humble 
questions: (1) which time period is considered? (2) which outsider-race is meant? (3) could 
perhaps personages be named, who would have exercised such influence? You understand, it 
must be important for every teacher of Roman law to either let himself be convinced by this 
thesis or to oppose it. That can, however, happen only after an examination, which can only 
occur after my questions have been answered.54
In his blunt response, Schmitt merely advised Pringsheim to read his (Schmitt’s) 
works. To Pringsheim, the tradition of Roman law stood above any political tur-
bulence or Party Programs. Roman law was German, and moreover, to know 
Roman law was to be ‘learned’ (gebildet); under its banner lay a civilizing legacy 
thousands of years old.55 He understood clearly that the biggest threat to this 
52 Winkler 2014, 163; cf. Paul Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht. München, 
C.H.Beck 1966, IX–XII.
53 Mehring 2014, 305. 
54 “Da diese bereits mehrfach vorgebrachte These hier zum ersten Male von einem 
deutschen Rechtslehrer aufgenommen wird, darf ich mir als Lehrer des Römischen Rechtes die 
sehr ergebene Anfrage erlauben: (1) an welche Zeit ist dabei gedacht? (2) welche fremde Rasse 
ist gemeint? (3) können vielleicht Namen von Persönlichkeiten genannt werden, die einen sol-
chen Einfluss ausgeübt haben? Sie werden verstehen, dass es für jeden Lehrer des Römischen 
Rechtes wichtig sein muss, sich entweder überzeugen zu lassen oder der These entgegenzutre-
ten. Das kann aber nur nach einer Prüfung geschehen, die erst nach Beantwortung meiner 
Fragen erfolgen kann.”, Reprinted in Fritz Pringsheim, ‘Die Haltung der Freiburger Studenten 
in den Jahren 1933–1935,’ in Die Sammlung 15 (1960), 532–538.
55 Ibid.: “Selbst ein neues Parteiprogramm hält den Einfluss dieser geistigen Macht nicht 
auf […]Täte man das erste, so würde man die Deutschen zu den Ungebildetsten der Welt 
machen, aber nicht ändern können, dass das Römische Recht durch die Macht der Geschichte 
in unser deutsches Recht eingegangen ist.”
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tradition, which he held to be characteristically German, was the new political 
elite and the scholars who were willing to follow its ideological guidelines and 
implement the fascist doctrines inside academia. The public talks of the leading 
academics, such as Schmitt, and the government’s intervention into education 
was not “just politics,” but resembled a greater struggle for the fate of German 
Bildung. 
If one takes Fritz Pringsheim as the representative of the values descending 
from imperial Germany and as a defender of the tradition of legal science, Carl 
Schmitt might be seen as the other extreme in the field of legal science. After a 
short period of hesitation following the National Socialist coup, Schmitt became 
the most distinguished scholar to provide academic support for Hitler’s regime. 
Schmitt had been a central figure in the conservative revolutionary movement, 
but participated in what seems to be wholehearted engagement in public discus-
sion, rationalizing the crimes of the Nazis.56 On closer scrutiny, many of the 
scientific texts written by the younger generation of scholars were built on and 
dealt with the concepts and doctrines Schmitt had developed for years, and which 
he now bent to justify Nazi totalitarianism.57 It was also primarily Schmitt who 
steered this anti-formal, legal-sociological discourse to confirm to the racist, ex-
clusive worldview. 
Whereas the war generation of young legal scholars, including for example 
Ernst Forsthoff and Erik Wolf, but also more established figures like Rudolf 
Smend and Julius Binder, all found their scientific nemesis in Hans Kelsen’s 
“pure theory of law,” it was Schmitt who manifested this theory as “Jewish” in 
essence.58 Yet, after a few celebrated years as the highest scientific authority of 
the Third Reich (Schmitt was referred to as Staatsrat or crown jurist), Schmitt 
was replaced by a group of young and racially passionate lawyers, such as Otto 
Koellreutter, Theodor Maunz and Reinhard Höhn, who were also more success-
ful than Schmitt in the power struggles within the Nazi party.59 To the majority of 
academics, however, the division lines within this redefinition of Heimat and 
Bildung, national education, were not that clear. Nevertheless, and especially the 
war generation of young scholars, found the suddenly fashionable discourse of 
revolution in legal science intriguing. Karl Larenz, Ernst Forsthoff and Ernst 
Rudolf Huber among others contributed to the heated discussion following the 
56 Mehring 2014, 275–290.
57 e.g. Grothe 2005, 172; Rüthers 2012, 277–278; Meinel 2012, 36–38.
58 Volker Neumann, ‘Carl Schmitt, Introduction,’ in Arthur Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink, 
Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis. Berkeley, University of California Press 2000, 280–283.
59 Mehring 2014, 342–343, 346–348.
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Nazi coup of power, preaching a renewal of the understanding of the basis of the 
legal system, and the relation between the people and law.60 
The “New legal science” (die neue Rechtswissenschaft) was the vague defini-
tion which the young, conservative scholars of the war generation gave to their 
own orientation.61 The constellation to which the name referred was not unani-
mous or theoretically coherent, but the most important common denominator 
was that the ‘New legal science’ was comprised of young scholars who repre-
sented the war generation.62 They were also united in their battle against legal 
positivism, legal language inherited from the enlightened tradition, the liberal 
idea of the relation between a citizen and the state, and the form of academic 
practices and education that had appeared during the late years of the Weimar 
Republic. In their scientific perspectives these young scholars leaned mostly on 
neo-Hegelianism, Carl Schmitt’s theory of concrete order, or outright racist ide-
ology. In the ‘New legal science’ the people were primarily connected to their 
society through value-based ties like “responsibility,” “communality,” and “hon-
or,” and this institutional and communal foundation should also guide the per-
ception of future jurisprudence, as well as shape legal education and regulate the 
textual and linguistic tools which German lawyers used. The academic endeav-
ors of the new generation of scholars found congruence with the National Social-
ist view of society and the political purposes of fascist administration. 
Legal scientific texts were used to support a racially based, oppressive poli-
cy.63 Just as young scholars sought to reverse the liberal concepts of law, to 
60 Stolleis 2003, 9.
61 Franz Wieacker, ‘Das Kitzeberger Lager junger Rechtslehrer [1936],’ in Wollschläger 
(ed.) 2000, 163; cf. Karl Larenz & Georg Dahm (eds.): Grundfragen der neuen Rechtswissen-
schaft. Berlin 1935.
62 The ‘New legal science’ was not, of course, a closed establishment. It was a term which 
Wieacker himself used in attempting to give shape to a movement of young scholars to which 
he himself contributed (Wieacker, ‘Das Kitzeberger Lager 9[1936], 163–176). One impartial 
way to map the participants of the ‘New legal science’ is to follow Wieacker’s elaboration. 
Nevertheless, when Franz Wieacker later wrote of the contributions made by the ‘New legal 
science’ he referred to his acquaintances and friends from the universities of Frankfurt, Kiel and 
Freiburg. Basically, this meant the scholars of the Kieler Schule, Ernst Forsthoff, Werner Weber 
and Erik Wolf. Cf. Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung der römischen Rechtsgeschichte’ 1939; Wieacker, 
‘Vielfalt und Einheit der deutschen Bodenrechtswissenschaft der Gegenwart. Über die Umge-
staltung des Grundstückrechts durch die heutige Bodenpolitik [1942],’ in Wollschläger (ed.) 
2000, 431–462.
63 To what extent the legal scientific texts actually had an effect on the practical work con-
ducted in courts is debatable. Rüthers posits legal theory before practical implementations, thus 
shifting the responsibility for the immoral judicature of the Third Reich onto the ‘New legal 
science’ (Rüthers 2012). It seems that at least in criminal law new positions taken by a younger 
generation of legal scholars did have a real influence (Pauer-Studer & Fink 2014, 532–542). 
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Goebbels, for example, ‘enlightenment’ and ‘capitalism’ were plots against the 
German people.64 When Ernst Forsthoff, Karl Larenz and many others wrote in 
support of an institutional, concrete understanding of the law, National Socialists 
demanded the priority of racially pure Volksgemeinschaft, the people’s commu-
nity, which should be the starting point and a point of reference for all common 
activity.65 And finally, whereas the Kieler Schule upheld the idea of the morality 
of law, and its personal significance and binding nature for individual awareness, 
the totalitarianism of Hitler demanded absolute submission of all citizens.66 In 
pointing to the, to a degree coincidental, parallels in the legal scientific discourse 
and Nazi rhetoric, I do not wish to diminish the responsibility of the academics 
at that time. In the end, it was they themselves who redefined their theories and 
paradigms so that they became loyal and submissive to National Socialist ideol-
ogy. Likewise in legal science, the process of “coming together” with the Nazi 
ideology was more of a process of Selbstgleichschaltung (self-synchronization) 
then outer Gleichschaltung.67 Furthermore, when the legal scientific culture was 
transformed to reflect the fascist worldview, the committed heralds and apostles 
of this science of the Third Reich were found amongst the scholar class. 
Some kind of a high-point in fawning of the new political elite of NSDAP in 
legal science was reached at the 1935 meeting of the National Legal Teachers 
Association (Reichsgruppe Hochschullehrer).68 There Carl Schmitt laid out the 
new racial norms that forthcoming scientific works should follow. Scientific 
writings should not refer to the works of Jewish scholars; no Jewish scholars 
should be mentioned by name; no mention could be made of Jewish accomplish-
ments, or if necessary their deeds could be noted as an unnamed and abstract 
influence. Most importantly, the future generations of scholars should see Jews 
as degenerate parasites, merely a momentary setback for German culture. 69 The 
The National Socialist regime, however, did invest a lot in modifying legal science to back up 
its ideological purposes (Grothe 2005, 190) and the evident ambiguity of the concretization of 
the ‘new legal concepts’ and the ‘new reading’ of law in practical juridcature did not prevent 
the ‘New legal science’ from trying to influence matters.
64 Matthew Lange, Antisemitic Elements in the Critique of Capitalism in German Culture, 
1850–1933. Oxford, Peter Lang 2007, 289–296. 
65 Oliver Lepsius, ‘The Problem of Perceptions of National Socialist Law or: Was There a 
Constitutional Theory of National Socialism?,’ in Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh 
2003, 23–24.
66 Sax & Kuntz 1992, 255–262.
67 Cf. Thomas Finkenauer & Andres Herrmann, ‘Die romanistische Abteilung der Savi-
gny-Zeitschrift im Nationalsozialismus,’ in ZSS 134 (2017).
68 Meinel 2012, 229.
69 Carl Schmitt, ‘Schlusswort des reichsgruppenwalters,’ in Das Judentum in der Rechts-
wissen schaft. Ansprachen, Vorträge und Ergebnisse der Tagung der Reichsgruppe Hoch-
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network around Wieacker, scholars who had not yet established themselves as 
authorities in the field of legal sciences, to a degree followed Schmitt’s example, 
but were more hesitant and cryptic in their writings. For example, in his Totale 
Staat, Ernst Forsthoff labelled the degenerate force threatening the social order 
of Germany as “Jewish,” and Erik Wolf defined the false interpreters of domestic 
legal culture as “foreign and non-Aryans.”70 This use of racist rhetoric in the 
works of ‘New legal science’ scholars is evident, but it remained at such an am-
bigious level that these scholars were later able to argue that their texts merely 
reflected the pressure coming from political leaders and administrative policy-
makers rather than expressing their true beliefs.71 
After 1936, perspectives became clearer. The “renewal” of the society and 
higher education started to take the totalitarian shape which the NSDAP had 
aimed for. The ideological struggle and confusion about the virtues and values of 
the “new national culture” was over.72 Concurrently, the injustices committed by 
the fascist administration could no longer be bypassed as merely the unintention-
al side effects of administrative rearrangement. Everyone had a friend, relative or 
acquaintance who had suffered on account of the applied racist doctrines. Hitler 
ordered political murders which were carried out openly, such as when the Nazi 
party was “purged” during the so-called “Night of the Long Knives.” The perse-
cution and exclusion of Jews was evident in the everyday reality of jobs, public 
spaces and the media. Saul Friedländer asserts that at least after the “Night of 
Broken Glass” of 1938, the major part of the German middle classes felt anxiety 
about the unleashed violence which the new government exercised publicly.73 
This social reality of the nation state constituted, or at least should have consti-
tuted, an impossible dead-end for legal scientists in their attempts to interpret the 
fascist actions in good faith and scientifically approve the compatibility between 
the German Geist and National Socialist ideas.74 
schullehrer des NSRB am 3. und 4. Oktober 1936. 1. Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft im kampf 
gegen den jüdischen Geist. Berlin, Deutscher Rechts-Verlag 1936, 28–34; See. p.  44–45
70 Ernst Forsthoff, Der totale Staat [1933], in Pauer-Studer & Fink, 2014, 274: “Darum 
wurde der Jude, ohne Rücksicht auf gusten oder schlechten Glauben und wohlmeinende oder 
böswillige Gesinnung, zum Feind und musste als solcher unschädlich gemacht warden,”; Erik 
Wolf, Richtiges Recht im nationalsozialistischen Staat. Freiburg I Br., Wagner 1934, 15.
71 Another excuse, but also a peculiar fact, was that most of these young scholars had good 
friends of Jewish descent. Arnold Ehrhardt and Ernst Forsthoff, for example, had a very close 
friendship; Erik Wolf’s and Fritz Prigsheim’s connection continued up until Pringsheim’s death 
in 1967.
72 Stolleis 2003, 9.
73 Friedländer 1998, 4.
74 Of course, everyday reality in the late 1930s was a complex affair. After the War when 
scholars and the officials of the occupation administration attempted to distinguish between 
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In universities the emigration of Jewish scholars to the United Kingdom, the US 
and Switzerland reached vast dimensions. Within legal history and Roman law 
Fritz Schulz, Ernst Levy and Fritz Pringsheim were lucky enough to escape; Otto 
Lenel died bitter, unable to understand why his Heimat had turned against him and 
his family.75 Arnold Ehrhardt, a good friend of Wieacker and Ernst Forsthoff, 
found refuge in England after having been bullied and mistreated by both the ad-
ministration and university students. Like Lenel, Ehrhardt was both patriotic and 
conservative in character and had even in 1924 volunteered for the Freikorps to 
fight against the Bolsheviks in Latvia. His service in these proto-SA troops, was 
not however sufficient reason to be given decent treatment.76 Many “Aryan” 
scholars who had previously advocated the “revolution” and hailed the destruc-
tion of the Weimar Republic were disappointed, and tried to withdraw from public 
collaboration with the new administration. Martin Heidegger stepped down from 
his post as Rector of Freiburg University. Erik Wolf made a similar decision ear-
lier. Ernst Jünger, who had never agreed to co-operate with the National Social-
ists, isolated himself and started to write his satirical book On the Marble Cliffs.77 
The young scholars of ‘New legal science,’ among them Franz Wieacker, con-
tinued to pursue their place in first-class scholarship. The dismissal of Jewish 
professors left many chairs in different universities open, and competition for 
these vacancies was fierce. Young scholars continued to publish their works, but 
now they had no choice but to toe the Third Reich line. The arguments in the 
‘New legal science’ had to be compatible with the demands of the political ide-
ology of National Socialism, and the worldview upheld by the fascist administra-
tion. In order to address the questions why this alliance took place, how estab-
lished legal scientific concepts like Rechtsbewusstsein intertwined with National 
Socialist ideology, and why Franz Wieacker among other scholars of the ‘New 
legal science’ adopted, utilized and further developed the legal language to meet 
the ‘revolution,’ one must study the intertwinement of the personal and public 
spheres of society. That is, one must analyze the individual perception of social 
development, and the meaning which the respected individual gives it in discus- 
 
“active” and “passive” Nazis,” it proved difficult to define when the exact “revelation” of the 
criminal nature of the National Socialist regime might have reached the individual. Remy 2002, 
151–155.
75 Pringsheim, ‘Die Haltung der Freiburger Studenten in den Jahren 1933–1935,’ 535–537.
76 Leonie Breunung, & Manfred Walther, Die Emigration deutschsprachiger Rechtswis-
senschaftler ab 1933. Berlin/Boston 2012, 576; Meinel 2012, 53.
77 Koonz 2003, 217; Safranski 2002; Christoph M. Scheuren-Brandes, Der Weg von na-
tionalsozialistischen Rechtslehren zur Radbruchschen Formel. Paderborn, Ferdinand Schö-
ningh Verlag 2006; Elliot Y. Neaman, A Dubious Past: Ernst Jünger and the Politics of Litera-
ture after Nazism. Berkeley, University of California Press 1999, 45–46.
853. Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945
sions with his in-group. As I have already partially shown, and as I intend to ar-
gue in what follows, the reasons are found in the common understandings and 
meanings attached to the concepts of Bildung and Stand.
3. Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945:  
Personal redefinition of Bildung and Stand
In 1935 new national instructions for legal studies (Studienordnung) in Germany 
were given. The doctrine was prepared under the surveillance of K.A. Eckhardt, 
a committed National Socialist and the professor of legal history at the Universi-
ty of Kiel.78 In his official announcement on the new curricula, Bernhard Rust, 
the Third Reich Minister responsible for higher education, commented on the 
historicizing and politicizing of the legal sciences, at which the instructions 
aimed: “The German legal sciences must be made National Socialist.”79 Three 
decades later, in the second edition of his Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit 
(1967), Franz Wieacker commented on the reform and especially the way it em-
phasized some parts of the BGB: “In this sense, it [the Studienordnung] was not 
politically motivated.”80
The state of German legal science in the early years of the Nazi regime con-
centrated on this, at first glance, impossible contradiction. To Minister Rust Stu-
dienordnung was an achievement and embodiment of Hitler’s ‘thinking with the 
blood’. It was a plan to bend higher education to make it serve the needs of a 
fascist state; to raise soldiers who valued the physical over the intellectual and 
found their strength in physical dexterity rather than from the mind. K.A. Eck-
hardt and Reinhard Höhn saw it as a vital extension of the National Socialist 
‘revolution’ to the field of legal science.81 The content of university curricula 
was formally decided in a “Conference for university teachers” held in Berlin on 
20–21 December 1934. The participants were summoned by Carl Schmitt and 
K.A. Eckhardt, and the speakers included Hans Frank and Alfred Rosenberg, 
Rosenberg’s talk being “The Worldview, Law and the Paragraph.” Only two 
weeks later the curricula were published.82 On Christmas Day 1934 after return-
ing from the conference, Wieacker wrote to Erik Wolf about the reform:
78 Grothe 2005, 196. 
79 Grothe 2005, 199.
80 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 440.
81 K.A. Eckhardt, Das studium der Rechtswissenschaft. Hamburg, Hansseatische Verlag-
santalt 1935; Reinhard Höhn, ‘Die neue Studienordnung für Rechtswissenschaft im Rahmen 
der Universitätsreform,’ in Deutsches Recht (1935), 51–53.
82 Winkler 2014, 140–143.
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All presentations on the reform of the lecture plan kept a certain standard, and the final resolu-
tions seem to me, apart from their experimental trait which is inherent of every thoroughly re-
arrangement, quite well done.83 
The main thing for Wieacker was that the compulsory lectures on legal history 
had not been wiped out from the curriculum.84 To Wieacker (and, among others, 
to Ernst Rudolf Huber and Karl Larenz) Studienordnung was first and foremost 
a manifestation of the new kind of jurisprudential stance to legal theory and his-
tory. It was a generational achievement targeted against the stiff and dogmatic 
majority of the academia.85 Its content celebrated the intertwining of practice and 
knowledge. The point of departure for ‘New legal science,’ and accordingly for 
the new Studienordnung, was anti-positivism. The sweeping opinion in the legal 
academia was that the politically corrupted nature of the legal language of previ-
ous decades had to be renewed. German jurisprudence needed to be purified from 
foreign and unhealthy features. The intention was “again” to connect positive 
norms with the spheres of morality and justice.
The other side of the coin was the thorough renewal of national legal science 
to coincide with social change and the National Socialist ‘revolution.’ The ‘New 
legal science’ attempted to redefine legal language, thinking and practices just as 
the National Socialists were (allegedly) renewing the fundamental structures of 
society. Even if one leaves aside racial exclusion, the themes which young schol-
ars called for, namely experience and awareness, in some respect corresponded 
with those called for by National Socialists like minister Rust. From the perspec-
tive of our own times, it is difficult not to perceive the 1935 Studienordnung as 
politically motivated. Its groundwork had started well before 1933 but it was the 
Nazi party who sought to benefit from it by using it for racist goals.86 
Wieacker participated in ‘legal renewal’ with a notable contribution, and pub-
lished regularly in journals whose ideological stance was unmistakenly National 
Socialist.87 He often concentrated in his texts in the 1930s and 40s on the way in 
which the new political order could be assimilated into the substance of legal 
science. In addition he joined in National Socialist associations, most notably the 
NSKK, and in the end, enlisted in the National Socialist party (NSDAP) on 1 
83 “Die Referate über die Neugestaltung des Vorlesungsplans hielten sich alle auf gewisser 
Höhe, und die entgültigen Entschließungen scheinen mir bis auf den experimentellen Zug, den 
jede gründliche Neuordnung enthält, doch ganz wohl gelungen.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf in 
25.12.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
84 Ibid.
85 Eckert 1992, 56; See also Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 409. 
86 Grothe 193–205; cf. Frassek 1994.
87 Winkler 2014, 458–459.
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May 1937.88 Naturally, Wieacker was no expception in the field of legal science. 
Since the research task of this book is to study conceptual change, one cannot 
simply derive conclusions on the nature of Wieacker’s perception on law, the 
people and culture from the common culture of German academia in the 1930s. 
A more detailed view is necessary, including acknowledging the existence of 
mixed intentions in (most of) the legal scientific works during the ‘legal renew-
al.’ An example of the mixed intentions in scholarly works following the Nazi 
coup are the texts of Erik Wolf. Wolf was promoted as a vice-dean by Martin 
Heidegger in 1933, and for a short while Wolf’s writings loyally echoed the 
wishes of the new order, and the scientific elite to which he had now been up-
graded. In his Richtiges Recht im nationalsozialistischen Staate (1934) Wolf 
wrote: “Foreigners and those who are racially of a foreign origin count among 
the non-Aryan peoples, who hold no civil status.”89
The text as whole was for the most part a blunt reproduction of nationalistic 
slogans.90 In January 1934 Wolf sent the manuscript to Wieacker, who responded:
In my eyes the good word from Richtiges Recht receives [in your treatise] a purer meaning than 
its abusive utilization by [Rudolf] Stammler. Your explanations from page 6 ff. on the fixation 
of thinking on the purpose of legal history, were for me – for private use – a strong grip. The 
entire treatise assists in the efforts to read property and family law, so that the contours of the 
new developments and jurisdictions become discernible under the fabric of the shattered histo-
ry of ideas of the 19th century. I am very grateful to you for this.91
Wieacker did not take part in or bathe in the racist rhetoric of the Third Reich. In 
the letters I have succeeded in collecting, there is not a single racist remark nor 
any signs of willingness to propagate fascist ideology. He was, however, willing 
to work with scholars who devalued the rule of law, echoed the racist rhetoric of 
the Third Reich, and openly supported the totalitarian regime. Of course, the 
88 Liebs 2010, 24.
89 “Zu den nichtarischen Volksgästen, denen keine Rechtsstandschaft zukommt, gehören 
rassisch Fremdstämmige und Ausländer.“, Wolf 1934, 15.
90 Wolf did not continue on this path, and later in 1934 he resigned from administrative 
responsibilities and distanced himself from Nazi ideologues and ideologists. This was not the 
case in early 1934, however, nor in his argument in Richtiges Recht. Cf. Scheuren-Brandes 
2005.
91 “Das gute Wort vom Richtigem Recht empfängt mir einen reineren Sinn, als bei seiner 
missbräuchlichen Inanspruchnahme durch Stammler. Ihre Ausführungen S.  6 ff waren für mich 
bei der Fixierung von Gedanken über Ziele der Rechtsgeschichte – zum privaten Gebrauch – 
ein starker Halt. Der gesamte Aufsatz ist eine Unterstützung bei dem Bemühen, Sachenrecht 
und Familienrecht so zu lesen, daß unter den zertrümmerten ideengeschichtlichen Strukturen 
des 19. Jhdts. die Konturen des neuen Aufbaus und der neuen Zuständigkeitszuordnung sicht-
bar werden. Ich habe Ihnen auch hierfür sehr zu danken.“, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934, 
NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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National Socialist attack on the rule of law was camouflaged as a counter-reac-
tion to legal positivism. Wieacker found it easy to participate in this ‘fight,’ since 
for him legal positivism represented the greatest imaginable threat to the legal 
sphere of society in degrading the authority of law. Wieacker saw the time as a 
great challenge to legal science, legal consciousness and German society. This 
challenge was raised by legal positivism and scholars who “utilized abusively” 
the law,92 stripped it of its authority and thus endangered the historical and jurid-
ical basis of German society. The twisted use of history and the meaning of law 
was personified by Rudolf Stammler, who represented the positivistic stance on 
legal science, and to Wieacker, was equivalent to Hans Kelsen and his ‘pure 
theory of law’.93 What connects Franz Wieacker’s pre-war texts is the idea of the 
new generation of jurists, some of which National Socialistically oriented, who 
resembled the “new structure and new jurisdiction” in the society, and primarily 
fought against old twisted legal theories.94 
As mentioned in chapter II, Wieacker moved from Freiburg to the University 
of Frankfurt in 1933. From Frankfurt he steadily reported the events and tones, 
which he either witnessed or personally experienced, to his Freiburg mentor and 
friend Erik Wolf. At the time Wieacker was invited to the university, it seemed a 
dynamic and ambitious faculty where a young scholar could make a career, de-
spite or because of the newly-elected, Nazi-minded administration.95 It is obvi-
ous that in moving to Frankfurt, Wieacker believed he would soon receive a 
permanent position there.96 The structure of legal education in Frankfurt was 
planned by Ernst Forsthoff with the help of Franz Beyerle. In practice this meant 
a “concrete order” view of jurisprudence and a nationalistic treatment of German 
law and legal history, thus implementing the principles that the ‘New legal sci-
92 Cf. above.
93 In 1967 Wieacker describes the works of Stammler (and Hans Kelsen) as bearing a “dis-
tinctive uncompromising [black-and-white, uneigestandene] ethos.” Wieacker, A History of 
Private Law 1995, 589.
94 Cf. Franz Wieacker, ‘Der Stand der Rechtserneuerung auf dem Gebiete des bürgerlichen 
Rechts [1937],’ In Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 241: “Während für den Antipositivismus der neuen 
Forschung und Gesetzgebung die Überwindung des alten Gesetzes durch neues Recht die ei-
gentliche Aufgabe ist, erschien unserm Richter das Gesetz, ob alt oder neu, von je als der Kern 
der Rechtweisung.”; cf. also Franz-Stefan Meissel, Societas. Struktur und Typenvielfalt des 
römischen Gesellschaftsvertrages. Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang 2004, 11–61.
95 Forsthoff seemed to believe that Frankfurt was a progressive university because of its 
declarative National Socialism. Meinel 2012, 52.
96 In the early days of 1934 Wieacker reported to Erik Wolf about the sudden uncertainty 
plaguing the University in Frankfurt, which left many important decisions open. “Wie sich 
meine Beziehungen zur hiesigen juristischen Fakultät gestalten werden, […] ist ungewiss.” 
Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg 
im Breisgau.
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ence’ emphasized and the war generation appreciated. Wieacker was enthusiastic 
about the Frankfurt legal curriculum. 97 The break with the “old ways” was evi-
dent, and, unlike before, universities again seemed to cultivate true Bildung. Law 
education now proposed creating jurists who had assimilated a body of legal 
historical knowledge, and could adjust it to various contexts. This new genera-
tion would be in direction communication with both reality and with the values 
of their community.98
On another level, the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität of Frankfurt was in 
the eye of the storm in 1933 and 1934. During the spring of 1934 fascist student 
organizations demanded changes to the education and the dismissal of staff 
members who were either Jewish or not supportive enough of National Socialist 
ideas.99 One of the victims was Wieacker’s friend Arnold Ehrhardt, who was no 
longer able to teach due to resistance from student organizations as well as from 
some university officials. Although the April law restrictions did not extend to 
Ehrhardt, who had a Frontkämpfer status and was considered Halbjude, in prac-
tice he was not allowed to work.100 Wieacker refers only indirectly to these ten-
sions in his letters to Erik Wolf.101 Mostly Wieacker was worried about the fate 
of the faculty of law in Frankfurt. He reports about the uncertainty plaguing the 
university during the 1934 spring term. There were rumors that Ernst Krieck was 
about to leave the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, which according to 
Wieacker “causes serious anxiety around here.”102 
In May 1934 Krieck did indeed leave for Heidelberg and at the beginning of 
April it seemed that the faculty of law would be subject to serious cuts and reduc-
97 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 19.11.1933, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
98 Ibid; cf. Meinel 2012, 51–53.
99 Dorothee Mussgnug, Reinhard Mussgnug & Angela Reinthal (eds.), Briefwechsel Ernst 
Forsthoff Carl Schmitt (1926–1974). Berlin, Akademie Verlag 2007, 8: “schwierige Lage” and 
“Unruhe der Studentenschaft”; cf. Windt 2009, 53–55.
100 Leonie Breunung & Manfred Walther, Die Emigration deutschsprachiger Rechtswissen-
schaftler ab 1933. Berlin/Boston 2012, 576.
101 In fact, Wieacker only mentions Ehrhardt in his letters after the latter had fled to Swit-
zerland: “Ehrhardt ist in Lausanne ausserlich ganz zufreiden; doch lässt sich nicht voraussehen, 
was am Ende daraus wird.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.12.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Lud-
wig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. Wolf nevertheless knew Ehrhardt (possibly 
through Pringsheim, possibly because Ehrhardt had worked at the University of Freiburg), and 
was aware of his situation.
102 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1933: “Kriecks Ruf nach Heidelberg, der sehr beunruhigt 
ist.” Cf. Wieacker to Wolf 2.4.1934: The worst-case scenario was that the faculty of law would 
have been downsized and other disciplines, namely economics, expanded unprecedently, leav-
ing “juristischen Restbeständen wird zurückbleiben.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universi-
tätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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tions. Wieacker’s hope for a permanent professorship seemed to be in ruins. 103 
However, after a few weeks, the original announcement of a major reduction of 
the faculty was ameliorated to a plan in which the faculty of law would be com-
bined with philosophy department. Wieacker, along with his colleagues, was not 
sure what to think. In addition, three professors from other universities were 
forced to move to Frankfurt, among them the prestigious Roman law professor 
Fritz Schulz.104 This relocation was a result of Nazi legislation since the new-
comers were of Jewish descent, and the decision on both the transfer of “unwant-
ed” scholars as well as the downsizing of the faculty of law at Frankfurt was 
carried out at the Ministry for National Education (Reichserziehungsministeri-
um).105 Wieacker described this as a “collapse.”106 To Wieacker, the fault for the 
catastrophic situation lay with the bureaucratic tendency to reduce the role of 
legal science and jurisprudence, and the contemporary urge to move all the insti-
tutions of higher education to technical training facilities, thus ignoring the his-
torical and cultural values that legal education should stand for. 
By no means does one look into the future with great cheerfulness regarding this matter. At 
least one has given what was taken from the law (and philosophy) departments to the medical 
and natural science departments. There it really seems that one is thinking about an expansion, 
so that the program of having various types of universities becomes more apparent with the 
expansion of the humanities or the sciences.107
The situation was especially dispiriting for Wieacker, who had an emotional 
bond with Frankfurt University. He often wrote of his affection for the natural 
103 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934 “Das bedeutet für mich, daß [mein Plan] ganzlich 
zusammenbricht.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
104 “Die Angelegenheiten in der Frankfurter Juristenfakultät beginnen sich immer neuarti-
ger und origineller zu gestalten. Die Wegberufungen sind durch niemand anderes als die Herren 
James Goldschmidt, Hoeniger, G. Husserl und Fritz Schulz ersetzt worden. Der Studenten-
schaft gegenüber bedeutet dies eine große Erschwerung der Sachlage, und auch wenn man sich, 
wie immerhin möglich, im gemeinsamen Interesse mit ihr auf ruhigen Ausgleich einigt, dürfte 
das Semester gelegentlich bizarre Formen annehmen.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 18.4.1934. NL 
Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau; cf. Hammerstein 2012, 
299–301.
105 Dorothee Mussgnug, Reinhard Mussgnug & Angela Reinthal (eds.), Briefwechsel Ernst 
Forsthoff Carl Schmitt (1926–1974). Berlin, Akademie Verlag 2007, 8.
106 “Zusammenbruch” Wieacker to Erik Wolf in 2.4.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Lud-
wig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
107 “Man sieht hier keineswegs mit großer Heiterkeit in die Zukunft. Immerhin hat man, 
was man der juristischen (und philosophischen) Fakultät nahm der medizinisch-naturwissen-
schaftlichen wieder gegeben. Dort scheint man wirklich an einen Ausbau zu denken, sodass 
sich das Programm der verschiedenen Universitätstypen mit Ausbau je der geisteswissen-
schaftlichen oder naturwissenschaftlichen Seite immer deutlicher abzeichnet.”, Wieacker to 
Erik Wolf 18.4.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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environment and cultural surroundings of the region. They generated within him 
genuine feelings of belonging and beauty; the region and the University was 
Heimat and everything it represented. Thus, although many of his friends left the 
University, he felt obliged to stay.108 With respect to his career, Wieacker’s per-
sonal prospects for the future appeared challenging. The plan he had produced 
and followed had failed and other options, such as returning to Freiburg, were 
uncertain. The disappointment took concrete form as Wieacker found himself 
penniless, and in order to carry on his academic vocation he had to ask for Wolf’s 
help.109 This to Wieacker was the nadir in his relation to the state. Although in 
1934 Germany was already a National Socialist nation, and the new administra-
tion could have been blamed (with good reason) for the ‘collapse’ of Frankfurt 
University, Wieacker saw things differently. The root of the misfortunes was the 
‘modernization’ process, of which the Weimar Republic had been a symbol. 
Prospects changed however in 1935 when Wieacker received a position from 
the University of Kiel to work as a outside lecturer [Privatdozent]. During this 
time, either by coincidence or not, his encounters with Carl Schmitt intensified, 
Schmitt showing interest in Wieacker’s work.110 In Kiel Wieacker joined the cir-
cle of colleagues who comprised the Kieler Schule,111 Karl Larenz, Ernst Ru-
dolph Huber, Georg Dahm, Karl Michaelis, Wolfgang Siebert, Friedrich Schaff-
stein, Martin Busse, and Franz Wieacker comprising the core of the Schule. 112 
108 “Es [leaving] wäre dann nur ein Provisorium, das gegenüber der Heimatsuniversität im 
ganzen nicht gerechtfertigt wäre.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.4.34. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Lud-
wig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
109 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1935: “Ich habe noch eine Bitte. Ich habe hier finanziell nicht 
sehr gut gestanden und würde mich freuen, wenn mein Privatdozentenstipendium wieder ein-
setzte. Ich weiß nicht, ob es wieder von selbst in Lauf kommt, oder ob es noch eines Antrages 
bedarf […] Ich freue mich sehr, ab Anfang Mai den großen Dank, den ich Ihnen für die gütige 
Beratung und Wahrnehmung meiner Angelegenheiten während meiner Ansenz schulde, durch 
den Versuch einer fördernden und einsatzbereiten Mitarbeit erstatten zu dürfen.” NL Erik Wolf, 
Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
110 Schmitt had a reputation for being able to arrange teaching positions for his students 
(Mehring 2014). Later Schmitt was ready to bring Wieacker to Berlin. See Wieacker to Carl 
Schmitt 11.7.1944. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
111 Wieacker did not have the position of Ordinarius at Kiel, but worked there as Privatdoz-
ent, which has generated a debate whether he belonged to the actual Kieler Schule or not. See 
e.g. Winkler 2014, 261, 264; Liebs 2010, 25–26; Frassek 2008, 358.
112 The Kieler Schule was not tied to a specific faculty, and to the participants the most de-
cisive feature of the school was the personal ties they had with one another. To contemporary 
scholars it appeared as a group to be mostly united by its methodological stance and its relation 
to the University in Kiel (cf. Heinrich Lange, Die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft vom Bürgerli-
chen Recht. Eine Privatrechtsgeschichte der neuesten Zeit. Tübingen, Mohr 1941, 11). With 
these points in mind, I consider the Kieler Schule to be comprised of the above-mentioned 
scholars. This is also Wieacker’s own opinion, see Wieacker, ‘Kitzeberger lager’ [1936], 163.
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Gerard Dulckeit was later assigned to fill in for Wieacker, who left for Leipzig. 
Walther Schoenborn and Julius Binder were scholars who managed to keep their 
chairs in the purge preceding the establishment of the Schule, and are sometimes 
included.113 In 1935 the Schule experienced its period of greatest florescence. 
K.A. Eckhardt, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Georg Dahm and Friedrich Schaffstein had 
contributed to the creation of the new curriculum for legal studies.114 The new-
ly-started legal journal Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft devoted its first issue of 
1936 to the writings of the Kielians.115 
The Schule was established as, and it seemed to represent, the vanguard of the 
‘New legal science’ against the old theories and practices of the “old ways.”116 In 
many ways, the members of the Schule represented a typical sampling of the 
conservative revolutionary and nationalistic circles of early 1930s Germany. 
They were all young, Protestant, and confident in their world-historical task at a 
critical moment in Western civilization. The idea of a “new elite” and its nation-
alistic and speculative theologies of history was promoted by the far-right press, 
but it also had its supporters in academia. Carl Schmitt in particular legitimized 
his attack on “neutral” legal science with his conviction that the “last days” of the 
old world order were at hand.117 He actively sought to have an effect on the wid-
er opinion or consciousness of the German people, in which his circle of disci-
ples – including from the Kieler Schule Ernst Rudolf Huber and Franz Wieacker 
– played an essential role.118 Thus, the self-legitimation of the Kieler Schule as 
the young elite of German legal science was confirmed not only by the new fas-
cist administration, but also by the “public (nationalistic and to a degree learned) 
opinion” and their academic mentors. 
This loose group of colleagues bonded and created a working environment 
which the participants recollected with nostalgia even decades later.119 Although 
113 See e.g. Grothe 2005, 172. Yet, as I argue in the following pages, there was a decisive 
difference whether one was among the eight war generation scientists or whether one represent-
ed an older generation, no matter what opinions one had of the “political revolution.”
114 Grothe 2005, 195 fn.  138.
115 Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 1 (1936).
116 Concerning the significant input of the Kieler Schule in ‘legal renewal,’ see Eckert 1992, 
65–68.
117 Mehring 2014, 241, 242, 245–248.
118 Ibid., 240, 335.
119 On the inner atmosphere of the Schule, see Winkler 2014, 470–476. Cf. Wieacker to 
Ernst Rudolf Huber 2.7.1961, when Wieacker and Huber were again able to work together in 
the same University at Göttingen: “[…] da die mir sich eröffnende Möglichkeit, mit Dir zusam-
men wieder an der gleichen Hochschule sein zu können, mich so sehr erfreut, dass für mich 
hinter diesem Prae alles andere, weil technisch, mittelbar und ungewiss, vollkommen zurück-
tritt. […] In der Tat wäre Dein Hinzutritt zu unserer, richtiger der dann sich bildenden Juris-
tischen Fakultät der beste Gewinn, den die Fakultät seit vielen Jahren gemacht hätte. Wie sehr 
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the inner climate of the group was informal, supportive and warm, the visible 
habitus of the young legal scholars adjusted to their suddenly achieved status as 
the forerunners of legal studies in Germany. There was a good degree of arro-
gance in the public appearance of the Schule, as Wieacker later recollected.120 
The self-understanding of the young scholars as the most dynamic, informed, 
and aware legal scientist elite was unshakable. Their advocacy of the ‘New legal 
science’ was sincere.
It is very difficult to draw a decisive distinction between the ‘stance’ of the 
Kieler Schule and other discourses in legal scientific debates.121 On the level of 
scientific discourse, the Kieler Schule’s orientation diverged from the more par-
ty-oriented theorists. Accordingly, Walkenhaus draws a distinction between the 
groups of “ordo-theoretical Hegelians” and “anarcho-theoretical sympathizers of 
SA, SS and SD” in the field of ‘New legal science,’ and more general in the Third 
Reich’s legal discussions concerning the relation between state and law. 122 
Whereas the members of the Schule all upheld, albeit to varying degrees, some 
kind of connection to the Hegelian or institutional theories on society, the ‘party 
sympathetic’ side was represented by, for example, Reinhard Höhn.123 To many, 
schön es gewesen wäre, wenn dieses Resultat vor Jahren ohne Umschweife und Umwege über 
die Nordsseküste hätte erreicht werden können, ist klar; dennoch kann ich mich noch immer 
über das Resultat freuen und möchte wünschen, dass sich ein wenig von dieser Empfindung auf 
Dich übertrüge. Unsere regelmässigen Ferienunterhaltungen gehören für mich zu den Ange-
nehms ten, das Freiburg bietet; aber wieviel wichtiger wäre es, sich hier in täglicher Zusamme-
narbeit zu besprechen.” Cf. Wieacker To Ernst Rudolf Huber 20.11.1957: “Lieber E. R. H, 
zugleich im Namen von Schaffstein und Michaelis möchte ich erfragen, ob Du Lust hast, uns 
zum nächsten Wochenende 30/11 / 1/12 (1. Advent) zu besuchen. Schaffstein schlägt vor, bei 
ihm zu wohnen. Ich schlage vor, gegen Sonnabend früh abzufahren und gegen Mittag hier an-
zutreffen. Abends würden wir zusammen in einem netten Waldgasthaus eine Ente verzehren; 
Sonntag uns unterhalten. Montag werden wir vermutlich alle wieder im Geschirr sein müssen.” 
NL Ernst Rudolf Huber Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Ernst Rudolf Huber to Wie acker 
25.11.1957: “Lieber Wieacker, schönsten Dank für die freundschaftlichen Einladung, der ich, 
wie ich Michaelis schon heute morgen am Telefon sagte, gerne Folge leiste […] Grüsse an 
Schaffstein (mit Dank für die Einladung zum Nächtigen), an Michaelis (mit Dank für den An-
ruf) und besondere an Dich.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber Bestand 1505, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
120 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 410 fn.  2; cf. Eckert 1992, 55.
121 Grothe 2005, 215–216.
122 Ralf Walkenhaus, ‘Totalität als Anpassungskategorie. Eine Momentaufnahme der Denk-
entwicklung von Carl Schmitt und Ernst Rudolf Huber,’ in Ralf Walkenhaus, Alfons Söllner & 
Karin Wieland (eds.), Totalitarismus, Eine Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Berlin, Aka-
demia Verlag 1997, 95. 
123 To Ernst Rudolf Huber (and to e.g. Wieacker) the relation of law and state presupposed 
an existence of some kind of Stand, a political body of people, whereas Höhn held ‘the people’ 
and Volksgemeinschaft to be identical concepts (Grothe 2005, 219–220). The breach between 
these two streams also originated very probably from their relation to Carl Schmitt. Höhn, also 
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the Kieler Schule distinguished itself in its view of legal education, and thus the 
vehement opponents of the Kieler Schule were mostly against the stance it was 
seen to represent in the field of legal pedagogics.124 Nevertheless, to conclude that 
these disputes made the Kieler Schule somehow “less National Socialist” would 
be incorrect, although that was how Ernst Rudolf Huber saw things in 1945.125
The most decisive feature of the Schule for its members, which later retained 
its importance in reconstructing the ‘Kielian narrative’ of the Nazi era, was the 
fighting stance it took against the old practices of the higher education and older 
staff, which represented the ‘degenerating bourgeois spirit’. In the spring of 
1939, devoted member of the Kieler Schule and the professor of legal philosophy 
at the University of Kiel, Karl Larenz, wrote to Gerard Dulckeit:
The second point [of the letter] is related to our problem child, Julius [Binder]. To my horrifi-
cation he writes to me he wants to preface his “Wissenschaftslehre” by a “general explanation 
on science as a whole, pure and purposive science, objectivity and other things like that”. The 
outcome is clear: a worsened edition of the foreword from his Grundlegung [der Rechtsphilos-
ophie (1935)], a complete embittered polemic against the “new” German science as it is reflect-
ed in Julius’ eyes, a more or less covert attack against the ideology and the National Socialistic 
jurisprudence etc. You must prevent that! How? I leave this to your well-proven cleverness and 
your subtlety.126
This letter is no exception in the correspondence between Larenz and Dulckeit. 
Many of Larenz’s letters from 1936 to 1939 concentrate on mocking Julius Bind-
er, the other professor of legal philosophy in Kiel during that time, and Larenz’s 
doctor father. According to Larenz, Binder was miserably outdated in his theo-
a party informer inside academia, appeared to Schmitt to be a participant in the group which 
caused his dethronement during the late 1930s. As such, to “Schmittians” Höhn was a despica-
ble person; cf. Mehring 2014, 337–338.
124 Cf. Lange 1941.
125 Grothe 2005, 218.
126 “Der zweite Punkt betrifft natürlich unser Schmerzenkind, Julius… Zu meinem Entset-
zen schreibt er mir nun, er wolle seiner Wissenschaftslehre eine eine “allgemeine Erörterung 
über Wissenschaft überhaupt, reine und zweckbestimmende Wissenschaft, Objektivität und 
dergl. mehr” vorausschicken. Was das wird, ist ja klar: eine verschlimmerte Auflage des Vor-
worts aus der Grundlegung, eine einzige verbitterte Polemik gegen die “neue” deutsche Wis-
senschaft, so wie sie sich in Julii Augen malt, und ein mehr oder weniger versteckter Angriff 
gegen die Weltanschauung, eine nationalsozialistische Rechtswissenschaft, usw. Sie müssen 
das verhindern! Wie, das überlasse ich Ihrer bewährten Klugheit und Geschicklichkeit!”, Karl 
Larenz to Gerhard Dulckeit 4.4.1939, NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, 
Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen. Emphasis original. The book 
in question is Binder’s Wissenschaftslehre des Rechts, which was published post-humously in 
1957. cf. Ralf Dreier, ‘Julius Binder (1870 –1939). Ein Rechtsphilosoph zwischen Kaiserreich 
und Nationalsozialismus,’ in Fritz Loos (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in Göttingen. Göttingen, 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1987, 449.
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ries. The bibliography and books Binder wished to include in the faculty’s curric-
ulum were simply dull. Nor was his teaching much better; Binder failed to bond 
with his audience and did not understand the essence of lecturing, namely the 
education of young minds. Overall, to Larenz his senior college was simply un-
aware of the contemporary reality in which legal science should also evolve.127 
The distinction which Larenz draws between himself (together with Dulckeit) 
and Binder is, however, revealing with respect to the basic attitude of the Kieler 
Schule in general. Binder was by no means a legal positivist or “Kelsenian.” He 
had established himself as a tireless critic of the Neo-Kantian, for example, Ru-
dolf Stammler’s legal doctrines.128 Michael Stolleis shows how Binder in his 
strongly adjusted Hegelianism draws the legal discipline closer to nationalistic 
and anti-democratic discourses. In other words, Binder can undoubtedly be labe-
led a conservative revolutionary.129 Binder, however, was not a youngster, and 
unlike the war generation of the conservative legal scientist, he could not under-
stand, support or accept the way National Socialists were shaping higher educa-
tion. Inevitably, that stance placed him at odds with the Kiel scholars of the war 
generation, since their determined aim was to distinguish their ‘school’ from the 
old hierarchies and academic practices. 
In the first part of the 4 April 1939 letter to Dulckeit given above, Larenz deals 
with the state of the law faculty at the University of Kiel. His main point circles 
around the question of whom the faculty should hire after Karl Michaelis had left 
the University and accepted a professorship at Leipzig. The newcomer should be 
a scholar whose personality, ideological stance and scholarly interests would fit 
the overall frame of the ‘stormtrooper faculty.’ The first choice would have been 
Wieacker, whom Larenz had already consulted earlier, but who “after long oscil-
lation” between Leipzig and Kiel decided to stay in Leipzig,130 and thus Dulckeit 
and Larenz were forced to rethink their options. The subsequent part of the letter 
127 Karl Larenz’s letters to Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsis-
che Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen.
128 Cf. Dreier 1987.
129 Michael Stolleis, A History of Public Law in Germany, 1914–45. Oxford, Oxford UP 
2004, 167.
130 The fact that Wieacker moved to Leipzig does not mean that he was no longer part of the 
Kieler Schule. The Schule was a group, not a faculty (cf. p.  205 fn.  108). Furthermore, the Cen-
tral administration had plans to turn the law school at Leipzig into a similar ‘stormtrooper fac-
ulty’ like the one in Kiel (Grothe 2005, 172). In the light of these plans it is understandable that 
Wieacker was not alone in moving to Leipzig. Huber, Dahm, Michaelis and Schaffstein also 
continued their work in Leipzig. Another National Socialist model school was later (1941) es-
tablished in Strasbourg, where Huber, Schaffstein and Dahm found professorships. Finally, 
after the war, the members of the original Schule continued to foster their Kameradschaft at the 
University of Göttingen. Winkler 2014, 473–474.
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suggests some points around which the faculty teaching should concentrate. Here 
Larenz exhibits the distinguishing grounds which both separated the ‘war gener-
ation’ from the older conservative revolutionaries, and made the young scholars 
such a politically ambiguous group. While pondering ways to coordinate the next 
semester, Larenz praises the contemporary rector Paul Ritterbusch who, accord-
ing to him, had succeeded in putting his ideas into action and had achieved im-
pressive results. Larenz concludes the positive results:
Same goes with his university weeks, with the lecturer academy [Dozentenakademie] and now 
with the conference of his institute which was very well attended from home and abroad and 
has been very interesting. The contacts with party, city, and navy are, as especially this confer-
ence showed, very convenient. The lecturer academy stages besides monthly presentations of 
certain working groups as well.131
Larenz suggested that the faculty should deepen its cooperation with Ritterbusch 
and with the institutions he represented. The intertwining of politics, social 
change and university teaching was natural, and even desirable, since the means 
were less important than the end, namely to educate and “engage in fruitful sci-
entific work.”132 
The war generation was not hesitant to co-work with the Nazi party and ad-
justed its teaching to meet the new ideology. It is also here where one can see a 
decisive shift towards National Socialist legal science on the level of practice. 
Later during the war Paul Ritterbusch was given the task of gathering together 
German scientists and shaping a “weapon of war” from their texts and thoughts, 
hence the Aktion Ritterbusch project. Participants demonstrated the value of the 
humanities, social sciences and law in the “intellectual prosecution of the war” 
and in the planning of a new Europe under German leadership.133 Activities in-
131 “So mit seinen Universitätswochen, mit der Dozentenakademie und jetzt eben mit der 
Tagung seines Instituts, die aus dem In- und Ausland ausgezeichnet besucht war und sehr inter-
essant verlief. Die Beziehung mit Partei, Stadt und Marine sind, wie gerade diese Tagung 
zeigte, sehr günstig. Die Dozentenakademie veranstaltet ausser monatlichen Vorträgen auch 
bestimmte Arbeitsgemeinschaften.”, Karl Larenz to Gerhard Dulckeit 4.4.1939, NL Gerhard 
Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, 
Göttingen.
132 Ibid.
133 Frank R. Hausmann, »Deutsche Geisteswissenschaft« im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die »Akti-
on Ritterbusch« (1940–1945). Heidelberg, Synchron 2007; Schönwälder 1992, 208–216; cf. 
Karl Larenz To Gerhard Dulckeit 31.1.1940: “Ferner hat Ritterbusch von Ministerium einen 
Auftrag u. Mittel zwecks “Einsatzes der Geisteswissenschaften im Kriege” erhalten: ich habe 
ihm bereits einen Plan für die Rechtsphilosophischen unterbreitet u. hoffe nun auf Ihre Mitwir-
kung. Bei der Zusammenkunft mit Wieacker an der auch Glockner teilnehmen wird, können 
wir auch über die ZDK sprechen.” NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Nie-
dersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen. 
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cluded organizing conferences and publishing collective works. The project 
might be regarded as one of the saddest symbols of the alliance between the 
fascist government and German social sciences. From the original Kieler Schule 
at least Larenz, Huber, Michaelis, Dahm and Wieacker participated in Aktion 
Ritterbusch, and Wieacker’s small part was to convince readers of the similarity 
between the mentality and base values of German and Roman cultures.134 
Larenz was clearly more aggressive in tone and style than Wieacker, but I 
would argue that in some respects his message can be generalized to describe the 
culture and mentality of the whole Kieler Schule, including Wieacker. The ‘New 
legal science’ was not only considered to be the correct way to see law and soci-
ety, but the paradigmatic change from the “old” was an inescapable temporal 
necessity if one wanted to shape contemporary German society. There were traits 
of patricide and fascinated “motion-blindness” in the existence of the Kieler 
Schule and its young scholars. Abandonment of the frustrating old codes, a sense 
of the dazzling possibilities which the new national uprising seemed to offer for 
bright young minds, and if not support for racial exclusion, at least selective ig-
norance towards the concrete results to which the racist slurs were taking people, 
are obvious characteristics of the culture of the Kieler Schule.135 A radical breach 
with respect to the scholarly tradition also occurred in the sphere of practices. 
The cooperation in the form of camps, direct interaction with society in network-
ing with the party and military, and changes in the University hierarchy as well 
as in the style of teaching brought about by the new Studienordnung, were all 
aspects that marked an enormous rift in comparison to the way the war genera-
tion had started their own studies in the 1920s.136 The practices brought a sense 
of togetherness and aroused emotions which distinguished Wieacker’s circle 
from the traditional way to do legal science. 
There are only three letters written by Wieacker in the archives of Erik Wolf 
and Carl Schmitt sent during his Privatdozent times in Kiel.137 There is, however, 
134 Ibid. Wieacker’s “Entwicklungstufen des römischen Eigentums” (1942) was an article 
published in the collection Das neue Bild der Antike (Leipzig 1942), edited by Helmut Berve. 
It was part of the program “Kriegeinsatz der Altertumwissenschaft” directed by Berve, which 
itself was part of the “Kriegseinsatz der Geisteswissenschaft” led by Paul Ritterbusch. Like 
many other contributions in “Aktion Ritterbusch,” Entwicklungstufen des römischen Eigen-
tums could be seen as either ‘normal science’ or propaganda. Frank R. Hausmann, »Deutsche 
Geisteswissenschaft« im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die »Aktion Ritterbusch« (1940–1945). Heidel-
berg, Synchron 2007.
135 Eckert 1992, 55, 56, 60.
136 Gerhard Müller: Ernst Krieck und die National-Sozialistische Wissenschaftsreform. Mo-
tive und Tendenzen einer Wissenschaftslehre und Hochschulreform im Dritten Reich. Wein-
heim, Beltz 1978, 389; Grothe 2005, 197–200.
137 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.7.1935, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
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an abundance of correspondence where Wieacker recollects those times and 
compares his present and future situation to the nostalgic memory of the ka me-
rad schaftliche experience.138 I will deal with this theme in more detail in chapter 
IV. For now, it is suffice to note that the time in Kiel, especially the experience of 
belonging to a group of like-minded friends, was a decisive feature in Wieacker’s 
personal life history, according to which he arranged and interpreted the later 
events and phenomena in his life. The network which formed in Kiel also contin-
ued to support its members long after the war, in such universities as Freiburg or 
Göttingen.139
Wieacker did not find it a problem to be linked with National Socialist-minded 
scholars in their mission against “foreign and capitalist” traits in German culture, 
because these notions roughly resembled his own underlying ideas in attempting 
to conceptualize justice. To Rust, Rosenberg, Frank and Hitler the priority was to 
purify Germany from anything Jewish-related, to exterminate the Jews. In order 
to be comprehensive they extended their mission to eradicate ‘racial corruption’ 
in culture and science.140 To Wieacker, however, the ‘racial element’ was irrele-
vant to science. There was instead a wrong and dangerous kind of weak argumen-
tation by disrespectful people, whose work needed to be set aside for the greater 
cause of the fatherland and German culture.141 Because of this ‘merging of inten-
tions’ Wieacker, like many other young scholars, worked with the National So-
cialists, and ignored the reality of Nazi injustices. Here lies one reason for the 
success of the fascist coup in German academia. The National Socialists managed 
to convince their contemporaries that they were responding to the basic needs of 
the people, that they were aware of amorphous social changes, and were able to 
fight against the grievances brought about by modernization. Many scholars ad-
vocated ‘legal renewal,’ and like Wieacker celebrated the “improved structuring 
of studies” which “brought them closer to real life,”142 but there was a difference 
between the older scientists and the war generation with regard to attitudes con-
cerning education and practical engagement in National Socialist programs.143 
Freiburg im Breisgau; Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 13.7.1935 and 2.9.1935. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 
0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
138 Cf. p.  205, fn.  108.
139 Winkler 2014, 470–476.
140 Cf. Schönwalder 1992, 32–33.
141 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
142 Wolfgang Kunkel & Hans Würdinger, ‘Vorschlag einer Neuregelung des juristischen 
Studiengangs’ [1934]. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duis-
burg; cf. Winkler 2014,144, 158, 161.
143 Cf. Schönwälder 1992, 31: although the older generation welcomed the political change 
in society, they were more reluctant to accept its effects on higher education.
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Wieacker was concerned with Bildung and Stand. They presented the ethical 
foundation of the everyday life (Wirklichkeit) of German society and represented 
the principles of social justice. He was, nevertheless, intrigued by the possibilities 
which the changed political atmosphere had brought about from the perspective 
of educational reform. Thus, in distinction to many older legal scholars, he par-
ticipated in projects and programs which drew him close to National Socialist 
Gleichschaltung.
a) The late 1930s and war as Erlebnis
During the war Franz Wieacker found his distinguishing style in studying and 
describing legal historical phenomena. The understanding that legal concepts 
should reflect the material bond between the people and normative order re-
mained, as it did for the rest of his career. So too did the claim that law embodied 
humankind’s triumph over degeneration and superstition – law was the sum of 
people’s cultural achievements – although Wieacker’s argument took a more so-
phisticated and versatile form. In his letters the quest to combine law and the 
reality as perfectly as possibly took a metaphysical turn, and his interest started 
to turn from contemporary and current legal problematics to historical themes. 
Scientifically, he was very active. His scholarly work was interrupted when Ger-
many invaded Poland in September 1939, and Wieacker was drafted, but he was 
able to return to his academic duties fairly quickly and he was not called up again 
until the summer of 1944.144 Whereas the terms Rechtsbewusstsein and Gewissen 
started to appear in his scientific texts, in private Wieacker struggled to give a 
precise definition to these concepts. What exact features and meanings did these 
words signify? What was the distinction between them? Who expressed them 
and in what circumstances? What were the limits of these concepts in defining 
social change from a historical perspective?
Wieacker’s ambigious stance towards the National Socialist regime is evident 
in the secondary sources from the war years. Party informers produced a report 
on Wieacker’s political reliability (as they did for most scholars), which stated:
[Wieacker] is completely dependable in the political sense. [...] Pg. Wieacker is filled with the 
idea of the new state and participates with the utmost diligence to make it come true. [...] The 
willingness to make sacrifices is present, [his] reputation is good. At least, nothing detrimental 
is known.145 
144 Liebs 2010, 28; Winkler 2014, 456 fn.  3.
145 “[Wieacker] ist in politischer Hinsicht vollkommen zuverlässig. […] Pg. Wieacker ist 
erfüllt von der Idee des neuen Staates und arbeitet mit äusserstem Fleiss and ihrer Verwirkli-
chung mit. […] Opferbereitschaft ist vorhanden, Leumund ist gut. Auch sonst ist nichts Na-
chteiliges bekannt.” “Beurteilung” der NSDAP-Kreisleitung Leipzig, 19.10.1938, quoted in 
Winkler 2014, 463.
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Judging by his correspondence, Wieacker was by no means an eager supporter of 
the regime, and there are no signs of a fascination with war in his letters to his 
friends. In general with regard to the war, the picture which previous studies on 
Wieacker creates is similar to most of the retrospective analyses of the inner 
worlds of people living under Nazi rule. The war was a necessary evil, which 
individuals often wanted to set aside like bad weather and concentrate on rou-
tines or matters of spiritual life instead and as fully as possible.146 On the surface, 
Wieacker’s correspondence repeats the same narrative. If there had been a place 
for nationalistic zeal in his Weltanschauung before the 1940s, war-weariness cer-
tainly removed any beliefs in the sustainability of the political nationalism of 
Nazi Germany. In his letter to Erich Rothacker, Wieacker expressed his irritation 
towards the war. It constantly interrupted his scholarly work and prevented him 
from carrying out the meaningful work of studying and writing about law:
Furthermore, the progression of war can put an end to my scientific work for an indefinite pe-
riod every day. In practice the result would be, that the editors can not expect the delivery of my 
manuscript for two and a half years irrespective of the other war events burdening their busi-
ness.147
Viktor Winkler sees Wieacker’s war years as a time when he consolidated previ-
ous influences. The identity and vision of Wieacker as a researcher had already 
been formed earlier; his permanent position at the University of Leipzig enabled 
Wieacker to put this vision into practice. Winkler correctly shows that during the 
war, Wieacker wrote many of his key texts which were later brought together in 
an essay collection, Vom Römischen Recht (1944). It is also obvious that the first 
drafts of Das Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1952) had already been written 
in the early 40s.148 Wieacker’s correspondence confirms this picture. In his letters 
Wieacker reported that he had started a new project in late 1941, namely a study 
on “the scientific consequences of Roman law on the Occident” as well as “the 
history of German private law in modernity.”149 These themes, with different 
146 “In Leipzig hat das Trimester mit vielen ersten Semestern begonen; es erschöpft einen 
ziemlich, wenn man daneben noch arbeiten will. Ich habe mich bei Ihnen noch sehr zu entschul-
digen, da ich Ihnen etwas so Gutes wie die »Rechtsdenken« durch die Vorspiegelung entlockte, 
ich würde auch mein Bodenrecht schenken; ich hatte es über den Krieg vergessen und erschrak 
heute sehr, als es mir einfiel.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.9.1940. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Lud-
wig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
147 “Zudem kann die Kriegsentwicklung jeden Tag meiner wissenschaftlichen Arbeit auf 
unbestimmte Zeit ein Ziel setzen. Praktisch würde dies heissen, dass die Herausgeber vor 2,5 
Jahren nicht mit der Ablieferung meines Manuskripts ruchnen dürfen, ausser den zusätzlichen 
Kriegsfällen, mit denen ihre Unternehmung ohnedies belastet ist.” Wieacker To Erich Rothack-
er 8.8.1944. NL Erich Rothacker, Bonn Landesbibliothek.
148 Winkler 2014, 172–173.
149 “So ist im Erscheinen begriffen eine Sammlung von Versuchen über das römische Recht, 
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topics and developments, comprised the two major branches of Wieacker’s 
scholarly works throughout the following decades. 
The turn towards historical meaning, the result of both disappointment and 
new scientific influences, is evident. In his letter to Erik Wolf, Wieacker, both 
frustrated and curious, discusses how poetry succeeds in capturing the essence of 
law better than philosophy ever will. Following Wolf’s encouragement Wiecker 
interpreted Hölderlin’s Rhein, and saluted the poem’s ability to display the Geist 
of binding norms: 
If I may judge, I find the difficult concept that one can learn from the poet about the existence 
of law, carefully and productively composed. Very strange, how unipolar and undialectical his 
[Hölderlin’s] definition of law is. How strictly he excludes the positive definitions of the law 
from his own ideal. He also deals further in a terminologically meaningful way with the law in 
Rhein: For sooner must law and home hearth crumble, / And mankind’s day turn ugly, before / 
One such as this could think to / Forget his origin / And the distilled voice of his youth”.150 
His suspicion of rational philosophy (Hölderlin is characteristically a poet who 
rejected philosophical reasoning) as a tool to draft laws, understand legal matters 
and sustain social justice in everyday reality is a visible feature of Wieacker’s 
war time writings.151 Within this theme Wieacker found an appreciative and 
well-informed counterpart in Carl Schmitt. 
Both Reinhardt Mehring and Florian Meinel notice a serious drift between 
Carl Schmitt and his disciples from 1936 to the late years of the decade.152 They 
interpret this as a “moment of soberness” on Ernst Forsthoff’s and Ernst Rudolf 
von denen der letzte, fast 100 Seiten lange, die Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Abend-
land, d.n. praktisch einen Ueberblick über die Geschichte der abendländischen Rechtswissen-
schaft zum Gegenstande hat. Schlimmer ist es noch/dass ich ein Buch über “Deutsche Privat-
rechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit” vorarbeite, das ziemlich weit gefördert ist und voraussichtlich 
einen Umfang von Schätzungsweise 20 bogen erreichen dürfte.” Wieacker to Eric Rothacker 
8.8.1944. NL Erich Rothacker, Bonn Landesbibliothek. 
150 “Ich finde den schwierigen Gedanken, aus dem Dichter über die Existenz des Rechtes zu 
erfahren, behutsam und fruchtbar durchgeführt, wenn ich urteilen darf. Sehr eigentümlich, wie 
einpolig und undialektisch seine Bestimmung des Rechts ist. Wie streng er die positiven Be-
stimmungen des Rechts aus seiner Idee ausschließt. Vom Recht handelt er nebenher auch ter-
minolologisch bedeutsam, im »Rhein«: “denn eher müsse die Wohnung vergehn und die Sat-
zung und zum Unbild werden, der Tag der Menschen, ehe vergessen ein solcher dürfte den 
Ursprung und die reine Stimme der Jugend“.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.9.1940. NL Erik Wolf, 
Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau; Hölderlin’s Rhein translated by Sus-
an Ranson.
151 Wieacker did not like abstract, theoretical philosophy. See e.g. Wieacker to Dulckeit 
25.12. 1948: “Meine Unzuständigkeitserklärung in philosophicis ist kein versteckter Hochmut.” 
NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universi-
tätsbibliothek, Göttingen.
152 Mehring 2014, 336–337; Meinel 2012, 228–229.
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Huber’s behalf, resulting in Schmitt’s attempt to whitewash the murderous purge 
of the NSDAP during the Night of the Long Knives and his escalating anti-Sem-
itism. On the other hand, Schmitt himself was “dethroned” by SS-minded oppo-
sition, which suspected (correctly) that Schmitt’s engagement with the regime 
was not sincere and wholehearted. After the blurry chaos of the early years of 
Gleischaltung, the National Socialist policy had become distinctively racist and 
vulgar. So it is not far-fetched to allege such “soberness” in the case of Wieack-
er’s orientation as well. Detlef Liebs suggests that around the time of the out-
break of the war, Wieacker was already well aware of the true nature of the Third 
Reich. Especially the ousting and exiling of Fritz Pringsheim had opened his eyes 
to Nazi betrayal. 153
Nevertheless, after a few years of silence between Wieacker and Schmitt, their 
cooperation deepened considerably during the war years from chance encounters 
to collegial acquaintance. After the surrender of France, the Germans established 
a ‘model university’ at Strasbourg. It employed many of Wieacker’s friends, in-
cluding Ernst Rudolf Huber, and Wieacker himself visited there.154 On these 
trips, which sometimes included a visit to the German Institute of Science in 
Paris, Carl Schmitt accompanied Wieacker. The two also travelled together on a 
conference to occupied Hungary. Wieacker invited Schmitt to Leipzig for guest 
lectures, commented on his articles, and inquired into Schmitt’s opinion on some 
of his ideas.155 Wieacker obviously admired Schmitt’s intelligence and writing 
153 Liebs 2010, 28.
154 Winkler 2014, 473–474; Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 30.11.1941. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 
0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
155 Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 7.11.1941: “Das Leipziger politisch-historische Colloquium, 
das von je einem Mitglied der Philosophischen und der Juristenfakultät veranstaltet wird und 
etwa alle Woche oder zwei Wochen eingeführte Kenner über ihnen besonders vertraute Ab-
schnitte eines losen Generalthemas sprechen lässt, hat bereits im Sommer 1939 die Freude 
gehabt, Sie mit einem Vortrage über den französischen Juristen bei sich zu Gaste zu sehen. Als 
stellvertretender juristischer Leiter dieses Colloquiums (seit Hubers Fortgang bis zum Eintref-
fen seines Nachfolgers) darf ich anfragen, ob Sie, sehr verehrter Herr Staatsrat, uns die Ehre 
und Freude machen würde, im Lauf des Wintersemesters über Toqueville oder einen anderen 
französischen Sozial- und Staatsdenker des gleichen Zeitraums im weitesten Sinne (nach Ihrer 
Wahl) zu sprechen.” And Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 30.11.1941: “Ich freue mich sehr, daß Sie 
zu uns über Tocqueville sprechen werden, […][Ich bin] unter dem frischen Eindruck Pariser 
Erfahrungen, die für uns auch persönliche Spannung auf Ihr Urteil und Ihre Einschätzung des 
alten-neuen Frankreich begründen.” See also Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 11.7.1944: “Später den-
ke ich doch daran, den Grundriss der ”Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit” abzuschließen; das 
inreressanteste, was man sich denken kann. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nord-
rhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.; On the trip to Hungary, See Wieacker To Reichsminister für Wis-
senschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung 2.9.1944. Personal Akten SG 0457 Wieacker, Universi-
tät Archiv Leipzig. 
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skills. The relation might have given Wieacker some practical advantage with 
respect to work positions and publishing, but undoubtedly Wieacker also benefit-
ted scientifically from their interaction.156 After the war, cooperation with Schmitt 
was in general disapproved, and the correspondence between the two ended im-
mediately. But like in the cases of so many other scholars, Schmitt’s influence 
was decisive, and it showed also in Wieacker’s post-war production.
In 1941 Schmitt gave a lecture in Leipzig on French jurisprudence and later 
sent Wieacker a copy of his article ‘Die Formung des französischen Geistes 
durch den Legisten.’157 The war-time correspondence between Schmitt and 
Wieacker followed the same themes which they had discussed earlier in 1935. 
Then Schmitt had asked Wieacker’s opinion on Johan Stroux’s article on Greek 
influences in Roman legal culture, which gave Wieacker a perfect opportunity to 
exhibit his expertise on Roman law, but also to defend his vision of the distinct 
nature and meaning of Roman legal scholarship.158 In his 1935 letter to Schmitt, 
Wieacker wrote of Roman law and lawyers:
[The Greek systematization] produces a legal theory from a Greek model for the relationship of 
natural and civil law that is rather subordinate to classical Roman law. It leads on the other hand 
to a rationally and logically arranged survey of legal concepts that have been handed down, as 
they are self-evident to the Greek-educated Roman, and thereby make the somewhat archaic 
guild-like thinking style of the pre-classical lawyers (comparable to the English Inns of Court) 
much more interesting. In comparison, I think that the inner structure of the classic jurispru-
dence almost completely refused to give itself to these influences, and it maintained the ancient 
Roman style up to Julian’s former revision of the Roman edicts.159
In his 1935 letter Wieacker defended his Romanistic views to a distinguished 
scholar who infamously had blamed Roman law for the ‘scientification’ of Ger-
156 Schmitt offered Wieacker a position in the University of Berlin in 1944, but Wieacker 
refused, Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 11.7.1944. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nord-
rhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
157 See Wieacker to Schmitt 25.8.1942. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nord-
rhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
158 Johannes Stroux: “Griechiche Einflüsse auf die Entwicklung der römischen Rechtswis-
senschaft gegen Ende der republikanischen Zeit,” Atti del CIDR, 1, 111–132.
159 “[…] bringt einmal eine für das klassische römische Recht ziemlich untergebliche 
Rechtstheorie griechschen Musters über das Verhältnis von natürlichem und bürgereigenem 
Recht hervor. Sie führt auf der anderen Seite zu einer rationaleren und logisch durchgeglieder-
ten Erfassung überlieferter Rechtsvorstellungen, wie sie dem hellenistisch gebildeten Römer 
selbstverständlich ist, und lokert dadurch den etwas zopfigen zünftlerischen Denkstil der vor-
klassischen Juristen (vergleichbar etwa dem englischen Inns) stark auf. Dagegen glaube ich, 
dass das innere Gefüge der klassischen Jurisprudenz sich diesen Einwirkungen fast gänzlich 
versagte und den altrömischen Stil bis zu Julians Ediktredaktionen wahrte.”, Wieacker to Carl 
Schmitt 13.7.1935. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
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man legal culture.160 Being aware of both Schmitt’s earlier announcements as 
well as his scientific rhetoric and interests, Wieacker – in a very traditional man-
ner – accuses Greek theories of corrupting the pure ‘pre-classic jurisprudence,’ 
and, curiously, defends true Roman law as being like the ‘English courts of Inns’: 
‘guild-like’ and ‘infused by masculine expressions’. In other words, Wieacker 
defended Roman legal scholarship as a distinct ‘concrete order.’161 Wieacker’s 
response was not mere lip-service to the Staatrat Schmitt. As becomes evident in 
his 1930s writings, he truly believed in Schmitt’s methodology of analyzing legal 
entities from the institutional point of view, 162 and later held on to his view of 
Late Republican jurisprudence as a distinguished community guided by its own 
tradititions and norms. This becomes evident when, on the basis of his 1935 re-
sponse to Schmitt, Wieacker wrote an article which he sent first to Salvatore 
Riccobono and which was later published in English.163 It cannot be constructed 
from his letters to what extent Wieacker shared Schmitt’s anti-parlamentarism, 
but his doubt concerning the functionality of a legal system built solely on the 
virtues of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment is obvious.164 
Wieacker rejected the idea that some people because of their origins, national 
or linguistic, would have a “birthright” to a more comprehensive understanding 
of justice. Furthermore, mere knowledge did not equate with wisdom in legal 
matters. Nevertheless, some people seemed to succeed better than others, and 
this more beneficial position intrigued Wieacker. He agreed with Schmitt’s asser-
tion that it was the institutional premises which cultivated the perspective to un-
derstand and the ability to apply justice in society. Different people seemed to 
possess different ways of understanding law and jurisprudence, and this was due 
to national virtues as well as to institutes of legal praxis and education. In other 
words, national legal cultures were related to the mentality of their people:
160 Cf. p.76 
161 To Schmitt the English courts were foremost examples of ‘concrete orders.’ See Carl 
Schmitt, ‘On Three Types of Juristic Thought’ [1934], trans. Joseph W. Bendersky. Westport, 
Praeger 2004.
162 On Schmitt references in Wieacker’s 1930s works, see Winkler 2014, 268, 277.
163 Franz Wieacker to Salvatore Riccobono 2.2.1940. The personal collection of Professor 
Mario Varvaro, Università degli Studi di Palermo – Dipartimento di Storia del Diritto, Paler-
mo-Università degli Studi, Palermo. The letters are a concession of Salvatore Riccobono’s 
family. Professor Professor Varvaro himself discovered the documents in Riccobono’s house. 
Therefore, they are not stored in an official archive; The article in question is ‘The Causa Cur-
iana and contemporary Roman jurisprudence,’ in Irish Jurist 2 (1967), 151–164.
164 In his 25.8.1942 letter to Schmitt, Wieacker provocatively askes: “Wird es uns möglich 
sein, ein Weltreich aufzurichten, ohne aufzuhören, Philosophen zu sein, was ja zu unserem 
Volkscharakter indelebiliter gehört?” NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein- 
Westfalen, Duisburg.
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Indeed, one wonders, if that German systematic-philosophical type of pervasion of the judicial 
office with a function, which the basic political order assigns to the lawyers, hasn’t failed so far, 
namely because of that learned-systematic approach. Admittedly, the systematic-normative ap-
proach of life for better or worse is significant for life and act, and also the political acts, of the 
Germans; that school of thought in the German legal science, as it has been established by 
Windscheid, is by the way actually very German.165
To Wieacker as a Romanist, the absolute point of reference between different 
legal cultures was the one prevailing in the Late Roman Republic.166 I will return 
to the questions of what kind of legal culture the Romans had, what virtues it 
comprised, and what was its lasting significance from the point of view of mod-
ern society later in chapter IV, but for now the focus is on the way in which 
Wieacker saw the relation between the distinguished legal skill of the Romans 
and the mentality of the common people. Wieacker presumed that the ‘guild’ of 
Roman lawyers cultivated its own inner mentality and derived its legal decision 
from this shared culture, thus it was represented as an ideal ‘concrete order’ 
which – during the golden age of Roman jurisprudence – defined the essence of 
Roman law and in more general terms constituted the lawyers estate, Stand, in-
side the Roman culture.167 In 1943, on Schmitt’s request, Wieacker reviewed 
Valentin-Al. Georgescu’s book Études de philologie juridique et de droit ro-
main.168 In his book Georgescu compared the belief-systems of ancient cultures, 
making no distinction between the Romans and other cultures. Wieacker disa-
greed, and in his response to Schmitt, laid down some of the fundamental princi-
ples of his ideas on legal history and Roman law. 
[I am unable] to go any further than what I say in “Roman jurist” on the characteristic legal 
ontology of the Romans, so I cannot say that the autonomous, life-affirming validity of the 
traditional and professional developed legal structure in ancient Rome could be classified 
165 “Freilich fragt man sich, ob in jenem deutschen systematisch-philosophischen Typ die 
Durchdringung des Richteramts mit der Funktion, welche die politische Grundordnung dem 
Juristen zuweist, nicht bisher misslungen ist, und zwar eben wegen jener gelehrt-systemali-
schen Betrachtung. Zuzugeben ist, dass die systematisch-normative Betrachtung des Lebens im 
Guten wie im Bösen auch für das Leben und Handeln, auch das politische Handeln der Deut-
schen bezeichnend ist; jene Richtung der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, wie sie etwa Wind-
scheid ausprägt, ist nebenbei wirklich sehr deutsch.”, Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 25.8.1942. NL 
Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
166 Ibid.: “Ich halte auch den römischen Juristen nicht für den einzigen denkbaren Typus 
”der” juristischen Begabung, freilich für einen, der einem etwa denkbaren phänomenalen Typs 
”des” Juristen am nächsten kommt.”
167 Cf. Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 13.7.1935. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
168 Valentin-Al. Georgescu: Études de philologie juridique et de droit romain. I. Les rap-
ports de la philologie classique et du droit romain. Paris, Les Belles lettres 1940.
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alongside the conciousness-categories of the magical, numinous, the taboo, Orenda and ethno-
logical auxiliary concepts alike.169
In this excerpt, Wieacker concentrates on the idea of his masterly article ‘Vom 
Römischen Juristen,’ (1939) in one sentence, but his review as a whole is dually 
revealing. 170 First, he presents the essence of Roman jurisprudence as a group of 
‘highly educated experts’ as opposed to the common awareness of tribal socie-
ties, which was characterized by surperstition and primitive forms of thinking. 
Second, the feature which lifted the original Roman law above any other ‘legal 
form,’ was that the ‘expert-culture’ with its ‘style of thinking’ overcame the prim-
itive ‘ontological’ explanations of common ‘awareness.’ In other words, the suc-
cess and prestige of Roman law was due to the authorative status which the 
lawyer Stand had retained in Roman society. Furthermore, such status was asso-
ciated with a particular form of education. This education, which cultivated legal 
wisdom and further uplifted a group of people to a distinguished position within 
society, continued to serve as the backbone of the legal order and civilized cul-
ture.171 These requirements were true of legal education in ancient Rome and 
were equally valid in modern Germany.
The purpose of higher legal education, and concurrently the responsibility of 
the teacher, was to bring up an ‘estate’, Stand, of legal experts who had assimi-
lated the virtues and traditional knowledge emblematic of the profession, and 
further would be able to fulfill their duty of guarding and guiding the legal con-
sciousness of the people. This trope or ontological premise was a principle which 
not only sustained the core of Wieacker’s legal historical writings over the dec-
ades, but also provided a key to understanding his vision of the intertwinement 
between society, legal science and people’s way of thinking. 
The relation between this ‘historical trope’ and Wieacker’s contemporary so-
ciety was not unidirectional. He did not merely explain the twentieth-century 
German society from the perspective of the Roman ideal, nor did he straightfor-
wardly consider that the gestalt of present-day society mirrored that of Ancient 
Rome. Rather, his legal scientific research task took the form of a circle: from the 
169 “[W]as ich im “Römischen Juristen” über die eigentümliche Rechtsontologie der Römer 
sage, nicht hinaus gehen, also keineswegs zugeben, dass die autonome, lebensheilige Geltung 
der überlieferterten und fachlich fortgebildeten Rechtsform in Altrom in die Bewusstseins-Kat-
egorien des Magischen, Numinösen, des Tabu, Orenda und ähnlicher ethnologischer Hilfsvor-
stellungen fällt.”, Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 16.5.1943. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesar-
chiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
170 Franz Wieacker, ‘Vom Römischen Juristen,’ in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissen-
schaft 99(1939), 440–463.
171 Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 11.7.1944. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nor-
drhein-Westfalen, Duisburg. 
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bases and evaluations of twentieth-century German society he sought to under-
stand the Roman world (as it appeared in textual sources), and from that rep-
resentation he commented on present-day phenomena, which were then again 
compared to the ideal reference point of antiquity, and so on. In coping with his 
contemporary society and the challenges which the academic world in particular 
faced, Wieacker maintained a historical picture of Roman jurisprudence and a 
vision of the ideal contemporary society. These two spheres explained one anoth-
er and helped to understand the social change in which Wieacker was personally 
situated. 
The idea of the relation between a Stand of legal experts and the people as a 
mirror of the justness of a given society was further sharpened by his experienc-
es in the war. The experience which separated, and continues to separate, Wieack-
er from many historians was his service as a front-line soldier. Wieacker was 
called up for military service twice, and though he never publicly reflected on 
these events, nor apparently was he subject to any severe traumas, that experi-
ence was a horizon which on the one hand connected him to some scholars, and 
on the other opened an irreversible breach between him and the younger genera-
tion of scientists. Service in the army, fighting for one’s country, was a duty, a 
natural and correct thing to do. The idea of ‘the inevitability of war’ is a theme 
and an axiom, which seems to connect the scholars of the early twentieth century 
around the world despite cultural differences.172 In Wieacker’s letters from the 
frontline, his frustration and tiredness with fascist propaganda is obvious. There 
are two countries on whose behalf Wieacker is fighting. On one hand, there is the 
law-based obligation of a citizen to defend the nation which he inhabits, and on 
the other the affectionate need to protect one’s Heimat. Wieacker talks of his 
service as a “duty” (Dienst), but he also combines and conjugates the word in a 
way which conveys a tone of the distinct “reality of duty.”173 
In his letters from northern Italy in the spring of 1945, Wieacker expressed his 
thoughts and feelings in an indirect way by referring to prose classics or well-
known characters in German literature. This might have been a means to avoid 
military censorship, but a more plausible reason was that he typically perceived 
chaotic and stressful social reality through metaphors and narratives provided by 
the Western cultural tradition. Thus, while writing from the frontline, Wieacker 
compared himself to Corporal Gottlieb Köpke from Willibald Alexis’s Isegrimm, 
172 Consequently, after the war, European legal historians found a common ground in build-
ing a Cold War worldview from the experience of war. Ville Erkkilä & Jacob Giltaj, Interview 
with Tony Honoré, in Forum Historiae Iuris 26/02/2015. http://www.forhistiur.de/2015-01-erk-
kila-giltaij.
173 Wiecaker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.1944[1945]. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
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and described the war and his surroundings with the help of Ernst Jünger’s In 
Stahlgewittern, Shakespeare’s Macbeth, and Boccaccio’s Decamerone. 174 Such 
recourse testifies on the impossibility of an individual to exhaustively categorize 
and give linguistic shape to the distorting reality of war and totalitarianism. But 
it also suggests Wieacker’s fundamental trust in textual learnedness, Bildung, 
and the significance which the heritage of high culture had in his personal way of 
perceiving the world. Rather than accepting ready explanations on human be-
ings, Wieacker searched for points of connection from cultural examples which 
were familiar to him due to his upbringing and the Bildungsbürgertum world-
view. Likewise, after the Second World War when Wieacker tried retrospectively 
to make sense of his actions and attitudes towards the National Socialist regime, 
the explanation was made by referring to the texts of Goethe and Schiller.175 
In his letter to Hans-Georg Gadamer in March 1945, Wieacker explains that he 
will adopt in the letter the role of a “scientific travelling novelist” while reporting 
the things he sees, and in order to understand things he will make some compar-
isons. 176 To both Gadamer and Wieacker, the tradition of ironic essays based on 
journeys was familiar. From Jonathan Swift to Montesquieu the meaning of such 
reports has not been so much to describe the landscape the author had supposed-
ly inhabited, but to comment on the culture where his audience resides and he 
himself lived before the trip. Thus, in his letter Wieacker in an indirect way ex-
pressed his thoughts and feelings about Germany. He refers to Italy (and/or Ger-
many) as an actor in a play.177 Later in his letter he makes a remark about a 
Shakespearean tragedy which he had seen in an Italian city some time ago: 
174 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.[1944]1945 and 23.2.1945. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, 
Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.3.1945. NL Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar. 
175 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 410, fn.  2; Wieacker to Paolo Grossi 27.9.1974, 
quoted in Christian Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 473.
176 “Ich schweife in Reflexionen ab, anstatt zu erzählen. Ich schrieb schon, an reinem Er-
zählstoff fehlte es nicht; aber teils ist es nicht möglich, teils so leicht, vergnügt und un-
verbindlich dass einem die Feder stockt, angesichts der allgemeinen Lage und der Not des hier 
so doppelt vermissten und entbehrten Vaterlandes [.]” Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 
14.3.1945. NL Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar. A clos-
er example of an indirect commentary on one’s homeland would be Ernst Jünger’s “On the 
Marblecliffs,” to which Wieacker referred in his letter to Ernst Rudolf Huber on 23.2.1945. NL 
Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
177 Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.3.1945: “Es ist eigentlich als Filmschauspieler auf 
dem abendländischen, gegenwärtigen Kultur.” NL Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur 
Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
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Something very remarkable in this context was a performance of Macbeth in the theater of the 
largest city of this land, where I am almost constantly. It was quite good, but continuous self-de-
nial by the players.178
To Gadamer, Shakespeare’s plays represented a fundamental cultural value.179 
Thus, Wieacker’s reference was most certainly understood. Indeed, Wieacker’s 
metaphor would be evident even to a reader who does not inhabit the time and 
space shared by Gadamer and Wieacker. Macbeth is foremost a play on political 
ambition, on yearning for power for its own sake, and the destructive effects of 
such obsession. 180 In the spring of 1945, a character in a play who unwittingly 
and in stubborn denial fulfills a political tragedy was quite an accurate symbolic 
description of the Fascist regimes and the ‘official’ public opinion prevailing in 
them. 
Yet the saddening political atmosphere and destruction brought about by the 
war did not prevent Wieacker from making observations on the time from the 
point of view of a legal historian. To researchers studying Wieacker’s production, 
the war seemed to sharpen some of the ideas Wieacker had presented earlier and 
slightly shifted the emphasis of his overall research orientation.181 It is clear that 
after the war in his scientific texts Wieacker mostly concentrated on the Europe-
an legal heritage, the fundamental role of language in legal culture, and the sys-
tematic intertwinement of people, cultural transition and the word of law in his-
tory. In other words, the mentalities, interpretations and thoughts on law took 
prior position in his quest to describe the essence of European legal history. A 
distinct research agenda was well on its way as an idea during the late war years, 
but one can see the wider research stance in progress when Wieacker wrote to 
Gadamer on 14 March 1945.
What is great and distinctive to us regarding this land, the Antiquity, the Trecento, the hesperi-
an heavens, have certainly nothing to do with the current political conditions and the least to do 
with the vast, entirely middle European plain in the north. But there is yet something classical 
178 “Sehr merkwürdig, war für diese Zusammenhänge eine Macbethaufführung im Schau-
spielhaus der weitaus grössten Stadt dieses Landes, in der ich fast dauernd bin. Sie war ganz 
gut, aber eine fortwährende Selbstverleugnung der Spieler.”, Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gada-
mer 14.3.1945. NL Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
179 Gadamer recalled later in an interview that it was those texts which for him worked as 
an antidote to the Prussian war-mongering of his youth. The world of Shakespeare’s dramas 
and comedies provided a sphere where a true cultivation of one’s spiritual abilities was possible 
without combining this personal Bildung with the political and ideological necessities of the 
Zeitgeist. Richard Wilson, Free Will: Art and Power on Shakespeare’s Stage. Manchester, Man-
chester UP 2014, 299.
180 Glynne Wickham, Shakespeare’s Dramatic Heritage: Collected Studies in Mediaeval, 
Tudor and Shakespearean Drama. London, Routledge 1969.
181 Avenarius 2010, 151–152.
110 III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness
at present which is the man of this territory himself; and of the man per se remains after all that 
collective and determinated still a large piece. […] And even so, what a refreshing wonder each 
new language is, and what an opportunity it is to interpret the relationships between people and 
things from their origin.182
There were points of connection and comparison in the mentalities of Europe-
an people which had emerged over centuries of cultural exchange. What the war 
and twisted political intentions could not wipe away was the essence and history 
of diverse cultures and the people living in them. Wieacker once again realized 
the intriguing phenomenon of the interplay between language and cultural prod-
ucts, and the people who expressed these abstract entities. To a historian, study-
ing the origins of such phenomenon was not only satisfying, it was also impor-
tant with regard to understanding diverse cultures and societies. Such a strong 
conviction in his thought was evident in such post-war works of Wieacker as 
Vulgarismus und Klassizismus and especially Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neu-
zeit, but the seed of such a stance could already be found in Das römische Recht 
und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein, which was more or less the groundwork on 
which Wieacker built the later representations of European legal culture.183 In 
those texts Wieacker put an increasingly marked emphasis on the mentalities of 
the common people in a given time and culture. 
Nevertheless, Wieacker continued to be interested in the ‘people’ from the point 
of view of a conservative jurist and a historian of ideas brought up in the early 
decades of twentieth-century Germany. Thus, the research slogan ‘back to the 
people’ did not produce a shift towards an ethnographic interest in the everyday 
acts of the common people. Rather, his earlier utterance on the necessity of ‘legal 
anthropology’ in studying the long line of European legal history became even 
more firm.184 However, the inevitable distance between Franz Wieacker the legal 
historian and the ‘people’ he studied remained. Wieacker was confident that he, 
as a representative of a distinguished tradition of thinking and analyzing, was able 
to interpret the ‘reality’ of the people in a more truthful and accurate way than the 
people who inhabited that ‘reality.’ Whereas the ‘people’ clung to superstitious 
182 “Was für uns gross und unauswechselbar ist an diesem Land, das Altertum, das Trecento, 
die hesperischen Himmel, das hatte ja mit der gegenwärtigen politischen Form nichts zu tun, 
und am wenigsten mit der großen, noch ganz mitteleuropäischen Ebene im Norden. Aber es 
gibt doch noch etwas Klassisches gegenwärtig, und das ist der Mensch dieses Landes an sich; 
und von dem Menschen an sich bleibt nur ja hinter allem Kollektiven und Determinierten, noch 
ein so großes Stück über.[…] Und doch was für ein erquickendes Wunder ist jede neue Sprache 
und was für eine Gelegenheit, die Beziehungen zwischen dem Menschen und den Dingen von 
Ursprung an noch einmal aufzufassen.”, Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.3.1945. NL 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
183 Liebs 2010, 38–39.
184 Cf. Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutsche Vermögensrechts’ 1941, 10.
1113. Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945
beliefs and religion, Wieacker’s own scientific knowledge and ‘conscience’ would 
lead to an understanding of the human realm. The ‘strange’ displacement of mil-
itary service allowed him to study the community in an unusual way.185 Wieack-
er’s war service on the frontline enabled him to observe human conduct in its 
rawest, most primitive form. Or at least that was how he saw the situation. In his 
letter to Ernst Rudolf Huber from 23 February1945 Wieacker writes thus:
But the side stage is also an arsenal of enjoyable discoveries for the historian. The psychology 
of constituents like the masses and armies, the chemistry, or should I say alchemy, of the times 
and our circulating culture in its death throes and labor pains, the conditions of culture, lan-
guage and homeland all give sublime joy to the eye, this fearless organ that does not take part 
in the graying and destabilization of the other organs of mental function and conscience. A trip 
through the occupied territories, the (passive) participation in a fighter-bomber mission in the 
Sch[...] at the edge of the war satisfy one’s need for a meaning of existence to such an extent 
which could outdo us in a real participation in the war. If only each participant had at all the eye 
for the divinity that plays in the events and circumstances, if I may express myself so strangely. 
I myself know, as an example, a large city lying immediately behind the front that, contrary to 
the untouched old cities in the heart of our homeland, approximately presents the phenomena 
that Boccaccio recounted on the occasion of the Black Death in Florence: intense feasting by 
day and the chaos of the war of all against all by night. This relates to my alma mater, which is 
so glorious in the history of my narrow technical discipline.186
The war allowed Wieacker to take a look at the origins and deep spheres of law. 
He articulated the war experience as a perennial algorithm, which enabled an 
observer to read the essence of human existence. War was partly a cold and ra-
tional distinguisher, but it also had its ‘alchemical,’ mystical side. It was ‘sub-
185 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 23.2.1945. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz.
186 “Aber für den Historiker ist auch der Nebenschauplatz ein Arsenal von Entdecker-
freuden. Die Psychologie des Einzelnen wie der Massen und Heere, die Chemie oder soll ich 
sagen Alchemie der Zeit und unserer in Todes- oder Geburtswehen kreissenden Kultur, die 
Bedingungen von Kultur, Sprache und Volksheim bereiten dem Auge, diesem furchtlosen Or-
gan, das an dem Grauen und der Erschütterung der anderen geistigen Organe und des Gewis-
sens nicht teilnimmt, unerhörte, sublime Freunden. Die Fahrt durch ein Bandengebiet, die (pas-
sive) Teilnahme an einer Jagdbomberaktion in der Sch[...] am Rande des Krieges befriedigen 
den Sinn für die Existenz an sich in einem Masse, das uns durch die wirkliche Teilnahme am 
Kampf überboten werden könnte; wenn nur jeder Teilnehmer überhaupt das Auge hätte für die 
in den Erscheinungen und Zuständen spielende Gottheit, wenn ich mich so seltsam ausdrücken 
darf. Ich kenne als Beispiel allein eine große, unmittelbar hinter der Front liegende Stadt, die 
im Gegensatz zu den alten Städten unserer Heimat in ihrem Kern unberührt, ungefähr die Er-
scheinungen bietet, die Boccaccio anlässlich der Pest in Florenz erzählt: heftige Schlemmerei 
am Tag und nachts das Chaos des bellum omnium contra omnes. – Es handelt sich um die in 
der Geschichte meiner engeren Fachwissenschaft so ruhmreiche alma mater.”, Wieacker to 
Ernst Rudolf Huber 23.2.1945. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; 
The city which Wieacker refers to as the ‘alma mater of my scientific knowledge,’ was of 
course Bologna. In February of 1945 the battles in Italy concentrated very close to the city.
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lime,’ terrifying but nonetheless brought ‘joy.’ The fact that Wieacker defined 
war using Jüngerian rhetoric points not only to his sophisticated learnedness, but 
to the deep effect that a conservative and ultimately pessimistic perception of the 
world of human affairs had on his mind.187 In the excerpt above, Wieacker artic-
ulated his worldview and ontological premises in an unusually pronounced way. 
It contains features which were typical of his historical vision, and whose roots 
go deep into the cultural atmosphere of Weimar Germany.
With respect to the Wieacker’s concept of Rechtsbewusstsein this quote is re-
vealing in two ways. First the ‘divinity’ which ‘played’ constantly in human af-
fairs, was disguised to most. The oblivion where the absolute majority of the 
people remained, was not a moral dilemma; it was a sustaining element and a 
constituent way of the world. The expressions ‘mass’ or ‘combat’ should not be 
taken as references to National Socialist language, rather they indicate that in his 
letter Wieacker described a raw experience of reality, without the distracting 
structures of the ‘modern.’ Clearly Wieacker thought he witnessed a Hobbesian, 
original state of being (“bellum omnium contra omnes”),188 and the cultural illu-
sion through which this chaos was being regulated. This was the reality (Wirk-
lich keit) from which modern jurisprudence had been alienated, and that reality 
was cruel.189 Such a view of society is very Schmittian, but can hardly be inter-
preted as an export of scholarly ideas from some other influential thinker. Never-
theless, it is an orientation which can explain Wieacker’s attachment to certain 
theories and theorists, and his views on historical development.
Second, to become aware of ‘divinity’ was to know the culture. The masses 
did not have an understanding of the terrors and conscience in the world. They 
lacked the ‘eye’ to observe the reality provided by the cultural building blocks. 
This possession of knowledge was what separated the ‘Master’ from unnamed 
people. To understand ‘divinity’ was terrifying, but elevating, and it seemed to be 
the ones who were destined to remain within the mass who did not have the cour-
age to engage themselves in ‘combat’ in order to reveal the truth about human 
societies.
Earlier in his correspondence Wieacker had adopted the role of cynical witness 
with respect to the war, but now the air raids were destroying German cities, and 
this had a special meaning to him personally. Hamburg, Bremen and Hannover 
represented Heimat, now turned to ashes, as was the main building of Leipzig 
University.190 The culture, knowledge and values to which he was attached, 
seemed to suffer most from the war. At the same time he and the scholars of the 
187 See Ernst Jünger, In Stahlgewittern. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta 2014.
188 Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Glasgow, Fount Paperbacks 1983, 141–145.
189 Cf. p.67–69.
190 “Hätte ich nicht so an Würde und Flor der Leipziger Universität gehangen, würde mir 
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‘New legal science’ shared a conviction that the people in their irresponsible and 
irrational war mongering were basically to blame for the consequences, but at the 
same time the masses lacked the understanding of what had happened and what 
was going on.191
It is notable that Wieacker sees this blind struggle of the people as belonging 
to the ‘psychology of the masses.’ Wieacker rejected the view that Rechtsbe-
wusstsein and the transmission of cultural awareness within European legal his-
tory was essentially a group-psychological phenomenon.192 This argument was 
obviously a statement against Freirechtsschule and Eugen Ehrlich’s formulations 
of law as primarily a psychological phenomenon.193 But, and as the above quoted 
letter clearly expresses, underneath the law there clearly affected psychological, 
irrational forces. However, if one understood this feature, emblematic to all hu-
man civilizations, it ceased to be group-psychological or irrational. The distinc-
tion between ‘The Eye and the masses’ was irreversibly transmitted to the con-
cept of Rechtsbewusstsein. While the ‘divine play’ of war and destruction repeat-
ed itself over and over again in history, there were always people who understood, 
explained and controlled it. So Rechtsbewusstsein signified the blind (“without 
an ‘Eye’”) and infinite participation of the masses in the battle between cultures, 
and at the same time the existence of a Stand of people who were aware of the 
rules and magic of this battle. The ability of the Stand to read the historical mean-
ing, ‘existence,’ of social reality was due to its knowledge of culture, hence Bil-
dung. People were easy to deceive and believed in myths, but it was the scholar’s 
responsibility to bring awareness of the circumstances dictating the social reality, 
the ‘divinity which played in the phenomena,’ and thus to take care that social 
justice was realized in one’s society. 
In the following section I analyze the way Franz Wieackert utilized the con-
cept of Rechtsbewusstsein in his scientific works. My aim is not to construct the 
legal reference-world of Wieacker’s argument, nor weigh the jurisprudential 
sharpness of his texts. Instead I attempt to study how he used the concept of Re-
chtsbewusstsein (and the terms and vocabulary surrounding it, signifying the 
same ontological meaning) in his texts as a heuristic tool in understanding soci-
ety, and as depicting the relation between the law, people and the community. 
alles viel leichter sein.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 23.1.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Uni-
versitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
191 Cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
192 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 26; Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 
17.
193 Cf. p.68.
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The concept was a tool to connect the past and the present, attaching their con-
nections with meanings which were then transmitted to the reading audience.
4. The concept of property
A scientific theme which Wieacker elevated to the first rank of importance in 
the1930s was the question of ‘property’ (Eigentum). Wieacker sought to redefine 
the concept to better match the social reality and changing temporalities of the 
post-Weimar Germany. It was high time for a reconceptualization both in light of 
the longer legal development and jurisprudential discussion concerning the 
theme as well as regarding the National Socialist attempt to redefine the relations 
between subjective rights and the state’s rule over its people. From a legal dog-
matic point of view the concept of ‘property’ certainly needed rethinking. The 
legislation in the German Civil Code (BGB) and the Weimar constitution fell 
short and dragged behind the new forms of merchandise and ownership which 
the rapid economic and technological development produced.194 The social 
norms and laws concerning property in many respects belonged to the time of the 
nineteenth century.
The First World War meant a drastic and violent deployment of ideas on the 
state’s entitlement to common and even private property within its sphere of in-
fluence. This ‘War-socialism’ did not come out of the blue (as Franz Wieacker 
later showed),195 but it was a turning point which changed the perception and 
regulation of ownership and the individual rights related to it for good. In Wei-
mar the commanding power of the state was handed over to the Parliament. In 
practice, this meant that the norms regulating the administration/individual rela-
tion on property, were decided by parties and groups whose ideological diver-
gences on the meaning, form and essence of wealth and ownership were peren-
nial.196 Moreover, the dominant stream in the parliamentary quarreling over the 
changing idea of property seemed to stem from socialists and laissez-faire liber-
alists, both of whose views were understandable in light of the massive econom-
ic dilemmas facing the Weimar Republic as well as the dissolution of the es-
tate-state following the Revolution of 1919.
194 A lively debate on the subject had already surfaced during the Weimar Republic. See e.g. 
Martin Wolff, ‘Reichsverfassung und Eigentum,’ in Festgabe der Berliner Juristischen Fakultät 
für Wilhelm Kahl. Teil IV, Tübingen 1923; cf. Meinel 2012, 196–200.
195 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 545.
196 Cf. Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei 
Corollarien. Duncker & Humblot 1996.
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Whereas the fundamental structures of society vis-à-vis the idea of individual 
property had overgone a total transformation, the bourgeois values of the educat-
ed elite changed more slowly. In the Wilhelmine Empire the personal property of 
the middle classes had been guaranteed by a solid judicature, which derived its 
authority from the monarchy and the privileges of the estates.197 Within this field 
the separation of social reality (the bourgeois acknowledgment of things) and the 
legislation (meaning the ‘sad’ performance of legal positivism) appeared even 
more concrete than usual. It was thus no surprise that the ‘New legal science’ 
emphasized the importance of the theme, and took ‘property’ to be one of the key 
terms in its task of redefining the legal concepts of the “late-liberal state.”198 It 
would be incorrect to assert that the interest the young and conservative legal 
scholars showed in the question was solely motivated by the National Socialist 
seizure of power. To the Nazi party the question was naturally fundamental given 
its aim to build a totalitarian nation and demolish subjective, state-provided 
rights, but obviously in 1935 the concept was at the center of political endeavors 
and of immediate concern.199 In retrospect, the 1930s discussion concerning the 
concept of ‘property’ reflects the wider picture of the rise of National Socialism 
in Germany. Whereas some attempts at social change were motivated by the need 
to exclude and oppress, some interpreted these attempts as acts to revive the 
‘good old’ core of society and confining every harmful aspects of the ‘modern.’ 
When in 1935 Wieacker wrote many of his texts on the concept of ‘property,’ the 
context and discussion in which the concept was used contained many views and 
intentions. These ranged from fascist and conservative ideologies to ideas about 
generational clash and the struggle between academic cliques, and often these 
influences were intertwined. 
To Wieacker the conceptual change in the notion of ‘property’ during the early 
twentieth century appeared to reflect the larger historical development of Euro-
pean legal culture, and throughout his career he maintained that the problematic 
it embedded reflected the “degradation-history of law.”200 The accumulating ten-
dency of the state to intervene in the sphere of legal affairs, eventually leading to 
197 Meinel 2012, 197.
198 Meinel 2012, 201; or redefined them from the point of view of “institutional legal think-
ing.” Rüthers 1992, 24.
199 See Reinhard Höhn, Rechtsgemeinschaft und Volksgemeinschaft. Hamburg, Hansea-
tische Verlagsanstalt 1935, 65; Ernst Forsthoff, ‘Kriegswirtschaft und Sozialverfassung,’ in 
Konrad Hesse (ed.), Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresberichte. Hamburg 1936. However, the Na-
tional Socialist battle against liberal subjective rights simplified the multifaceted concept of 
‘property’ and the academic tradition which sought to define it. Mostly formulations concen-
trated either on how the regime could confiscate as fully as possible, or connected the concept 
to a dull “farmer mythology,” Meinel 2012, 201.
200 Cf. Winkler 2014, 53.
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the “crisis of justice,” became actualized in the early twentieth-century German 
“social-state,” which upset the balance between the people, the state and law. 201 
Within this larger context, Wieacker’s conceptual study was an exploration of the 
changed idea of individual freedom and existence within the temporal frame-
work of administrative power. Whereas in his later works the theme of ‘property’ 
represented a case study in a broader historical development, the 1934–1936 
contributions where mostly arguments situated within a debate on how should 
one study and understand the concept, and suggestions on which bases legisla-
tion relating to it should be arranged. 
The starting point for Wieacker’s argumentation was the evident failure of the 
Weimar Republic. The failure was not only about inoperative legislation. To 
Wieacker, Germany in the early 1930s had experienced an unprecedented ethical 
dilemma considering the authority of individual subjective rights and legitimacy 
of state’s ruling, and as consequence, the former were ignored and latter con-
structed falsely. He argued that when the “liberalist state” tried to regulate and 
define the changing world of ownership, work and trade, the end result at its 
worst looked much like the judicature of the Weimar “late-individualistic” Re-
public.202 The origins of that failure were, however, in place over a hundred years 
before. Societal and legal development after the French Revolution had created a 
“political tension” within the jurisprudential perception of ‘property.’ The ad-
ministrative practices of the state, carried out in all post-Enlightenment societies, 
were characterized by this same tension between the ruler and the ruled, shifting 
the “unsolvable antithesis” to legal language and modern theories on society.203 
The high point in this distinction between the language of the law and legal real-
ity, in which the ‘property’ was actually being constituted, was to be found in 
positivist heories on law. Positivism comprised a legal doctrine which announced 
“everyone for oneself” and accepted that “the legal freedom of one could harm 
the legal freedom of another,” and hence it ignored and violated the “pre-juridi-
cal German life-order on which property was based.”204 
To Wieacker, German jurisprudence, along with positivism and the liberalist 
view on law, had lost its connection to the real world and the reality and tradition 
of the people. Legislation had shrunk the broad legal world of property to indi-
vidual rights and the ownership of “things” (Sache). Such legal language forgot 
201 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 482; Meinel 2012, 197.
202 Franz Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung. Ein Versuch zur Neufassung der Grundfra-
gen’ [1935], in Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 135.
203 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 127.
204 Franz Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], in Wollschläger (ed.) 
2000, 30; cf. Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung [1935]’, 129.
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and ignored the fundamental link between the concepts and the reality.205 The 
source of the law as justice was not a matter of regulation and law-giving, but of 
legitimacy, which was achieved in the congruence of positive law with the com-
mon perception of the rule of law. The law-giving had to follow the “absolute”, 
un-written, constitution of the people. The people, for their part, were comprised 
of different groups and traditions, whose life conditions could never fully be 
grasped by merely positive norms.206 Seen within this context, in legal reality, 
the individual was not just a package of rights and obligations wrapped together 
as a legal subject, but a “systematic position” (Ordnungslage) which carried 
within itself intertwined meanings and duties:207 
It [the legal subject] is rather a legal systematic position substantiated in the structure of 
the people’s order […], which constantly regenerates the measure and content of rights and 
binding obligations from itself, without separately confronting legal authority and legal obliga-
tions at all.208
As a result, the concept of ‘property’ in Wieacker’s texts in 1934–1936 was de-
fined (i) through its relation to the cultural entity of people and (ii) in reference 
to the varying value systems of professions with their own distinctive norms 
within the nation. In other words, norms and rules concerning German ‘property’ 
could only be correctly analysed if understood as being part of ‘concrete orders’:
No longer the formal prestige of the few, as can still be commonly affirmed for all things, but 
rather the concrete orders of the law for currencies, inherited lands, allotments and livestock 
determine the material meaning of our legal conditions of property.209
205 Wieacker, ‘Zum Wandel der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 4: “Denn damit ist dar Reich 
verlassen, in dem juristische Begriffsbildung wirksam ist: die Wirklichkeit der Rechtsgemein-
schaft. Hinter dem Sachbegriff verbergen sich Rechtswirklichkeiten, die eine gerechte Le bens-
ordnung veschieden ordnen und werten muss.” 
206 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Eigen’ [1935], In Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 110. 
207 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Eigen [1935]’, 111; also Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung 
[1935]’, 145: ”Das Eigen ist nicht subjektives recht oder eine Summe objektiver Rechte, bes-
chränkt durch gesetliche normierung und gesetzmässige Eingriffs möglichkeiten.”. 
208 ”Es ist vielmehr eine im Aufbau der Volksordnung begründete rechtliche Ordnungslage 
[…], die aus sich selbst das Mass und den Inhalt von Berechtigung und Pflichtbindung ständig 
erneut hervorbringt, ohne dass sich überhaupt gesondert Rechtsmacht und Rechtspflicht 
gegenübertreten.”, Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 146.
209 ”Nicht mehr die formale Geltung des wenigen, da noch für alle Sachen gemeinsam aus-
gesagt werden kann, sondern die Konkrete ordnungen des Rechtes für devisen, erhöbfe, Schre-
bergärten, schlachtvieh bestimmen für uns den materiellen Gehalt unserer Eigentumsverfas-
sung.”, Franz Wieacker, ‘Zum Wandel der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1934], in Wollschläger (ed.) 
2000, 6. Emphasis mine; cf. Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 102: 
“[D]en innerhalb der rechtlichen Regelung konkreter Institutionen, wie sie die Forderungen 
nach einem konkreten Ordnungsdenken verwirklichen will, ist die Systematik des relative und 
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The legal order structuring the allocation of goods within the community should 
bear in mind the innate bond between an individual and his community. Since 
‘property’ was inevitably bound to the actual life of the community, Wieacker 
stressed and even prioritized the values the concept contained. The community 
was not a mere heterogeneous compilation of people, but a group held together 
by a deep spiritual togetherness.210 In describing this community Wieacker used 
examples and terms relating to the body, the home and the family.211 By this he 
was able to exhibit the “beyond-legal” values and emotions which should guide 
the legal system.212 The values of ‘responsibility’ and ‘honor’ could not be distin-
guished from the ‘property,’ thus they should be acknowledged while studying 
the concept, and more importantly, while making laws concerning it.213 Accord-
ing to Wieacker, those values had previously (in the liberalist and modern legal 
theories) remained outside the jurisprudential “concept-creation.” Moreover, the 
previous legal theories had in their twisted inner politicization, their idea of au-
tonomous will, and their emphasis on subjective rights equated ‘honor’ and ‘re-
sponsibility’ with money.214 A law which disregarded the immaterial values em-
bedded in different properties, different histories and purposes for ownership 
was not only bad, it was unjust: “Every system of land laws refers directly to 
transpersonal values of the people.”215
absoluten Privatrechts, die ja nur am isolierten subjektiven Recht abgelesen warden kann, 
fruchtlos.” Emphasis mine.
210 See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 134.
211 Wieacker emphasized the meaning of “Erbhof.” He also defined different communities 
as “limbs” in the “body” of society. See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ 
[1935], 31.
212 Cf. Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögensrechts’ 1941, 10; “übergesetzli-
chen Prinzipien”; also Franz Wieacker, ‘Bauernrecht und bürgerliches Liegenschaftsrecht’ 
[1936], in Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 191: “Im ganzen gesehen wird aber das bäuerliche Standes-
recht sich auch in seiner sachenrechtlichen Gestaltung, die nur eine Ausstrahlung de Urpersön-
lichen Verfassung des Bauernstandes ist, vom bürgerlichen Recht weit entfernen: nicht nur als 
bäuerliches Sonderecht, sondern auch als Einbruchstelle allgemeinverbindlicher Grundsätze 
des neuen Rechtsdenkens.”
213 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 142: “Ohne diese Zuweisung gäbe es 
keine Verantworklichkeit der Glieder, keine durch Verantworklichkeit gebundene Volksord-
nung und keine Familie oder Sippe”; see also Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 
31. On honor as a virtuous glue of society, see Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfas-
sung’ [1935], 81; Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 145: “Pflichtsbindung.”
214 Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 81; also Wieacker, ‘Eigen-
tum und Enteignung’ [1935], 134: “Die Einteignung mit voller Geldentschädigung ist im 
eigent lichen Sinne keine Enteignung mehr; sie ist mehr die Verpflichtung, den Bodenwert in 
einen Kapitalwert einzutauschen.”
215 Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 59. “Jede Bodenrechtsord-
nung bezieht sich unmittelbar auf überpersonliche Volkwerte.”
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Nevertheless, in the new National Socialist regime, these values were to be 
assimilated in the language of law, hence the new definition of ‘property.’216 
Acknowledging the values which the communality brought about was not only 
vital for making just and usable laws, but would strengthen the moral atmosphere 
of the national community.217 While prioritizing the cultural entity of people or 
the natural constellation of the community – in line with National Socialist legal 
theories – Wieacker was hesitant to use the concept ‘people’s community’(Volks-
gemeinschaft), and preferred the term ‘people’s order’ (Volksordnung). On a se-
mantic level this distinguishes him from scholars like Reinhard Höhn, and signi-
fies a theoretical difference between them, although whether one used the term 
‘Volksgemeinschaft’ or ‘Volksordnung’ in the legal scientific discourse of the 
1930s had, with regard to the reading audience, little relevance. In practice, 
Wieacker’s ‘Volksordnung’ was defined with roughly similar attributes as the 
later more notorious ‘Volksgemeinschaft’:
The concept of “to each what he deserves” first assigns accountable stewardship to those who 
were property owners up to now, then to those who are related by ancestry. The suprapersonal 
collective which the authority of the peasant is executed for is the blood bond collective of the 
peasant’s House (not the nuclear family). The House is the sphere of people’s order [Volksord-
nung] where the property of entailed estate is connected with it. This order is not based on ab-
stract legal entities, but on the connection of concrete individuals by a blood-relationship.218
The new legal space for an individual derived on one hand from belongingness 
to the natural community of people (Volksordnung), in practice the German na-
tion,219 but on the other hand to a distinguished group of people united by their 
vocation and profession (Stand). The “vocation estates” (Berufsstand), acquired 
their inner values, binding social norms and sense of communality from a unify-
ing orientation to a particular task within the larger community of the Volksord-
216 The chapter in ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935] is titled “Voraussetzung 
des personalen Lebensordnung: Die Ehre des Rechtsgenossen” (81–82).
217 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 142, fn.  1.
218 “Da es jedem das Seine gibt, beruft es zu verantwortlichen Verwaltung zunächst den 
bisherigen Eigentümer, sodann seine Nächsten, die durch gleiche Abstammung Verbundenen. 
Der überpersonliche Verband, für den die Befugnisse des Bauern ausgeüpt warden, ist der 
Blutsverband des Bauerngeschlechtes (nicht der Kleinfamilie). Das Geschlecht ist der Kreis 
der Volksordnung, in dem das Erbhofeigentum mit ihr zusammenhängt. Diese Ordnung gründet 
sich nicht auf abstrakte Rechtssubjekte, sondern auf der Verbindung konkreter Personen durch 
einen Blutszusammenhang.”, Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 80–
81. Emphasis mine.
219 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 149: “Eigen ist verstanden worden als mit 
der Gemeinschaft mitgegebene natürliche Einordnung des Gliedes in engere völkische Le bens-
kreise und personbestimmte Vermögenskreise [.]”
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nung.220 The idea of a national community (Volksordnung) based on a corpora-
tive organic society, was very traditionally conservative and not new at all. In 
Wieacker’s legal sociological descriptions, the estates or corporates, Stand, were 
connected to a larger whole like limbs connected to the body, and likewise con-
ducted a necessary task in relation to and on behalf of the larger collective. Such 
a view was not revolutionary or originally National Socialist. 
In the long line of German social conservatism, it was an undisputed principle 
that individual freedom could only be achieved by merging the alienated and the 
isolated ‘self’ to the organic idea of the state. The argument was that since the 
ideal was perceived as more truthful than its concrete historic variations, it was 
necessary for individual citizens to subordinate themselves to the greater cause 
of the fulfillment of the national cause. In order for the material and ideal to co-
incide on the national level, everyone and everything had to have their natural 
place and task within the community.221 To Wieacker, the structures of the ‘peo-
ple’s order’ and ‘vocation estate’ were innate and original formations of commu-
nality which predated any legal theory. 
The older conservative ideal was nevertheless made fascist and emptied out of 
any constructive meaning in the National Socialist rhetoric. Also, the division of 
‘the people’s community’ to the particles of Stand, was a cliché in the Third Re-
ich and in National Socialistic legal science.222 The old vocabulary was used to 
camouflage the political coup and make it seem like a legal and social reform. 
Likewise, Wieacker’s texts repeated the message of the exceptional nature of the 
‘legal renewal’ in relation to previous tradition; the strength and revolutionary 
essence of the new (National Socialist) legislation concerning ‘property’ relied 
on its way of defining individuality as well as the individual’s relation to owner-
ship, trade and inheritance on the basis of the communal order.223 Nevertheless, 
and paradoxically, to the young conservative legal scholars, the justification of 
‘legal renewal’ came exactly from its alleged ability to rise above ‘empty words’ 
and implement the ideas – which had grown out of real and material conditions 
of the people – to the contemporary legal reality. 
220 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 144: “Der Sinngehalt des Eigens wird am 
deutlichsten sichtbar, wenn wir gegeständliche Einzelordnungen aufsuchen, in denen der An-
gehörige eines Berufsstandes mit einer Vermögenseinheit umgeht, die einer engeren berufsstän-
dischen Aufgabe bestimmt ist.” 
221 Cf. Dilcher 2016.
222 See e.g. Ernst Forsthoff, Deutsche Geschichte seit 1918 in Dokumenten, Stuttgart: Al-
fred Kröner 1938, 269; cf. Paul Nolte. Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft. Selbstentwurf 
und Selbstbeschreibung im 20. Jahrhundert. München, C. H. Beck Verlag, 2000, 159–186.
223 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 148.
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It is noteworthy, though, that the necessary homogeneity of ‘vocation-estates’ 
and even ‘the people’s community’, is not in Wieacker’s texts based on racial 
distinctions. Rather, the idea of Berufstand for Wieacker enabled a renewed view 
of society. Acknowledging their essential meaning, and their significance for the 
national community allowed the scholar to bring forth values and emotions as 
vital communal factors, and further helped lawgivers to define laws which would 
take into account those values and emotions. While understanding the nature of 
the individual’s existence concretely, the ‘New legal science’ was able to intro-
duce a more just definition of the connection between the personal and the com-
munity.
While the community recognizes the individual member as a part of it, it recognizes him as a 
capable and needy member responsible for an existence and a task. […] the true meaning of 
possession and the self-protection, however is all the more based in the fabric of the people’s 
order and justified by its necessities.224
Wieacker’s conceptualization of ‘property’ gained appreciation for its highly 
contemporary theoretization – utilization of fashionable neo-Hegelian and 
Schmittian ideas – but also for the author’s ‘material’ and historical orientation. 
Wieacker’s 1930s texts on ‘property’ indeed followed the dull rhetoric of the 
National Socialist ideology, and referred to fascist principles concerning the ap-
parently unproblematic (in)division of political power and the abolishment of 
subjective rights. In elaborating the historical background and the political cir-
cumstances of the law concerning property, Wieacker relied heavily on Carl 
Schmitt. The view on law in relation to ‘concrete orders,’ the ideas of the politi-
cal tension within legal concepts and the ‘neutral state,’ and the conviction on 
positivism’s inability to overcome the breach between the social justice and 
norms, are not only themes which Schmitt brought into the scientific discussion, 
and on which Wieacker built, but Wieacker also explicitly refers to Schmitt’s 
works while elaborating these themes in his own works.225 
224 “Indem die Gemeinschaft den Genossen als zugehörig anerkennt, erkennt sie ihn als 
verantwortliches, einer Existenz und einer Aufgabe fähiges und bedürftiges Glied an. […] der 
wahre Sinngehalt des Eigens und des Eigenschutzes aber um so fester in das Gefüge des Volks-
ordnung sebst gestützt und aus ihren Notwendigkeiten begründet.”, Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und 
Enteignung’ [1935], 142.; cf. 138: in Weimar, under the formal legal order, an individual “was 
threatened in his existence.”
225 Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 30 fn.  27 (a reference to Carl 
Schmitt’s Der Begriff des Politischen) and 102 fn.  110 (a reference to Carl Schmitt’s Über die 
drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens); Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ 
[1935], 127, fn.  1 a (reference to Carl Schmitt’s Epilogue in Heft 17 of Der deutsche Staat der 
Gegenwart) and 136–137 (a reference to Carl Schmitt’s Die Auflösung des Enteignungsbe-
griffs, [JW 1929]).
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Wieacker’s stance has also been categorized as neo-Hegelian by Bernd 
Rüthers.226 The implicit connections and explicit references to the Hegelians of 
the Kieler Schule can easily be traced.227 This is not surprising given Wieacker’s 
firm position in the intellectual context of the Kieler Schule. The unproblematic 
use of the value-based connection between the individual and the whole might 
also be considered neo-Hegelian. Whereas in Wieacker’s later texts the varia-
tions between and within different emotional communities became the bench-
mark of his history of legal mentalities, in the 1930s formulations on ‘property’ 
and the link between the personal and the communal was straightforward. In this 
respect Wieacker’s works were in congruence with those of, for example, Ernst 
Rudolf Huber. Wieacker, too, adapted Carl Schmitt’s vaguely constructed con-
cepts, and sought to reinterpret the legal tradition by contrasting it with Schmitt’s 
powerful slogans charged with ‘material’ substance and (occasionally) a Hegeli-
an orientation. In the case of both Wieacker and Huber it is clear that they admi-
rably succeeded in addressing the inconsistencies of the German constitution, but 
also offered tools for the politicization of the rule of law.228 
On the semantic level, Wieacker did not use the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein 
in his articles about ‘property.’ The meaning of that term was yet “un-conceptu-
alized” and unformulated in the text. Nevertheless, in these works one can al-
ready see the embryos of scholarly thinking which he carried through to the 
times of the Federal Republic, and which were later conceptualized under the 
term Rechtsbewusstsein. To Wieacker, the legal definition of ownership, i.e. the 
concept of ‘property,’ reflected the abstractions of freedom and justice, and leg-
islation concerning ‘property’ mirrored the value which each time and place suc-
ceeded in giving to those fundamentally European ideals. Wieacker’s elaboration 
226 Rüthers 2012, 354–356; cf. Meinel 2012, 204: “[Wieacker’s] Dialektik, die die über-
kommene Antinomie von subjektiver Gerechtigung und objektiven Schranken auf der höheren 
Ebene des Eigens zusammenführte [.]”
227 See e.g. references to Wolfgang Siebert in ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ 
[1935], 50; to Ernst Rudolf Huber ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 25 and ‘Ei-
gentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 139; to Karl Larenz ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ 
[1935], 24, 117 and ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 141, 142; to Georg Dahm ‘Eigentum 
und Enteignung’ [1935], 147; to Martin Busse in Franz Wieacker, ‘Familiengut und Erbenge-
meinschaft’ [1936] in Vollschläger (ed.) 2000, 191.
228 Cf. Mehring 2014, 239. Wieacker’s and Huber’s contemporaries did, however, distin-
guish their work from that of, for example, Reinhard Höhn. Höhn was closer to the structures 
of the NSDAP, and more often echoed the exact ‘will’ of the party –which the former members 
of the Kieler Schule were quick to point out after the war. For Wieacker’s criticism against 
Reinhard Höhn, see e.g. Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Eigen’ [1935], 110, 112. In retrospect, the 
difference between these two views remained on the academic level, and it mostly derived from 
a disagreement on what weight should be given to, and how should one use, the idea of ‘con-
crete order.’
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was both ‘existential’ and ‘material.’ 229 The economic, ideological, juridical and 
political justifications which a given society provided for the allocation of goods 
and the protection of privacy varied. However, these arguments could be used 
against each other and they were not universally valid. What was essential was 
how a legal culture managed to link its legal tools and concepts to the material 
– concrete and everyday – life of its people.230 
Wieacker’s approach to the case of Germany, and the way in which he pro-
vides proof for his elaboration, is, however, carried out via historical review, 
where he argues for the necessity of structuring and perceiving the society in 
corporates, Stand. In these ‘estates’ the ideal spiritual and virtuous form of Ger-
man society exists; it exists as an atemporal order, but it is reacheable through 
legal historical comparison. This starting point, originally Hegelian and social 
conservative, was a leitmotif on which he based his further analysis on German 
and European legal history. Wiecker asserted that the positive norms did not 
constitute the realm of social justice. The sense and understanding of the law 
came from the everyday practices of the people. It was the task of legal science 
to acknowledge this value-binding as the result of the material life of a particular 
group of people. In a correctly formulated legislation and legal judgments, norms 
should echo the valuations of the community which they seek to regulate. The 
principle of basing positive law on the communal mentalities which emerged 
from the material life of the people, dominated Wieacker’s historical vision as 
early as 1935:
The concept [of ‘property’] has been primarily changed by the binding of the German people, 
not by the binding of their property. It is correct that the requirements for new legal conditions 
of property are produced through personal, especially through professional or farm constitu-
tional measures.231
Embedded in Wieacker’s thesis, however, is the experience of the failure of the 
liberal Weimar state. In its judicature the Weimar Republic (and along with it the 
legal scholars who advocated the values on which the Republic had been built) 
had conducted policy which was at odds with the conservative ideals of the 
Bildumsbürgertum. As presented in chapter II, to the ‘lawyer Stand’ personal 
229 Meinel 2012, 204; Behrends 1995. 
230 Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 148: “die Art der Einwirkung auf die 
gliedschaftliche Einordnung des Volks- und Berufsgenossen, in der Seine Existenz und der 
Sinn seiner Sachgüter erst begrundet sind.”
231 “Dass begriff [of ‘property’] sich primär durch bindung der deutschen Menschen, nicht 
durch bindung des Eigentums geändert haben. Es ist richtig dass die Voraussetzungen für die 
neue Eigentumsverfassung durch personliche, insbesondere durch berufsständische oder 
bäuer liche Verfassungsmassnahmen hervorgebracht worden ist.”, Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der 
Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 112 fn.  5.
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property was tied with the notions of social dignity and status. Money was ex-
cluded from the ideal of ownership as individual freedom; rather, fiscal matters 
were disdained as a corrupting force and perceiving things through their mone-
tary value was seen as a symptom of the lack of inner morals. The point of com-
parison was to be found from the ‘golden ages’ of history, either from the nation-
al past or, in Wieacker’s case, from ancient Rome.232 Allegedly, during these 
epochs, abstract values such as honor, discipline, freedom and willpower were 
the yardsticks for evaluating ‘property.’ On the other hand, the recollection of the 
concrete and personal experience of the war generation represented the dissolu-
tion of the bourgeois ideal after the First World War. The ‘property’ which was 
supposed to guarantee one’s social status and bright future was being devalued in 
the political and economic turmoil of the Weimar Republic. Since the legislation 
regarding ownership, trade and heritage was now increasingly a result of a par-
liamentary process, the phenomena and opinions which eroded and nullified the 
Bildungsbürgertum’s idea of ‘property’ became associated with the natural social 
‘other,’ the communists and liberal leftist politicians.233
5. Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 
(1944): The historicization of the relation between  
mentality and law
If the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein is still indefinite in Franz Wieacker’s texts 
on ‘property,’ the situation had changed in his 1944 article Das römische Recht 
und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein, which was originally presented as a lecture 
in Leipzig in the preceding year.234 The text constitutes a key argument in 
Wieacker’s later attempts to describe the long line of European legal history, and 
it was included in the collection Vom Römischen Recht (1944). In the 1944 article 
Rechtsbewusstsein appears both as a means to understand the past, but also a 
phenomenon which should be the target of legal historical study. To analyze law 
in different times and cultures (inside the European tradition, descending from 
232 See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Familiengut und Erbengemeinschaft’ [1936], 195: “[I]n dieser Ge-
stalt wurde die Erbrechtsordnung in Deutschland rezipiert. Entsprach sie im antiken Recht ei-
gentümlichen und konkreten Aufbaubedingungen der römischen Bürgerverfassung, so wurde 
sie der Begegnung mit der deutschen Lebensordung des ausgehenden Mittelalters zum 
Werkzeug weiterer Zersetzung der geschlossene Erbfolge in Sondergüter.” See also the com-
parison between the “liberal components from 1789” and “the law of antiquity [based on val-
ues]” in Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 17–18.
233 Meinel 2012, 199.
234 Liebs 2010, 38–39.
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Roman law) was to understand the attitudes, emotions and perceptions (the men-
tality) of the people in relation to the legal institutions and norms of a given time 
and place. Thus the neo-Hegelian idea of the value-based relation between an 
individual and the whole, was further enriched by a concept whose development 
and different forms could be subjected to a historical study. This concept was no 
longer a vague principle and necessity, but a temporal structure. Yet consistently, 
Wieacker held that this conceptual phenomenon could only be understood with 
respect to the material, concrete reality of those who expressed it.
On one hand, Wieacker posits the text in the contemporary discussion where 
legal science attempted to determine the place of German law within the Europe-
an context. After 1941 the Nazi regime tried to present the German law and legal 
development as essentially European. The concrete measures in this ‘cultural 
war’ were such projects as Aktion Ritterbusch as well as the conference journeys 
the German scholars made in the occupied countries.235 The purpose was not 
only to persuade foreign cultural elites to adopt a more conciliatory stance to-
wards German occupation, but to inveigle the Europeans to unite against the 
Eastern threat of Soviet Union and advancing Red Army.236 On the other hand in 
his article Wieacker was able to explicitly present the vision he had held since the 
times of his apprenticeship with Fritz Pringsheim; the superior essence and aes-
thetics of Roman law. 
As elaborated in section III.2, National Socialist legal science was not support-
ive towards Roman law. Moreover, the contemporary jurisprudential paradigm 
was that Roman law with its emphasis on the individual and ownership had cor-
rupted the national legal tradition, which was mostly the reason for the legal 
turmoil of the late-liberal state. The violent intrusion of Roman law was embed-
ded in the prevailing legal historical narrative of the reception of Roman law, 
which stressed the rational administrative tendency which the application of Ro-
man law brought to the German culture. Because of the Reception, the dominant 
narrative argued, the people and the state had been separated for good.237 This 
was the prejudice which Wieacker sought to alter by means of his article. Detlef 
Liebs asserts that Wieacker’s research task was a courageous act, since it could 
have brought him unwanted and dangerous censure from fundamentalist legal 
235 See p.96–97.
236 Conrad 1999, 352–353.
237 See e.g. Carl Schmitt, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit des deutschen Rechtsstandes,’ in 
Deutsches Recht 6 (1936), 181–185. Cf. Peter Landau, ‘Römisches Recht und deutsches Ge-
meinrecht: Zur rechtspolitischen Zielsetzung im nationalsozialistischen Parteiprogramm,’ in 
Michael Stolleis & Dieter Simon (eds.), Rechtsgeschichte im Nationalsozialismus: Beiträge 
zur Geschichte einer Disziplin. Tübingen, J.C.B Mohr 1989, 11–24.
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scholars backed by the SS.238 Here, however, I do not attempt to study Wieack-
er’s contribution in that respect. I will instead investigate how Wieacker concep-
tualized the relation between common national values and law with the help of 
the abstraction Rechtsbewusstsein, scrutinize what kind of meanings the concept 
contained, and further analyze how his stance might possibly have changed from 
the 1930s. 
In weighing the positive law’s changing relation to social reality, Wieacker in 
Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein elaborated three view-
points concerning the phenomenon, which commented and challenged the exist-
ing understanding of German legal history. These viewpoints can be categorized 
as (i) the phenomenology of the wrong turn taken by the legal culture in the ad-
vent of modern era, (ii) juridical humanism and scientification (Verwissenschaft-
lichung), and (iii) the estate-based essence of the new class of lawyers. Wieacker 
starts his argument by briefly presenting the prevailing prejudice of the harmful 
nature of Roman law and its role as the defining factor in the tragic division be-
tween the state and the material reality of the people. This actual breach had been 
exhibited as the distinction between the self-feeling of the bourgeoisie and the 
rational, administrative language of the legal rhetoric.239 Wieacker rejected any 
attempts to turn back the wheel of time and return to the times when the law was 
made and interpreted by laymen, a time when there (allegedly) was ongoing 
contact with the national, common understanding of justice. Wieacker argued 
that the rational essence of the law in the modern state was a fact one needed to 
acknowledge, and the efforts to “purify” law from “foreign” particles would not 
“seal the gap”:240 
So would the scientification of our law be nothing else then a dreadful wrong track away from 
the community off to the presumptuous domination of the intellect over life? No. With such a 
judgement we have to reject the state of the modern era itself.241
According to Wieacker, whereas the scientification of the law was a matter of 
fact, a better understanding of the structures, development and attitudes involved 
in that process would benefit contemporary legal science in its quest to make and 
interpret laws in congruence with the people’s reality. To Wieacker the Reception 
was a historical event guided by larger social and intellectual historical forces of 
238 Liebs 2010, 38.
239 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 4, the “Selbst-
gefühl” versus “Rechtssprechungmonopol.”
240 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 5, 44.
241 “So wären den die Verwissenschaftlichung unseres Rechts nichts al sein schlimmer Irr-
weg von der Gemeinschaft fort zu der anmassenden Herrschaft des Verstandes über das Leben? 
Nein. Mit einem solchen Urteil mussten wir auch den Staat der Neuzeit selbst verwerfen.”, 
Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 44.
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economic change and rationalization. During the Reception the living conditions 
of the people and the ruling elite rapidly developed, resulting in dramatic altera-
tions in the mentalities of both individuals and the community.242 
Wieacker stated – in congruence with contemporary estimations of the medie-
val world – that in the world of the late middle ages jurisdiction was firmly built 
on the personal prestige of the elite which ran the courts. The replacement of the 
natural economy with the monetary system, and the differentiation of society 
deriving from specialization in the labor market, produced more complex admin-
istrative challenges, of which the laymen or the sheriffs were no longer able to 
handle by means of their personal, practical knowledge.243 In other words, the 
material, historical development brought about an unbalance in the foundations 
to which the authority of the law was anchored. The ideal of the pre-Reception 
judicature was noble, but alas, shifting circumstances separated “status-based 
legal knowledge” and the individual “sense of law” of the laymen from the actu-
al needs of the community.244 The language of the law (as expressed by laymen) 
was no longer in accordance with legal reality. In the long run, the changed legal 
environment resulted in a distinction between the general communal awareness 
of the rule of law (Rechtsbewusstsein) and the functioning of the courts.245 
Here Rechtsbewusstsein, a consciousness of law and legality among the peo-
ple, is irreversibly bound to the material conditions concerning work, social hier-
archy, appreciated skills, and future prospects prevailing within an actual com-
munity, very much like in Wieacker’s 1930s texts on contemporary legal con-
cepts. Nevertheless, Rechtsbewusstsein in the 1944 context also signified the 
erring nature and false expectations of the people. The idea of justice, to which a 
given Rechtsbewusstsein – since there were many different Rechtsbewusstsein246 
– was inclining, did not understand the meaning and variation which the general 
242 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 24: “[D]er 
zunehmenden wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Differenzierung des Spätmittelalters die einzelnen 
Lebenskreise nicht mehr zu überblicken und ihre besondere Rechtsanschauung von den Schöf-
fen nicht mehr zu erleben. In diesem Augenblick wurde ihr Rechtsgewissen unsicher.” 
243 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 23, 24.
244 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 24.
245 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 25: “[S]eine 
überlieferte Spruchpraxis nicht mehr als zureichende Leistung galt, und seine durch geistiges 
Gesetz und verstandesmässige Schlüsse nicht fassbare Entscheidung auch nicht mehr der Aus-
druck eines starken Rechtsgewissens war,” also 40–41. It is important that the relation between 
Wieacker’s concepts of Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein is not yet clear. The legal per-
ception of the sheriffs, thus laymen, could (in 1944) be elaborated as Rechtsgewissen, legal 
conscience.
246 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 28: “Dem 
tiefer Eindringenden aber trat noch in den gleichsam ausgeglühten Juristentexten des Corpus 
iuris die klare Geistigkeit eines klassisch gewordenen Rechtsbewusstsein entgegen.”
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historical development added to the requirements of the working legal practice. 
The communal awareness or consciousness of law was founded on the authority 
of its judicature. In a comparative manner, from the viewpoint of legal historical 
scholarship, that authority was functional (brought justice) if it applied an inter-
pretative model in giving laws and verdicts, which again reflected the material 
needs and valuations of those who were being ruled. To put this in the language 
of Wieacker’s concepts: the Rechtsgewissen or the Rechtsgefühl of the judges 
was the spiritual skill behind their verdicts. If a legal system was functional, that 
skill cultivated judgments which matched the Rechtsbewusstsein, the values of 
the people; the language of the law and the social reality were compatible. This 
enabled the judicature (or the judges) to enjoy the trust of the community, and be 
counted as authoritative. 
People’s consciousness of law was a feature which guaranteed the continuity 
in the legal system. Some axioms could not be switched with every new scientif-
ic theory or policy. The material law was “reality-entangled,” and it carried along 
with it older perceptions and cultural traits.247 Rechtsbewusstsein changed like an 
organism. It grew, became more mature, and was transmitted from one genera-
tion to another like an accumulating knowledge of life.248 The peculiar feature of 
the legal consciousness of the German middle ages was, however, its primitivism 
with respect to the legal language. To Wieacker, the authority of pre-Reception 
German law was inevitably temporal, since the language this judicature used to 
describe and categorize legal phenomena was neither transmittable nor ration-
al.249 Here by rationality in a appreciating sense (since ‘rationality’ often bore a 
negative significance as an expression of ‘scientification’),250 Wieacker meant a 
combination of linguistic capability, the acknowledgment of previous legal 
achievements (i.e. tradition), and skillfulness (kündig) in understanding life more 
broadly.251 The Reception, or to be more precise, the historical development it 
included, separated the German legal consciousness and the administration of the 
state for hundreds of years, and the German legal consciousness has remained in 
this state of irrationality ever since. The ‘experience-bility’ of the law was lost.252
247 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 38.
248 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 11.
249 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 23: “Das 
Recht ist unter dieser Betrachtungsweise nicht sowohl Norm als Sinngehalt des beurteilen Le-
bensverhalts, daher nur in sehr beschränktem Umfang lehrbar und begrifflich zu legitimieren.”
250 Cf. Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 449.
251 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 17.
252 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 43: “Das Er-
gebnis war, gleichviel, mit dem Aufhören der Anschauligkeit und Erlebbarkeit des Rechts Ver-
lust der unmittelbaren Teilhabe des Volkes am Recht. In Zukunft trat dem Rechtsgewissen des 
Einzelnen wie des Volkes das rationale und intellektuell erfasst Staatliche Recht al sein Frem-
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With respect to Wieacker’s historical vision, the meaning he gives to human-
ism within his narrative of German (and European) legal history is important. 
That entity encapsulated the problem of ‘scientification,’ which in the contempo-
rary German social, legal and humanistic studies were perceived as the root of all 
evil. Scientification introduced a division between the state and the people, a di-
vision which the Nazis and more broadly even legal scholars, intended to over-
come in order to find the true essence of German society. Previously, Germanis-
tic scholars had blamed Roman law for the rationalistic tendencies in German 
culture, which had allegedly originated from the Reception.253 Wieacker attacked 
these arguments asserting that it was not the law which was rationalistic, but the 
power which utilized the law.254 The humanist revolution of the late middle ages 
had “unsealed the spiritual eyes” of the people, who now yearned for more ad-
vanced techniques in administration, commerce and governing. There was a 
strong need for universality in the German culture of Reception, stemming from 
the “feeling of life” and “spiritual experience.”255 These streams, however, car-
ried along with them the seeds of future anomalies. Humanism appreciated above 
all the “higher spiritual meaning of Form,” which later resulted in the formalistic 
and material theories of law and society.256 Roman law as a superior technique 
addressed these demands and offered a “spiritual force to control life itself.”257 
The evolution of Wieacker’s thoughts with respect to his previous arguments 
on the legal sphere is most evident in the way he conceptualizes the Stand of ju-
rists in the text of Das römische Recht und das deutsche rechtsbewusstsein. In 
1941 Wieacker had contributed to the contemporary discussion on the need to 
define a new system for German law.258 Following the political discourse, the 
new system had to be freed from the corrupting tendencies of liberal and eco-
nomic necessities and stress the togetherness of the German people. To Wieack-
er, such a task should be started from an elaboration of the material conditions 
leading to the contemporary situation, as well as the need to scrutinize the flaws 
and virtues of previous theories. In ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögenrechts’ 
des entgegen, dem er sich auf Treu und Glauben oder in äusserem Zwang unterwarf.” (empha-
sis mine) and “Seitdem ist ein grundsätzlicher Widerspruch zwischen dem Rechtsgefühl des 
Einzelnen wie des Volkes und der staatlichen Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung möglich ge-
worden” (emphasis mine). See also 46: “irrationalen Rechtsgewissen des Volkes“; also 22. 
253 Landau 1989, 17–24. 
254 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 45.
255 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 28, 29.
256 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 28.
257 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 15.
258 Cf. Werner Schubert, ‘Volksgesetzbuch. Teilentwürfe, Arbeitsberichte und sonstige Ma-
terialen,’ in Werner Schubert (ed.), Akademie für Deutsches Recht. 1933–1945. Protokolle der 
Ausschüsse Bd.  III, 1. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 1988.
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(1941) Wieacker had argued that a functional system of law had to be independ-
ent of the formalistic construction of natural law-based theories and instead rely 
on a communal understanding of principles, acts and ideas.259 He expanded his 
previous argument on a society built on “vocation estates,” and asserted that the 
most sustainable statements on and creations of law, could be obtained within an 
estate which material task was to deal with the law. Such a constellation would 
be that of a “juridical estate.”260 An insurmountable historical example of such a 
Stand was the guild of jurists in the Late Roman Republic.261 At the same time, 
Wieacker gave credit to the natural law scholars like Pufendorf and Grotius who, 
despite their many disadvantages, understood “juridical anthropology,” meaning 
that the ideas of the lawyers were also historically situated, they were “the mate-
rial ideas of law.”262 It is important to acknowledge that the existence of the “ju-
ridical-estate” and “the material ideas of law” was not to challenge any belief in 
metahistorical or timeless legal principles. On the contrary, utilizing these start-
ing points would bring forth an understanding of “beyond-legal” axioms within 
the law, and in this way a legal system would be more related to legal reality.263
Consequently, Wieacker’s representation of the German Reception was a nar-
rative of how such a Stand of lawyers had arisen in the German legal history. The 
point of departure was the conditions which brought about social change, which 
in turn created a need for new kinds of professionals: “[T]he new kind of admin-
istration [state], with its neutral ruling and decision techniques needed skilled 
men who were familiar with such techniques.”264 The rapid development of the 
administrative sphere, reaching all fields of society, could no longer be managed 
by means of individual capabilities, nor could such a machinery rest on the per-
sonal prestige of the elite. It was vital to accommodate a “community of skilled 
and committed officials who enjoyed the respect of the regime,” and who were 
able to guide and uphold the state.265 The feature which distinguished this new 
generation of lawyers from the preceding officials was their learnedness in Ro-
259 Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögenrechts’ 1941, 7: “In ständiger Abschlei-
fung an dem älterer vorüberziehenden Material reift ein Schatz von Regeln, Maximen und 
Vorstellungsweisen, die kraft des Ansehens des Rechtskundigen in der Gemeinschaft zur ob-
jektiven Autorität, zu Recht, werden.” 
260 Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögenrechts’ 1941, 7: “juristische Stand.”
261 Here (in ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögenrechts’ 1941, 7) Wieacker refers to his 
own article ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939.
262 Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögenrechts’ 1941, 10 “juristische Anthro-
pologie,” “materialen Rechtsidee.”
263 Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögenrechts’ 1941, 10.
264 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 29.
265 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 24: “fachli-
chen Berufsgemeinschaft.”
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man law (since according to Wieacker, the new generation was actually the off-
spring of the social elite, who had served as sheriffs or laymen in the courts).266
The foundation of his decision-making was, however, the authority of the Corpus Iurus Civilis, 
in which expert opinions, precedents and scholarly literature accumulated to traditional les-
sons, or land law that had been issued from the sovereign: his application of law was deter-
mined by the logical subsumption of each isolated case covered by the norm. These documen-
tations were, however, completely inaccessible to the unlettered.267 
Applying his conviction of the material bases of legal ideas, Wieacker argued 
that the emergence of a new generation of lawyers and the new legal instrument 
in the service of the state, was ultimately a social historical event. For example, 
sending one’s offspring to South Europe in order to be educated in Roman law 
was an attempt by the bourgeoisie to raise the social status of one’s family.268 
Wieacker’s text turns towards social history, when he distinguishes three differ-
ent groups within the new generation. First there were the “ethical ones” who 
exhibit the highest virtues both in their studies and in following a career. The 
second group was comprised of advocates; they were the semi-educated, who 
were helpful in carrying out small practical tasks for the “ethical” group. Thirdly, 
Wieacker posits the “juridical proletariat,” who were only concerned with mon-
ey. The last group came into existence because in the beginning the borders de-
fining the Stand were not strict enough. The bad name which some historical 
sources give to lawyers is on account of this last group.269 It is curious that 
Wieacker also applied a similar categorization for the guild of Roman lawyers.270 
No doubt this was a convenient way to uphold the idea of the spiritual superiori-
ty of the lawyer-estate and deal with the historical subject matter. The historical 
sources which spoke of the immorality of the lawyers, could be treated as stories 
about encountering the lesser material of the “estate,” not with the true virtuous 
“core.”271 
The new generation of lawyers (during the Reception), however, possessed all 
the virtues Wieacker perceived as fundamental with respect to the modern legal 
 
266 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 28, 32.
267 “Seine Entscheidungsgrundlagen aber sind die Autorität des Corpus iuris, in der Gut-
achten, Präjudizien und gelehrtem Schrifftum angesammelten überlieferten Lehre oder das 
vom Landesherrn erlassene landrecht: seine Rechtsanwendung war durch logische Subsump-
tion des Einzelfalls unter die Norm bestimmt, diese Unterlagen aber den ungelehrten, d. h. allen 
nicht rechtswissenschaftlich ausgebildeten Deutschen, grundsätzlich unzugänglich.”, Wie-
acker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 41.
268 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 43.
269 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein’ 1944, 31.
270 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 446–447. 
271 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 447: “Kern des Standes.”
132 III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness
system. The newly-erected Stand of jurists comprised a system of correct ‘atti-
tudes’ towards jurisprudence. Their ‘legal thinking’ was virtuous since it was, for 
the first time, connected to the superior legal tradition and Bildung in the form of 
knowledge about ancient sources.272 Their science was not modern for it started 
the process of ‘scientification,’ but in a way their praxis was more just than the 
modern counterparts, since it was built on an actual bond with ancient wisdom: 
“it was not the concept and system, but rather the authority of the word and the 
teachings of the tradition, that controlled legal life.”273
The Stand possessed and utilized their own distinguished Rechtsgewissen; a 
“spiritual technique” which enabled them to become “the true master [Herr] of 
the written and learned processes.”274 Here the Stand mirrored the greatness of 
the Glossators of Northern Italy. After all, to Wieacker, knowledge of the Stand 
came directly from the institutions which the Glossators had reinstated. Thus the 
‘spirit’ which the Stand manifested, although advanced, was not modern in a 
negative sense. Rather than being subordinated to social forces, it offered a tool 
to control the society. It was ancient wisdom usable through different times and 
spaces:
[T]he science of the corpus iuris, as well as the ideal of rome itself, continued to be a spiritual 
power for the time being which claimed power on life itself rather than contrariwise wanting to 
serve “life”. It [the science of the corpus iuris] was a great monument for the creative power of 
pure theory in service of an absolute belief.275
In his 1944 article Wieacker for the first time with utmost explicitness connects 
the sub-concepts of Stand and Bildung to the scientific concept of Rechtsbe-
wusstsein. The national consciousness of law is formed in relation to the themes 
of ‘Perfection through education and studying’ (Bildung), and to an ‘estate based 
on legal abilities’ (Stand). If one was to study the history of legal consciousness 
those sub-concepts would have to be involved. Also, he argues for the principle 
that the modern state cannot be understood without, and is built by, the official, 
272 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 35.
273 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 35. “Denn 
nicht Begriff und System, sondern die Autorität des Wortes und der überlieferten Lehre be-
herrschten das Rechtsleben damals.” 
274 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 42: “geistige 
Technik,” “Geistige Macht der Wissenschaft”; also 41: “Trotzdem ist er früh der eigentliche 
Herr des schriftlichen und gelehrten Prozesses geworden.”
275 “Bei alledem blieb die Wissenschaft vom Corpus iuris wie die Romidee selbst zunächst 
eine spirituelle Macht, die über das Leben selbst Gewalt forderte und nicht umgekehrt dem 
“Leben” dienen wollte, ein großes Denkmal für die Schöpferkraft reiner Theorie im Dienste 
eines absoluten Glaubens.”, Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusst-
sein 1944, 15–16.
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academic and therefore learned jurist-estate.276 I will return to the phenomenolo-
gy of the concept of Rechtsgewissen later in chapter IV, but the 1944 article is 
foundational also in the manner which Wieacker uses Savigny’s concepts in the 
arguments of which he had already given, but not yet with such clarity. However, 
in this text the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein, Rechtsgefühl and Rechtsgewissen 
are still used in a somewhat inexact manner. In Wieacker’s text the concepts of-
ten overlap and the hierarchy between them is not always clear. 
It may seem surprising that Wieacker decided to introduce Savigny’s concepts 
as late as 1944, and his idea of the materiality of legal science did not necessitate 
such concepts, as he had proved in his previous articles on ‘property.’ From the 
publishing of Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein on, he 
nevertheless used the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein in his task to trace the un-
changing historical and legal principles from the past. The concept offered him a 
heuristic tool to understand history, but also the cognitive means through which 
he was able to communicate his findings to his reading audience. 
There are many possible reasons which might have led Wieacker to pick the 
concept of Rechtsbewusstsein at that particular moment and in that particular 
text. The more opportunistic explanations point to the fact that Carl Schmitt had 
decided to use the concept earlier in his Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswis-
senschaft (1943).277 During that time the acquaintance between Schmitt and 
Wieacker was at its most intense phase, Wieacker spending his time with Schmitt, 
and commenting on the texts which he sent him. Clearly, he was impressed by 
Schmitt’s endeavors to depict and capture the essence of the European legal her-
itage. Also, the larger search to describe and analyze the basis of a common Eu-
ropean legal thought relates to the explicit policy conducted by the National So-
cialist administration, whose aim was to unite Europe under German rule against 
Soviet Russia. Introducing a concept which enabled the comparison and evalua-
tion of different legal systems in time and space made this task much easier. 278 
276 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 5: “beamtet-
en, fachlichen und daher auch gelehrten Juristenstand.”
277 Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft [1943/44],’ in Verfassun-
grechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924–1954. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1958, 386. Cf. 
Meinel 2012, 252. Schmitt spoke on the topic at Leipzig University and in a conference in 
Budapest, which Wieacker also attended (Mehring 2014, 401). Both Schmitt’s and Wieacker’s 
“turn towards legal consciousness” was nevertheless preceded by Ernst Rudolf Huber’s study 
on the ambigious essence of German nationalism in his Strassbourg works, especially in 1942 
in Reich, Volk und Staat in der Reichsrechtswissenschaft des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts 
(Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 102, 593–627).
278 Benjamin G. Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture, Harvard UP 
2016, 180–262.
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The above reasons alone, however, produce only a one-sided picture of the 
methodological shift in Wieacker’s scientific works. Even to Schmitt, the study 
of the “Asylum for the European legal consciousness,” as expressed in Die Lage 
der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft, was a camouflaged representation of his 
disappointment with the results of the ‘legal renewal’ of the 1930s. During the 
‘legal renewal,’ Rechtsbewusstsein had been equated with the unsurmountable 
and ahistorical consciousness of the German people, which the Führer had re-
vealed and harnessed. During the war, at the latest, the conservative legal schol-
ars understood the hollowness, cynicism, and unscientific nature of the construc-
tion.279 Thus writing about ‘legal consciousness’ was an attempt to proceed from 
the low point of legal science of the 1930s. Although in a very indirect and fum-
bling way scholars started to challenge and question the prevailing dogmatic 
truth of the relation between a people and its law. In practice this turn was evi-
denced by studying past time, reviewing natural law theories or concentrating on 
very abstract, particular and detailed legal phenomena.280 The wrong turn which 
academia had started to take in 1933 was not of course as such addressed. One 
had to wait for roughly twenty years for the first honestly reflective legal scien-
tific works, where scholars considered their collective and personal engagement 
with the regime. Nevertheless, their disappointment during the early 1940s on 
the ‘legal renewal’ promised by National Socialism was genuine. 
As elaborated in the section III.3, Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945, 
Franz Wieacker had also processed the idea of legal thinking and the dilemma of 
how some sophisticated styles seemed to reproduce themselves throughout his-
tory. His conclusion started to lean more towards the direction that the base of a 
legal system could not be formed from a mere idea of common national values. 
The Rechstbewusstsein, legal consciousness, of the people was (a) erring, and (b) 
consisted of different layers. Some forms of thinking were more vulnerable to 
short-sightedness and more unaware of larger social and historical forces than 
others. The contexts where Wieacker first presented his lectures and articles are 
also not without importance. Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbe-
wusstsein was originally a speech given in Leipzig to commemorate and honor 
the destroyed main library. To Wieacker, that distinct incident, unsurprisingly, 
was a metaphor for the meaningless devastation of the war. Thus, his speech was 
more of a wishful assurance that, despite the prevailing harsh situation, the bal-
ance between the people’s idea of justice and material conditions could be ob-
tained.
279 Meinel 2012, 241–246; Mehring 2014, 401.
280 Stolleis 1998. 
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6. Culture in Rechtsbewusstsein 1945–1968:  
Explaining ‘Point Zero,’ the defensive battle of  
the German academia
In many ways one can call the year 1945 in Germany ‘point zero,’ at least in the 
material sense. Detlev Poekert wrote:
The dreamed ‘people’s community’ stood by no means at the end of the Third Reich and the 
World War that it staged. Instead the society laid in ruins, not only in its bombed-out material 
substance (which, as became apparent after the war, had proven surprisingly solid), but also 
mentally and morally and with respect to its social conditions.
Hunger, unemployment and homelessness had an inevitable effect on the way 
people perceived the meaning of their everyday life and that of the future. The 
visible ruins of the material living conditions were joined with a feeling of “loss 
of tradition” and suddenly non-existent “standards of social relations.”281 The 
reconstruction process seemed to necessitate radically different values than those 
of the preceding years. Since the economic and material conditions were of high-
est priority, ‘the modern’ rushed in with an aggressive manner. The relocation of 
millions of inner-state refugees, rebuilding the infrastructure, redirecting the 
economy to follow the rules of the free liberal economy and securing the demo-
cratic constitution in binding citizens to support the administration by means of 
a social security system, all this demanded a shift in the relation between the state 
and the people.282 In practice, Germany had no choice but to rapidly transform 
itself into a “social state” in which the public administration upheld, maintained 
and regulated the social structures, but on the bases of a strict, almost dogmatic, 
constitutionalism and parliamentarianism. With respect to the preceding years, 
extending also beyond the totalitarian era, this meant a novel and abrupt catego-
rization of citizenship and community. To many conservative writers, Germany’s 
transformation meant an irreversible degradation in the spiritual essence of the 
national style of living and an unforeseen burden for the people, not only in pub-
lic regulations, but in the type of social expectations they faced.283 
281 Michael Wildt, ‘Konsum und Modernisierung in den fünfziger Jahren,’ in Frank Bajohr, 
Werner Johe & Uwe Lohalm (eds.), Zivilisation und Barbarei. Die widersprüchlichen Poten-
tiale der Moderne. Hamburg, Hans Christians Verlag 1991, 321–325.
282 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Demokratie und Sozialstruktur in Deutschland,’ in Ralf Dahrendorf, 
Gesellschaft und Freiheit. Zur soziologischen Analyse der Gegenwart, München, R. Piper & 
Co Verlag 1961, 260–299.
283 See e.g. Helmut Schelsky, Der mensch in der wissenschaftlichen zivilisation. Köln, 
Westdeutscher Verlag 1961.
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One part of the wider picture was of course academia. The question of the 
re-opening of German universities became an urgent matter in the fall of 1945. 
In the Potsdam conference the Allied forces had agreed on a decisive re-orienta-
tion of German education, punishment for those responsible for distorting the 
system and worldview within this field, and the deployment of Germans them-
selves in this task in order to retrain the people in democracy.284 The project was 
called the denazification or Entnazifierung of education. With respect to univer-
sities, the direction of this goal was after a short while left mainly to the Ger-
mans, since the occupation administration lacked manpower, knowledge and 
even interest in the arrangement of higher education. The staff in the new-
ly-opened universities had to answer special questionnaires (Fragebogen) and 
sometimes go through an interrogation, based on which the university board in 
cooperation with the occupational officials decided on the ‘suitability’ of each 
candidate.285 The cases of more suspicious figures were handled in Spruchkam-
mern, local civilian denazification tribunals, where the crimes of the defendants 
where decided according to a four-level scale.286 
Ernst Forsthoff’s racist rhetoric of the 1930s was for many reason enough to 
distance him from academia. Forsthoff underwent a Spruchkammer process 
where he was declared a Mitläufer, “fellow traveller” with respect to the Nation-
al Socialist actions of transforming Germany into a totalitarian nation. Thus, he 
had to wait for a considerable time before receiving an official teaching position 
at the University of Heidelberg.287 Of the members of the Kieler Schule Georg 
Dahm and Friedrich Schaffstein faced serious accusations of cooperating with 
the Nazi regime. Georg Dahm had as the Rector of the University of Kiel (from 
1935 to 1937) ensured the exclusion of scholars and students of Jewish descent 
from the university.288 Schaffstein had had a visible role in turning criminal law 
284 Remy 2002, 126.
285 Remy 2002, 117–122, 147–156.
286 Clemens Vollnhalls, Entnazifizierung: Politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den 
vier Besatzungszonen 1945–1949. Munich, DTV 1991, 259–338. Based on the information 
gathered by a questionnaire and by occupational officials, the tribunals charged individuals 
according to these categories: (1) major offenders (Hauptschuldige), (2) activists, militarists, 
and profiteers (Belastet), (3) those with probational status (Minderbelastet), (4) followers or 
fellow travelers (Mitläufer), and (5) those exonerated (Entlastet). In all of West Germany by 
1950, 3,660,638 cases had been tried, and of those, 1,005,874 resulted in Mitläufer verdicts. 
2,579,622 cases had resulted in either exoneration or amnesty on other grounds. In 1,167 cases 
the defendant had been judged as Hauptschuldige. Remy 2002, 178. 
287 Forsthoff, however, had indisputably had quarrels with the Nazi administration and the 
SS press. He also had a distinguished supporter in Gustav Radbruch, who publicly spoke for 
Forsthoff’s rehabilitation. Meinel 2012, 304–306; Remy 2002, 158–159.
288 Gerhard Paul & Miriam Gillis-Carlebach (eds.), Menora und Hakenkreuz: zur Geschichte 
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into “political criminal law,” where the offences of an individual were interpreted 
as crimes against one’s duty to the community. This train of thought provided the 
intellectual bases for National Socialist judges to sentence people for crimes 
against the Nazi ideology.289 Both were allowed to return to any university only 
in the 1950s. 
Among the legal scholars (if one excludes Carl Schmitt) Ernst Rudolf Huber’s 
case caused the most heated dispute. Huber appeared to be an archetype of a ju-
rist who had sold his talents to the service of the Third Reich. Huber’s 1930s 
texts were indisputably fascist, and contained attacks against Judentum in sci-
ence and politics. Huber had been a visible figure in the National Socialist re-
gime, one of the most notable in jurisprudence, and his editorship of fascist jour-
nals, his active contribution to constitutional discussion and his colleagueship 
with Carl Schmitt connected him irreversibly to the National Socialists.290 In 
private, Huber did go through an era of self-examination. Retrospectively, he did 
see a congruence between the National Socialist reasoning of a totalitarian nation 
and his own studies in the 1930s, although he could not see himself as having 
advanced the National Socialist cause. He gradually cut connections with his 
mentor and colleague Carl Schmitt, but was still not allowed to return to the 
teaching profession for years, which struck him as a major injustice.291 
All modes of inquiry were insufficient and too rigid in their attempts to make 
sense of the multi-faceted and complicated reality of the preceding twelve 
years.292 It proved to be very difficult to conduct the denazification of universities 
in such a way that all education would be given by formally competent anti-Na-
zis. Neither were there enough such people available, nor sufficient time for reli-
ably inspect of who were truly “anti-Nazis” and who were indisputedly in the 
category of “primary perpetrators” (Hauptschuldige). It was almost impossible 
to find a common understanding of what “anti-Nazi” meant, or even a more mod-
est common concept of what a “non- follower” signified. Who had been an “ac-
tive” Nazi? What did it mean to be a passive one? Providing a juridical definition 
of to what extent a given individual had assimilated and supported the crimes of 
the Third Reich proved to be a matter of interpretation.293 In time, the pressing 
der Juden in und aus Schleswig-Holstein, Lübeck und Altona (1918–1998). Neumünster, Wa-
choltz 1998, 241.
289 Pauer-Studer, ‘Einleitung’ 2014, 80–83.
290 Bernd Rüthers calls Huber a “crown jurist” of the Third Reich. Bernd Rüthres, Entar-
tetes Recht: Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich. München, C.H.Beck 1988, 102.
291 Grothe 2005, 317–321.
292 Franz Neumann, ‘Die Umerziehung der Deutschen und das Dilemma des Wiederaufbaus 
[1947],’ in Franz Neumann, Wirtschaft, Staat, Demokratie. Aufsätze 1930–1954. Frankfurt am 
Main 1978.
293 Sentencing university professors was very difficult, partly because of the largely prevail-
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practical necessities obliged officials to hurry the process. Due to the catastroph-
ic death-toll of the war, the four occupation zones lacked enough skilled and 
educated Germans to maintain a working society. It was also obvious that young 
people needed somewhere to spend their days productively. In addition to the 
practical impossibility of an exhaustive denazification of the universities, the 
academics themselves where hesitant to accuse other academics of the injustices 
of the Nazi era.294 Finally, the foreign political situation of the Federal Republic 
assured leading politicians that the biggest threat to the nation did not come from 
within but from the east. Thus, the resources of the nation had to be utilized to 
counter communism, not on aggressive litigation of past behavior. This led to a 
sweeping amnesty for civil servants, academics and writers from the Nazi period 
by the Konrad Adenauer government.295 
The need to come to terms with the past in post-war Germany appeared in all 
discussions involving the present and future of the society. Fitting the irrational 
National Socialistic crimes to a temporal frame, and providing the totalitarianism 
of the Third Reich with a cause and purpose was a necessity in reconstructing the 
German community. The varying explanations and opinions comprised a debate 
over the policy towards the past (Vergangenheitspolitik or Vergangenheitsbewäl-
tigung).296 The fields of science and higher education likewise were engaged in a 
dispute over the meaning and heritage of the preceding years as well as their ef-
fect on academia. Since the breach between “what had been” and “what was” in 
itself was hard to confront with concrete measures, the public discussion on the 
national tradition and orientation conducted among scholars focused mainly on 
Bildung.297 In this debate all of the above- mentioned views merged. 
Was Bildung part of a process in which society turned against itself, namely 
againct the helpless ones who in the modern political ethos it should have pro-
tected? How should one safeguard the heritage and virtuous core of German 
universities and German scholarship? From whom should it be rescued or which 
discourses should be excluded from the academic sphere? Was the root of all evil 
in the administrative endeavors of the politicians, the over-equalizations of the 
socialists, or the false conclusions of corrupted scholars? Some officials of the 
occupational administration and a substantial group of German intellectuals be-
ing “Mandarin culture.” The majority of Germans supported denazification in principle, but felt 
that too many ordinary people were persecuted, whereas the truly guilty ones were able to 
conduct their business as usual. See Remy 2002, 151; Moses 2007, 65; Grothe 2005, 312–317.
294 Remy 2002, 130, 149.
295 Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Ver-
gangenheit. München, C.H. Beck 1996, 29–54.
296 Conrad 1999, 11–22; Grothe 2005, 311.
297 Moses 2007, 131–159.
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lieved that indeed the university system was partly responsible for the successful 
Nazi seizure of power. The conservative atmosphere embedded in the structures 
of higher education had exposed the academic culture to outer political inten-
tions, and contributed to its inability to resist the National Socialist Gleich-
schaltung. The British occupational administration produced a “Blue Report” in 
which they suggested a structural rearrangement of German universities in order 
to link it more directly to the public sphere and to more open decision-making.298 
Although the practical implications of the report were minor, the direction of the 
development regarding the purpose and status of universities as institutes within 
the field of national education was set. In the forthcoming years the universities 
transformed from being providers of educational facilities for the social elite to 
‘mass universities.’ The ideological framework supporting the latter emphasized 
equal opportunities in achieving higher education, the significance of university 
training from the point of view of social cohesion, and its relation to other sectors 
of society. Such a view did not in many cases concur with the idea of Bildung 
which the conservative scholars of the war generation (not to mention their 
teachers) still appreciated.299 
For conservative scholars the universities represented the essence of German 
culture. Not only did they educate the citizens and passed on the knowledge of 
previous generations, in scholarly work the characteristics of a living, healthy 
culture became apparent. Academics worked with and utilized the national spirit 
(Geist), and as a group contributed creativity to cultural rebuilding. The autono-
my of universities against any outside interventions was essential in preserving 
German culture as well as the ‘Occidental’ (abendländische) tradition to which it 
adhered.300 The peculiar status of German universities derived from their original 
definition as autonomous establishments outside the political sphere of society, 
but nevertheless as embodiments of the nationally significant values, and as con-
crete institutes which fostered the emergence and impact of these values in the 
social reality of the nation.301 
Rightfully, the Humboldtian university system was perceived as an important 
European invention, but opinions on who or what exactly embodied the idea of 
298 Moses 2007, 132–133.
299 Sylvia Paletschek, ‘Die deutsche Universität im und nach dem Krieg. Die Wiederent-
deckung des Abendlandes,’ in Bernd Martin (ed.): Der Zweite Weltkrieg und seine Folgen: 
Ereignisse – Auswirkungen – Reflexionen. Berlin, Rombach 2006, 242–248; Moses 2007, 136.
300 Axel Schildt, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenland-
schaft der 50er Jahre, München; Oldenbourg 1999, 21–23, 39.
301 The values concerning education were nationally significant since they were universal, a 
notion not foreign to the Romantic worldview. Cf. Karl Jaspers, Die idee der Universität. Ber-
lin, Springer-Verlag 1946, 9–13.
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the university in the Federal Republic or for what reasons it had originally been 
constructed, clashed. In other words, despite the fact that Humboldtian universi-
ties were supposed to live separately from national politics, the major political 
crises of the twentieth century had always extended and continued to extend in-
side the realm of university education. Consequently, university education suf-
fered from repeated “crises,” “uncertain core ideas,” and seemed to be in the 
need of “inevitable reform”.302 When crises in higher education occurred, the 
subsequent explanations and coping strategies with respect to the actual crisis 
were constructed by relating the current situation to preceding crises in order to 
find out the “true core” of Bildung. This “untainted” ideal would then serve as the 
foundation for the succeeding academic culture.303 However, the explanations 
tended to be more on the side of conservation, the ‘Humboldtian ideal’ being 
used to redefine the meaning given to the institutes and idea of education, but 
also to make sense of the relation which the educators, the professors, had with 
respect to the national past, the present and the future.
Gerd Tellenbach, a friend of Franz Wieacker and a colleague of Fritz Prings-
heim,304 narrated the crisis of higher education following the end of the Second 
World War in 1946.305 In his narrative, which dealt with the essence and ideal of 
higher education, he reflected on the emotions and experiences of the conserva-
tive educational elite during and after the Nazi reign. Tellenbach saw the 1930s 
and 1940s as an era in which a brutal attack had been made on the scientific and 
cultural heritage of German universities. “[T]he state had raped the universities,” 
intervening in their centuries-long administrative authority. Thus, German uni-
versities were the victims of the politicizing actions of the fascist administration. 
The relative guilt that the universities (and their staff) bore lay in their lack of 
belief in the virtues and values of Bildung, and the lack of devotion in cultivating 
that ideal in practice. Tellenbach saw that particular feature as a factor which 
explained the success of the Nazi attack on education.306 Furthermore, the post-
War task of the universities (and their staff) was to find again the “Occidental 
302 Jürgen John, ‘ “Not deutscher Wissenschaft?” Hochschulwandel, Universitätidee und 
akademischer Krisendiskurs in der Weimarer Republik’, in Grüttner et al., Gebrochene Wissen-
schaftskulturen: Universität und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ru-
precht 2010, 107–142.
303 John 2010, 112–115. 
304 See, Korrespondenz mit Franz Wieacker, Bestand C0157, Signatur 431, Universitätsar-
chiv der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i Br. See also Nachlass Gerd Tellenbach, Tod 
von Fritz Pringsheim, Bestand C0157, Signatur 447, Universitätsarchiv der Albert-Lud-
wigs-Universität Freiburg i Br. 
305 Gerd Tellenbach, ‘Zur Selbstorientierung der deutschen Universität,’ in Die Sammlung 
1, 1946, 530–43.
306 Tellenbach 1946, 534. 
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tradition,” which had shaped the virtuous core of German and European culture 
long before the traits of the industrial revolution and modern political selfishness 
had perverted the social and communal reality of the Western world.307
Tellenbach’s explanation was by no means an exception in its emphasis on the 
“idea of the spiritual nobility,”308 but what gave it its particular explanatory pow-
er was the comparison between the conditions prevailing in the Weimar Republic 
and the ‘point zero’ of 1946 Germany. In Weimar, the “modernization process,” 
the redefinition of the meaning given to the universities and higher education 
within society, had been explained as the degeneration of the essence of national 
cultural.309 It had threatened to destroy the world of the Weimarian Bildungsbür-
gertum, and that threat seemed similar to (or at least it was interpreted as the 
same thing as) the phenomena which were appearing in the post-Second World 
War social reality. Again, the harsh conditions and allegations which the learned 
faced seemed to represent a dissolution of binding national values.310 
To scholars, Bildung was both a sphere which was separated from politics – 
and as such opposed National Socialist barbarism – and was connected to the 
“Occidental tradition.” Often the learned saw the destiny of the nation depended 
on the value it gave to Bildung. Bildung was not just simply training, it provided 
a general humanist education in which scholars became the guardians of Occi-
dental tradition. Because of this link with the “healthy core” of Bildung, the 
conservative university staff who had retained their working place during the 
years of National Socialism, and had consented to the demands of the regime to 
varying degrees, saw themselves as “apolitical,” whereas National Socialists 
themselves had committed a crime in politicizing the realms of science and cul-
ture.311 In seeing the Nazis as a phase in a larger development, the war generation 
– the academics born between 1902 and 1908 – could link the totalitarianisms of 
the twentieth century and the post-Second World War reformation efforts towards 
the academic realm as symptoms of a larger phenomenon which was distorting 
the basis of society and law. This modernization process, which was also defined 
307 Tellenbach 1946, 535–537. See also Lena Foljanty, Recht oder Gesetz: Juristische Iden-
tität und Autorität in den Naturrechtsdebatten der Nachkriegszeit. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 
2013, 115–116 and the post-War use of the concept of Abendland, which as a “slogan” turned 
conservative spiritual values into a geographical term.
308 Paletschek 2006, 245.
309 Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Communi-
ty 1890–1933. Cambridge: Harvard UP 1969.
310 Sylvia Paletschek, ‘The invention of Humboldt and the impact of National Socialism. 
The German University idea in the first half of the twentieth century,’ in M.Szöllösi-Janze (ed.), 
Science in the Third Reich. Oxford: Berghahn Books 2001, 37–58.
311 For example, both Eugen Fehrel and Wolfgang Panzer defended against the charges in 
the Spruchkammer process, referring to their scholarship as “apolitical.” Remy 2002, 185, 190.
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as ‘politicization’ and ‘scientification’ (Verwissenschaftlichung), further ex-
plained the new interventions by the state bureaucracy against the educational 
elite as ‘politically’ motivated, as opposed to the ‘spiritual’ motives of scholars.312 
Tellenbach’s narrative was not a thoroughly misleading or retrospective dis-
tortion, after all already in 1933 many, including Fritz Pringsheim, had interpret-
ed National Socialism as destroying education and tradition by submitting them 
to politics.313 In addition, during the modernization process of Germany the ad-
ministrative power of the state had arguably replaced some structures of commu-
nal decision making and deprived the people of some traditional symbols of free-
dom.314 However, the sweeping explanation which Tellenbach’s narrative – and 
common academic opinion on the totalitarian era – provided, ignored the more 
subtle and controversial aspects the 1930s also possessed. With some acts and 
representations the ‘tragedy of modernization’ gave less convincing explana-
tions. The contradictions of conservative narratives like Tellenbach’s should not 
be considered surprising. In the end, it is the function of communal narratives to 
deal with disturb and complicate social phenomena; in evoking continuities and 
discontinuities they dwell on the ‘untainted’ past in order to make the present 
circumstances and their causes understandable. 
The discontinuities which conservative narratives made understandable, in-
cluded the more general change in the political field and in ideological power 
relations. The coupling of fascism and late 1940s political interventions on high-
er education enabled scholars to create a retrospective explanation of their posi-
tion vis-à-vis the fascist regime and its ideology, but also to define their position 
with respect to a new threat that communism seemed to represent to the tradition-
al way of life. Bildungsbürgertum had been hostile towards socialism since the 
end of the First World War, and already in the Weimar conditions domestic com-
munism appeared to threaten national values.315 But whereas in the 1930s con-
servative discourse, communists had been treated as the misunderstood masses, 
in the Federal Republic their conviction to eradicate social classes and harness 
312 Thus, Tellenbach asserted in another context, that “Geistigen Aufbau des Abendlandes 
[…] um die dämonischen Kräfte der Technik binden zu helfen und sie ihrem eigenen grenzen-
losen Weiterwachsen ins Unmenschliche zu entziehen. Es ist klar, daß der Humanismus ir-
gendwelcher Art für sich allein diese Bindung nicht erreichen wird, sondern daß nur die letzten 
und tiefsten religiös-sittlichen Bindungskräfte dazu imstande sind” quoted in Paletschek 2006, 
245; cf. Martin Heidegger, Die Technik und die Kehre [1962]. Pfullingen, Verlag Günther 
 Neske 1988; Carl Schmitt, Nomos der Erde: im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum. 
Greven 1950.
313 See p.79.
314 Max Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf’[1919], in Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), Max Weber: Ge-
sammelte politische Schriften. Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr 1988.
315 See p.62–63.
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formal education to produce workers to serve the state was seen as a real menace 
to the life style of the educated class.
The wider discussion on the fate of and the relation between Bildung, the na-
tional institutes of higher education and the post-War social change of Germany 
in many cases overlapped the narrower legal scientific discourse. Academic dis-
course on legal and political sciences ultimately concentrated on the fundamental 
question of the relation between the state and society, or to be more precise be-
tween the rule of law and the welfare state, or as translated in the terminology of 
1950s German legal theory, between the Rechtsstaat and the Sozialstaat.316 In 
particular, scholars argued over the extent and essence of the values which sup-
posedly held together the national community, and about the meaning one should 
give to the transformation of the social constellation with respect to economic 
development, industrialization and political group formation. In a more political 
sphere, the possible threat whether “Bonn would become Weimar,” that the frag-
ile democracy of the Federal Republic would collapse just like the social order of 
the 1930s, was a practical implementation of this legal scientific search for the 
stable, systematic and solid common values of society. The two main sides in the 
dispute over the ideal essence of German society were the “Schmitt School” and 
the “Smend School,” which comprised the former students of the two scholars.317 
Amidst the political reconstruction process and the rapid social change follow-
ing the end of the Second World War, the intellectual geography of the Federal 
Republic took a peculiar turn. Now it was the former conservative revolutionar-
ies of the war generation, such as Ernst Forsthoff and Werner Weber, who de-
fended in a libertarian manner the rights of the individual against the regulatory 
actions of the state. On the other hand, the scholars of the Smend School, who 
often leaned to the left, advocated social cohesion and common values.318 The 
‘conversion’ of, for example, Ernst Forsthoff was not however a sudden turn at 
all. His arguments – and more generally those of the Schmitt School – were 
based on a deep mistrust not of the state in general, but on the newly-drafted 
Republic, which was ‘artificial’ in the sense that it neglected the conservative 
value-base on which the community was supposed to be built.319 The organic and 
natural whole of society, constituted of different Stand, which the Schmitt’s stu-
316 Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought. 
New Haven, Yale UP 2003, 76.
317 Frieder Günther, Denken vom Staat her: Die bundesdeutsche Staatslehre zwischen Dezi-
sion und Integration 1949–1970. München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag 2004, 10, 112–190. Smend 
and Schmitt personally seemed to stay outside the vicious dispute between the two schools. 
Müller 2003, 68–70.
318 Müller 2003, 70.
319 Meinel 2012, 410–416. 
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dents had tried to articulate in their 1930s texts, continued to represent an ideal 
which could not be translated to the social and political reality of the Federal. In 
other words, the Federal Republic was not a concrete order, and thus it should not 
act like one.320
It also has to be acknowledged that the ‘modernization’ narrative did serve as 
a fruitful context for many novel conceptualizations of Western society and its 
history. It was as if no traits remained which linked Germany to the rest of the 
world or to its own past. The war and the preceding totalitarianism represented 
an enormous obstacle to any optimistic narratives about future development. 
Whereas the ‘modernization tragedy’ narrative of the war generation of Franz 
Wieacker and Ernst Forsthoff, as well as to some older scholars like Hans Freyer 
and Carl Schmitt, was partly a personal apologia for a bygone era, to the young-
er generation of “45ers” it appeared a truthful theory of why the world possessed 
no meaning.321 It was easy, especially for the ‘skeptical generation’ of the post-
war years, to see little hope in the Cold War’s intergovernmental processes and 
Germany’s destiny within them.322 The Weltbürgerkrieg, worldwide civil war, 
into which the world inevitably seemed to slide, symbolized to Carl Schmitt, 
Ernst Forsthoff and Franz Wieacker a continuation of the Weimar disarray. The 
younger generation represented by, for example, Helmut Schelsky and Reinhart 
Koselleck found it a useful tool to explain their experiences of war and imprison-
ment.323 Thus, the deep mistrust towards ‘modernization’ and the world of tech-
nology was a common stance in academia, not because it reflected the reality 
more truthfully than other theories, but because it connected the worlds of the 
(conservative) older and younger generations of scholars.324
320 Müller 2003, 73–75.
321 The sustaining influence which authors who could explicate the scarcity and “abyss of 
emotions” of the post-war society to the younger generation of lawyers and social scientist has 
been documented in numerous studies. Teachers like Ernst Forsthoff, Ernst Rudolf Huber and 
Franz Wieacker were able to transmit some sense of continuity, dignity and reason to their 
students; Moses 2007, 76; Müller 2003, 61–62; Liebs 2010, 38.
322 Helmut Schelsky, Die skeptische Generation – eine soziologie der deutschen Jugend. 
Düsseldorf/Köln, Diederichs 1957.
323 The concept of Weltbürgerkrieg was Carl Schmitt’s and its diffusion in one part also 
mirrors his strong position as the scientific mentor of young scientists and post-War scholarly 
circles. Schmitt 1950. About Koselleck, war-experience and Carl Schmitt, see e.g. Manfred 
Hettling, Bernd Ulrich: Formen der Bürgerlichkeit. Ein Gespräch mit Reinhart Koselleck in 
Manfred Hettling (ed.): Bürgertum nach 1945. Hamburg 2005.
324 Cf. Conrad 1999, 42, 397; Moses 2007, 71–72.
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7. Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1945–1968:  
The experiences of disorder, scarcity and dislocation
Wieacker felt, with good reason, lucky to have survived the war. After returning 
from a POW camp, he found his parents alive and relatively healthy. Although 
the family property had in large part been destroyed, Wieacker was alive and able 
to continue working in the field he loved. In February 1946 Wieacker wrote to 
Erik Wolf:
It is about as ordinary and normal with me as for all young people who had the luck or skill to 
survive the war fully intact. I mean, after all, the luck in the sense of “opportunity” to restitute 
themselves and do their part to restitute the nation.325 
As his correspondence and early 1940s works demonstrate, Wieacker’s earlier 
scientific stance was not deflected but rather sharpened due to the war experienc-
es and Germany’s defeat.326 In many aspects, with respect to methodology for 
example, his orientation did not undergo any drastic changes. The notion that 
Wieacker’s works from the 1950s to the 1960s are reconstructive in essence – i.e. 
that they sought to find and synthesize common patterns in history – is tangible 
in the light of his war experiences and his consequent vision of German legal 
culture being partly constituted on a historical misunderstanding.327 However, 
post-1945 events also affected Wieacker’s thinking and writing. During the post-
war years, Wieacker’s ideas on the relationship between scholarly work and the 
political sphere changed. In his personal adjustment process after the war 
Wieacker tried to understand the changing world with the help of his personal 
life history and in interaction with his closest friends. 
Towards the end of the war, Wieacker’s view on the nature of the worldwide 
catastrophe and the reasons which had led to such chaos began to take on an in-
creasingly clearer form. The intoxicated and unaware masses had provided an 
opportunity for criminal individuals to seize power and command the nations to 
war.328 This fatal error in judgment did not lie solely with the common people or 
‘masses.’ The false conclusions of historians who had drawn from the national 
325 “Sie ist bei mir so alltäglich und gewöhnlich wie bei allen jüngeren Leuten, die den 
Krieg im ganzen intakt zu überleben das Glück oder Geschick hatten; ich meine doch: das 
Glück in Sinne von “Chance” sich und mit sich zu ihrem Teil die Nation zu restituieren.”, 
Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.2.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im 
Breisgau.
326 Cf. Winkler 2014, 172.
327 Reinhard Zimmerman, ‘Foreword,’ in Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, v–xiii; 
Rückert 1995.
328 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946: “Und wo ich solches begegne – was immer-
hin häufig vorkommt, denke ich mit Schrecken daran, wie wenig ich gewusst habe, wie den 
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past had created an atmosphere in which national development and European 
culture were in conflict. The incorrect belief in a national culture distinct from 
the wider tradition was according to Wieacker the root of the tragedy of the twen-
tieth century. To him, Germany was possessed by a hostile national mentality 
towards any influence of European (Roman) legal culture. Pre-Enlightenment 
“juridical humanism” had caused a national counter-reaction, based on a false 
understanding of the legal tradition, and this had created a belief in a vanguard 
culture fighting against alien influences. 329 Again, Wieacker was confident that 
explaining the historical development in a truthful manner and offering scientif-
ically constructed arguments for fixing the nature of things, required emphasiz-
ing the consciousness, Bewusstsein, of the people.
Wieacker found the field of legal science, and himself as a scholar within that 
scientific paradigm, in a situation where the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein need-
ed a twofold redefinition. Wieacker still firmly believed that there was such a 
thing as common awareness and a common experience of law – a cultural men-
tality concerning law – and legal historical studies should concentrate on that 
phenomenon. Yet, both the actual convictions embedded in that mentality, and 
the scientific elaborations presenting the development of that mentality, were in 
error. As a result, the German legal consciousness was plagued by an illusion of 
the foreign and arbitrary essence of the European legal tradition. The first part of 
the redefinition, to represent the historical development of the law-people-state 
interaction (in other words the process of emergence of the German Rechtsbe-
wusstsein) in a more accurate way, was well underway during the last years of the 
war. The first steps had already been taken and explicated in his correspondence 
with both Erik Wolf and Carl Schmitt.330 The founding textual work exhibiting 
that rethinking process was his article Das römische Recht und Deutsche Rechts-
bewusstsein. In 1944 Wieacker interpreted his own stance within the field of le-
gal sciences as contributing to the continuing struggle against the original mis-
comprehension of German Rechtsbewusstsein, and participating in a ceaseless 
scholarly debate concerning the history of that legal consciousness.331 
damals – 1933 – beiseite Gedrängten zumute war.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
329 It was not that “juridical,” “second,” humanism had not affected Germany, it was that it 
had created a misunderstanding about the relation between the state, the people and law. 
Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.4.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg 
im Breisgau.
330 Cf. p.  99–101, 103–105, 110–113.
331 Wieacker’s presentations in conferences after the Second World War concentrated very 
much on themes related to Rechtsbewusstsein. For example, Vom römischen Staat als Rechts-
ordnung (1949) and Ursprünge und Elemente des europäischen Rechtbewusstseins (1955) 
were both originally talks given in legal history conferences. 
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The second task for Wieacker’s ontological premises, however, was set by an 
unexpected demand to reconsider the previous intellectual practices. After the 
war, the crimes of the Nazi regime were revealed in their full enormity, and legal 
scholars and the discipline of legal science had to clarify their involvement and 
possible participation in those crimes. On a general level, German jurisprudence 
had not been able to maintain a sober relation with totalitarian ideology and ad-
ministration, but it also seemed that Wieacker as an individual scholar had con-
tributed in morally dubious fascist projects, which cast a shadow on the legitima-
cy of his scientific attempts to define ‘justice’ in history and society. No one 
could deny that as a whole the unconditional obsession with the ‘will of the 
people’ in the legal scientific works of the preceding twelve years had been a 
misjudgment. 
The scholars of the ‘New legal science’ strongly claimed that their intentions 
had been sincere and were unrelated to the destructive policy of National Social-
ism, but nevertheless they faced considerable pressure to further distance them-
selves and their scientific contributions from the legacy of the totalitarian re-
gime.332 The consequent personal and scientific task in forthcoming scientific 
presentations was to redefine one’s earlier thoughts as unattached to totalitarian 
ideology, but at the same time to maintain some kind of connection with the ar-
guments of earlier works. To a historian, a total displacement of one’s historical 
vision from preceding thoughts, principles and discourses – starting from scratch 
– would have been a mission impossible in any case. In this chapter I will con-
centrate on Wieacker’s post-war process of working through the ‘dilemma of 
totalitarianism’ with respect to higher education and the meaning of science in 
society. In other words, I will focus on the spheres of Bildung and Stand. In chap-
ter IV I will scrutinize how Wieacker dealt with the ontological challenges con-
cerning his personal past and the idea of justice as a scholarly practice. 
The original principle that Rechtsbewusstsein in Wieacker’s earlier texts had 
signified, was no longer adequate. The idea that a mental attribute, shared by the 
people and shaped by their culture, could be used in defining a rightful interpre-
332 It seems that many war generation scholars were honestly surprised by the accusations 
made against them. Wieacker did not accept the allegations concerning, for example, Ernst 
Rudolf Huber and Huber’s consequent suspension from any formal teaching positions in insti-
tutes of higher education. Wieacker considered the denazification process to be a “gamble” 
(Glückspiel), and hoped that his friend could return to his work: “Im übrigen bin ich recht un-
glücklich, dass ich meinem Wunsch, Dich recht bald wieder an der Dir zukommenden Stelle 
und Rang tätig zu sehen, bei meiner geringen Qualifikation anders als mit Empfindungen und 
Worten nicht Ausdruck geben kann; denn was kann meine Stimme unter den heutigen Um-
ständen gelten?” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.10.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 
1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Ernst Forsthoff perceived the denazification at the University of 
Heidelberg (partly led by philosopher Karl Jaspers) as “Jasperle-theater.” Meinel 2012, 304.
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tation of positive law in accordance with social justice, had not proved to be a 
sustaining idea with respect to the morality of historical representations.333 The 
fundamental question was whether Rechtsbewusstsein could still be used as a 
methodological tool for the scholar in trying to make sense of the rule of law, 
both in the past as well as in his contemporary society. Wieacker – like many 
other scholars – did not want to abandon the concept, rather he adjusted it on the 
bases of his earlier works and personal experiences. As a result, Rechtsbewusst-
sein proved to be useful not only in describing the unimaginable legal havoc of 
European civilization, but it also fitted very well to the explanation which 
Wieacker gave to the dilemma of totalitarianism. Before I analyze Wieacker’s 
scholarly texts and the post-War use of the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein, I need 
to elaborate how Wieacker’s personal experience of the people, the state and law 
related to the public discourse of post-war Germany, which further influenced his 
vision of the German legal consciousness.
a) Wieacker’s hearing and the conclusions derived
Wieacker himself was also accused of disseminating the National Socialistic 
worldview. In 1946 Ludwig Schnorr von Carolsfeld, professor of civil law at the 
University of Erlangen charged Wieacker with advocating and propagating fas-
cist views during the Nazi reign.334 Wieacker’s involvement in the Kieler Schule 
and the texts published in fascist journals were also reasons enough for an offi-
cial, legal processing of his relation with the totalitarian state. The allegations 
came to a head in the winter of 1946/1947, and Wieacker was prosecuted by the 
local tribunal, Spruchkammer, in Göttingen. As was the custom, Wieacker had to 
provide the board with evidence of his (sincere) motives and intentions during 
the Nazi regime. 335 Several scholars delivered reports on their view of both 
Wieacker’s involvement in National Socialist actions, and on the extent of 
Wieacker’s assimilation of fascist doctrines. Mostly their statements emphasized 
Wieacker’s scientific worldview, which he had not compromised in the face of 
totalitarianism.336 In addition, Fritz Pringsheim took the side of Wieacker, and 
333 See section III.4 ‘The Concept of Property’.
334 “monströse Denunziationen eines leider aus dem Gleichgewicht geworfenen (Schnorr v. 
Carolsfeld) erstaunen [.]” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber [beantwort 21.2.1946]. NL Ernst 
Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
335 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 24.4.1947: “Da ich aber jetzt durch eine (nach allgemeiner Auf-
fassung) empörende Denunziation meines Kollegen Schnorr v. Carolsfeld in große politische 
Not gelangt bin[…] so bin ich, offengestanden, auch Ihrer Hilfe sehr bedürftig.” NL Erik Wolf, 
Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
336 The scholars included Erik Wolf, Wolfgang Kunkel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Franz Bey-
erle, Fritz Pringsheim and Werner Heisenberg, all to a degree Wieacker’s friends and distin-
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defended his former student.337 Wieacker was judged as a ‘fellow traveller’, Mit-
läufer, to National Socialist crimes.338 
One of the charges presented in the tribunal process dealt with Wieacker’s 
conduct in one of the Wissenschaftlagers (in Todtnauberg) in 1933 and his sub-
sequent enlisting in a National Socialist association.339 This allegation Wieacker 
saw as coming directly from Ludwig Schnorr von Carolsfeld. The original state 
of affairs in the camp, led by none other than Martin Heidegger, had been blurry, 
but in any case, Wieacker had been sent home abrubtly and prematurely from 
Todtnauberg. Expulsion was due either Wieacker’s ironic remark, which had up-
set Heidegger, or was according to a plan which Heidegger had drafted well be-
fore the actual camp.340 Startled by the incident, Wieacker assumed that his ca-
reer as a legal scholar was about to end before it had even properly started. 
Wieacker decided to show some commitment to the new elite and – encouraged 
by Erik Wolf – enlisted in a National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK).341 
In 1947 and in the Spruchkammer process the allegation was, however, that 
during the Todtnauberg camp in October 1933 Wieacker had offended the church 
 
guished scholars, Heisenberg even Nobel laureate. According to their statements Wieacker had 
been an “uncompromising opponent of the NS state” full of “hate” against the ideology which 
had “destroyed his spiritual world and its best values.” The most tentative report came from 
Wolfgang Kunkel, who acknowledged Wieacker’s contribution to the ‘New legal science’ and 
claimed that Wieacker had “sought the favor of National Socialist students and the administra-
tion,” but he [Kunkel] could not judge whether Wieacker had “believed in finding a political 
homeland [Heimat] in National Socialism.” Winkler 2014, 463. 
337 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 29.5. 1947: “aber doch von Ihrer Motivierung, die meiner Erin-
nerung genau entsprach, für meine Argumentation der größten Nutzen gehabt. Pringsheim hatte 
mir ein Schriftstück gegeben, diesen Inhalt mich […] herzlich freute.” NL Erik Wolf, Al-
bert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau; Parts of Pringsheim’s empathetic report 
can be found in Behrends 2009, 2349–2350.
338 Winkler 2014, 571.
339 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 24.4.1947: “es handelt sich um meinen damaligen Hinauswurf 
aus dem leidigen Todtnauberger Lager (Oktober 1933) und […] einer Gliederung der Partei 
(NSKK) beizutreten.”. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breis-
gau.; cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.5.1947. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
340 On the former option see Liebs 2011, on the latter alternative see Winkler 2014. In any 
case Wieacker insisted that by that date (spring 1947) he was not sure why he had been expelled 
from Todtnauberg: (“dessen Gründe mir bis heute nicht klar sind[.]”), Wieacker to Erik Wolf 
14.2.1947. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
341 The NSKK (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps) or National Socialist Motor Corps 
can hardly be considered a concretization of the National Socialist race war, nor was it an asso-
ciation close to Wieacker’s heart. It is likely that joining the NSKK in 1933 truly was a precau-
tionary move on Wieacker’s behalf.
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– which had led to his expulsion from the camp – in a way that his later enlist-
ment in the National Socialist association did not appear as a reluctant precau-
tion, but as a natural continuum.342 This particular instance, and the allegation, 
appeared important with respect to the overall decision of the Spruchkammer. 
Since leaving the University of Leipzig after the war, Wieacker did not yet have 
a professorship, and the future chances of a position in any German university 
were dependent on the tribunal process and its decision.343 Wieacker reached out 
to Erik Wolf, who as respected fellow at Freiburg University and as a former 
vice-dean of the University, had been involved in sorting out the original case at 
Todtnauberg in 1933.344 Wolf delivered a statement where he explained Wieack-
er’s actions in the camp as a misunderstanding and the consequent enlistment as 
a necessary procedure amidst the blurry circumstances following the National 
Socialist coup. Both Wolf and Wieacker subtly emphasized the responsibility of 
the leader and arranger of the camp, Martin Heidegger.345
The effect of the ‘Todtnauberg incident’ in the overall judgment might have 
been a minor one, and in retrospect it does not stand out as the most decisive 
event with respect to Wieacker’s relation to National Socialism. From a certain 
perspective, Carolsfeld’s accusations were correct, and this might have been the 
reason for the interest the local tribunal in Göttingen showed on the event in 
1947. Schnorr von Carolsfeld held Wieacker’s relation towards Christianity as a 
proof of Wieacker’s fascism, and, indeed, Wieacker had never thought highly of 
the church. His attitude, however, was not the same as the attitude towards reli-
gion of the SS wing of the Party, which wanted to abolish churches and set up a 
Hitler cult instead. Wieacker simply did not believe in the revered position of the 
church and the particular significance of the religious vocation in the German 
 
342 To make things even more complicated, Heidegger was, despite his past, a very influen-
tial figure at Freiburg University in 1947. Wieacker pleaded with Wolf not to involve Heidegger 
too much in the clarifications concerning the inquiry on Wieacker (“Es muss möglich sein, über 
diesen Vorfall zu gutachten, ohne Heidegger (zu sehr) hineinzusiehen, das würden Sie nicht 
wünschen, und ich ebensowenig.”) Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.2.1947. NL Erik Wolf, Al-
bert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
343 “es ist wohl nur der schlechte Ruf Schnorrs, der meine als Suspension verhindert hat – so 
bin ich, offengestanden, auch Ihrer Hilfe sehr bedürftig.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 24.4.1947. NL 
Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
344 Ibid.
345 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.5.1947: “Mein Entwurf für die Rechtfertigungsschrift stellen 
die Sache genau so dar; er betonte ausdrücklich, daß der damalige Dekan” in “Sorge für eine 
politische Befolgung des durch das Lager unter anderen Umstände ‘belasteten’ Nach wuchs-
kräfte nahegelegt habe usf.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im 
Breisgau.
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culture.346 This conviction was nevertheless one that Wieacker had to suppress 
during the Spruchkammer process. Wieacker’s atheism could have been inter-
preted as sign of sympathy towards National Socialism. 347 Frustrated by the pro-
cess, and especially the charges of Schnorr von Carolsfeld, he wrote to Ernst 
Rudolf Huber: 
I feel in myself the great need to lay out before you my state-theoretical explanations that arose 
from the sheerly naive contemplation of reality. I mention only one: As I feel myself, by virtue 
of defect, not particularly bound by the Christian-European ideas of the history of the world 
(fundamentally Iranian ideas, ideas of history as the history of salvation and decision) as one of 
a suspenseful, once incipient, moral drama, I am fundamentally apolitical, pre-political: State 
(and Church) have no transcendence for me. On this transcendence, however, and the convic-
tion that the people (do not do the same, but rather) should be of the same mind are based the 
unrelenting religious wars and persecution psychoses of Western civilization and its ideological 
poisoning. This was virtually non-existent in ancient times [and] in the Indian and Chinese 
worlds, which was no disadvantage to their extent of religious depth, if my interpretation is 
correct.348 
To Wieacker, most people were driven by beliefs and superstition, of which ide-
ologies and religions for most part came. There were, however, some spheres 
which were less contaminated by the ‘persecution psychoses.’ Such islands were 
cultures of antiquity (Rome) and law. Since Wieacker had devoted himself to a 
lifelong learning of these entities, he argued that his textual contributions were 
not associated with the contemporary world of “politics.”349 The letter also con-
346 Cf. e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 18.10.1940. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universi-
tätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau, and Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 1.9.1946. NL Ernst Ru-
dolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
347 The sentences given in the Spruchkammer could be mildened because of the religious 
conviction of the defendant, if he was able to assure the tribunal that such a conviction had re-
mained even during the Third Reich. See e.g. Remy 2002, 190, 193.
348 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.5.1947. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz. “Ich empfinde selbst das starke Bedürfnis, meine aus der blossen naiven 
Anschauung der Wirklichkeit hervorgegangen staatstheoretischen Aufstellungen vor Dir ge-
ordnet auszubreiten. Nur eines sei angedeutet: da ich mich dem christlich-europäischen, im 
Grunde iranischen Gedanken der Geschichte als Heils- und Entscheidungsgeschichte, der Welt 
als eines entscheidungsträchtigen, einmal anfangenden, moralischen Dramas kraft irgend eines 
Defekts nicht so verpflichtet weiss, bin ich im Grunde apolitisch, vorpolitisch: Staat (und Kir-
che) haben für mich keine Transzendenz; auf jener Tranzendenz aber und der Überzeugung, 
dass die Menschen (nicht das gleiche tun, sondern) gleicher Meinung sein sollen, beruhen aber 
die unablässigen Glaubenskriege und Verfolgungspsychosen der abendländischen Geschichte 
und ihre ideologische Vergiftung, dergleichen es in der Antike kaum in der indischen und chi-
nesischen Welt so gut wie gar nicht gegeben hat, wenn ich recht sehe, nicht zum Nachteil ihrer 
Größe in religiöser Tiefe.”, Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.5.1947. NL Ernst Rudolf Hu-
ber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
349 Wieacker considered both Schnorr von Carolsfeld and Heidegger’s intentions to be po-
litical as opposed to his own actions. He always thought of himself as being ‘apolitical’: “Ich 
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firms that after the war Wieacker maintained his view on the irrational nature of 
history. That position reflects largely the apology his peers upheld when explain-
ing their relation to National Socialism. 
b) Bildung and Stand in the social reality of the Federal Republic
The constant underlying feeling that Wieacker possessed during the post-war 
years was that of a lack of justice.350 Partly this was due to the prosecution of 
Wieacker and his friends and the disarray brought about the denazification pro-
cess. More broadly it originated from the subjugated position of the scholars and 
lawyer class within society. Like Wieacker many scholars had been forced to 
leave their homes and working places and, finding support only from other schol-
ars, were obliged to search for a new home and circle of colleagues in some 
other part of the country. The status of the universities within the national cul-
tures became concretized in the living and working conditions of scholars. 351 
Thus, when the “army of the homeless learned” desperately tried to find a new 
place to continue their careers, it appeared to Wieacker as if the millennia-long 
foundations of the European culture had been shattered.352 Since in the German 
culture legal scholars had traditionally been privileged a self-sufficient position 
between the state and the law, the relative (and concrete) alterations in the prac-
tice of legal scholarship seemed like interventions in the binding norms of the 
society. It is noteworthy that during the Nazi years Wieacker did not feel as if the 
building blocks of society and the cultural way of life had been threatened, but in 
the post-war scarcity he saw the destruction of European culture.353 
bin zu wenig politisch und zu sehr Mystiker, um daneben auch noch Sonne und Mond, Himmel 
und Erde, Musik und unvergängliches Wort, endlich den unausschöpfbaren Reichtum alles 
ewigen Menschentums gehen zu lassen [.]” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber [beantwort 
21.2.1946]. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
350 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
351 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.2.1946: “dem unseligen Heer heimatloser Gelehrter, dem ich 
sonst noch mehr Platz wegnehmen würde, ohne das mindeste Anrecht darauf zu haben durch 
vorherige Leiden oder Zurücksetzung oder vielmehr, wesentlicher gesehen, durch eine vorbild-
lich unkonziliante, die Maßstäbe laut ins Rechte setzende Haltung.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Lud-
wig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. See also Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 
25.5.47: “Es ist ein sehr typischer Vergang, der Dir einen Eindruck von den Freuden des heuti-
gen Noch-im-Amte-Seins vermitteln mag.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesar-
chiv Koblenz.
352 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.2.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Frei-
burg im Breisgau.
353 Huber 29.3.1946: “Die besonders hervortretenden menschlichen Ausfallserscheinungen 
sind ein Symptom dieses Zustandes, die Summe menschlicher Gemeinheit ist wohl immer 
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It has to be acknowledged that the ‘experience-world’ of the scholars was a 
narrow one. For example, to Wieacker the sad material conditions following Ger-
many’s defeat and the most blatant symptoms of injustice were those relating to 
higher education and the treatment of scholars, Bildung and Stand. Thus in Jan-
uary of 1947 he wrote to Rudolf Smend, who had offered to Wieacker and sever-
al former members of the Kieler Schule a working place at the University of 
Göttingen, as follows: 
Therefore I feel moved to express my most earnest gratitude for the great kindness, with which 
you as a rector have made possible the incorporation of exulanten into this university, and with 
which you have given the spirit access to academia.354
“Exulanten,” to which in his letter Wieacker equates himself, and for example 
Wolfgang Siebert and Karl Michaelis, were Protestant expatriates of the 16th and 
18th century who had to leave their homeland due to cruel religious persecution. 
From the perspective of the twenty-first century it is difficult to see the fate of the 
post-war legal scholars as tragic, as like refugees who had to flee for their lives 
due to their religious convictions, nor see the question of the ‘spiritual well-be-
ing’ of the nation depending on whether the legally trained found suitable places 
of work. That was, however, the experience of the learned themselves in the 
years following the end of the Second World War. Their inexorable conviction 
was that the ‘just order’ of society depended on the status which society gave to 
legal science and to scientists. When legal scholars had to renounce their tradi-
tional right to interdisciplinary self-definition with respect to society and the 
state, to give up their self-proclaimed entitlement to announce the current form 
of social justice, it appeared as if the authority of law had been degraded and the 
Geist of the nation lost. 
The chaotic times were concretized in the threat which Bolshevism constituted 
to the value base of the German nation. The hazard was a real one since the So-
viet Union and German communists announced an explicit intention to overrule 
the social order of Germany. Indeed, the changes which were carried out in So-
viet East Germany – and which socialists in the West supported – already aimed 
at removing of the bourgeoisie, and at transforming the institutions of formal 
ziemlich gleich gross oder klein; aber sie wird in solchen disorganisierten Zeiten viel sichtbarer 
als sonst.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
354 “Dafür aber fühle ich mich zu lebhaftestem Dank aufgerufen, für die große Güte, mit der 
Sie als Rektor die Angliederung der Exulanten an dieser Hochschule möglich gemacht haben, 
und mit der Sie dem Geist den Zutritt zur Akademie geöffnet haben.”, Wieacker to Rudolf 
Smend 14.1.1947. NL Rudolf Smend: Allgemeine Korrespondenz. Cod. Ms. R.Smend A 960. 
Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen. Emphasis mine. Wieacker 
uses the word Rektor [rector], although Smends position in Göttingen was „Präsidenten der 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen“.
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education to produce workers in the service of the state. Communism was being 
interpreted as the absolute dissolution of Western culture, as the extreme oppo-
site to the appreciation of law (legal science), and as an irreversible alteration to 
the national tradition.355 Conversely, the last fortress of hierarchies which com-
prised the European cultural heritage, the Geist and free creativity, was to be 
found in academia. In his letter to Erik Wolf of 14 March 1946 Franz Wieacker 
wrote about the “red alienation” of Leipzig University and the eastern provinces 
of Germany.356 In addition, and in congruence with conservative narrative of the 
time, he compared the “inhuman” development of the east on the disaster of the 
Nazi regime.
Here [in Göttingen] the matters are naturally not that clearly apparent due to a strong desire for 
intellectuality and great exhaustion, but how rejoicing it would be if one could perceive a real 
re-establishment of the old works. Unfortunally many characteristics that one ascribed to the 
Nazis alone until the great crash; intolerance, egoism, sycophancy, self-opinionated dogmatiza-
tion, the desire to oppress, a war-mongering spirit […] are back again. 357
In the letter Wieacker sees the communist restrictions on academic life and the 
“scholarly spirit” of West German universities as opposites in the larger picture 
of the fate of European culture.358 The communist assault on higher education 
was true totalitarianism, and as such a direct heir of National Socialism and all 
the expressions of ‘modernization’ which preceded it. The rise of these totalitar-
ianisms was not a sudden phenomenon. The process of alienation had started 
long before, when the common value-base and connection to reality had fallen 
apart in ‘technicalization’ and modernization, which represented the opposite 
force to the values associated with ‘humanity,’ or Bildung.359 Thus, along with 
355 Cf. p.  142–143.
356 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946. See also: “Die Umwandlung dieser (etwa vor allem in 
der philosophischen Fakultät) so vortrefflichen Universität in eine Arbeitervolkshochschule 
(was ja ganz sinnreich sein könnte) hat sich in Formen vollzogen, die für lange Zeit jeden 
‘Wiederaufbau’ unmöglich machen.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Frei-
burg im Breisgau.
357 “Hier [in Göttingen] sind natürlich die Dinge durch starken Willen zur Geistigkeit und 
große Erschöpfung nicht so deutlich sichtbar, aber wie würde man sich freuen, wenn man hier 
eine wirkliche Reorganisation der alten Werke erkannte. Aber leider viele Eigenschaften, die 
man selbst bis zum großen Krach den Nationalsozialisten allein zuschrieb; Intoleranz, Egois-
mus, Kriecherei, rechthaberisches Dogmatisieren, Unterdrücken wollen, Kriegsgeist, […] 
wieder [zurück][.]”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universi-
tätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
358 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
359 Wieacker cynically stated that it was too late to strip modern society of its aberrations, 
and distortions as old as the industrial revolution were to be resolved only if “diese Auflösung 
wäre einmal möglich durch eine Selbstzerstörung der technischen Welt, sodaß nur mehr Acker-
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the communist threat and its intention to rearrange the traditional order of aca-
demia, the German community was overwhelmed and oppressed by sentiments 
which deprived them of their affection towards culture and tradition, the key at-
tributes in pursuing social justice.360 And conversely, actions stemming from the 
destructive emotions of hate and revenge were incapable of rebuilding a just so-
ciety. 
To Wieacker in 1946, the force that threatened social justice, and spread values 
opposite to the virtues of Bildung, was that of “barbarians.”361 The natural con-
trast to the barbarian worldview was the culture appreciated by himself and his 
group of friends. Scholars faced barbarism from many directions and in many 
forms. The hypocritical attitude of the victors, in bemoaning the depths of Na-
tional Socialist totalitarianism, was not only “gullible” but also in part “barbar-
ic.”362 It was as if the nature of war had surprised the Western world. The at-
tempts to rearrange higher education on the basis of a alien political ideology 
seemed to Wieacker a “brutal crime,” ignoring both the cultural heritage and the 
affective attitude which scholars had for their work as torchbearers of tradition.363 
The most acute and explicit features of “barbarism” were, however, the demands 
on behalf of the political realm for scholars to back up the newly-drawn constel-
lation of society. Wieacker wrote to Huber:
I find that it is not my (or our) task to further help with removal and destruction so that a new 
heaven and earth may emerge. At any rate, we take action against our culture if we want to go 
along with the promising barbarians.364
bauer, Hirten und Jäger überbleiben.” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. See also 
Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946: “die Zerstörung des politischen Welt (seit langer 
Zeit).” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
360 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946: the tendency to dismantle the tradition of higher edu-
cation as embedded in the Humboldtian ideal of the university was “gegen die wissenschaftli-
che Ausbildung, die wir in Sacksen in den letzten Jahren mit allen zugrundeliegenden Instink-
ten mehr als lieb kennen lernten.” Cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.2.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Al-
bert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
361 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946; and Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 
29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Wieacker to Erik 
Wolf 14.3.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau; 
Wieacker to Gerhard Dulckeit 25.12.1948, NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 
5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen.
362 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946: “[A]ber die [gutglaubigen und barbarischen] 
haben ja doch kein Urteil, und keinen Wissen zum Urteil.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 
1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
363 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
364 “Ich finde, es ist nicht meine (oder unsere) Aufgabe, weiter mit Abtragen und Zerstören 
zu helfen, damit ein neuer Himmel und eine neue Erde entsteht. Wir jedenfalls handeln gegen 
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Whereas the “brutal” attacks on the core of the legal tradition of the continent 
were observable in all areas of contemporary society, “free will” and the “will-
power” of history prevailed in the circle of scholars, most notably in the group of 
his friends and their mentality.365 Although the sad conditions of the time, in the 
form of negative sentiments, extended to the Stand of lawyers, it nevertheless 
constituted a constellation which carried on the “spirit of the tradition” and which 
was able to rebuild the cultural foundations of society. Wieacker wrote to Huber:
And further, the billow of reluctance and persecution within the estate ought not to be overes-
timated, because everybody is too much involved with himself and also the immediate struggle 
for life to have much time for resentments.366
The shady years of legal science during the Nazi regime had not eradicated 
Wieacker’s unquestioning conviction of the distinguished moral skill brought by 
legal historical knowledge and the common culture of scholars. Wieacker was 
confident that he and his friends had the gift of speaking on behalf of and utiliz-
ing the “spirit of tradition.”367 This capability sprang from their learnedness, their 
assimilation of past wisdom and their knowledge of the past generation of legal 
thinkers. Amidst the total destruction and the following widespread scarcity, 
scholars could evaluate and weigh the importance of things, and give advice on 
the emphasis of the reconstruction. It was only scholars who had a larger under-
standing of the causes and consequences of the “collapse.”368
The consequent scholarly task, which Wieacker assigned to himself, was the 
one of teaching and writing history. The rebuilding of the German and European 
Rechtsbewusstsein had to be left to experts on justice, namely legal scholars. 
unsere Kultur, wenn wir die frischen zukunftsträchtigen Barbaren mitziehen wollen.”, Wie-
acker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz.
365 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz.
366 “Und ferner: die Woge der Abneigung und Verfolgung innerhalb des Standes sollte man 
nicht überschätzen, denn jeder ist ja viel zu sehr mit sich selbst beschäftigt und noch den unmit-
telbarsten Daseinsnöten, um sehr viel Zeit für Ressentiments zu haben.”, Wieacker to Ernst 
Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
367 Wieacker to Walther Schönfeld 3.3.1958: in memory of Walther Schönfeld Wieacker 
wrote to Schönfeld’s widow: “mit ihm wird sich stets eine Leistung verbinden, an der Glaube 
und Herzblut gesetzt worden war und die darum nicht vergessen werden können. So gesellt 
sich zu der Trauer auch Ehrfurcht und der Trost eines durchaus menschenwürdigen Lebens in 
der Würde des Geistes und der Liebe zum Geist.” NL Walther Schönfeld, Bestand 645, UAT, 
Tübingen.
368 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz: “[A]ber der totale Umfang der Zerstörung sowie die Abwesenheit aller 
sichtbaren Mittel zur Rettung ist nicht zu leugnen – was wohl nur wir mit dem traurigen Klar-
blick des Besiegten richtig genug sehen können.”.
1577. Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1945–1968
Since intervening with anything that had to with politics was out of the question, 
the rebuilding had to be conducted in the spheres of education and legal histori-
ography.369 Not only was the educational assignment noble and meaningful from 
the point of view of the nation, Wieacker was also genuinely worried about the 
actual living conditions of students. In general he was concerned about the direc-
tion in which young people – who had grown up in a totalitarian society – were 
able to take the country.
Sad and touching is the helplessness of the young people; because the time in which they have 
been growing up has, except for a few favored by the grace of the situation or their own 
strength, taken the wits to reason with which they could find new directions.370
It was the duty of scholars to educate the younger generation capable of making 
and willing to make righteous judgments in reconstructing the society.371 Since 
students, in National Socialist state, had been trained to follow, not to criticize, 
the first task of teaching was to convince students that an ability to carry out 
critical evaluations was essential for a prosperous future for both themselves and 
their nation. Only then could teachers provide students with the means to decide 
and evaluate. To Wieacker the purpose of higher legal education was to introduce 
students to the rich world of legal tradition, with all its exemplary virtues and 
‘love for the spirit.’ Such knowledge would ‘emancipate’ and cultivate ‘free 
will,’ which on their part would produce practical solutions for the problems 
plaguing the ‘inhuman’ contemporary society. Analytical thinking and jurispru-
dential skill necessitated the awareness and assimilation of tradition. Thus, the 
process of reconstruction, to which Wieacker devoted himself, and which he 
hoped students would continue, was to rebuild the cultural (i.e. legal historical) 
premises of Europe. 
It was in the attitudes towards the European legal heritage where the juxtapo-
sition between the ‘inhuman spirit’ of the time and the values appreciated by 
Wieacker (and his colleagues) became most apparent. The war had cut the origi-
369 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946: “Halte ich noch den Erfahrungen mit Partei 
und Parteien Generalstab, Beamtentum, ‘Wirtschaft’ nicht mehr für möglich […] Das Ge-
heimnis ist, daß der moderne Staat nicht einmal der Idee noch mehr von den Besten verwaltet 
wird.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Emphasis original. 
370 “Traurig und rührend ist die Ratlosigkeit der jungen Leute; denn die Zeit, in der sie 
aufwuchsen, hat ihnen ja auch bis auf wenige Dauer güst der Lage oder eigene Kraft begün-
stigte die Organe zum Urteilen genommen, mit dem sie auf neue Wege kommen könnten.”, 
Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg 
im Breisgau.
371 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946: “Wir haben die große Vorgabe, unsere berufliche Auf-
gabe zu kennen, und sie sogar bei allen äußeren Hemmnissen f[...]gen (freilassen)zu können.” 
NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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nal cultural bond between the Western cultures, whose rebuilding was increas-
ingly vital in the face of the dark prospects for Europe. Europe was in a state of 
division, but more sadly, faced the danger of being “united” through mere power 
politics. Wieacker’s Europe was a “historical ideal” that had to be reconstructed 
taking into consideration its wider meaning.372 The significance of ‘Europe’ in 
Wieacker’s correspondence was on account of its peculiar existence both in the 
past and concurrently in the present. To Wieacker, the foundations of the great 
past legal cultures resided in their acknowledgment of the authority of law.373 On 
the other hand, that exact feature was a thing that contemporary Germany and 
Europe lacked. 374 Thus, in order to rise again, Germany (and Europe) needed to 
learn from the past the means and virtues which enabled the restoration of the 
authority of law and legal science. 
Wieacker hoped for the Europe that had once existed in history, “A united 
Europe on a co-operative basis.”375 Such a Europe would not be one built on 
nations. Contrary to Ernst Rudolf Huber’s ideas Wieacker rejected the priority of 
the state and asserted that Europe was built on legal tradition. The state had done 
what it had to do. Now was the time to build on law: 
Therefore I give you law, if you do not yet wish to give up the state (not yet a supranational 
organization) as the bastion of culture, justice and humanity. On the whole I believe, of course, 
that the state has played out its role for this culture, and that a dissolution of this whole hard-
ened and petrified power entity is required [.]376 
372 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946: “Allein, nicht nur aus Egoismus und Haß 
kommt es nicht zu einer solchen Konzeption, sondern weil ja Europa geteilt ist und die Ent-
scheidung, wem es zufällt, vielleicht noch offen liegt. Und ist diese Entscheidung gefallen, 
dann wird es wieder keine europäische Macht sein, die Europa organisiert. Sie wird Europa 
also ähnlich ‘befreien’ und ‘einigen’ wie die Mazedonier Philipp und Alexander und die Diado-
chen das unselige Griechenland zwischen 346 und 146.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 
1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
373 Cf. Wieacker to Hans–Georg Gadamer 14.7.1965, Nachlass Hans–Georg Gadamer, 
Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
374 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.2.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Frei-
burg im Breisgau.
375 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946: “ein vereinigtes Europa auf genossenschaft-
liche Basis.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
376 “Daher gebe ich Dir Recht, wenn Du den Staat (noch nicht eine überstaatliche Organisa-
tion) als den Bürgen von Kultur, Gerechtigkeit und Humanität noch nicht preisgeben willst. Im 
ganzen freilich glaube ich, daß der Staat für diese Kultur seine Rolle ausgespielt hat, und daß 
es erst wieder einer Auflösung dieser ganz verhärteten und versteinerten Machtgebildes bedarf 
[.]”, Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz. Already during the war Wieacker had been suspicious of the argument that 
the state was the original expression of the people’s will (the Schmittian idea of the gemeinwil-
len). He thought that Rechtsidee was at least as old as Reichsbewusstsein. See Wieacker to Erik 
Wolf 11.4.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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But the aim of law becoming the ‘fortress of culture, justice and humanity’ in 
contemporary society, necessitated a subject who would bring about the triumph 
of law. In order to understand the law one needed to be aware of the European 
tradition, and furthermore, in order to conduct a succesful interpretation of tradi-
tion one had to have an education conducted along classic lines. The solution lay 
in the style of one’s legal thinking, and in this an example was already available 
in European legal history. The essence of the European tradition could be found 
in the style of thinking developed by classic Roman law.377 The spiritual ability 
associated with Roman jurisprudence had brought about positive legal achieve-
ments in European history, but it had also provided a lasting model according to 
which lawyers should be trained. Moreover, the style of thinking of past cultural 
heroes was ‘European,’ and by this means the looming catastrophe could be 
evaded and a more civilized Europe achieved. In concrete terms one needed to 
study the history of legal thinkers, especially those who mastered Roman law, 
not just its texts, but the minds behind the representations. The idea was to be-
come like them on the level of thought. This assimilation of legal tradition – first 
and originally obtained by the Late Republican lawyers in Rome – would allow 
the modern legal scholar to teach and cultivate a Stand competent enough to steer 
the common legal consciousness of the nation (and Europe) in a healthy direc-
tion. Only in connection to the wisdom of this tradition could lawyers as an ‘es-
tate’ cultivate their own legal capability – a mental ability to make value judg-
ments – in practice. This would bring justice into social reality, and restore the 
authority of law in the legal consciousness of the people. Wieacker stated: 
Indeed, the greater culture that has corroded contains, therefore, some elements that we best use 
to serve the future, in conserving and proclaiming the past. The men of late antiquity who col-
lected, constricted and kept the old traditions in full consciousness, could not also know why 
they did so, and it was nevertheless gloriously worth the trouble after the High Middle Ages and 
later, as soon as the formerly barbaric pupils became ripe for reverence. To have an effect on 
the historical sequence of events no longer makes sense, if the empirical course of history has 
decayed into a new series of catastrophes. Outside these “Histories” lie the categories of our 
future fields of work of the smallest and greatest activities, “the next ones”[,] i.e. those entrust-
ed in remuneration and dependent upon us and “the People” should be the object of our activi-
ties and thoughts.378
377 Cf. p.  125–126.
378 “Vielmehr enthält auch die nun zur Rüste gegangene große Kultur somit einige Elemen-
te, daß wir der Zukunft am besten dienen, indem wir das Vergangene bewahren und verkünden. 
Die Männer des späten Altertums, die vollkommen bewußt das Alte sammelten, verengten und 
bewahrten, konnten auch nicht wissen, wofür und es hat sich doch seit dem Hochmittelalter und 
später herrlich gelohnt, sobald einmal die einst barbarischen Zöglinge zur Ehrfurcht reif wur-
den. Auf die geschichtlichen Abläufe zu wirken, hat keinen Sinn mehr, wenn sich der empiri-
sche Geschichtsablauf zu neuer Folge von Katastrophen zersetzt hat. Außerhalb dieser “Ge-
schichte” liegen also die Kategorien unserer künftigen Arbeitsfelder des kleinsten und des 
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A scholar’s duty was to educate, to rebuild the tradition, to find again the untaint-
ed core of jurisprudence, and, in order to succeed, study the legal thinkers of the 
past. In this way, the learned would again be able to educate the ‘barbarian youth 
ripe for reverence’ like their historical models in Late Antiquity. To reconstruct 
the European cultural whole, to rebuild and prevent a disaster occurring again, 
meant studying the tradition of law with the style of thinking contained in Roman 
law. According to Wieacker, the metaphorical comparison of himself and Huber 
to the Glossators was apt also with respect to the aim of their historical works. 
The Glossators were unable to foresee the fruits of their work, but focused on 
“guarding” the tradition. Accordingly, the contemporary historiography should 
not be a report on the levels of guilt, or concentrate on the faults of the recent 
past, but instead “history” should constitute a support for the larger goals of inner 
“emancipation” and “freedom.” The shadow of the totalitarian past affected all 
attempts at interpreting recent developments. In order to produce “mature” and 
“spiritual” results one had to go further, to the cultural heritage of antiquity, and 
concentrate on the minds of the great thinkers.379 To learn from history meant to 
be like the learned ones in history, those who had guarded and applied the tradi-
tion. This future-oriented learning from the past, identifying with the thinking of 
the tradition, or in other words, the merging of tradition and a personal experi-
ence of the law, was at the heart of Wieacker’s view on legal history and jurispru-
dence.380 
The shift in purpose of the scholarly work (or rather a return to origins) also 
meant the abandonment of ‘politics’ as they had appeared in the modern world.381 
The key for both a sound basis for future jurisprudence, and a meaning for one’s 
personal attempts to study history, was to be found in the healthy core of tradi-
tion. Along the lines of the classical understanding of Bildung, the process of 
learning from the past was not only socially moral but also a path for personal 
perfection. Like the Bildungsbürgertum in the Weimar Republic, Wieacker want-
größten Tuns, dass “Nächste” d. h. der nur in den konkreten Bezügen Anvertraute und auf uns 
Angewiesene und ”die Menschen” sollten der Gegenstand unseres Tuns und Denkens sein.”, 
Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesar-
chiv Koblenz. (Emphasis original). Here Wieacker refers to Goethe (“die Menschen sollten den 
Gegenstand unseres Tuns und Denkens sein”), but emphasizes the definite article die. Thus, 
instead of learning of and from the common people of the past, he bent the slogan to signify the 
‘learned’ of the past. 
379 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946: “Freiheit” “Freilassung.” Also “Auf die 
geschichtlichen Abläufe zu wirken, hat keinen Sinn mehr”. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 
1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
380 Avenarius 2010.
381 Cf. p. 157 fn.  369.
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ed to return to a world where all the disturbing elements of ‘modernization’ had 
not yet appeared. The challenges had changed, ideals had not.
In the scientific level of Wieacker’s texts this ‘process of maturation’ appeared 
as a change in the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein. To merely identify the sense of 
justice with a vaguely defined group of people, as in the Rechtsbewusstsein of 
Savigny or ‘legal renewal,’ ignored the human tendency to slide into irrationality 
and mass psychosis. To express the skill of interpreting the norms through a per-
sonal sense of Rechtsgefühl (as Jhering had), could not take into account the 
distinguishing force of the correct kind of Bildung. Some senses of justice were 
more accurate and directed more towards a sophisticated cultivation of the mind 
than others. During the late years of war, Wieacker realized that the exceptional 
legal ability, inevitable in creating ethically sustainable laws, conducting justi-
fied judgments and reading the contemporary legal system as a part of the long 
line of European legal tradition, could exist only in relation to a proper context. 
This context was the common legal mentality prevailing in a given time and so-
ciety. Thus, in Wieacker post-war texts, Rechtsbewusstsein became as the con-
text of the true distinguished legal ability. This legal ability Wieacker started to 
call explicitly as ‘legal conscience’, Rechtsgewissen. In order to preserve its au-
thority the ‘legal conscience’ had to be aware of the development of Rechtsbe-
wusstsein – the two had to be related but nevertheless distinct from each other. 
Now, in post-war Germany, however, the common understanding of the rule of 
law or legal consciousness – Rechtsbewusstsein – was characterized as a battle-
field between a sober understanding of law and justice, which the experts repre-
sented, and a constant attraction of sliding into beliefs, degeneration and super-
stition. Or at least that was how Franz Wieacker saw the development. Due to the 
disarray of the context (Rechtsbewusstsein) the distinguished legal ability (Re-
chtsgewissen) was lost in Federal Republic.
This ‘maturation’ – a conceptual change in Franz Wieacker’s scholarly works 
– was based on the experience of the contemporary social tragedy. If it had not 
been for the rethinking process that Wieacker had to go through, the transforma-
tion of his historical vision might have been different or not as sharp. Wieacker 
found congruence and proof for his ontological view of legal historical meaning 
from the everyday acts and ideas of the post-war “anarchical years” of the Fed-
eral Republic.382 To conceptualize this phenomenon along the theoretical frame 
of my thesis, Wieacker’s experiences of the post-war years, produced a changed 
understanding of the social reality. When applied to the writing process, it be-
382 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber [beantwort 21.2.1946]: “Geht es aus dieser Katastrophe 
nicht unablässig in dauernde Anarchie hinein, so wird sich auch bald ein Platz zeigen, an dem 
jeder von uns w[...]en kann.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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came a historical vision, an ontological stance on the meaning and direction of 
history. It was not that Wieacker was disappointed about the binding mentality of 
his own in-group (the scholars of the Kieler Schule), or found that it was con-
structed on biased principles. It was the behavior of other scholars, the alleged 
lack of justice in occupied Germany, and the irrationality of the common people 
that drove him to conceptualize the domain of the common understanding of the 
rule of law in a new way. 
Wieaker’s research premises expressed themselves and became intertwined 
with the entities of higher education, scholarly work and Germany’s relation to 
the European tradition, in other words in the themes of Bildung and Stand. 
Wieacker drafted his attitude on the basis of his previous experiences, which 
were referred to contemporary events. Thus this set of prejudices (or Vorurteil as 
Wieacker called it, and not in a negative sense of the word)383 enabled Wieacker 
to categorize the constantly changing political and social reality of the Federal 
Republic, but it also had an effect on his scientific works, were he interpreted 
historical sources through this ontological view of the world. This conviction of 
the ambigious nature of Rechtsbewusstsein amidst changing historical circum-
stances, overshadowed his works during the immediate years following the end 
of the war. The relation between the one reading the tradition and the true mean-
ing of that tradition remained, at this stage, an unresolved question. I will deal 
with this topic in more detail in chapter IV. In the next section I elaborate how 
this conceptual tool, ‘legal consciousness,’ appeared in Wieacker’s works in re-
lation to the legal history and destiny of Europe.
8. Vulgarismus und Klassizismus (1955):  
Rechtsbewusstsein and the collapsed legal order
In Vulgarismus and Klassizismus Wieacker’s explicit attempt was to methodo-
logically review the study of vulgar and Byzantine law. By vulgar law scholars 
have meant the diverse Occidental laws, which emerged after the collapse of the 
Roman Empire. Previously (according to Wieacker) the emphasis had been on 
the breach between the classic law of the Empire as well as on the “outer” influ-
ences of Greek and Germanic cultures. To Wieacker these elaborations remained 
one-sided since they did not take into account the larger conditions, cultural and 
sociological events which occurred during the “vulgarization” of the classic Ro-
man law. Just as modern law was being studied as part of society, the historical 
383 NL Franz Wieacker. Cod. Ms. F.Wieacker, D1. Niedersächsische Staats- und Universi-
tätsbibliothek, Göttingen.
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analysis of vulgar and Byzantine law should be a holistic endeavor to understand 
the entirety of past phenomena and all the aspects this involved. In particular, 
previous research had undermined the psychological sides which the process of 
“vulgarization” contained.384 
Again Wieacker’s view was ‘material’ in the sense that he intended to scruti-
nize the living conditions of past people and then derive the mental states the 
change in those conditions caused. This “affective change” affected the law.385 
Wieacker’s research task was bold, namely to study historical changes behind the 
normative system of law while concentrating on language, interpretation and 
education as they were expressed and appeared in legal sources. As “previous 
accounts” Wieacker first discussed the studies of Heinrich Brunner and Ludwig 
Mitteis,386 although he based his main argument primarily on the works of Ernst 
Levy, Fritz Schulz and Fritz Pringsheim.387 
In the text of Vulgarismus und Klassizismus the comparison between his own 
ideas and the preceding ones is marked by a recognition of the merits and virtues 
of the previous contributions. In 1949 when Wieacker started to concentrate on 
post-classical Roman law, his attitude was quite different. Schulz’s stance in par-
ticular was evaluated using categories familiar from Wieacker’s wartime writ-
ings. In the draft of his article, Wieacker labeled Schulz’s premises as “formalis-
tic and materialistic.”388 Thus, the results Schulz (and his disciples) drew from 
their analysis of legal historical phenomena, were inevitably contaminated by 
their ‘materialistic’ view on the relation between law and society. Since Schulz 
was not a legal positivist, by ‘materialistic’ Wieacker meant the (alleged) con-
temporary political bias of Schulz’s writings. According to Wieacker, Schulz 
quite explicitly used historical meaning (reconstructed from historical, textual 
sources) to argue on behalf or against a contemporary political tendency.389 In 
384 See e.g. Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 10: “In der rechtsgeschichte die 
psychologische Durchsetzungs- und Verwirklichungschance der hauptstädtischen Jurisprudenz 
und selbst des späteren Kaiserrechts leicht überschätze.” 24: “der Gesetztgebung als auf 
rechtspsychologischen Vorgängen beruhen,” and 20: “Auch die kennzeichnenden Stilmittel 
und Ausdrucksformen vulgärer Rechtsvorstellung lassen sich aus den gruppenpsychologischen 
Vorgangen ableiten, die sich aus der Spaltung einer Kulturegesellschaft ergeben.”
385 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 22: “Die affektive Wahrnehmungsweise 
der vulgären Wirklichkeitsempfindung.”
386 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 7.
387 See e.g. Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 7 fn.  2, 9 fn.  12, and 24–25.
388 NLFranz Wieacker. Cod. Ms. F.Wieacker, D1. Niedersächsische Staats- und Universi-
tätsbibliothek, Göttingen.
389 Wolfgang Ernst, ‘Fritz Schulz (1879–1957),’ in Jack Beatson & Reinhard Zimmermann 
(ed.), Jurists Uprooted: German-speaking Emigré Lawyers in Twentieth-century Britain. Ox-
ford, Oxford UP 2004, 105–203.
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one way or another this was the way in which Wieacker (like every other histori-
an) weighed the significance of a given historical “fact,” but Schulz had clearly 
argued on behalf of the “old legal scholarship” and against the ‘New legal sci-
ence.’ Wieacker considered Schulz’s compositions biased as a whole. To Wieack-
er, although Schulz was a skilled historian and researcher, the interpretation of 
past events was overshadowed by his opinions, which were constructed from the 
bases of the present social and political situation. 
Wieacker thought he saw in Schulz’s works the dogmatic tendency against 
which the ‘New legal science’ had fought; the attachment to liberal and abstract 
legal theories which penetrated the conclusions of the historian. To understand 
law as “close to life itself” and as an “awareness” brought about by real engage-
ment with society, were solid heuristic innovations, which Wieacker had realized 
during the previous decades, and which he saw as lacking in Schulz’s attempts to 
elaborate European legal past. So although the tone of Wieacker’s rhetoric was 
more moderate in Vulgarismus und Klassizismus, and he did not explicitly chal-
lenge Schulz’s results, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus is not only a continuation 
of Wieacker’s own construction of the long line of European legal history, but 
also another argument against the ‘materialistic’ view of legal history. The text 
exhibits Wieacker’s fundamental distinction between the ‘material’ study of legal 
history and ‘materialistic’ presentations of the past. In ‘material’ research orien-
tation a scholar takes into account the wide spectrum of possibly involved varia-
bles effecting on the object of his study,390 ‘materialistic’ orientation is the way 
of writing history, in which the purpose to which a legal historical argument is 
put is more important than the process of understanding the past.391 
In Vulgarismus und Klassizismus Wieacker on the one hand wants to show the 
continuity between legal cultures within Europe, on the other he argues against 
the paradigm of acknowledging the “scientific” (Wissenschaftlich) legal system 
of the Eastern Roman empire as the heir and successor of Roman jurispru-
dence.392 Especially in analyzing the vulgar law of Western Europe, Wieacker 
uses Rechtsbewusstsein as a conceptual tool in scrutinizing the change in legal 
reality which appeared in Europe after the third century AD. In comparison to 
Wieacker’s preceding works, the concept has been further developed, and it dis-
tinctively emphasizes the tension between the irrational and rational aspects in-
volved in legal worldviews. In addition, Wieacker applies his idea of Reception, 
which he has now enlarged into a universal model to explain interaction between 
different legal cultures. 
390 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 12.
391 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 348–518.
392 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955: on continuity and vulgarization as an 
example of Reception, 12–14; on the “alien” essence of East Roman “scientific” law, see 50 ff. 
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The following analysis of Wieacker’s article concentrates on three traits with-
in it, which, I argue, express the sustaining elements in his legal historical works, 
namely the process of interpreting history according to one’s personal life history 
and previous key experiences. Such traits are (i) the existence of a distinguished 
lawyer Stand within Roman society – emblematic of the Roman view of world 
– as a structure which safeguarded the overall ethicalness of society; (ii) the idea 
of a latent irrationality affecting all legal cultures; and finally (iii) Bildung as a 
spiritual asset and a concrete structure in legal reality, which maintained the wis-
dom of past cultures, and especially that of Roman jurisprudence. 
Wiecker acknowledges the difficulty in defining the essence of ‘vulgarization,’ 
and the diverse ways in which the shift from Classical Roman law to post-Classic 
jurisprudence had been conceptualized.393 Was it mainly a phenomenon of style, 
administration or rhetoric? Was it degeneration, Germanification, or should one 
talk about unique legal cultures of vulgar law and Byzantine law? Wieacker as-
serted that in order to fully understand the essence of ‘vulgarization’ one was 
compelled to first give a comprehensive picture of the historical reality of its 
predecessor, Roman law, and not just its appearance in the Empire, but the “true 
great jurisprudence” of the Late Roman Republic.394 Wieacker’s focus was on 
the culture of Roman law and its afterlife in the European context, thus Roman 
law was not just a matter of “administrative practices” or “style,” but the “spiritual 
creativity” of a group of people united in their education, vocation and way of 
perceiving the world.395 To describe Roman law narrowly as the jurisprudence 
prevailing in the Roman Empire was, according to Wieacker, a mistake. During 
the late years of the Empire, lawyers and jurisprudence had been assigned a spe-
cial task to serve the needs of the Emperor, but the legal work of the consilium 
was not the highest form of Roman law, rather a restriction to the previous sphere 
of creativity.396
To Wieacker, the roots and geistig essence of Roman law were in the sociolog-
ical exceptionality of the lawyer class in the Late Roman Republic. They formed 
an “expert-culture of a distinct and upper social class.”397 ‘Noble jurists’ were not 
393 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 8–10.
394 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 11: “die großen gedanklichen Schöpfun-
gen der klassischen Juristen und ihre geistige Erbe[.]”
395 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 18: “Wir können unmöglich die öffentli-
chen Funktionen des Fachjuristen in Gesetzgebung, Rechtsprechung, Kautelarjurisprudenz und 
Rechtsgutachtung vom Begriff der ‘Praxis’ ausschliessen.”
396 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 19, also 25: “Beschränkung der Aufgabe 
des Juristen auf die qaestio iuris.”
397 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 14: “einer auf sachkundige Oberschich-
ten beschränkten Spezialkultur,” 24: “[Der] einzigen Eigenart der klassischen römischen Ju ris-
prudenz […] fortentwickelt durch das ständische und und fachliche Selbstgefühl der alten 
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exceptional only with respect to their social background – which placed them in 
the social elite, if measured by their cultural knowledge and learnedness – but in 
the virtues they expressed while interpreting law and acting as the legal authori-
ties within Late Republican society. The inner culture of the lawyer Stand affect-
ed the legal norms of the Republic, and the statutes concerning contracts, mer-
chandise and inheritance were constituted on and supported by the virtuous 
codes for behavior presented by the Stand.398 From his Late Republican example 
Wieacker induced a general legal sociological principle: in any particular society 
in history, the conditions of and valuation given to the lawyer Stand mirrored the 
essence of its legal culture. The ‘special-culture’ of the ‘legal-experts’ (the exist-
ence of such a Stand was a characteristic of a decent legal order) was a structure 
in which cultural virtues and social requirements were combined and adminis-
trated in a just manner. Thus, the legal expressions produced by the Stand were 
(and are) not just theoretical abstractions of reality-detached scholars, but an in-
separable part of practical life:
Just one look on the Anglo-Saxon jurists, and altogether the classical Roman jurists, reveals the 
equation of expert legal special-cultures with academic legal doctrine to be unfounded [...] 
Today as before, heritage, sentiment, and the cognitive power of a legal culture’s officials are 
decisive for its mood and the height of its style.399
So the study of the appearance of vulgar law in Late Antiquity had to be conduct-
ed bearing in mind the significance of the Stand in legal cultures, and in compar-
ison to the legal system – the insurmountable predecessor – of Roman society. 
Consequently, Wieacker insisted that research on vulgar law should focus on 
“non-governmental associations” that lay outside of legal “science.” 400 By ‘sci-
ence’ Wieacker meant presentations which were theoretically categorized, and 
the rejection of such legal systemizations was due to the principle that ‘true great 
jurisprudence’ had been free of such Greek influence. While concentrating on 
Adelsjuristen, vertieft und geläutert durch logische und ethische Entdeckungen unter dem Ein-
fluss des Griechertums [.]” 
398 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 25: “[D]ie äusserste Abstraktion fachju-
ristischer Kunstvorstellungen von den anschaulichen und sozialrelevanten Lebenverhältnissen 
[…] entspricht eine solche der Rechtsethik, die sich gegenüber dem vulgären Moralbedürfnis 
bald durch adeligen Rigorismus (so bei der vollverpflichtenden Kraft des gesprochenen Wor-
tes), bald durch asketische Unnachgiebigkeit gegen unbestmmbare Billigkeitsrücksichten äus-
sert[.]” 
399 “[E]in Blick auf den angelsächsischen Juristen und vollends auf den klassischen römi-
schen Juristen enthüllt die Gleichsetzung fachjuristischer Spezialkultur mit akademischer 
Rechtslehre als unbegrundet […] Ausschlaggebend für die Stillhöhe und die Stimmung einer 
Rechtskultur sind vielmehr heute wie einst Herkunft, Gesinnung und Denkkraft ihrer Funktio-
näre.”, Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 19.
400 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 8–9.
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‘non-governmental associations’ Wieacker was able to analyze the historical 
continuity of cultural particles outside the indisputable collapse of the common 
culture and legal institutions of Rome. Wieacker acknowledged that administra-
tion and law usually went hand in hand, and in the sources which a historian had 
at his disposal, distinguishing between a “culturally coherent way of thinking” 
and the actual social conditions and requisites of a situation was often difficult. 
Thus, Wieacker admitted that the “implementations” of law were always inter-
twined with the temporal administrative power, but also strongly maintained that 
in the Roman Empire these “implementations” were above all “creations of le-
gally trained experts, which formed a legally qualified group.”401 
What distinguished Wieacker’s argument from other contemporary representa-
tions, is the “material” extension he gives to the mentality of the Stand. While 
scholars like Friz Schulz and Fritz Pringsheim were more than willing to use the 
idea that the Roman lawyer was above the common people, and the legal culture 
of the Rome was a virtuous “Golden age” of European jurisprudence, it was 
Wieacker who situated this culture in the wider surroundings of European social 
history.402 To him, the superior rationality, the mentality of a Roman lawyer was 
the result of educational, sociological and demographical factors, and scrutiniz-
ing these factors as well as their continuities in European history would result in 
both a truthful narrative of European legal culture as well as an ideal towards 
which European law should be developed.
Consequently, Wieacker rejected Ernst Levy’s argument that vulgarization 
manifested itself in the form of practices. To Levy, since post-Classical commu-
nities did not have the institutions and rituals which constituted the premises of 
Roman jurisprudence, the vulgar law of Occidental was a system where the dis-
tinction between laymen and jurists, juridical concepts and popular terms 
blurred.403 Wieacker objected mainly because the whole division between prac-
tice and theory was superficial. Moreover, he argued, “great jurisprudence” did 
not derive its power from administrative premises but from exceptional think-
ing.404 To Wieacker, the jurisprudence of Roman lawyers, was both abstract and 
401 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 15.
402 Cf. Fritz Schulz, Prinzipien des römischen Rechts. München/Leipzig, 1934, 152; Fritz 
Pringsheim, ‘Höhe und Ende der Römischen Jurisprudenz,’ in Gesammelte Abhandlungen, 
Bd.  1. Heidelberg, C. Winter 1961.
403 Ernst Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law: The Law of Property. Philadelphia 1951, 2, 5–6.
404 To Wieacker, Roman jurisprudence managed to abstain from the characteristics which 
marked other legal cultures in the past: “Die meisten geschichtlichen Rechtskulturen stehen 
indessen zwischen diesen äussersten Möglichkeiten [either ritualization through “taboo” or 
relating the “idea-world of its specialist to the cosmos”]. Ihre Rechtsvorstellung ist naturalis-
tisch; sie versucht den gedanklichen Ausdruck eines rechtlichen Zustandes oder Vorganges 
entweder der allgemeinen unbefangenen Anschauung eines Lebenverhältnisses oder den – was 
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thoroughly practical, “close to life.”405 The higher task of jurisprudence in Rome 
was to act as a guide in and resolve problems arising from everyday situations. 
The wisdom of Roman jurisprudence was phronesis, an abductive handling of 
experiences where a cumulative knowledge of legal matters resulted in truthful 
abstract expressions, namely in precise juridical rhetoric and legal concepts.
[The Late Republican jurisprudence was] both the utmost abstraction of specialized legal arti-
ficial ideas of the concrete and socially relevant living conditions and the strict reduction of 
legal technical terms to a minimum level of simplistic ideal models.406
The jurisprudence of the Classical period was “truly living” (wirklich lebende), 
meaning that it had originated in a fruitful interaction between everyday actions 
(in relation to actual jurisdictional questions) and solid assimilation of the aware-
ness or idea of the law. Moreover, due to this practical binding, it was adjustable 
in different historical conditions.407 The ‘great jurisprudence’ was an ethical and 
vital force within history. Roman lawyers “were experts of the highest practice.” 
Vulgar law in some sense reflected this skillful way of thinking and, to a degree, 
it was an “applied example” of this “practice of thinking.”408 So, like Levy, 
Wieacker holds that the institutional practices of Classical Roman law ceased to 
exist in the legal world of Late Antiquity, but the true ‘living’ practice of Roman 
law, the style of thinking, lived on in the heritage of Stand and Bildung. Roman 
jurisprudential reasoning and its textual expressions suppressed the irrational 
traits which affected every historical community, and produced knowledge and 
judgments which ruled over and were in the dominion of social affairs; as such 
these judgments were not subject to the whims of human behavior and perception.
meist dasselbe ist – seiner typischen Sozialfunktion anzupassen.” This was also the case with 
vulgar law, “Ihre Rechtsvorstellung ist naturalistisch […] einer Gruppenpsychologie, der ein 
besonderes ständisches oder intellektuelles Berufsethos und -pathos fremd ist.” As such it was 
very unlike Roman jurisprudence, which was “durch fachliche Reflexion emotional ge-
dämpft[.]” Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 21. 
405 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 18; also 19: “Ausschlaggebend für die 
Stilhöhe und die Stimmung einer Rechtskultur sind vielmehr heute wie einst Herkunft, Gesin-
nung und Denkkraft ihrer Funtionäre.” Here Wieacker argued against an old enemy. “Juristen-
recht” and legal science (of the correct kind) was certainly law. Cf. Wieacker, ‘Rudolf Von 
Jhering’ 1942, 9: “Rechtskundigen [meaning legal scientist…] deren Amt es ist, erkennend 
Handelnde zu bilden, in den alten Streit zwischen Theorie und Praxis, Idee und Erfahrung. […] 
Am besten schwiege er darüber ganz und zwänge, wie einst der römische Jurist, dem Zeitgeist 
durch die guten Früchte seines Tun Autorität ab.”
406 “[…] die äusserste Abstraktion fachjuristischer Kunstvorstellung von den anschaulichen 
und sozialrelevanten Lebensverhältnissen und zugleich die strenge Reduktion der juristischen 
Fachbegriffe auf ein Mindestmass einfach geschnittener Vorstellungsmodelle.”, Wieacker, Vul-
garismus und Klassizismus 1955, 25.
407 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 18.
408 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 18.
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Of course, vulgar law was a degradation, and the great jurisprudence, along 
with the material phenomena of Stand and Bildung to which it was contextual-
ized, faced eradication in post-Classical times. But the distinguishing feature in 
Wieacker’s article, and also a reason why Vulgarismus und Klassizismus has re-
mained a classic, is the way in which Wieacker bypasses the actual economic, 
administrative, political and environmental disasters which followed from the 
destruction of Roman Empire, and concentrates on the mental shift in legal con-
sciousness, Rechtsbewusstsein. Obviously, that cultural change in Rechtsbe-
wusstsein was caused by concrete change in the living conditions of people, but 
the altered essence of the post-Classical legal consciousness was a universal phe-
nomenon of “naturalization” rather than a case of a particular legal havoc in 
history.409
To Wieacker, every legal system carried within itself the seed of slipping into 
a state of unreliable judicature, which was marked by superstition and corruption 
rather than rational and just tradition. Accordingly, not even the legal culture of 
the Late Republic had been totally free from degrading aspects. Nevertheless, 
because of the “spiritual tension of the great jurisprudence” and the “pressure 
from the carefully planned legal order [characterized] by collective essence and 
expert jurists” these traits remained in the margins of the legal system of the Late 
Republic.410 In short, the Rechtsbewusstsein of vulgar law derived its essence 
from the lack of ‘spiritual power’ of the class of legal experts, which gave way to 
a more irrational, common understanding of law in society, and which conse-
quently appeared in the ways of reasoning and the linguistic expressions con-
cerning law and legality. 
Wieacker asserts that the “naturalization” process of the vulgar Rechtsbe-
wusstsein was a side effect of the dismantling of the Roman cultural entity, caus-
ing various group-psychological phenomena to surface.411 Unlike before, the 
Western European societies of Late Antiquity were unable to sustain the differ-
entiation between the higher intellectual ethos and the archaic need to “formal-
ize” legal inspection and execution and to make taboo the world of common 
human existence.412 Such a legal culture was the result of “vulgar psychology,” 
409 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 20: “Naturalismus,” 21: “Naturalistisch 
Rechtsvorstellung.”
410 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 40: “geistigen Spannung einer großen 
Jurisprudenz.”
411 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 20: “[Die] Ausdrucksformen vulgärer 
Rechtsvorstellung lassen sich aus de gruppenpsychologischen Vorgängen ableiten, die sich aus 
der Spaltung einer Kulturgesellschaft ergeben.” 
412 The naturalistic legal idea was: “[D]en gedanklichen Ausdruck eines rechtlichen Zu-
standes oder Vorganges entweder der allgemeinen unbefangenen Anschauung eines Lebenver-
hältnisses oder den – was meist dasselbe ist – seiner typischen Sozialfunktion anzupassen.”, 
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or to put it another way, the realization of the Rechtsbewusstsein of the post-Clas-
sical societies of Western Europe.413 Wieacker represents the psychological take-
over of the legal system built on rationality as a very human phenomenon. It 
springs from: 
[T]he need on the one hand for meaningful visibility of the legal procedures, on the other hand 
for impartial implementation of the social functions of a legally protected right. Both come 
from the naive aspiration for purpose and from the unrestrained aspiration for a characteristi-
cally, emotionally-determined view of reality that was not emotionally subdued by profession-
al reflection.414
Further, the penetrating psychological tendency of “vulgar society” remained not 
only in art and literature, but it took over the legal rhetoric. In the “language-psy-
chological” process the words depicting legal entities and procedure were re-
placed by more “sensual” terms, that were “forceful” and “emotionally loaded.” 
They referred to the common world of senses, untamed by reason, and the virtues 
of the specialists. The terms expressing evidence, rights, judgment and litigation 
forgot abductive abstraction, the logically derived style of previous masters, and 
became, rather than concepts “grounded on the Logos of a methodological expert 
art,” words for “emotional expression, self-interest and contestation.”415 The dis-
tinction between possessions and property, ownership and rights blurred. Anoth-
er vulgar process was that of replacing social goals with the immediate needs of 
the people. Since law was no longer based on higher virtues and the rationality 
of the expert class, legislation became a tool in achieving the objects of the more 
powerful classes. The legal rhetoric contaminated by group-psychological pro-
cesses together with the unconstrained economic purposes of the ruling elite de-
termined the judicature, and thus muddled the previously separated worlds of 
political endeavors and social justice.416
Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 21; See also Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klas-
sizismus 1955, 20.
413 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 29, 30.
414 ”[D]as bedurfnis einerseits nach sinnlicher Anschaubarkeit der rechtlichen Vorgänge, 
andrerseits nach unbefangener Realizierung der sozialen Funktionen eines Rechtsgutes; beide 
gehen aus einem naiven Zweckstreben und aus der einem unbeherrschten, durch fachliche 
Reflexion nicht emotional gedämpften Zweckstreben eigentümlichen affektbestimmten Wirk-
lichkeitsbetrachtung hervor.”, Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 21.
415 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 22; also 23: “Vermöge ihrer direkten, 
spontanen und affektiven Wirklichkeitsauffasung is die Vulgäre Stilhaltung auch nicht bereit, 
juristische Kategorien zu trennen, deren Grenzen nicht durch die Anschauung, sondern durch 
den Logos einer methodischen Fachkunst gesetzt sind”; 24, “Fühlweisen,” “Willenseinstel-
lung.”
416 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 24: “Wenn auch diese neuen Unterschei-
dungen zum guten Teil mehr auf wirtschaftpolitischen Zwecken der Gesetzgebung als auf 
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The practice which guarded against “naturalist” tendencies was Bildung.417 
Bildung – meaning both the common culture of the great jurists and the way of 
transmitting that culture to succeeding generations – was the opposite of the 
‘naturalistic world view.’ The ‘spiritual power’ of Roman law was preserved in 
its textual expression. Thus learning from and applying the example of great 
Roman jurists was to hold on to the healthy essence of the tradition. As such, the 
historical development in the Byzantine Empire presented an opposite to the one 
taking place in the Western part of the Roman Empire, since in the East law 
schools continued to study classical Roman law as practiced by the great jurists 
of the Late Republic.418 However, the legal culture in the East Roman Empire 
was not like the great jurisprudence – it was not grounded on Stand and Bildung 
like the ‘true great jurisprudence’ – but was a scientific distortion of it.419 For 
example, the compilators of Corpus Iuris let the over-theoretical principles of 
Greek descent corrupt the original meaning of law as expressed by the great 
lawyers.420 The pre-requisites of the great Late-Republican jurisprudence, where 
the law had been first and foremost derived from material life, was forgotten.
To Wieacker, the root of this distortion lay in the process where the political 
purposes of the Justinian government sidelined the legal work done by the schol-
ars of the Byzantine world.421 Thus, the East Roman legal culture, and along with 
it the Corpus Iuris, preserved some elements from the era of true classic jurispru-
dence, but as whole it was ‘legal science’ (Wissenschaft) and its legal education 
and expressions that were intertwined with political intentions. This opened up 
the possibility of the later abusive treatment of law as found in the theories of 
Begriffjurisprudenz and Pandectism. A healthy example of the cultivating prac-
tice found in Bildung was the independent, provincial legal schools of Western 
rechtspsychologischen Vorgängen beruhen, so bleibt doch die Ausdrucksweise dieser Gesetz-
gebung – im Gegensatz etwa zur justinianischen Gesetgebung – selbst vulgär.”
417 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 24; Also 51: “Eine Renaissance klas-
sischen Rechtes insbesondere ist nur möglich, wo die erhaltenden Bildungsschichten zugleich 
Träger der gesetzgebenden und rechtspflegenden Gewalt sind.”
418 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 52. 
419 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 54–55: Through “philosophically orient-
ed” education “bildet sich zum erstenmal in der Geschichte eine unseren Begriffen angenäherte 
Rechtswissenschaft, verschiedenen von der wissenschaftliche Praxis der großen Jurisprudenz 
[.]” 
420 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 54.
421 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 56: the “politisches selbstbewusstsein” 
of Konstantin, and “Erneurung [der klassischen Jurisprudenz] zu einem politischen Pro-
gramm.”
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Roman Empire, which conserved the textual and linguistic heritage, thus ex-
pert-jurisprudence, in their education.422 
The picture which Wieacker draws is both compelling and puzzling. On one 
hand, Wieacker firmly emphasises the natural and familiar nature of vulgar law. 
Unlike previous theorists he does not renounce vulgarization, but on the contrary 
manifests the process as common. In addition, vulgar law is not a breach, ca-
tastrophe or perversion; it is not only a part of the continuation in the European 
legal tradition, but a vital particle and a fruitful stage in the development of what 
we now understand as European legal culture. Vulgarization und Klassizismus is 
in a way a “rehabilitation” of vulgar law.423 
As a by-product, such a historical picture and narrative provided an explana-
tion for the immediate European past. In the 1950s, the recent process where to-
talitarian governments managed to seize the power and lead humanity into an 
unforeseen destruction, was an unsolvable puzzle. To the legal scholars a more 
concrete mystery was the fact that their field had not been able to prevent this 
degradation, indeed it contributed to it. The injustices had been conducted by the 
‘civilized’ and by those within the realm of European culture. How was it possi-
ble that the European legal culture had slid to such a perversion? What was Eu-
rope as a legal phenomenon if it was capable of such actions and so vulnerable to 
such a metamorphosis? 
The anatomy of the destruction of a legal system, which Wieacker presented 
in Vulgarismus und Klassizismus, answered these perennial questions. The pro-
cess of vulgarization which Wieacker described was not, as he explicitly stressed, 
restricted to the post-Classic world.424 Indeed one can find similar tendencies 
from his works elaborating the legal development of, for example, middle-age 
society, and, moreover, the description of the latent devastation inside the Euro-
pean legal consciousness extended also to modern societies. The takeover of the 
destructive elements within the legal consciousness – and embedded in all legal 
cultures and systems – was an ever present option brought about by the dichoto-
my between the masters and the mass, or to put it in another way, between the 
“expert culture” and “naturalism.”425 As Wieacker had stressed before, and con-
tinued to emphasize in his other writings, the mental degradation that appeared 
422 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 51: it was just that the Western legal 
schools had to work without the structures of a functioning society, and thus “Den Trägern der 
westlichen Bildung fehlte die Verfügung über die öffentliche Gewalt, die für die Neubildung 
einer klassizistischen Rechtskultur neben allem Bildungsbewusstsein unerlässlich ist.” 
423 Cf. Winkler 2014, 25–26 Wieacker describes the middle ages as a “vital” era in the nar-
rative of European legal culture.
424 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 30, 32. 
425 Cf. p.  110–113.
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in the realm of juridical language and the “pursuit-based” logic of twisted juris-
prudence, was the pet peeve of failed modern legal systems. For example, the 
legal concepts of Weimar jurisprudence were overwhelmed by the “political ten-
sions” within them, whereas the true linguistic expressions of legal conscience 
were marked by “spiritual substance.”426 Thus, it was not surprising that the Eu-
ropean legal consciousness had collapsed into a state of ‘barbarism,’ indeed it 
seemed as though it was inevitable. 
The main theme of Wieacker’s text, however, is constructive. There was such 
a thing as European legal consciousness, which should be analyzed in order to 
prevent further tragedy, and upon it the peaceful coexistence of the future had to 
be built. Unpleasant tendencies, moreover, needed to be acknowledged. Europe 
could not escape its past nor deny the fragile basis of its (Christian) culture. The 
tolerance Wieacker showed towards the vulgar and Christian attributes within 
European legal culture is shown in the discussions he engaged in with Erik Wolf 
and Ernst Rudolf Huber. In many respects Wieacker did not share their views on 
the relation between law, the people and the state (the Rechtsbewusstsein of the 
German people), but all the same he appreciated their thoughts and acknowl-
edged their value. 
Nevertheless, vulgarization was inescapably a degradation of the previous 
high culture. The culture and mentality of the Late Republican lawyers was that 
of virtuous moral behavior, which unquestionably transmitted to their rhetoric 
and writings. Their common culture and interaction was characterized by “eth-
ics,” “ethos,” “rigor,” “duty,” “responsibility,” “ascetism” and “will-power.” 
Such a virtuous core existed only in a distinguished association united by a 
shared value-base and education, the Stand of lawyers.427 The Stand represented 
the power which held the legal consciousness of a given culture together. By the 
means of their ‘spiritual power’ they guarded the language, practices and legal 
thinking, so that the people’s mentality in general would not collapse into anar-
chy. As the dichotomy between ‘naturalism’ and ‘expert thinking’ was eternal, it 
was possible to establish social structures which maintained the ‘spiritual’ herit-
age of the great jurisprudence. The British example, which Wieacker again took 
up, showed that it was both possible to maintain a ‘spiritual’ Stand in modern 
society, and appreciate the social corporates which cultivated justice within soci-
eties. After all, in the time of worldwide legal havoc, the British had been able to 
retain their legal consciousness and soberly stick to their legal tradition. 
Wieacker’s study on the ambiguous roots of European legal culture as present-
ed in Vulgarismus und Klassizismus were later repeated in Ursprünge und Ele-
426 See p.  116, 118.
427 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 25. 
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mente des europäischen Rechtbewusstseins (1956) and in the second edition of 
Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1967), in which Wieacker explicated and 
extended the dichotomy between ‘naturalism’ and ‘expert-thinking’ into a coher-
ent narrative of European legal history.428 Thus, in Ursprünge und Elemente des 
europäischen Rechtbewusstseins Wieacker defines the European Rechtsbewusst-
sein as a conceptualization in which the knowledge of European history merged 
with the common experience of recent years. It provided a tool for a legal scien-
tist to understand the history and idea of Europe as based on both tradition and 
atemporal scholarly experience:
Especially in the details of his [the specialist’s] work he learns that the phenomena of the legal 
history of Europe can only be appropriately depicted if the historical world of Europe is to be 
understood as a single social, political and cultural organization of human coexistence. Eu-
rope’s unity was neither convention nor postulate for the legal historian, but rather a working 
hypothesis that has proven itself in the course of his scientific work [.]429
The European Rechtsbewusstsein of the twentieth century was built on the foun-
dations and mentality following the collapse of the “high culture” of antiquity. 
The European legal conscience was comprised of three particles: the “ex-
pert-spiritual creation” of Roman lawyers, Christian ethics, and the “vital” herit-
age of societies following the Migration Period and their “living feeling.”430
These elements [the three particles] determine the European legal consciousness up to the be-
ginning of the High Middle Ages, perhaps with the exception of the fringes. The strength of 
these origins is clear to the modern observer as soon as he removes the sediment of the later 
European revolutions and reaches bedrock.431
428 ‘Ursprünge und Elemente des europäischen Rechtbewusstseins,’ in Marting Göhring 
(ed.) Europa, Erbe und Aufgabe. Internationaler Gelehrtenkongress Mainz 1955. Wiesbaden 
1956. S.105–119.
429 ”Gerade im Detail seiner [der Fachmann] Arbeit erfährt er, dass die Phänomene der eu-
ropäischen Rechtsgeschichte nur richtig abgebildet werden können, wenn die geschichtliche 
Welt Europas als eine einzige soziale, politische und kulturelle Organisation menschlichen 
Zusammenlebens begriffen wird. Für den Rechtshistoriker war also Europas einheit keine Kon-
vention und kein Postulat, sondern eine Arbeitshypotese, die sich im Laufe seiner wissenschaft-
lichen Arbeiten ebenso bewährt hat[.]”, Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 105.
430 Wieacker, ‘’Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 106; on the heritage of Roman law see e.g. 
107: “endlich aber das Verständnis des Rechtes als eine wissenschaftliche, d. h. als eine fach-
lich-geistige Scöpfung. Kürzer: dass Rechtsstaatliche Machtschöpfung ist und zugleich geisti-
ger Besitz, haben die Europäer von den Römern gelernt.” (emphasis mine).
431 ”Diese Elemente bestimmen bis zum Anbruch des Hochmittelalters das Europäische 
Rechtsbewusstsein, vielleicht mit Ausnahme der Randgebiete. Die Kraft dieser Ursprünge ist 
dem heutigen Betrachter deutlich, sobald er die Sedimente der späteren europäischen Um-
wälzungen abhebt und zum Grundgestein gelangt.”, Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 
1956, 108.
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In Wieacker’s 1956 presentation the relation between justice and Rechtsbewusst-
sein is more complicated than in the case of ‘vulgar societies’ as elaborated in 
Vulgarismus und Klassizismus, but nevertheless, Wieacker maintained that the 
heritage of vulgar law continued to affect European legal reality. In Ursprünge 
und Elemente Wieacker argued that the world of Late Antiquity witnessed an 
exemplary legal culture which combined “belief” and “reason,” or in other 
words, the “conscience” and “social reality.”432 The Glossators were able to syn-
thesize their learned logic and reason into an experience of tradition and come up 
with a cognitive apparatus which enabled them to apply law in concrete situa-
tions within the social reality. Such a European achievement was however lost, 
and the succeeding intellectual streams ignored the practical wisdom of the Glos-
sators and their jurisprudence.433 Only in England (and with some reservations in 
the Netherlands) did certain societal aspects prevent the legal consciousness 
from degenerating. This was especially due to the strong position which the 
Stand of jurists managed to retain in British society, but also because the corrupt-
ing effect of the “rationalism,” embedded in philosophical theories of law, did 
not extend to the “thinking” of the lawyers of the British Isles.434
To Wieacker, the Rechtsbewusstsein of Occidental however, was overwhelmed 
by misleading theories and ideologies – especially of Rousseau’s idea of the 
“common will” – and had lost the shared value base and order necessary for the 
actualization of social justice. Thus, it was vulnerable to the attacks of “tyrants,” 
“demagogues,” “dishonest lawgivers” and “a technical bureaucracy which 
lacked heart and overall vision.”435 Usually a “solid legal consciousness” would 
have been able to resist such tendencies, but Europe’s fate was different because 
of a “jurisprudence of interest,” which broke the last binding value which was 
left of the common European legal consciousness. In its determinist ethos, “juris-
prudence of interest” presented law as a mere reflection of the intentions of indi-
viduals and the lawgiver. It demolished the authority of the law.436 Wieacker ar-
gued that this incident was the basic reason for the “disasters following 1914.”437 
“Europe was indeed an entity, but precisely the disease of this single organism evoked the 
mortal enmity of each new civil and religious war [...] These wars must end in self-destruction 
432 Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 109–110.
433 Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 110: “Eine Einfügung ihrer Ergebnisse in 
einem allgemein auf Vernunft und Erfahrung gegründeten Erkenntniszusammenhang war dies-
er Wissenschaft zunächst noch fremd.”
434 Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 110, 112.
435 Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 115: “Tyrannen”, “ungerechte Gesetzgeber”, 
“Demagogie,” “technische bürokratie, der Herz und Überblick fehlt.”
436 Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 115, 116.
437 Wieacker, ‘’Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 114.
176 III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness
unless the reversal of personal conscience calls back reason, which recognizes, that no part of 
a sick organism can thrive alone.438
438 “Europa war zwar von je eine Einheit, aber eben die Erkrankung dieses einen Organis-
mus rief die Todfeindschaften jener neuen Bürger- und Glaubenskriege hervor[...] Diese Kriege 
müssen in Selbstzerstörung enden, wenn nicht die Umkehr der persönlichen Gewissen die Ver-
nunft zurückruft, die erkennt, dass in einem erkrankten Organismus kein Glied für sich allein 
gedeihen kann.”, Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 116.
IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history  
and in legal science
In Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit Wieacker built his narrative of European 
legal history on the concept of Rechtsgewissen, ‘legal conscience,’ which, he 
asserted, would present a solution to the ‘crisis of justice’ which had plagued the 
European legal culture throughout modern history. Thus, the meaning of the con-
cept of Rechtsgewissen was fundamental not only for the Privatrechtsgeschichte 
der Neuzeit, but for Wieacker’s legal scientific legacy in general. I argue that in 
order to analyze the longer line in Franz Wieacker’s legal scientific works, under-
standing the relation between the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechts-
gewissen is crucial. 
As analyzed in chapter III, Rechtsbewusstsein, legal consciousness, was about 
the people, social structures and law. Rechtsgewissen, legal conscience, on the 
other hand, signified a more personal (and exceptional) understanding of the law. 
Whereas legal consciousness signified the common perception of the rule of law, 
legal conscience was a distinct understanding of justice. Within a common legal 
awareness of the people (Rechtsbewusstsein), Rechtsgewissen was a mental tool 
for the more informed, capable and aware experts, who by means of this skill 
were able to give judgments in a way which benefitted the whole social constel-
lation and brought about social justice. If the legal conscience was allowed to 
guide the judicature of a given society, the people of this society would be able 
to adapt and deal with the economic, political and historical change the society 
confronted: if this occurred the legal consciousness of the people would be in 
line with reality. Whereas any European legal system usually included a distin-
guished class of legal experts who took care that the legal decisions were con-
ducted according to the common idea of the rule of law (the legal consciousness), 
the authorative expert position of this ‘estate’ was due to the fact that it was able 
to foster and apply the mental skill of Rechtsgewissen, legal conscience. Where-
as Rechtsbewusstsein was bound to time, place and cultural principles, Rechts-
gewissen was timeless, acting beyond and despite temporal and spatial axioms. 
This clear conceptual distinction, however, did not occur in Wieacker’s first 
legal scientific texts. The conceptual change emerged over a period of time and 
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signified a broader development in his historical vision. This vision reflected the 
changes in the material, political and scientific circumstances of his surround-
ings. Thus a study of that conceptual change is also an expedition to uncover the 
reasons which defined and influenced the evolving Weltanschauung of a given 
intellectual historian. Whereas Rechtsbewusstsein was comprised with the help 
of the spheres of social status and learnedness within the nation (which I named 
as the sub-concepts of Stand and Bildung), Rechtsgewissen was constructed on 
the ideas of scholarly togetherness and legal wisdom. I have named these 
sub-conceptual entities Kameradschaft and Schöpfung, which also include all the 
terms Wieacker used to signify his belonging to a certain group and the wisdom 
this group (and its historical paragons) possessed. In order to analyze the concep-
tual change of legal conscience, I will proceed just as in the preceding chapter. I 
study the intertwinement and interaction between the spheres of culture, body 
and language in the meanings the concept of Rechtsgewissen involved, and then 
analyze how Wieacker’s utilization of the concept altered during the turbulent 
era from the 1930s to the late 1960s. 
Thus I study the same historical circumstances which I dealt with in the 
preceding chapter, but now my focus has shifted. I now concentrate on how the 
ideas of communality and wisdom introduced by legal science developed and 
evolved amidst the changing social world, how these entities were handled in the 
correspondence of legal scholars, and ultimately, how they emerged in Franz 
Wieacker’s scientific texts. First, however, I briefly review the domain of lan-
guage of Rechtsgewissen. That is, how this concept was used by scholars other 
than Wieacker. I attempt to present the scientific and diachronic meanings that 
have layered into the concept, and discuss the scientific prerequisites which 
Wieacker had to take into account when using the concept.
1. Language in Rechtsgewissen: The preceding and contemporary 
philosophical approaches
Franz Wieacker was well aware of the preceding work done in the field of legal 
philosophy, sociology and legal history. He drew inspiration from the argumen-
tation of the previous scholar generations, and then gave an unmistakenly person-
al representation of a given legal scientific and historical dilemma. Thus to track 
the exact and scientific foundation for his ideas on legal conscience is a futile 
task, but clearly one influential thinker was Gustav Radbruch. Radbruch utilized 
the concept of Rechtsgewissen during the Weimar Republic period. Radbruch’s 
ideological stance after the First World War has been labelled legal positivist, 
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even relativist,1 but the breach between his late 1940s writings and his original 
‘formalistic’ stance might not be so vast as post-war legal historical research has 
presented. Radbruch was always interested in the objective principles anchored 
in ‘reality’ according to which the law should evolve. Though not (yet) a scholar 
of natural law, in his 1920s writings Radbruch introduced the idea of Rechts-
gewissen, a notion which enabled judges to weigh between conflicting interests 
in society.2 To him ‘legal conscience’ emerged as a judicatory tool to make sense 
of the drastically evolved, value-loaded essence of legal questions. The dramatic 
and violent social changes that had taken place in Germany – from an estate so-
ciety to a parliamentary democracy in the space of 20 years – brought new vari-
ables and different ethical aspects to the awareness of lawyers and judges when 
delivering a judgment on a given legal case. Where previously there had been a 
monarchic hierarchy of social values, suddenly a multitude of interests and com-
peting groups existed each with their own distinct appreciations and aims. 
Radbruch’s earlier writings are, nevertheless, more on the systematic side, and 
the essence of Rechtsgewissen was very much bound to the written norms and 
provisions enacted by the legislator.3 Radbruch’s ‘legal conscience’ certainly 
was not what Rudolf von Jhering had conceptualized as Rechtsgefühl, the ‘sense 
of justice,’ in his 1872 book.4 To Jhering there was an idea of justice, reachable 
to human senses, which was located outside of positive, temporal law. It was not 
that positive law and Rechtsgefühl were totally separated; Rechtsgefühl was be-
ing cultivated within people, living under and being aware of the law. So the 
ability of ‘sensing justice’ had emerged through experience and socialization, 
and it could be used to measure the justness of legal decisions and current law.5 
Although Jhering’s Rechtsgefühl and Radbruch’s Rechtsgewissen were not syn-
onymous, both scholars sought to upgrade their concepts from what Carl Fried-
rich von Savigny had called Rechtsbewusstsein.6 The idea of legal capability 
1 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 319, 466.
2 Gustav Radbruch, Politische Schriften aus der Weimarer Zeit 2, Justiz, Bildungs- und 
Religionspolitik. Bearbeitet von Alessandro Baratta. Heidelberg, C.F.Müller Juristische Verlag 
1993, 63–64, 181.
3 Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Legal Theory, 5th ed. London, Stevens 1967, 204.
4 Originally Rudolf von Jhering, Der Kampf um‘s Recht. Wien, Verlag der G. J. Manz‘schen 
Buchhandlung 1872; reprinted in Hermann Klenner, Jherings Kampf ums Recht, Demokratie 
und Recht. Freiburg, Haufe 1992.
5 Lothar Eley, ‘Rechstgefühl und materiale Wertethik,’ in Ernst-Joachim Lampe (ed.), Das 
sogennante Rechtsgefühl. Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie X. Wiesbaden, 
Springer 1985, 136.
6 See p.  67; See also John Bell, ‘Continental European Jurisprudence,’ in Michael Lobban 
& Julia Moses (ed.), The Impact of Ideas on Legal Development. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 
2012, 114.
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usable in weighing options and legality was a more diverged and specialized 
mental faculty than Savigny’s common legal mentality of the people. In the 
works of subsequent legal theorists, and in the legal scientific discourse of Wei-
mar, the ‘sense of justice’ and ‘legal conscience’ were increasingly attached to 
special legal education, and had a connection to the attempts of the legal scholars 
to define their field and profession against other disciplines and specialists.7
In the Weimar Republic and due to the deployment of the German codification 
of law (BGB), the wider idealist problematic in legal scientific discourse concen-
trated on more narrow and specific questions. How should one turn the inner 
feeling of justice into a scientific concept – a textual and heuristic device – which 
would enable jurisprudence to meet the changing social conditions? To this dis-
cussion Franz Wieacker also contributed. Wieacker’s position in the discussion 
was constructed around the concept of Schöpfung, whose importance to German 
legal scholarship has been, and is, vital.8 In the early decades of the twentieth 
century, the concept referred to the situation where the word of the (codified) law 
did not itself provide the means to decide in a given case. On what bases, and 
according to what principle or faculty, should a judge interpret the meaning of 
the law? On the other hand, the theme also referred to the division of tasks be-
tween the courts and legislators: Whose responsibility was it to bridge the gap 
between the norm and an emerged social demand? The dilemma evoked a vast 
body of legal scientific literature during the Weimar era, of which a few were 
Romanist, especially because article §242 in the German codification (BGB) an-
nounced that such an act of interpretation should be conducted within the borders 
of Treu und Glauben, good faith. 9 Originally, the expression was directly de-
rived from the appeal to the bona fides of Roman law. Thus, for example, Fritz 
Pringsheim contributed to the contemporary legal scientific dispute, defending 
7 Gerhard Dilcher, ‘The Germanists and the Historical School of Law: German Legal 
Science between Romanticism, Realism, and Rationalization,’ In Rechtsgeschichte – Legal 
History 16 (2016), 20–72; Hans-Peter Haferkamp, ‘The Science of Private Law and the State 
in Nineteenth Century Germany,’ In The American Journal of Comparative Law 56 (2008), 
667–689; Cf. Philipp Heck, Das Problem der Rechtsgewinnung: Gesetzauslegung und Inter-
essenjurisprudenz: Begriffsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz. Bad Holmburg, Gehlen 1968.
8 Rüthers 2012, 9. See also 55, 215, 266. As Rüthers acknowledges, the modern under-
standing of the dilemma owes much to Wieacker’s framing, especially his “Zur rechtstheore-
tischen Präzisierung des §  242 BGB” (1956). Nevertheless, the ideas about the ‘creative’ usage 
of law and ‘living law’ are already found in Eugen Ehrlich’s works. See E. Ehrlich, Freie 
Rechts findung und freie Rechtswissenschaft [1903] reprinted as ‘Judicial freedom of decision: 
its principles and objects,’ in Bruncken & Register, Science of Legal Method. Boston Book Co., 
1917.
9 Okko Behrends, ‘Treu und Glauben: Zu den christlichen Grundlagen der Willenstheorie 
im heutigen Vertragsrecht,’ in Gerhard Dilcher & Ilse Staff, Christentum und modernes Recht. 
Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1984, 255–301.
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the authority of the written law, but also engaging himself in a determined study 
on the historical origins of the concept, and highlighting the various attempts of 
different legal cultures to apply this legal virtue of Roman law. Emblematic of 
Pringsheim’s production was the notion of the inevitable degradation of the orig-
inal appearance and usage of bona fides in history.10 In his works on Schöpfung, 
Wieacker adopted many principles introduced by his mentor.11
The other dimension of the dispute over Treu und Glauben, and wrapped up in 
the dogmatic controversy, was its direct effect on the nature and social value of 
the work conducted by those using the law. The war generation yearned for the 
possibility of a ‘creative’ usage of law since the codification had seemingly 
robbed the traditional privilege of the lawyer Stand to interpret and further devel-
op law to match social equality and people’s understanding of the law. In other 
words, it used to be the responsibility of the legally trained, by means of their 
creative handling of the law, to seal the gap between law and reality, and produce 
decisions which were in line with people’s Rechtsbewusstsein. Thus the prioritiz-
ing of Schöpfung in the ‘New legal science’ was eminent and widespread. Both 
the new Studienordnung of 1935 and announcements of ‘legal renewal’ empha-
sized the meaning of Schöpfung, which legal positivism had temporarily made 
impossible.12
From an administrative perspective the above-mentioned theoretical construc-
tions and idealist representations, when (if ever) applied in practice, were mainly 
academic matters. Thus, during the revolutionary atmosphere of ‘legal renewal’ 
all of the concepts, Rechstgewissen, Rechtsgefühl and Rechtsbewusstsein, were 
often used to explain the same phenomena, and there were no serious attempts to 
scrutinize the philosophical differences between them. The main theme in Ger-
man legal science following the Machtergreifung was to acknowledge the supe-
riority of the will of the people, and Hitler as its representation. Hence, just as 
Rechtsbewusstsein was used in National Socialist propaganda, so too Rechts-
10 Fritz Pringsheim, ‘Höhe und ende der Römischen Jurisprudence,’ in Gesammelte Ab-
handlungen. Bd.  1. Heidelberg C. Winter 1961, 54–62; Pringsheim, Die archaistische Tendenz 
Justinians,’ in Gesammelte Abhandlungen. Bd.  2. Heidelberg, C. Winter 1961, 9–12, 34–40.
11 Winkler 2014, 67–76.
12 See e.g. Karl Larenz: “So wie alle menschliche Schöpfung und Gestaltung, aus dem 
Volksgeist und seiner jeweiligen Konkretion hervorgeht, so ist ihre Voraussetzung und ihr Ziel 
als eine lebendige Wirkung die Gemeinschaft des Volkes. Auch das Recht ist Schöpfung und 
Gestaltung des völkischen Geistes und dient der Gemeinschaft. Es ist weder eine Beziehung 
unter den Individuen noch nur ein Sollen, eine Anforderung an die Einzelnen, sondern Form 
und Gestalt der völkischen Gemeinschaft und als solche eine konkrete Ordnung.” Karl Larenz, 
‘Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der Gegenwart [1935],’ in Pauer-Studer & Fink 2014, 193. 
Emphasis original.
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gewissen came to mean a legal extension of German Volksgeist. The Third Reich 
Minister of Justice Franz Gürtner stated in 1936:
For us, the healthy national sense is the embodiment of the legal concience, the outlook of the 
just thinking people.13
To many National Socialist legal scientists, the German Rechtsgewissen was a 
feeling of law, deriving from the racial togetherness of the German people. It was 
an affective knowledge of justice, actualized in history, and could again be ob-
tained in a society united under the will of the Führer. This national awareness 
enabled the racially purified Volksgemeinschaft to uncover the real meaning of 
law beyond the written statutes.14
After the war it might have been impossible for a long period of time in Ger-
many to write about social justice with the help of the concept of Rechtsgewissen 
if it had not been Gustav Radbruch, who decided to undertake such a task in 
1946.15 Yet, after the Second World War Radbruch’s writings were strongly in-
fluenced by his religious convictions, and thus it seemed as if he had radically 
converted from his previous positivist stance to a proponent of natural law theo-
ries.16 Radbruch attempted to conceptualize the relation between totalitarianism 
and legal thinking. He sought to explain the breach in legal tradition at the same 
time aiming for a solution which would enable the post-War jurisprudence to be 
based on moral foundations. Radbruch’s texts addressed the immorality of the 
judicature during the Third Reich, concluding that the judges as a profession 
should not be blamed for this aberration, rather the degenerating effect of trium-
phant legal positivism had allowed a politicization of law which had led to social 
injustice.17 Thus, the concept of Rechtsgewissen in its post-war deployment in-
cluded both an explanation of the immediate historical past, and a passage away 
from it. Radbruch’s intention was not to conceptualize the continuities and dis-
continuities in the national legal culture as a whole. His Rechtsgewissen contin-
13 “In dem gesunden Volksempfinden verkörpert sich uns das Rechtsgewissen des Volkes, 
die Anschauung der gerecht Denkenden.”, Franz Gürtner, ‘Der Gedanke der Gerechtigkeit in 
der deutschen Strafrechtserneuerung. Vortrag, gehalten auf dem XI. Internationalen Straf-
rechts- und Gefängniskongress am 18.8.1935 in Berlin,’ in Franz Gürtner, Roland Freisler, 
Rüdiger Goltz, Das neue Strafrecht: Grundsätzliche Gedanken zum Geleit. Berlin, R.v. Decker 
1936, 25. Emphasis mine.
14 Carolyn Benson, Julian Fink, Raymond Critch, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, David Fraser, 
Kristen Rundle, Carolyn Benson & Julian Fink, ‘A Symposium on Nazi Law,’ Jurisprudence, 
3 (2012):2, 461–463.
15 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht,’ in Süddeutsche 
Juristenzeitung 1 (1946), 105–108.
16 Wolfgang G. Friedmann, ‘Gustav Radbruch,’ in Vanderbilt Law Review 14 (1960): 191–
209.
17 Radbruch 1946, 106.
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ued to serve as a concept of and for the legal professionals, and it comprised a 
moral point of reference in his narrative of legal scholarship.
Akin to Radbruch, Wieacker in his Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1952) 
attempted to explain what in general had happened in the history of German legal 
culture, and build again the premises of awareness of morality in legal scholar-
ship and jurisprudence.18 Wieacker’s intention was to present the problem of the 
‘aberration of jurisprudence’ within the long line of the legal history of ideas, 
nevertheless providing a solution for the current jurisprudential dilemma which 
he called a “crisis of justice.”19 The solution was conceptualized with the help of 
the Rechtsgewissen, legal conscience. Since such ‘spiritual’ ability for a just de-
cision was contextualized in the vast history of European legal thinking, Wieack-
er’s concept of Rechtsgewissen was explicated with help of the themes which, for 
example, Savigny and Jhering had scrutinized in their texts. The skill of ‘legal 
conscience’ as argued in Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, took into account 
the mental sphere of law and legality, just as Savigny and Jhering had insisted, 
and was comprised of such elements as ‘experience,’ ‘a sense of justice,’ ‘the 
creative use of law’ and ‘tradition,’ as found in the accounts of romantic legal 
scientists. Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit was not, however, a mere duplica-
tion of previous, romantic works on social justice and jurisprudence. Wieacker’s 
Rechtsgewissen was an enriched conceptualization, which discussed such con-
temporary methodological discourses and theories as those of Hans-Georg Gad-
amer and Josef Esser.20 The ‘legal conscience’ was situated within the tradition 
of legal scholarship, the body of law, and the judicial decision-making of a par-
ticular community.21
So in distinction to Gustav Radbruch’s Rechtsgewissen – and to the ‘school of 
Rechtsgefühl’ – to Wieacker the part of Gewissen, ‘conscience’, in the concept 
was decisive, and here he differed significantly with what Radbruch had meant 
by ‘legal conscience’. The similarities between his and Radbruch’s concept lay 
in the utilization of a similar word and in the objective of analyzing the recent 
‘aberration’ of jurisprudence and producing a solution that would enable an eth-
ical reading of the tradition despite the looming shadow of the recent past. The 
two concepts were also built in a similar manner. Wieacker, like Radbruch, built 
upon a) his previous scientific representations, and conceptualized the continui-
ties and discontinuities in legal discipline with b) the help of his view on contem-
porary society, and c) his personal life history and (shared) experience during the 
preceding years.
18 Rückert 1995, 531–532.
19 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 484.
20 Ibid., 3, 469.
21 Cf. Bell 2012, 113.
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The ‘conscience’, Gewissen, to which Wieacker refers in his scholarly works 
preceding Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, was a form of wisdom. It related 
to actual jurisprudence in a way that Schöpfung, the situation-bound capability to 
apply and further develop the law, resulted from a more general orientation of 
possessing practical wisdom (Gewissen). Understanding the ‘sense of justice’ as 
a mode of practical wisdom, or like ‘common sense’ as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
proposed, enabled Wieacker to outline a morally sustainable jurisprudential tool. 
That elaboration was very much akin to Martin Heidegger’s formulation of the 
right and proper way to make sense of human existence. After all, it was Heide-
gger who equated Aristotelian ‘practical wisdom’ with the German word Gewis-
sen, and utilized this concept in his quest to analyze the ontology of (European) 
philosophical thinking.22 Thus, in order to understand the meaning of Rechts-
gewissen as elaborated in Wieacker’s scientific works, one needs to study the 
emergence of Gewissen in his texts, its compatibility with Heidegger’s presenta-
tions, and the channels and moments which might have brought Heidegger’s in-
fluence to Wieacker.
Previous research has not sufficiently addressed the relation between Wieack-
er and Heidegger, nor in the light of my research task is it sufficient to merely 
compare Wieacker’s and Heidegger’s ideas and analyze the possible influence 
Heidegger had on Wieacker’s concept of Rechtsgewissen. It is however impor-
tant to acknowledge that in Wieacker’s concept the existential dimension was 
essential.23 Wieacker’s concept of ‘legal conscience’– like Radbruch’s and even 
Gürtner’s terms – also worked as a linguistic and cognitive tool to depict the 
temporal nature of justice, which, when utilized in historiography, claimed to 
elaborate not only the past, but the present and anticipated future of this social 
value in the national and European context. The ‘conscience’ part of the term 
was nevertheless built on a specific, existentialist understanding of the nature of 
wisdom, which in Wieacker’s historical vision was constituted on the impor-
tance of scholarly communality and the creative and distinguished manner of 
expert legal thinking. Thus, research on the change in Wieacker’s concepts of 
Rechtsgewissen has to address the changes in ideas – both on the national level 
and in the scholarly sub-culture shared by Wieacker – of communality and 
learned thinking.
22 Rodney R. Coltman, The Language of Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Heidegger in Dia-
logue. Albany, State University of New York Press 1998, 11–24.
23 Behrends 1995, XIV.
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2. Culture in Rechtsgewissen 1933–1945: The contested 
Kameradschaft in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich
Why did the ‘legal renewal’ upheld by the young scholars of the ‘war generation’ 
merge with the National Socialist Gleichschaltung? The NSDAP of course had 
its own purposes and a racial ideology which some legal scholars supported. But 
even those scholars of the ‘New legal science,’ who in private might have per-
ceived the Nazis as vulgar and their worldview as repulsive, were committed to 
the ‘revolution,’ which was obviously administrated by National Socialist politi-
cians and civil servants. In 1933 few could foresee what the final tragic results of 
the Gleichschaltung in the legal sphere would be, but its radical and exclusive 
essence could not be ignored. Furthermore, the outspoken ideology of National 
Socialism was ‘anti-intellectual,’ which the age acknowledged and accepted. 24 
Why did the ‘war generation’ participate with such enthusiasm? One reason was 
the notion that the ‘old ways’ of university education, with all the dogmatism that 
entailed, was being fought, and the young conservative scholars of the ‘New le-
gal science’ felt that they were in the vanguard of this battle. This level I analyz-
ed in chapter III. Another motive, and with respect to this study an important one, 
was the real experiences of togetherness and communality at that time. This lev-
el will be analyzed in this chapter. 
The congruence between Gleichschaltung and the ‘New legal science’ did not 
remain solely at the level of fashionable slogans. Rather, the war generation saw 
themselves as a major element in the ‘revolution,’ participating in and develop-
ing educational practices which were intended to eradicate the borders between 
political society and science, but also expressing their identity with the vocabu-
lary provided by fascist discourse. In 1941 Ernst Rudolf Huber defined the  Kieler 
Schule, the “academic Heimat” of both himself and Franz Wieacker as follows:25 
What has been designated as the “Kiel way” was not a scientific school in the sense of a par-
ticular system of theories, but rather a comradely associated working community of younger 
jurists who through the experience of the events of 1933 were bound together in a mutual sci-
entific effort.”26
24 Folker Schmerbach, Das “Gemeinschaftslager Hanns Kerrl” für Referendare in Jüte-
borg 1933–1939. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2008, 19–20; Jean Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: 
eine Biographie. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013.
25 Wieacker’s letter to Huber in 29.8.1947: “Unserer gemeinsamen frühere academische 
Heimat.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
26 “Was man als “Kieler richtung” bezeichnet hat, war kein wissenschaftliche schule im 
Sinne eines bestimmten Lehrgebäudes, sondern eine kameradschaftlich verbundene Arbeitsge-
meinschaft junger Rechtsgelehrter, die durch das Erlebnis des Jahres 1933 zu gemeinsammen 
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The above quote is illuminating on many levels, but here the most important 
feature is that to Huber the scholars of the Kieler Schule were a ‘camaraderie,’ 
which at that time referred to National Socialist rhetoric and to a fascist view of 
society constructed on the virtues of male communality. Huber asserts that the 
communality appreciated and upheld by the Kieler Schule was analogous with 
the National Socialist idea of national communality. To understand how this con-
gruence came about, one needs to look at the shifts in the meaning of ‘commu-
nality’ both in the national and the academic cultures of early twentieth-century 
Germany.
In his groundbreaking book Kameradschaft Thomas Kühne analyzes the com-
mon way of working through the experience of the Great War in the Weimar 
Republic.27 He asserts that the incompatibility between a personal experience of 
a violent event (the war) and the public explanation given to that event was cir-
culated with the help of myth-making. This meant that an individual recollection 
and an official explanation could be fitted together and dealt with by means of a 
commonly-acknowledged symbol and a narrative attached to it.28 In Weimar, 
Kameradschaft, brotherhood-in-arms, came to mean a widely accepted social 
constellation, a physical formation of togetherness, among which one could feel 
understanding, containment and approval even amid contrary or distorted emo-
tions and reminiscences. 
In art, tradition and oral memory the experience of Kameradschaft was uplift-
ed above everyday life. The sense of male camaraderie during the First World 
War was remembered as exceptional for its level of feelings (compassion, 
self-sacrifice, caring and friendship) and gestures (unselfish assistance, piety, dil-
igence and commitment), in comparison with the other-worldliness of war. Al-
though this sacred brotherhood necessarily had nothing to do with the reality of 
battle, the vast majority felt it comfortable and healing to talk about Kamerad-
schaft as if it had been as important and distinguished a phenomenon as the offi-
cial version suggested.29 Thus Kameradschaft became a concept and myth 
which aspired to and cherished the values of togetherness between men, both in 
the trenches and in peace-time. It was a linguistic tool to express and share emo-
tions relating to the reality of the Weimar Republic. Kühne writes how “socially 
wissenschaftlichem Einsatz verbunden waren.”, Ernst Rudolf Huber, ‘Rechts- und Staatswis-
senschaften,’ in Die Bewegung 9 (1941), H48/49, 7.
27 Kühne 2005.
28 Cf. Bo Stråth, ‘Introduction. Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of Commu-
nity,’ in Bo Stråth (ed.), Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community: Historical Pat-
terns in Europe and Beyond. Bruxelles, Peter Lang 2000, 19–48.
29 Kühne 2005, 50.
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originated emotions were experienced through Kameradschaft and were com-
pared and arranged with its help.”30 
Since Kameradschaft had become the representation of the national communi-
ty in miniature, the question of who decided on its master-narrative became a 
struggle in the public sphere for the power to decide what was good and what 
was bad.31 In the beginning Kameradschaft was not a word which fitted the 
National Socialistic ideology. It was a “bourgeois invention” which emphasized 
“man to man” (human to human) compassion. There was no space for empathy 
in the “morality of the dead” advocated by the Freikorps and Nazi ideologists.32 
In the Nazi ideology the priority was placed on the Männerbund, an all-male 
group, which especially in the SA and Freikorps language represented the pure 
way of social being. Military units and fraternities had special status in this view 
as organizations which carried the virtues of the nation. These groups were ex-
clusive, defined their activities and interaction according to a strict code, and 
drew a very heavy line between themselves and opposing “others” in society.33 
Whereas Männerbund were violent, misogynist and exclusive, Kameradschaft, 
to some extent, paid attention to women and children, and the concept was also 
used in workers’ language. Despite the obvious differences, these two concepts 
could be, and were, merged, since they both encapsulated a longing for a mascu-
line, prestigious and uncompromising world.34 Such an ideal world was one 
where men had the will-power to resist, the prestige to judge, and the strength to 
fight (successfully) against the variety of immaterial and concrete dangers that 
threatened the reality or mentality of the bourgeois male. 
It was, in fact, the NSDAP who ultimately won the battle for the right to define 
what exactly Kameradschaft meant in political and social reality. After April 
1933 it was the National Socialists who used the term and gave it substance. In 
the late 1930s if one wanted to write of Kameradschaft it was impossible to avoid 
Nazi connotations, and most often using the word meant that one was maintain-
ing or re-distributing fascist ideology.35 The concept was deployed to argue on 
30 Kühne 2005, 77; cf. Folker Schmerbach, Das “Gemeinschaftslager Hanns Kerrl” für 
Referande in Jüteborg 1933–1939. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2008, 80.
31 Kühne 2005, 33, 39.
32 Kühne 2005, 45; Theweleitt 1989, 43–46.
33 Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies. Volume 1: Women, Floods, Bodies, History. Minneap-
olis, University of Minnesota Press 1987, 27.
34 Kühne 2005, 90, 95, 96.
35 I need to stress that the distance between accepting the Nazi definition for Kamerad-
schaft and committing crimes against humanity is vast, and embodying political rhetoric is not 
comparable to conducting violent or discriminative acts. I also do not want to diminish the guilt 
of the Nazi perpetrators. Adopting and fulfilling the false realism of fascist rhetoric is not an 
excuse for illegal deeds, but deconstructing the rhetoric enables one to understand why some 
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behalf of destructive social and political aims, and because of its rhetorical capi-
tal, it was easier for people to consent, obey and participate.36 At the same time, 
the term continued to carry along with it positive associations from the immedi-
ate years following the First World War, so that it still signified a strong, pure, 
and correct kind of communality. Thus, Kameradschaft represented the common 
ground for a better future. In addition, expressions born from the kameradschaft-
lice Erlebnis, the experience of communality with a sense of shared values and 
shared destiny, were supposed to be both exceptionally close to the national real-
ity and ethical with respect to the way of being of the German people. 
In the German academia the idea of communality had its own history. As elab-
orated in chapter II and III, lawyers perceived themselves as an ‘estate’ inside the 
Bildungsbürgertum. Hence, to Franz Wieacker the idea of a distinguished Stand 
of lawyers was foundational both in history and in the present moment.37 More-
over, the more abstract and vague ideal of an ‘estate’ distinct in its learnedness 
had a more concrete realization in the structures of the higher education. The 
students in German universities were exceedingly organized in student corpora-
tions and Burschenschafts, and the academic traditions highlighted the ambigious 
opposition between professors and students as a community.38 The student or-
ganizations cultivated a culture of spiritual togetherness, tradition and honor 
which they presented as the immaterial opposite to the allegedly corrupt worldy 
affairs, politics and economic realm of the society.39 It was within this world-
view emphasizing ‘spiritual communities’ within the national community that 
executed those deeds. The starting point for making a certain collaborative path understanda-
ble, in my view, starts from the level of rhetoric. 
36 Kühne 2005 97, 109–110.
37 Cf. p.  57–59.
38 Peter Lambert, ‘Generations of German historians: patronage, censorship and the con-
tainment of generation conflict, 1918–1945,’ in Mark Roseman (ed.), Generations in Conflict: 
Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770–1968. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 
2003, Lambert 168.
39 It is a fact that the young scholars of the ‘New legal science’ had mostly been members 
in conservative student organizations or Burschenschafts or had first-hand experience of mili-
tary organizations. This worldview was very familiar to them. Ernst Rudolf Huber, for exam-
ple, participated in Nerother Wandervogel, Ernst Forsthoff in Deutsch-völkischen Schutz- und 
Trutzbund (Meinel 2012, 16). Wieacker was an active member in the Corps Rhehania (Liebs 
2010), Arnold Ehrhardt had even participated in the Freikorps, and Erik Wolf was a Freiwillige 
in the First World War (Hollerbach 1982). On the other hand, that was not in any case unfamil-
iar to the young men of the Bildungsbürgertum. To be totally outside of the clubs and commu-
nities characteristic of the Wilhelminian academic and bourgeois culture would have been ex-
ceptional. Even Max Weber had been an active member in the Burschenschaft Allemania Hei-
delberg (Dirk Kaesler, Max Weber: Preuße, Denker, Muttersohn. Eine Biographie. München, 
C. H. Beck 2014, 195–197).
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Franz Wieacker grew up.40 But in the time of Machtergreifung, Wieacker’s ref-
erence group and culture was the tradition cultivated by university staff. Peter 
Lambert and Philipp Schofield have written on the academic culture of early 
twentieth-century Germany:
[The] professoriat contained within its ranks an elite of incumbents of full, established chairs, 
Ordinarien. These were the eminent mastercraftsmen of what German historians came to refer 
to as ‘the guild’ (die Zunft), an imagined community of scholars which gradually developed 
rules and rituals of admission. The word ‘guild’ is itself suggestive of the past-mindedness of 
the men who created it. It gave a curiously pre-modern inflection to the highly modern process 
of professionalization and academic specialization.41
The “guild” of professors was united in their belief of the “aristocratic” essence 
of their spiritual community, its opposition to the “barbarism” of left liberals and 
Bolshevists, and trust in the “autonomy” of the “guild” with its inner tradition 
and detachment from political administration.42 Along with full membership in 
the community of Ordinarien came a guarantee of a certain social status, but also 
a secured financial position. In 1933 Wieacker – like so many other young schol-
ars of the war generation – was not a member of the ‘guild,’ but waited for his 
opportunity to receive a permanent chair at university. This does not mean that 
he had not assimilated the value-base of the Wilhelminian academic culture. 
Rather, the general opinion among the academically trained offspring of Bil-
dungsbürgerum was that the political arrangements conducted by the Weimar 
Republic had hindered their chances of admission to the inner circle of the aca-
demic elite.
This Wilhelminian tradition the National Socialists stirred with their educa-
tional politics. As early as 1933 the Nazis started to incorporate their idea of 
Kameradschaft into the academic world in the militant manner common to the 
SA and the Freikorps. The tradition, “the knowledge,” of the paramilitary troops 
was the guideline for education in books like Alfred Bäumler’s Männerbund und 
Wissenschaft from 1934.43 The aim was to “introduce the group as the typical 
National Socialistic form of life and education.”44 By the means of structural 
rearrangements, the “group-experience” was intended to become the key peda-
40 Cf. p.  53–64, 85–99.
41 Robert Harrison, Aled Jones & Peter Lambert, ‘The institutionalisation and organisation 
of history,’ in Peter Lambert & Phillipp Schofield, Making History: An Introduction to the 
History and Practices of a Discipline. New York, Routledge 2004, 10.
42 Lambert 2003, 168, 169, 174.
43 Alfred Bäumler, Männerbund und Wissenschaft. Berlin, Juncker u. Dünnhaupt 1934.
44 Volker Losemann, ‘Zur Konzeption der NS-Dozentenlager,’ in Manfred Heinemann 
(ed.), Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich. Teil 2: Hochschule, Erwachsenenbildung. 
Stuttgart, Ernst Klett 1980, 87. 
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gogical tool of the education conducted in the Third Reich.45 Further, this expe-
rience would usher in a common, ethnic, ahistorical and directed will of the peo-
ple. This cultivated spiritual force was intended to be superior to all former 
modes of knowledge and was a prerequisite for the further training of citizens in 
the National Socialist regime.46 In emphasizing the significance of experi-
ence-based knowledge the Nazi strategy to take over the German academia did 
not have to go against the grain. Martin Heidegger, Henri Bergson and Walter 
Benjamin were only a few of the multitude of scholars utilizing and analyzing 
the meaning of experience in their texts. 47 However, fascist aims were not as 
sophisticated as were academic pursuits. The Nazis’ overall objective thus was 
not only to reinstate the form where education, Bildung in a widest sense of the 
word, was being “produced,” but to influence its essence in introducing the ‘spir-
it’ of the Männerbund as the root and model for common learning.
Consequently, camps and distinct working groups, arranged in the outdoors 
for a short period time, with a schedule, theme and a physical curriculum, be-
came an essential part of the education in all its levels.48 The obsession for 
communality in the Third Reich was sweeping and penetrated all areas. The ad-
ministrators responsible for education were eager, though quarrelsome, in prac-
ticing this “ideology of communality” along the lines of the Führer’s ideas and as 
echoed by SA-minded writers.49 Hans Kerrl, for example, a Prussian politician 
and official, saw it important to reeducate young people to meet the standards 
introduced by Hitler. He organized a series of camps which were directed at stu-
dents and researchers of law. Kerrl writes:
The National Socialist state must know above all that the one who he [the NS state] intends to 
entrust as a judge or a public prosecutor with exercising the most important public duties of the 
state has the character of a German man. The character of the man reveals itself in togetherness 
with others. Only by such togetherness will it become apparent if the man in question will be 
suitable as a judge or public prosecutor.50
45 Ernst Krieck, ‘Der Neubau der Universität,’ in Die deutsche Hochschule, Heft 1. Mar-
burg 1933, 1–7.
46 Bäumler 1934.
47 See Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a 
Universal Theme. London, University of California Press 2005.
48 Losemann 1980, 106–107.
49 Schmerbach 2008, 153–158.
50 “Der nationalsozialistische Staat muss vor allen Dingen wissen, dass derjenige, den er 
[the lawyers] als Richter oder Staatsanwalt mit der Wahrnehmung wichtigster Hoheitsaufgaben 
des Staates zu betrauen gedenkt, ein Charakter ein deutscher Mann ist.[…] Der Charakter des 
Mannes zeigt sich im Zusammenleben mit anderen. Nur durch ein solches Zusammenleben 
wird offenbar, ob der betreffende als Richter oder Staatsanwalt brauchbar sein wird.”, Quoted 
in Schmerbach 2008, 22.
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Likewise, the 1935 renewal of the legal Studienordnung followed the larger prin-
ciples of the time. It asserted that all students of law needed to complete the in-
troductory studies, which in practice comprised the first academic year. Ewald 
Grothe summarizes its meaning: 
[It was] intended to be intertwined with the communal experience, which the student has had 
in the SA, the Hitler Youth, work-service, and thus assists the prospective jurist in evaluating 
German law from the national basis and in recognizing foreign law.51
The camps directed towards university staff (Gemeinschaftslager, Wissenschaft-
slager and Dozentenlager) represented the dual significance of ‘communality’ in 
1930s German culture. First, from the point of view of the Nazi administration, 
the camps were an important attempt in re-educating academics in a National 
Socialist manner.52 In practice, if one wanted to have a good chance to obtain a 
permanent position at any university, active participation in the camps was a 
must. As expressed in Hitler’s rhetoric, scholars of the bygone bourgeois world 
with their obsession for unhealthy reading and mastering information, had no 
role in the destiny of the nation.53 Hence the learned needed to be retrained. Na-
tional Socialist educators did not distinguish between students and docents; 
everyone working in the academic realm had to be indoctrinated to sincerely 
participate in Volksgemeinschaft and thus both obey and further express the com-
mon will of the people. Second, and with respect to the legal sphere, the concrete 
symbols of the “healthy communality,” the educational camps directed at stu-
dents and professionals, were intended to root the “new reading” (neue Ausle-
gung) of law to the Stand of German jurists.54 The educational camps were the 
new form of education and a serious attempt to replace the ways that Bildung had 
produced, used and manifested.55 Ernst Krieck, the education ideologist of the 
party and the principal at the University of Frankfurt designed a special lecturer 
academy at the University of Frankfurt as examples of the revolution in educa-
tion:
The lecturer academy as a working group of full professors, lecturers, assistants and advanced 
students, a community of teaching and learning persons that in German universitys had never 
51 Grothe 2005, 199.
52 Schmerbach 2008, 192–216.
53 Scholars were constantly ridiculed in the newspapers close to the NSDAP. Cf. Koonz 
2003, 47.
54 Rüthers, 1992, 23.
55 In the beginning of the 1930s scholars were largely unanimous that the new educational 
curriculums concerning legal affairs should emphasize “general knowledge” (allgemein Bil-
dung). The National Socialist plans on Studienordnung, by contrast, highlighted the importance 
of “general knowledge of one’s people” (allgemein völkische Bildung) or “political education” 
(politische Bildung). Grothe 2005, 191, 193.
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been seen before, was supposed to be the interdisciplinary central body of the university and 
over time develop to a permanent institution of the new philosophical faculty based on the in-
tegrating foundation of the “national-political anthropology” and comprise the “front” of the 
“young” reformist science. The avantgarde of the “revolutionary science” had a weekly meet-
ing to an interdisciplinary discussion, preceded by a presentation which was freely selected by 
the speaker but in contact with the objectives of the lecturer academy. In this round of discus-
sions the disciplinary borders were reduced, methodological questions discussed, the relations 
between science and professional were reflected, the reform of the overloaded degree programs 
discussed and new research priorities of the “territory-bound”-university were setted through 
recollection of the research on the macro-societal “living space” of each university’s location.56
The words ‘culture’ and ‘education’ remained essential symbols of social pres-
tige. The anchoring of these concepts to the interaction between citizens, and the 
groups of people which they connoted, was, however, subject to heavy redefini-
tion. Krieck proclaimed in his inaugural talk in 23 May 1933, that the Gleich-
schaltung with respect to higher education was about “[W]hether the universities 
as institutions need to be re-installed, as Akademias in the original meaning of 
the word, which are able to bring the teachers and the students together as a com-
munity and towards a common direction.”57
At the level of University administration, combined with the educational re-
form of the Studienordnung, the intention was to create “stormtroop-faculties” 
which would carry on and cherish the political spirit of the Third Reich.58 K.A. 
Eckhardt was, at least at the beginning, the leading figure in the process. He was 
also personally in charge of guiding one of these faculties at the University of 
Kiel. Determined to make the “small university, without a trace of the old scien-
tific tradition, to be fighting one and mold it fundamentally new”, 59 he assigned 
56 “Die Dozentenakademie sollte als örtliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft von Hochschulprofesso-
ren, Dozenten, Assistenten und Studenten höherer Fachsemester, einer bislang an deutschen 
Hochschulen nicht gekannten Gemeinschaft von Lehrenden und Lernenden, das interdiszipli-
näre Zentralorgan der Universität sein und auf der integrierenden Basis der “völkisch-politi-
schen Anthropologie” im Laufe der Zeit zur festen Institution der neueren philosophischen 
Fakultät ausgebaut werden und die “Front” “junger” und reformwilliger Wissenschaft umfas-
sen. Die Avantgarde der “revolutionären Wissenschaft” sollte sich einmal wöchentlich zu ei-
nem interdisziplären Gespräch treffen, dem ein vom Referenten frei wählbarer Vortrag voraus-
ging, der freilich an die Zielsetzung der Dozentenakademie anknüpfen sollte. In dieser Diskus-
sionsrunde sollten die Fachbarrieren abgebaut, methodische Fragen besprochen, die Beziehung 
von Wissenschaft und Berufspraxis reflektiert, die Reform der überlasteten Studiengänge dis-
kutiert und der “landschaftsgebundenen” Hochschule durch Reflexion der Froschung auf die 
Bedürfnisse des gesamtgesellschaftlichen “Lebensraumes” des jeweiligen Hochschulstandor-
tes neue Forschungsprioritäten gesetzt werden.”, Müller 1978, 389.
57 Losemann 1980, 87–88.
58 Grothe 2005, 171.
59 “kleiner Universität und unbeschwert von alter wissenschaftlicher Tradition kämpferisch 
zu wirken und grundlegend Neues zu gestalten.”, Quoted in Eckert 1992, 54.
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a group of young lawyers to replace the old faculty, which had been largely 
sacked because of their Jewish descent. These minds of the war generation con-
stituted a school in the sense that they wrote and lectured on the ‘New legal sci-
ence,’ but also in the ideological sense. They were supposed to comprise “a fu-
sion of the faculty into a politically and ideologically homogenous whole.”60 
The plan of Eckhardt and the Nazi officials in the Ministry of Culture was to 
introduce a distinguished institution (geschlossene Kameradschaft) within the 
University of Kiel, and to make sure from the beginning that the staff of the in-
stitution shared the same values and worldview.61 These values were supposed 
to represent the Volksgemeinschaft (in a National Socialist manner) in miniature. 
This entity, a group united by its inner virtues, would produce scientific works 
and new legal tools for the benefit of the whole national community. These ex-
pressions, texts, concepts and education for their part would enable law in the 
future Germany to be studied, understood and applied according to the Weltan-
schauung of the original ‘distinguished institution,’ and at the same time, reflect 
the values of the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft. In other words, the facul-
ty of law at the University of Kiel was supposed to become a ‘concrete order’ 
within the world of legal science in German academia – not far from the guild-
like ideal of the academic tradition – but in a National Socialist, fighting manner. 
Thus, when the scholars of the Kieler Schule referred to their scientific commu-
nity they spoke and wrote of Kameradschaft.62 
The Kameradschaft of the Kieler Schule managed to combine the good sides 
of the ‘communalities’ of both academic culture and the ‘völkisch revolution.’ 
The young scholars maintained their distinctive academic prestige and belonged 
to a ‘guild of the learned’ bound by common virtues and shared purpose. On the 
other hand, their work seemed to be ‘close to reality,’ meaningful from the point 
of view of national destiny. The Kieler Schule did indeed produce the results that 
the Ministry of Culture intended. The new outlook of the Studienordnung and its 
emphasis on political and ‘völkisch’ education in university training for lawyers 
and judges was supported not only by K.A.Eckhardt, who had a decisive role in 
forming the new curriculum, but also by scholars working in the ‘stormtroop-fac-
ulty.’63 In the legal renewal following the April laws, the scholars of the Schule 
were a visible group. They also understood the assignment they were given: to 
introduce a novel view of the legal world from the bases of a new kind of schol-
arly communality. Karl Larenz referred to the “mission” which the official in the 
60 “eine Verschmelzung der Fakultät zu einem politisch und weltanschaulich homogenen 
Ganzen”, K.A.Eckhardt, ‘Recht oder Pflicht?’ in Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 1 (1936), 7.
61 Grothe 2005, 172.
62 See e.g. Eckhardt 1936.
63 Grothe 2005, 196.
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Ministry of Culture had given him, Ernst Rudolf Huber and Georg Dahm when 
they were recruited to the newly-erected ‘stormtroop-faculty’ at Kiel:
Our group had not been randomly compiled. It was meant to form an intellectual center in Kiel 
from which the fundamental inspiration on the development ought to start. My special task was 
to make sure that the state that was now in the process of forming would be founded not in mere 
power, but rather on the ethical foundation of the idealistic legal and political philosophy, as I 
had only recently depicted it in the handbook of philosophy.64
Both the National Socialist educators in the Ministry of Culture and the target 
groups, the students and scholars, called the participants in the camps and the 
communal higher education Kameradschaft.65 The concept of Kameradschaft 
had a slightly different meaning to different people, but everyone considered it 
desirable. The initiative in practical, camp-like educational reforms came from 
the officials of the National Socialist regime. Their larger purpose and education-
al philosophy followed and executed the ideology of the party elite. Since the 
purpose of National Socialist officials was to raise soldiers, they arranged con-
crete opportunities for students and scholars to experience togetherness. These 
solid experiences of communality in the context of National Socialist ideology 
were supposed to foster thinking and writing which supported the fascist world-
view. The intervention was not as abrupt as it might seem at first glance. It did 
break the hierarchic tradition of learning and teaching in German universities, 
but to the young scholars of the war generation it managed to combine two ideals 
which they have not been able to achieve prior to1933: belonging to a ‘guild’ of 
professoriate and participating in the ‘brotherhood-in-arms.’ Suddenly, for this 
generation, which had been too young to participate in the First World War and 
was too inexperienced to be admitted to the inner-circle of science, the chance to 
gain both in one go was possible. 
As intended, this communality brought about a new view of the relation be-
tween law and the people.66 I do not wish to whitewash the racial and ideologi-
cal context in which the educational camps operated, or the results they aimed at, 
but undoubtedly from these camps genuine experiences of togetherness and joint 
group-mentality emerged. Whereas the political message of the camps, like in 
64 “Unsere Gruppe sei nicht zufällig zusammengestellt. Sie sole in Kiel ein Geisteszentrum 
bilden, von dem wesentliche Impulse auf die Entwicklung ausgehen sollten. Meine spezielle 
Aufgabe sei es, mit dafür zu sorgen, dass der nun in der Entstehung begriffene Staat nicht auf 
dem blossen Machtdenken, sondern auf den ethischen Fundamenten der idealistischen Rechts- 
und Staatsphilosophie, wie ich sie eben im Handbuch der Philosophie dargestellt hatte, errich-
tet würde.”, Karl Larenz to K.D.Erdmann, cited in Eckert 1992, 50.
65 Schmerbach 2008, 79–80.
66 Cf. Winkler 2014, 279–282. For contemporaries, the Kieler Schule was the ideological 
institution behind the new legal curriculum. See Lange 1941, 11.
1953. Affections in Rechtsgewissen 1933–1945
the case of Franz Wieacker, was often ignored by the participants, the concrete 
experience of communality stayed. This experience, Erlebnis, remained a deci-
sive event in the life-history of many participants, and affected later perceptions 
of the significance of personal life, communality and history. It was important 
that the camps as a pedagogical arrangement marked a decisive difference to-
wards the traditional manner of studying. It was apparent that the structure and 
atmosphere of traditional academic studies had not evoked experiences of com-
munality or supported collaborative learning. In this sense the camps were revo-
lutionary and even efficient.
3. Affections in Rechtsgewissen 1933–1945:  
Wieacker’s community and legal wisdom
Wieacker’s participation in the Dozentenlager and his relationship to the Kieler 
Schule aroused and has continued to arouse disputes on his orientation towards 
National Socialism.67 Detlef Liebs explains Wieacker’s connection to the atmos-
phere and scientific work of the Schule and camps as juvenile mistakes and laps-
es in judgement.68 Viktor Winkler doubts whether Wieacker as the youngest par-
ticipant had any true influence on the “synthetic and spiritual” result of either the 
Kitzeberger or the Todtnauberg camps.69 Bernd Rüthers, however, asserts that 
the Kitzeberger lager and Wieacker’s report on it are symptoms of the alienation 
of the late 1930s academia. In a “strange and comical” atmosphere scholars re-
gressed to a level which not only made serious research impossible, but enabled 
the Nazis to transform Germany into a totalitarian nation without facing any se-
vere resistance.70 Both Rüthers and Ralf Frassek see the Kitzberger camp as a 
manifestation of the Kieler Schule, which for its part was nothing more than an 
offshoot of the National Socialist worldview. Frassek maintains that the Na-
zi-oriented legal thinking nourished in and around the Kieler Schule continued to 
have an effect on legal science in Germany even after the Second World War had 
ended, and, for example, Wieacker’s Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1952) 
is the fruit of this thought.71 Thus, different interpretations of Wieacker’s inclina-
tion towards the scholarly camp-life of the 1930s remain. More widely, the ex-
planation one gives to Wieacker indicates the interpretation one accordingly 
67 Cf. p.148–150.
68 Liebs 2011, 26. 
69 Winkler, 468. This is also Okko Behrends’ view, see Behrends 1995, XXXII.
70 Bernd Rüthers, Entartetes Recht. Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich. 
München, Dtv 1994, 42: “komisch-befremdliches Bild.”
71 Frassek 2008, 366 fn.  53, 374–377.
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gives of the wider question of Wiecaker’s possible Nazi sympathies.72 Further-
more, did the participation result in long-term consequences which emerge in 
Wieacker’s texts? 
In his texts Wieacker emphasized the meaning of the “educational conscious-
ness,” which laid the base for the whole European legal tradition.73 The forms 
and ethos of the juridical Ausbildung, as well as the relevance which the sur-
rounding society gave to the educational reproduction of tradition, reflected the 
ethicalness of a given society. The fundamental importance which he gave to the 
phenomena of “community” and “experience” in legal science and education is 
also acknowledged.74 Thus, the relation which Wieacker had to the new forms 
of legal education following the new Studienordnung and the administrative 
compulsion to arrange university teaching around camps, is not relevant with 
respect to his attitude towards National Socialism, but it is in the context of the 
birth and development of some of the basic ideas of his texts. Consequently, 
these ideas need to be studied in a manner which is also characteristic of Wieack-
er’s own methodology; one needs to concentrate on the ‘material’ circumstances 
which cultivated them. 
Although Wieacker’s relation to the “camping” of the ‘legal renewal’ is often 
reduced to his report of the Kitzeberger camp, that occasion was not the only 
politically-oriented scientific gathering in which he participated. He also attend-
ed at least the camps of Todtnauberg and Bad Elster.75 Through his correspond-
ence it is possible to reconstruct his attitude towards the pedagogical arrange-
ments of the ‘legal renewal,’ along with the ‘new form of education,’ especially 
with respect to the teaching which took place at the National Socialist “model 
university” of Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main.
In September 1933 the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University was nominated a 
Reichs-Universität.76 With it came the honor and obligation to work as a torch-
bearer for higher education in National Socialist Germany. The person in charge 
of this task was Ernst Krieck,77 and in April 1933 Krieck asked Ernst Forsthoff 
to teach at the university. In the coming autumn, Forsthoff received a professor-
72 Winkler 2014, 466.
73 “Bildungsbewusstsein” in e.g. Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 51; 
Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 236. See also Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 
235: “Das römische Recht ist ihm [to Savigny], und zwar zutreffend, das konstituierende Ele-
ment der deutschen Rechtskultur, insofern sie als Bildungsvorgang verstanden.”
74 See e.g. Winkler 2014, 252–253; Avenarius 2010, 122; Wolff 2007: “Für Wieacker war 
die Universität wirklich Genossenschaft der Lehrenden und Lernenden.”
75 Thomas Ditt, Stoßtruppfakultät Breslau. Rechtswissenschaft im “Grenzland Schlesien” 
1933–1945, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2011, 216; cf. p.  138–141.
76 Mussgnug, Mussgnug & Reinthal (eds.) 2007, 7.
77 Notker Hammerstein, Die Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main 
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ship in public law in Frankfurt, and along the lines of the university’s promotion, 
he accepted the responsibility of renewing the faculty’s working methods.78 In 
1933, most likely in October, Franz Wieacker was also called to work as an out-
side lecturer at Frankfurt University.79 
Forsthoff took his duties seriously and started to arrange studies in line with 
“Carl Schmitt’s orientation,” bringing students and scholars “bound by a com-
mon purpose” together to engage in the “communal scientific-political studying 
and educating.” 80 The aim was to approach legal training from a very down-to-
earth angle, and the emphasis was on the practical jurisprudential problematic. 
The studies encouraged students to apply their own understanding, trained argu-
mentative skills and logical procedure in a commonplace context. Education was 
partly carried out in the form of projects, where students and teachers analyzed 
realistic cases in a collaborative manner.81 The pedagogical orientation of the 
legal teaching in Frankfurt was ahead of its time. Forsthoff’s ideas followed the 
methodology and aims of the new national legal Studienordnung, although it was 
not officially launched until January 1935. The underlying agenda defining the 
structure of the teaching and studying conducted in Frankfurt was that law was 
not an entity separated from the surrounding society. Moreover, the changes in 
the ideological or material spheres of society produced changes in law. The ques-
tion was not whether law and politics should remain unattached, rather the prob-
lematic concerned to what extent law should be political. Thus the explicit pur-
pose of Forsthoff (with Franz Beyerle) was not that conventional; it was to carry 
out a “fundamental renewal of our [German] juridicical thinking.”82 
A fixed part of the curriculum of the academic year were the activities and 
camps arranged for both the staff alone and with students.83 The camps had a 
Bd.  I: Von der Stiftungsuniversität zur staatlichen Hochschule 1914–1950. Wallstein 2012, 
284–286; cf. p.  73, 177. 
78 Meinel 2012, 52.
79 On the establishment of special Dozentenakademia in Frankfurt, see Mussgnug, Muss-
gnug & Reinthal 2007, 8 fn.  40; cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 19.11.1933: “Ich bin in Frankfurt 
sehr freundlich aufgenommen worden und habe viele und viel kennengelernt.” NL Erik Wolf, 
Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
80 Mussgnug, Mussgnug & Reinthal 2007, 8. The authors note that Forsthoff was able to 
accomplish “political schooling in the meaning of National Socialism.” Cf. p.  88–89.
81 Ernst Forsthoff’s “working communities” (Gemeinschaftarbeit) and educational camps 
(Wissenschaftlager) concentrated on actual themes of legal science and education while con-
necting them to the political atmosphere of National Socialism. The themes included e.g. Arbe-
itgemeischaft für Rechtserneuerung, Erörterung des Wissenschaftsbegriffs and Problem der 
Erziehung. Mussgnug, Mussgnug & Reinthal 2007, 8 fn.  40; Meinel 2012, 53; Wieacker to Erik 
Wolf 19.11.1933, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. 
82 “grundlegenden Erneuerung unseres juristischen Denkens,” quoted in Meinel 2012, 53.
83 Wieacker to Wolf 19.11.1933: “Die Lage in der Studentenschaft ist sehr interessant. Die 
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settled structure and form. The participants met outside, most preferably in a 
place where one could hike and some place of historical interest was nearby. 
Castles or monasteries sufficed very well. 84 In a seminar-like first part, the 
members gave talks or presentations on a theme, which was comprised of a 
methodological dilemma bound to a concrete political or judicial question in the 
light of National Socialist ideology. A free and enthusiastic discussion followed 
the presentations. The more informal part constituted hiking, songs and competi-
tions. The physical side of the camps was notable, and the participants were truly 
tested in their physical endurance.85 The local newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung 
reported about a particular camp arranged by Forsthoff on 29 July 1934:
The style of the seminar was marked by soldierly strictness and comradely connection. Aca-
demic titles were banned from camp language. Sport and marching had their place next to in-
tellectual work as well. The course of the day was strictly planned like a duty roster. The inner, 
natural connections between the state and the intellectual life of the nation made up the working 
context of the seminar.86
In the report the emphasis is on the physical composition of the educational 
event, as well as in the way the National Socialistic slogans of ‘combat,’ ‘duty,’ 
‘leadership’ and ‘togetherness’ were embodied in the appearance of this new 
manner of conducting ‘spiritual work.’ The camps seemed to promote the new 
values of the Third Reich in action. Forsthoff’s camps were commitedly Nation-
al Socialist, and marked a serious ideological change from the previous style of 
university education. From a strictly pedagogical point of view they were also 
revolutionary. Not only were the studies combined with physical exercises and 
the conditions were very informal, but also the relation between students and 
teachers, as well as among teachers, was intentionally more dialogical and 
Fachschaftsarbeit geht fakultativ, in drei Arbeitsgemeinschaften der juristischen Fachschaft 
über lockere und zwangslos ausgewählte Themen vor sich.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Uni-
versitätsarchiv.
84 “Die Möglichkeit, [vom] Schloss Trifenstein, ist eine besondere Freude für unsere 
Arbeits pläne.” The presence of nationally relevant landscape and historic buildings seemed to 
be essential for the arrangement of camps. Wieacker participated in camps at Trifenstein castle, 
and in the towns of Oberursel and Todtenauberg, which were located amid impressive land-
scape. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 3/1934; also Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Al-
bert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv. 
85 Wieacker to Wolf 12.7.1935, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv.
86 “Der Stil des Seminars war durch soldatische Straffheit und kameradschaftliche Verbund-
heit gekennzeichnet. Akademische Titel waren aus der Lagersprache verbannt. Auch Sport und 
Ausmarsch hatten neben der geistigen Arbeit ihren Platz. Der Ablauf des Tages war dienstplan-
mässig streng geregelt. Die inneren, wesensmässigen Zusammenhänge zwischen dem Staat 
und dem geistigen Leben der Nation bildeten den Arbeitszusammenhang des Seminars.”, ‘Das 
Wissenschaftlager,’ in Frankfurter Zeitung 29.7.1934, quoted in Meinel 2012, 1.
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non-hierarchical.87 These two levels, the National Socialist performativity around 
the fashionable contemporary key concepts and the true breach with the academ-
ic pedagogical tradition, existed concurrently in the camps. The camps diverged 
in their nature; some were merely anti-intellectual play. Nevertheless, in order to 
study the possible effect they had, both levels have to be acknowledged. When 
one studies how ‘combat,’ ‘duty’ and ‘togetherness’ as experienced in the camps 
relate to the concept of ‘spiritual work’ in the worldview of a single individual, it 
is important to keep in mind that camps as an educational experience, like the 
whole concept of Kameradschaft, bore a wide set of meanings.
The revolutionary pedagogy which the camps seemed to represent is strongly 
present in Wieacker’s correspondence with Erik Wolf. Of the eleven letters he 
wrote to Wolf from Frankfurt, camps and working groups are mentioned eight 
times, and always in a positive light. The Johann Wolfgang Goethe University 
diverged from Wieacker’s previous studying and working places on account of 
its milieu, namely the people and the atmosphere of Frankfurt University. He 
quickly found a “circle” of friends, consisting of Forsthoff, Arnold Ehrhardt, and 
Werner Weber, who regularly attended and arranged Wissenschaft and Arbeits-
gemeinschaft camps as fixed parts of the teaching and studying plan of the uni-
versity.88 Wieacker felt physically better in pleasant company. He wrote to E. 
Wolf on 25 January 1934: 
The activities in Frankfurt are fruitful, satisfying and promote, perhaps, the newer maturation 
better than the lonely years of inspection and giving one’s all before habilitation.89
87 Meinel 2, 52; Wieacker to Erik Wolff 3/1934: “Es [The camp arranged in castle Trifen-
stein] ergibt sich daraus eher eine noch elastischere und freiere Arbeitsmöglichkeit.” About the 
increased physical content of the academic work, cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 19.11. 1933: “Der 
Wehrsport ist gegenüber dem Sommer zugunsten politischer Schulungsarbeit zurückgestellt 
worden; er findet nur in den Wehrverbänden statt.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universi-
tätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau; cf. Schmerbach 2008, 20 fn.  8.
88 Although these three comprised the core of Wieacker’s network in Frankfurt, he also 
mentions Franz Beyerle, Friedrich Klausing, Hermann Heimpel, and Fritz von Hippel. See 
Wieacker to Erik Wolf 3/1934; 2.4.1934; 14.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universi-
tätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
89 “Die Frankfurter Tätigkeit ist fruchtbar, befriedigend und fördert/ vielleicht das neuere 
Ausreifen stärker als die Jahre einsamen Untersuchens, und Aus-sich-herausspinnens vor der 
Habilitation.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934; also e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934: “ich 
würde mich sehr freuen, wenn ich an dem Pfingstferien-lager [in Oberusel], das Sie im Kaiser-
stuhl planten, teilnehmen dürfte.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg 
im Breisgau. “Die Frankfurter Tätigkeit ist fruchtbar, befriedigend und fördert/ vielleicht das 
neuere Ausreifen stärker als die Jahre einsamen Untersuchens, und Aus-sich-herausspinnens 
vor der Habilitation.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934;
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It was not just that the working atmosphere in the faculty of law was relaxed, but 
this new kind of communality elevated the pursuit of academic work to another 
level.90 In his letters, while expressing individual, personal feelings, he used the 
same contemporary concepts and terminology which occupied the public dis-
course and sought to emphasize the exceptionality of the national, völkisch revo-
lution. The terms ‘togetherness’ and ‘troop’ in Wieacker’s letters are applications 
of the rhetoric of the Zeitgeist, but nevertheless signify a personal experience; 
they were embodiments of the contemporary concepts. The mere idea of the near 
future gatherings with the “circle” [Zusammenhäng] brought pleasant emotions 
to Wieacker: 
It seems, according to what I heard, that it is likely that the official camp of the juridical field 
will still take place in Oberursel, but the seminar and working community camps, that includes 
the same good clan, of which I told you, will take place in T[riefenstein].91
Behind the common contemporary vocabulary, the existence of a genuine emo-
tional experience emerging from a new kind of scholarly practice is obvious. 
Wieacker, however, connects the significance of the learning camps directly to 
the results of academic work. The exercises and togetherness experienced 
through the communal working method could not be separated from the 
“spiritual” essence of one’s scholarly pursuits.92 Wieacker described them as be-
ing “overloaded but uplifting” and they were an important, and pleasant, part of 
the work of a researcher.93 The preliminary work, which Wieacker prepared e.g. 
for the camp in Oberursel (Forsthoff’s) was substantial, and he perceived it as a 
90 Wieacker perceived his stay in Frankfurt as an experience of exceptional scholarly activ-
ity: “[D]ie umfangreife fachschaftliche Arbeit, deren exemplarische Entwicklung eines der 
Hauptgründe meines vorläufigen Verbleibs in Frankfurt sein sollte (…),” Wieacker to Erik 
Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
91 “Es scheint nach dem, was ich jetzt höre, so zu liegen, dass das amtl. Fachschaftslager 
nach wie vor in Oberursel stattfindet, dass aber die Seminar- und Arbeitsgemeinschaftslager, 
die den gleichen guten Stamm umfassen, von dem ich Ihnen erzählte, in T. stattfinden.”, 
Wieacker to Erik Wolf 3/1934 NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im 
Breisgau.
92 Wieacker was confident that Forsthoff’s method, which the faculty of law in Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe University adhered to was productive, exceptional and transferable. He 
wanted to take it with him to other universities, possibly to Freiburg, as he wrote to Wolf: “Ich 
würde mich für diese Arbeit, an der ich in Frankfurt mit großer begeister Anteilnahme und 
Freude teilnahm, sehr gern auch in Freiburg bereithalten […] es wäre für mich sehr schmerz-
lich, diese Möglichkeit zu einer ganz neuen Ausfüllung des Lehrberufs durch neue Formen der 
Zusammenarbeit wieder zu verlieren.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Al-
bert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
93 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.7.1935: “eingefüllt mit verdrießlicher (und mit erfreulicher) 
Arbeit”. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. The letter 
was sent to Wolf after the Kitzeberger-camp.
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true scientific endeavor.94 The objective of these camps was to find a new way to 
do science. To interpret camps as theater is in my opinion a mistake. According 
to Wieacker’s correspondence, he experienced the camps as significant and au-
thentic meetings because of their scientific contribution: 
The camp of the juridical field during the Pentecost holidays will probably take place in Ober-
ursel. It is scheduled that right at the beginning, course and direction will be determined, and 
we will be given the opportunity to become aware of talents and performances before the term 
papers will be processed, not at the end of the semester as it was in winter. The addressed pub-
lic of the camp will be the student leaders of the study groups. Judging from the february results 
it will certainly be pleasant. The Borken camp was dedicated solely to athletic instruction to 
strengthen the sense of belonging and we all agree that it was a success in both organizational 
as well as in its spirit and its purpose. I am very glad that I did not missed it, because mentally 
I feel more relaxed and do have better nerves, as when the semester had ended. Though physi-
cally it was not insignificant.95 
The camps appeared as elevating experiences, where a scholar could physically 
feel the essence of the ‘spiritual work,’ which he conducted in academia. Before, 
cultivating the heritage of national culture in an academic context, in other words 
conducting Bildung, had mainly been a textual process of reading, writing, pre-
senting and occasionally sensing a meaningful connection with the linguistic 
cultural entity one was studying. In the camps, however, learning became more 
of an event of going through and living the meaning of abstract subject matter. 
The concrete pedagogical shift at which the new administrative actions aimed 
can be elaborated with the help of two German terms, both signifying an experi-
ence: Erfahrung and Erlebnis. Whereas Erfahrung had traditionally been empha-
sized as the founding phenomenon involved in learning, the new modes of edu-
cation attempted to make the learning experience Erlebnis.96 That is, learning 
was supposed to become a process of going through concrete sensations which 
would permanently change the view which one had on society and science. Stud-
94 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Frei-
burg im Breisgau.
95 “Das Fachschaftslager während der Pfingstferien findet wohl in Oberursel statt. Es soll 
so gleich zu Beginn Kurs und Richtung bestimmt werden und uns Gelegenheit gegeben werden, 
Begabungen und Leistungen vor Beginn der Semesterarbeit, nicht wie im Winter, am Semes-
terende zu kennen. Das angeredete Publikum des Lagers werden die studentischen Leiter von 
Argeitsgemeinschaften sein. Nach den Ergebnissen des Februars wird es sicher sehr nett. Das 
Borkener Lager war ausschließlich sportlicher Schulung bestimmt, die das Zusammengehörig-
keitsgefühl stärken sollte, und wird von uns allen als im organisatorischen und seinem Geist 
und Sinn nach als sehr gelungen empfunden. Ich bin sehr froh, dass ich es nicht versäumt habe, 
denn ich fühle mich geistig ausgeruhter und habe bessere Nerven wie nach Semesterschluss. 
Körperlich war es nicht ganz unbeträchtlich.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 5.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, 
Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
96 Cf. p.  188–190.
202 IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history and in legal science
ying and assimilating information would shift from a metaphorical journey to 
becoming a more concrete one.97
When the failure of the experiment of Frankfurt University became obvious 
and the “troop” of colleagues dismantled, Wieacker had to rethink his career and 
work possibilities:
After all, the uncertainty of the next semester gives the whole job something cheerfully non-
committal and at the same time sorrowful: How will things continue in Frankfurt, and in Frei-
burg, if I should need to go back there? Hopefully the teaching activities in Freiburg would at 
least be pleasant. The number of students certainly seems sufficient, and at the moment that is 
certainly the deciding factor for the development of a group of students who are capable of 
working, because it guarantees selection. Here in Frankfurt we have lost many of the most de-
cent and active in the exodus. The joyful troop of the science camps of the previous winter does 
not exist anymore.98
It is obvious that the sensation Wieacker wrote about was not just a fashionable 
textual trope. But did the Kameradschaft extend to the work of a scholar? And if 
it did, how did it manifest itself in Wieacker’s historical vision? Wieacker’s cor-
respondence reveals that by 1934 he had already understood the essence and 
benefits of group identity, but this notion grew ever stronger after he participated 
in the practices of the stormtrooper faculty of the Kieler Schule.99 The sense of a 
community and the new kind of working method which prevailed in the Kieler 
Schule were not just Wieacker’s ideas. To Ernst Rudolf Huber, for example, the 
Kieler Schule was first and foremost a ‘community’ built upon ‘youthful experi-
97 In 1940 Paul Ritterbusch formulated it thus: “Für die Kieler Fakultät und die Angehören-
den ist dieses ‘Experiment’ wohl das entscheidendste Erlebnis ihrer wissenschaftlichen En-
twicklung gewesen,” quoted in Winkler 2014, 275. Emphasis mine. See also Eckert 1992, 57: 
the camps as Gemeinschaftserlebnis.
98 “Doch gibt die Unsicherhehit der nächsten Semester der ganzen Tätigkeit etwas heiter 
Unverbindliches und Trauriges zugleich: Wie wird es weiter mit Frankfurt werden, und wie mit 
Freiburg, wenn ich dorthin zurück gehen sollte? Hoffentlich ist wenigstens der Lehrbetrieb in 
Freiburg erfreulich. Die Frequenz scheint ja ausreichend, und sie ist ja im Augenblick für den 
Aufbau eines arbeitsfähigen Studentenkreises das Entscheidende, weil sie Auswahl verbürgt. 
Hier in Ffm. in haben wir viele von den Ordentlichsten und Tätigsten durch Wegzug verloren; 
es bildet sich nicht eigentlich mehr die erfreuliche Truppe in den Wissenschaftslagern des vori-
gen Winters.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.12.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universi-
tätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. The rearrangements in Frankfurt, which led to the dissolution 
of the “circle” of friends meant an end to the “experience of fruitful work”: “Aber sie wird nach 
unsrer aller Erachten an Fruchtbarkeit dadurch sehr verlieren, dass sie später nicht fortgesetzt 
werden kann; vielleicht zerstreut sich der alte Stamm schon jetzt.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf in 
14.4.1934. Moreover, when the uncertainties in Frankfurt actualized, one of the saddest things 
was that the scheduled camps were also cancelled: “Leider finden nun auch die Fachschafts-
lager nicht statt.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universi-
tätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
99 Cf. Winkler 2014, 470–473.
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ence,’ which produced novel insights and applications in legal science precisely 
because of that particular mentality. The education and study in all the forms 
expressed by the Schule manifested a new kind of communality and a combative 
stance towards previous models of legal thinking. The Kameradschaft at Kiel 
signified both an actual experience and a distinct scientific custom when com-
pared to its predecessors.100 
The idea of a revolutionary turn in the academic work, echoing the goals of 
educational reform, in which Kameradschaft or Gemeinschaft were introduced 
into academic work, was explicitly reported by Wieacker in 1935. During the 
summer of 1935 the lecturers of legal science from all over Germany gathered in 
a camp in the town of Kitezeberger in an already familiar fashion. This time, 
however, the purpose was not only to reeducate the scholars into healthy and 
productive work, but to produce a series of foundational scientific results which 
would help to shape the legal study of the future Germany. Consequently the 
“summer-school” became both the most renowned and productive conference in 
the context of “legal renewal” and later a notorious symbol of the politicizing of 
legal science.101 The event was summoned by K.A.Eckhardt and his creation, the 
Kieler Schule, with all the involved scholars, was well presented. As a result of 
the lectures given in the Kitzeberger camp the participants published articles in 
the volume of the fascist journal Deutsches Recht in 1936. Wieacker’s responsi-
bility was to write a review of both the activities of the camp and the presenta-
tions given. In his article Wieacker wrote about the schedule and content of the 
camp days:
Hikes, marches, early-morning exercise and the little events of camp life create the relaxation 
and comradely connection in which the conformity of thought becomes absorbed into the fight-
ing work community.102
Unlike in Hitler’s talks, where physical education was the prior objective, and 
cultivating the mental faculties a secondary matter, in Kitzeberger the together-
ness and sport activities were a tool to give shape to an intellectual and cognitive 
achievement: 
Beyond the polemic that was promoted and successful everywhere against the requirements of 
older legal theory in recent years, the new form in which national law will come alive became 
100 On the “new form of education,” see Eckert 1992, 55–56. On its “fight” against the old 
practices, see Rüthers 1992, 23–24. 
101 Bernd Rüthers, Geschönte Geschichten – Geschonte Biographien. Sozialisationskohor-
ten in Wendeliteraturen. Ein Essay. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2001, 48.
102 “Wanderungen, Ausmärsche, Frühsport und die kleinen Ereignisse des Lagerlebens 
schufen die Entspannung und kameradschaftliche Beziehung, in der die Übereinstimmung im 
Denken sich zur kämpfenden Arbeitsgemeinschaft vertieft.”, Wieacker, ‘Das Kitzeberger La-
ger’ [1936], 163.
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apparent in collective work. This is how the Kitzeberg meeting made the impression on its 
participants that a new kind of collective work came alive here in the fight for a new jurispru-
dence: in a camp community the requirements for a fundamental collective attitude are identi-
fied, and this fundamental attitude itself was maintained in a series of essential issues.103 
One can take the quotes above as mere scribblings, where a young scholar (a 
28-year-old docent) repeats the keywords which he has heard and understood as 
fashionable. On the other hand, and against the former opportunistic explanation, 
the Kitzeberger report can be categorized as the unintelligent nonsense of Na-
tional Socialist “science,” like Ernst Krieck’s pamphlets on educational reform. I 
hold that both explanations do not fully capture the significance of Wieacker’s 
writings. To lean excessively on either of them makes one’s analysis too narrow, 
and some essential sides are lost from sight.104
In the 1936 report ‘Das Kitzeberger Lager’ Wieacker presented this particular 
camp as a ‘visible form of the method of new legal science.’ He seems to asserts 
that inside the informal gatherings of the young scholars, one could find a meth-
odological wisdom, usable in interpreting the past, present and future society. 
Thus in the Kitzeberger report Wieacker puts into words the methodological vi-
sion he not only believed in the 1930s, but to some extent maintained throughout 
his career.105 Judging by his correspondence, Wieacker did not assimilate or find 
attractive the ideological part of the Kieler Schule or lecturer academy in Frank-
furt University. But the foundational principles of the experience as a pedagogi-
cal key, and the community as the material context for an “inexhaustible, ideal 
experience” of law, were important to him.106 The pervasive idea of the above 
quote is that a basic attitude (Grundhaltung), mentality, which appears among 
the similar-minded in a friendly gathering and healthy atmosphere, is the wisdom 
that a dogmatism needs in order to become science. This notion remains in his 
thought more or less explicitly through the decades. The spiritual substance of 
103 “Über die in den letzten Jahren überall gefördete und erfolgreiche Polemik gegen die 
Voraussetzungen des älteren Rechtsdenkens hinaus wurden in gemeinschaftlicher Arbeit die 
neuen Formen sichtbar, in denen das völkische Recht lebendig sein wird. Daher hinterliess das 
Kitzeberger Treffen bei den Teilnehmern den Eindruck, dass hier im Kampf um die neue 
Rechtswissenschaft eine neue Art der Gemeinschaftsarbeit ins Leben trat: es sind in einer La-
gergemeinschaft die Voraussetzungen für eine gemeinschaftliche Grundhaltung festgestellt 
und diese Grundhaltung selbst an einer Reihe von wesentlichen Fragenkreisen bewährt wor-
den.”, Wieacker, ‘Das Kitzeberger Lager’ [1936], 163. Emphasis mine.
104 In his letter to Wolf, Wieacker describes the work in Kiel and the camp in Kitzeberger: 
“In ganzen war es sehr schön und außerordentlich anstregend.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 
12.7.1935 Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
105 Both Winkler (2014) and Avenarius (2010) hold that the methodological core of Wieack-
er’s texts largely remained the same from the 1940s to the late years of his scholarship.
106 Franz Wieacker, ‘Europa und das römische Recht,’ in Wieacker, Vom römischen Recht. 
Stuttgart 1961, 329.
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these groups (a) represents the ‘New legal science,’ and which is (b) living, clos-
est to life, and could (c) be useful in scientific work as a methodological tool. At 
this point Wieacker did not have a specific concept for this mentality he sensed 
and in which he participated. Later, however, he started to express it with the 
term Rechtsgewissen.
a) Creative legal thinking as ‘conscience’: The War and the dissolution of the 
Kameradschaft
Wieacker gained a permanent position at the University of Leipzig in 1937. This 
did not, however, mean that his network of colleagues would have drastically 
changed. By 1939, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Karl Michaelis and Georg Dahm had 
joined him at this distinguished University with its glorious reputation. More-
over, the National Socialist Ministry of Education had plans to transform the le-
gal training at Leipzig University into a similar ‘stormtrooper faculty’ than the 
one at Kiel University.107 Although the original Kieler Schule dispersed, the net-
work and friendships stayed. Moreover, the original Schule managed to man the 
key positions in model universities such as Leipzig and Strasbourg (and after the 
war in Göttingen).108 
To Wieacker the University of Leipzig offered a highly satisfying working 
place. Later he recollected it as a “true scientific working community.”109 Al-
though the decision to move from Kiel to Leipzig was not an easy decision, the 
107 Grothe 2005, 171. See also Winkler 2014, 473: The network was “strongly bound per-
sonally, scientifically and politically.” 
108 To Ernst Rudolf Huber, for example, the Kieler Schule was not a faculty tied to one 
school (Huber 1941), nor did Heinrich Lange mean a physical faculty when he talked about the 
legacy of the Schule. See Lange 1941; cf. Winkler 2014, 470–476. The members looked after 
each other: cf. Friedrich Schaffstein to Gerhard Dulckeit 1.6.1951: “Wie Sie gehört haben 
werden, habe ich es hier in Göttingen ganz gut getroffen. Ich bewohne Sieberts früheres sehr 
schönes und großes Zimmer in günstiger Lage und stehe in angenehmen, aber losem und rein 
gesellschaftlichem Kontakt mit der Fakultät. […]Im März u. April war ich 6 Wochen in Tirol 
zum Skilaufen u. traf dort u. a. auch Hubers u. Forsthoff.” Friedrich Schaffstein to Gerhard 
Dulckeit 3.7.1952: “[with respect to a book project] Aber dazu bedarf ich sehr der sachverstän-
digen Beratung, die ich mir von Wieacker und Ihnen erhoffe.”; Karl Larenz to Gerhard  Dulckeit 
21.1.1940: “Schön war es, daß wir in Leipzig Dahm, Huber, Michaelis, die alle mal Urlaub 
hatten, wiedersehen konnten.” NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische 
Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen; cf. Wieacker to Huber 21.7.1961: “ich war durch 
auswärtigen Besuch wie belagert; später noch durch die Tübinger Fakultätenkonferenz aufge-
halten (wo ich Dahm und Larenz sah) Wir freuen uns weiterhin auf den nun nahgerückten Tag, 
an dem Du einen der einge[...]en angemessenen Platz in unserer Fakultät […] und hoffentlich 
recht aktiver wirst, in der Du viel Freunde hast, die sich auf die Zusammenarbeit freuen.” NL 
Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
109 “echte wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft,” quoted in Winkler 2014, 473.
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history and landscape of this traditional university brought Wieacker pleasure.110 
The most satisfying factor was, however, the faculty, with his old friends and 
some new acquaintances.111 One of the new philosophic acquaintances was 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, who received a professorship in Leipzig in 1938, and with 
whom Wieacker had a lifelong friendship.112 With Gadamer, Wieacker extended 
his scientific curiosity to drama, literary criticism and hermeneutics. During his 
stay in Leipzig Wieacker established his status as the leading young scholar in 
Roman law, and published many highly influential and innovative texts on legal 
history, legal education as well as continuing his work on new conceptualizations 
in the fields of property and land law.113 To Wieacker himself, the work conduct-
ed in Leipzig was a natural continuum in his career. Although he had moved from 
the questions of property law in contemporary society to more historically-ori-
ented themes, the original research interest, the “material conditions of immate-
rial things” stayed.114 
The dilemma of the ungraspable nature of unchanging and just legal reasoning 
in changing historical times remained. In other words, how did the entities of 
expert knowledge (Stand), education in the context of tradition (Bildung) and 
justice relate and necessitate each other? In his wartime letters and textual works 
Wieacker started to approach the dilemma from the point of view of Gewissen, 
conscience. As a professor, with an extended teaching duty and pedagogical re-
sponsibility when compared to his lecturer times, Wieacker became more inter-
110 On Wieacker’s hesitation, cf. Larenz to Dulckeit 4.4.1939. NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Cod. 
Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen. On Wieack-
er’s emotional bond to Leipzig, see Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.5.1942, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Lud-
wig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
111 Wieacker to Salvatore Riccobono 2.2.1940: “Ich bin hier nun seit vier Jahren in Leipzig 
und habe mich in dieser äusserlich wenig anziehenden, aber wissenschaftlich und künstlerisch 
bedeutenden Stadt nun sehr gut eingelebt. Nicht nur im meiner eigenen Fakultät, sondern auch 
Historiker, Philologen und Philosophen verbindet mich dauernde Zusammenarbeit.” 
112 Robert J. Dostal, ‘Gadamer: The Man and His Work,’ in Robert J. Dostal (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Gadamer. Cambridge University Press 2002, 20; on the friendship, 
see Wieacker’s letters to Hans-Georg Gadamer 10.2.1975, NL Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches 
Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
113 Behrends 1995.
114 Wieacker to Gerhard Dulckeit 14.6.1950: “Meine Anschauungen über die Entwicklung 
des römischen Eigentumsbegriffs habe ich an leider ziemlich unzugänglicher Stelle (Das Neue 
Bild der Antike II (Rom) 169 ff, C.F.Koehler, Leipzig 1942 und 1944) so eingehend und ver-
gleichsweise deutlich auseinandergesetzt, dass ich die Verweisung ohne weiteres an die Stelle 
einer Diskussion setzen darf. Hausgenossenschaft und Erbeinsetzung und anderes war Ihnen 
ohnedies bekannt, und ich kann leider nur hinzufügen, dass ich meine Methode, die Dinge zu 
sehen, nicht ändern werde, unbeschadet aller historischen Korrekturen, die sich mir ständig 
aufnötigen werden.” NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische 
Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen.
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ested in matters of contemporary legal training. Engagement in this scientific 
field was also a logical continuation. After all, in Kiel Wieacker had been part of 
and amidst the “revolutionary renewal” of higher legal education, which had had 
an effect on his scholarly identity, especially on the pedagogical level. 115 
In some of his wartime articles Wieacker transformed his knowledge on land 
law into a proposal on the essential thematic structures behind this field, accord-
ing to which future legal education should be directed.116 Drawing a larger pic-
ture, Wieacker’s contribution can be connected to the drafting of and discussion 
over the new “peoples law” of Germany. This codification, collected and con-
structed from the viewpoint of the National Socialist ideology, was supposed to 
replace the old codification BGB. At a practical level the project did not ever 
really even begin, but it did not prevent scholars from arguing over the matter.117
To Wieacker, legal education had to cultivate the future lawyers’ own mental 
faculties, as well as initiate them to the virtuous and binding discipline of legal 
scholarship, where the personal examples as well as textual expressions of the 
preceding masters exhibited an uncompromising paragon. As already elaborated, 
to Wieacker the legally trained comprised a Stand, which was comparable to 
other legal associations in history, and in the long line of different social mani-
festations of the ‘lawyer-estates,’ the example of Late Republican Rome was the 
most virtuous and workable.118 All this he discussed with Carl Schmitt: 
But on the other hand I assign relative priority to the casuistic method of finding justice, be-
cause it is most appropriate for the purpose of law to work agilely through individual situations 
of social existence and with good judge’s disposition. Like strategy, upbringing and similar 
things bound to circumstances – but yet originated from orienting axioms – are not skills of 
social action that are attached to norms. I find the logical-exegetical-pragmatic legal expert of 
France and the philosophical-systematic dogmatist of Germany have equally lost this creative 
elasticity since the Reception. I believe, however, to the disadvantage of both peoples to whom 
115 Winkler 2014, 263, fn.  36.
116 Cf. Franz Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit der deutschen Bodenrechtswissenschaft der 
Gegenwart. Über die Umgestaltung des Grundstücksrechts durch die heutige Bodenpolitik’ 
[1942], in Wollschläger (ed.) 2000.
117 See Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 6.5.1941. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nord-
rhein-Westfalen, Duisburg. The theme of the Volksgesetzbuch is in itself a very interesting case 
study on the relation between National Socialist purposes and the scholar’s willingness to re-
spond to those demands. To Hans Frank, for example, creating the new codification was a pri-
ority and a fulfillment of the NSDAP party program. Wieacker contributed to the process of 
drafting the new “people’s law” to some extent (cf. Schubert 1988, 33–36.), though he later 
denied that he had had any significant part in the planning process. (a.o.o., 17). From the orig-
inal Kieler Schule, Georg Dahm, Karl Michaelis and Wolfgang Siebert also participated. 
Wieacker was reluctant about any codifications from a legal theoretical point of view. System-
izations hindered the vital connections between the law and reality. 
118 Cf. p.  105–107.
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the more liberal devotion to the Geist (idea or ideology) has given a higher representative rank 
but also a lower success in life than that which the Roman or English method can show for. For 
in contrast to the Greek and continental nations, who live from the Greek way of recognizing 
the world, both these peoples are true fetishists, but good or reasonable jurists.119
The two-way reference between the ‘great jurisprudence’ and Wieacker’s con-
temporary legal culture was constantly present. Legal thinking to Wieacker rep-
resented an ability to subordinate a given case to a more general principle (not 
just derive a decision from a rule), and recognize the similarities and differences 
between legally relevant events. It was a skill not only to use the law, but to fur-
ther develop it in one’s profession along with previous legal decisions. As such, 
legal praxis would be Schöpfung, a creative usage of the law, and, furthermore, it 
would bring just results from the point of view of the community: 
If you direct your attention to the specific English, French and German ways of investigating 
the law, one might wish that [our] doctrine were taken from there [roman jurisprudence][.]120
The pedagogical discussion in 1940s Germany did not circle around whether the 
previous dominant status given to Schöpfung should be reinstalled, rather schol-
ars quarreled on which way and following what “axioms” it was to be done.121 
Franz Wieacker both individually and as part of the Kieler Schule contributed to 
this discussion. Wieacker believed that the essence of the correct, “creative,” le-
gal thinking also provided a passage for successful legal education.122 The theme 
119 “Aber auf der anderen Seite gebe ich doch der kasuistischen Methode der Rechtsfindung 
den relativen Vorzug, weil sie am angemessensten der Aufgabe des Rechts ist, Einzelsituatio-
nen der sozialen Existenz geschmeidig und doch mit guter Richtungstendenz zu verarbeiten; 
ähnlich wie Strategie, Erziehung u. ähnliches Situationsgebundenes – aber doch von orientie-
renden Maximen, nicht normendurchsetzte Künste des sozialen Handelns sind. Diese schöpfe-
rische Elastizität vermisse ich beim logisch-exegetisch-pragmatischen Legisten Frankreichs 
und beim philosophisch-systematischen Dogmatiker Deutschlands seit der Rezeption gleicher-
massen; ich glaube doch zum Nach-teil beider Völker, denen die freiere Hingabe an den Geist 
(Idee oder Ideologie) einen höheren stellvertretenden Rang, aber auch geringeren Lebenserfolg 
gegeben hat als etwa die römische oder englische Methode zu verzeichnen hat; denn diese 
beiden Völker sind ja, im Gegensatz zum griechischen und den Völkern des Kontinents, die 
von der griechischen Art, die Welt zu erkennen, leben, wahre Fetischisten, aber gute oder leid-
liche Juristen.” Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 25.8.1942. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
120 “Wenn Sie die Aufmerksamkeit auf die spezifisch englische, französische und deutsche 
[Weise]der Ausforschung des Rechts lenken, so möchte man wünschen, daß bei uns auch die 
Lehre daraus gezogen werde[.]”, Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 25.8.1942. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 
0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
121 Cf. Frassek 2008, 360–364.
122 Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 25.8.1942: “Diese Frage möchte auch über den Denkstil unser-
er kommenden Richter und Rechtsdenker bestimmen.” NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesar-
chiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
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constituted a frame which knitted together his wartime writings. After all, 
Wieacker’s major project during the 1940s was to complete Privatrechts-
geschichte der Neuzeit, which was originally meant to serve as a legal historical 
textbook for legal education, and which is in particular a book on legal think-
ing.123 Hence, his enthusiasm for Erik Wolf’s Große Rechtsdenker der deutschen 
Geistesgeschichte (1939) becomes understandable on many levels, and the 
prominent and continuing feature in the correspondence between Erik Wolf and 
Wieacker is the interest Wieacker has in Wolf’s book. 
Wieacker’s own project of completing Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit 
seemed to progress at the same pace as he read Wolf’s book.124 Especially from 
1940 to 1943 Wieacker often wrote to Wolf about Große Rechtsdenker. Wieack-
er’s attempt was to “embody” the characters which Wolf wrote about, and un-
derstand their view of the world. In this hermeneutical task he asked for Wolf’s 
assistance in which he would either confirm Wieacker’s own insight on the in-
tentions of a given Rechtsdenker, or help Wieacker to more fully understand the 
borders of the horizons of past social theorists.125 Wieacker proceeded in the 
project of making sense of the thinking of past paragons in phases; he was clear-
ly and concurrently with the individual translation process trying to conceptual-
ize the long line of German legal thinking. How did the past scientist see jus-
tice? What were the axioms which distinguished noteworthy from mediocre the-
ories? What about the unchallenged truths which guided their thinking, and 
which changes marked a larger transition between the paradigms of intellectual 
history? 
Wieacker recognized a certain style of thinking in the works of past cultural 
heroes. Although they had not all been lawyers, their argumentation and reason-
ing followed a juridical pattern. Despite being poets or politicians Wieacker read 
them as legal thinkers. He started to see the intertwining of culture, the individu-
al and law appearing in the distinct ways of thinking of lawyers, a thinking which 
education had cultivated: 
123 Winkler 2014, 135–136.
124 See e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.5.1942: “Jedesmal wenn ich die neuere Privatrechts-
geschichte lese, nehme ich aufs Neue mit neuer Freude Ihre Rechtsdenker zur Hand.” NL Erik 
Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
125 See e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 18.10.1940. “Auch der lutherischen Lebensgesinnung 
dieser Männer wollte ich nicht präjudizieren. Nun konnte ich darüber nicht schreiben, denn der, 
dem der evangelische Geist selbst tot ist, kann sich auch nicht anmaßen, dergleichen in der 
Geschichte wiederzuerkennen; ich kann gleichsam das evangelische Erlebnis der Zeit nur an 
seinem literarischen Niederschlag wahrnehmen. So gebe ich zu, daß mein Bild notwendig un-
vollständig bleibt; aber ich habe mich wohlweislich gehütet, Oldendorfs und Melanchthon ein-
zubeziehen.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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It is great legal thinkers, not necessarily great jurists, who you mention, and I consider this to 
be no coincidence. “Great” in the traditional sense of historical significance is the statesman, 
poet, prophet or reformer, musician, artist, thinker and also the legal thinker. Jurisprudence as 
the intangible but enormously dense life-force of ancestry, the crust of life, capable power is 
practice itself, is so massive and enormous that its servant, the jurist, could rise to his own 
summit. Great are, therefore, your legal thinkers with the movements with which they reach 
beyond their legal functions and become moral philosophers or proclaimers of the legal con-
cept. The Roman jurists are, conversely, not great (the “greatest” of all), but rather Roman ju-
risprudence.126 
There were different types of legal reasoning varying in time and place and these 
culturally constituted ways of legal understanding could be compared to an ulti-
mate model of legal wisdom.127 In the correspondence, the statutes of positive 
law (Gesetz) and social justice (Gerechtigkeit) were separated ever more drasti-
cally and determinedly. Skillfulness in the former did not necessarily bring about 
learnedness in the latter. To be able to apply the idea of law, Rechtsidee, was a 
characteristic of a legal thinker.128 European culture was not in its essence the 
carefully ordered and regulated social reality of the modern world, rather it was 
originally based on the capability of the legally trained to be aware of their legal 
reality and consequently apply the legal ideas of a given society to judgments. 
The most important feature of a lawyer, judge or a legal scholar was to under-
stand the particularities of one’s society, to read the ‘existence’ of one’s social 
and temporal reality. It was understanding the peculiarities and borders of one’s 
time and its worldview, and in congruence with the preceding legal thinking, and 
126 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 10/1940. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Frei-
burg im Breisgau. “Es sind große Rechtsdenker, nicht notwendig große Juristen, die Sie zeigen, 
und ich halte dies für keinen Zufall. »Gross« im überlieferten Sinn der geschichtlichen Größe 
ist der Staatsmann, der Dichter, der Prophet oder Reformator, der Musiker, der Künstler und der 
Denker, auch der Rechtsdenker; die Jurisprudenz als die ungreifbare, aber unerhört dichte Le-
bensmacht des Herkommens, der Lebenskruste, der fähigen Macht ist selbst Routine, ist zu 
massiv und gewaltig, als dass sich ihr Diener, der Jurist, zu individueller Höhe erheben könnte. 
Gross sind daher Ihre Rechtsdenker mit den Zügen mit denen sie über ihr juristisches Amt hin-
ausreichen und zu Sozialethikern oder Verkündigern der Rechtsidee werden; umgekehrt sind 
gross nicht die römischen Juristen ‒ die »grössten« unter allen ‒, sondern die römische Ju ris-
prudenz”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 10/1940. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
127 Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 25.8.1942: “Ihre Forderung, durch Herausarbeitung eines be-
sonderen Berufsbildes die allgemeinen Aufstellungen über den französischen Geist oder Cha-
rakter erst konkret zu machen, ist sehr berechtigt; ebenso der Grundsatz, daß es nicht eine ju-
ristische Begabung gibt, die einigen Völkern zukommt, anderen nicht. Ich halte auch den römi-
schen Juristen nicht für den einzigen denkbaren Typus “der” juristischen Begabung, freilich für 
einen, der einem etwa denkbaren phänomenalen Typs “des” Juristen am nächsten kommt.” NL 
Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg. 
128 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.11.1941. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
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utilizing one’s legal education, to deliver a judgment in a single case. In concrete 
terms, a lawyer, judge or legal scholar had to be aware of, even assimilate, the 
prevailing mentality of his legal culture. Nevertheless, the legal consciousness of 
one’s culture had to be addressed from the perspective of the community of le-
gally trained individuals. The sub-culture, the community of the ‘legally skilled’ 
provided the means for an ‘anthropological’ study of ones ‘being.’ In other 
words, the underlying virtuous mentality of the scholars’ guild enabled a meta-
level scrutiny of the ways of thinking prevailing in one’s time. In 1936 Wieacker 
had called this shared and uniting mentality of scholars Grundhaltung, in 1939 
he continued to use the idea while writing about the Grundgedanken of Roman 
lawyers, which formed a point of departure in their legal “art”, and in 1942 he 
wrote of the lost Grundanschauung of medieval Germany.129 
In the context of the German legal science of the early twentieth century, 
Wieacker’s interest in the mental faculties involved in ‘creative’ jurisprudence is 
not surprising, but it is noteworthy how with the help of the concept he under-
stood and evaluated historical agents and epochs in order to contribute to the 
contemporary discussion of the interpretative activity of law. As the 1940s pro-
ceeded, the essence of legal thinking and the ability to usee one’s legal capability, 
as presented in the letters to both Carl Schmitt and Erik Wolf, were conceptual-
ized with increasing explicitness and sophistication. The position of the ‘true 
great jurisprudence’ of Roman law retained its place as a superior point of refer-
ence even to the legal culture of the modern world. As such, the view which 
Wieacker appreciated and upheld towards jurisprudence could have been articu-
lated as phronesis, practical legal wisdom, as presented by Aristotles and after 
him by a subsequent tradition of thinkers.130 
To Wieacker, however, legal thinking which allowed one to relate an individ-
ual case to a more general principle, and through a comparative perception to 
recognize the similarities and differences between one’s subject matter and exist-
ing decisions, as well as the skill to develop law, were explicated with the help of 
‘conscience,’ Gewissen. Such a choice of terminology clearly suggests a strong 
existentialist influence. It was after all Marin Heidegger who replaced the Aris-
totelian idea of phronesis with the German concept of Gewissen.131 The influence 
of Heidegger’s thinking might have been direct, but it was also indirect, stem-
129 See p.204 fn.  103; Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 449; Wieacker, ‘Die Stel-
lung’ 1942, 51.
130 Cf. Avenarius 2013, 67; Gadamer 2000, 308, 320–321. In another context Gadamer stat-
ed: “Phronesis [...] is the only methodological model for self-understanding of the human 
sciences if they are to be liberated from the spurious narrowing imposed by the model of the 
natural sciences,” quoted in Coltman, 1998, 19.
131 Coltman 1998, 12.
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ming from Wieacker’s acquaintance with Hans-Georg Gadamer and Erik Wolf, 
who used the concept, although in a different context, in their works.132 It is also 
noteworthy that in his wartime correspondence Wieacker started to refer to the 
social reality more and more as Existenz, as a complex web of assumptions, val-
ues, beliefs and images, which determined individuals being in the world.133 
There were limits to the human understanding of reality, and thus mechanical 
descriptions of social reality were both inaccurate and spoke of some sort of fear 
in admitting the finitude of human knowledge.134 
This existential tendency was obviously an extension of the familiar attack on 
legal formalism and naturalism of the preceding generations, but it is notable that 
contemporaneously, both Ernst Forsthoff and Carl Schmitt took steps in the 
same, more hermeneutically and existentially oriented, direction in their respec-
tive legal theorizations. Forsthoff returned to the teachings of Carl Friedrich von 
Savigny, analyzed the temporal limitations of legal language, and placed custom 
before positive law.135 Carl Schmitt praised Savigny for his attempts to distance 
the law from mere legality. Thus Savigny appeared to be pioneer in the jurispru-
dential battle against the “technicality” and “scientification.” The task of modern 
legal science was to follow Savigny’s “existential” attempt in order to become 
“the last safe haven of Rechtsbewusstsein.”136
Whatever Wieacker’s ultimate leanings were, from the point of view of his 
historical vision, the important outcome was that he started to incorporate the 
notion of ‘conscience’ into contemporary ideas regarding education and legal 
ability. The existentialist claim of Gewissen as the ontology of the highest form 
of individual human understanding was combined with the principles of the dis-
tinct position of the jurist Stand, and the cultivation of cultural knowledge (Bil-
132 Erik Wolf stated: “Die Tatsache des menschlichen Gewissens ist theoretisch unableitbar 
und von historischen Bedingungen unberührt,” cited in Ernst E. Hirsch, Zur Juristischen Di-
mension des Gewissens und der Unverletzlichkeit der Gewissensfreiheit des Richters. Berlin, 
Duncker & Humblot 1979, 55.
133 See e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.9.1940 (Hölderlin managed to capture the Existenz of 
the law). NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau; Wieacker to 
Ernst Rudolf Huber 23.2.1945 (On war and existence). NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 25.8.1942 (the correct jurisprudential meth-
od was to find a pattern or a form from social existence). NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Lan des-
archiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
134 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit [1953]. Albany, State 
University of New York Press 1996, 7–9.
135 Meinel 2012, 261–266; Forsthoff’s turn was familiar to Franz Wieacker. Forsthoff re-
called in his letter to Fritz von Hippel Wieacker’s response to his turn towards juridical herme-
neutics: “Der gute Wieacker knurrte brieflich etwas ob meiner conservative Grundhaltung 
[…],” quoted in Meinel 2012, 266.
136 In Meinel 2012, 261 fn.  186.
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dung). Thus Wieacker was able to bypass the fundamental dead end which ob-
structed the translation of Heidegger’s philosophy into a secular legal science. 
Now “conscience” could be attached to a tradition of legal knowledge so ground-
ed on common mentality and virtues that rather than a temporal construction it 
constituted a metaphysical structure.137
The application of this heuristic historiographical device started to take shape 
in his 11 April 1944 letter to Erik Wolf. In the letter Wieacker gave credit to Wolf, 
who in the second edition of his Große Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistes-
geschicht (1944) added sixteenth- and seventeeth-century theorists.138 At the 
same time Wolf came to deal with the era of the reception of Roman law as well 
as the origins of the idea of the state (Reichsidee) in Germany. Such themes were, 
of course, close to Wieacker and he congratulates Wolf for his vivid descriptions 
of past legal thinkers who “amid the blurring time” conducted their scholarly 
work without altering the particular spirit of law139 Wolf’s book was grounded on 
the same principles as before; without restricting himself narrowly to legal theo-
rists, he included important national figures who (according to Wolf) had contrib-
uted to the evolution of German legal culture. Wieacker commented:
I can safely tell you that I am also first tempted to get “annoyed” about it here (as with the legal 
thinkers) due to my restless and more flaring temperament, but it becomes clear to me that this 
toning down and negotiation are the manifestation of the scientific conscience.140
Wieacker did not attach ‘conscientious’ thinking only to his friends, like to Erik 
Wolf; the idea of ‘scientific conscience’ was a leitmotif which gathered the think-
ers of the past into a distinguished group, and vice versa, this concept constituted 
a heuristic tool in understanding the diverse writings, representations and expres-
sions of people in varying times and places. 
137 Wieacker elaborated the problem in 1967 as follows: “The difficulty lies in the very basis 
of this novel way of thinking, for it sees man as inevitably alone in his situation, and its criti-
cism of post-Platonic idealist metaphysics and its system of values destroys all possibility of 
any transcendent binding content of law.” Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 469. See 
also Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.11.1953. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Frei-
burg im Breisgau.
138 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.4.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
139 Ibid.: “Umsicht, mit der Strömungen, die die Zerisseheit der Zeitspiegeln, geordnet und 
vereinfacht sind ohne dass irgendeine in ihren besonderen Recht vergewaltig wird
140 “Ich darf Ihnen ruhig sagen, dass ich durch mein unruhigeres und flackernderes Tempe-
rament auch hier (wie bei den Rechtsdenkern) zuerst versucht bin, mich ‘daran zu ärgern’; aber 
es wird mir dann bald klar, dass diese Abtönungen und Vermittelungen der Ausdruck des wis-
senschaftlichen Gewissens sind.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.4.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Lud-
wig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau
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In the 1930s Wieacker had connected exceptional legal thinking with the idea 
of communality among legal scholars and explicated that shared mentality with 
the fashionable and national slogan of Kameradschaft. In the late years of the 
war, these connections fell apart. Despite the fact that distinct ‘legal art’ yet took 
place within the ‘estate’ of lawyers, and the circle of his Kieler Schule friends 
continued to represent the ‘academic homeland,’ legal conscience was no longer 
tied to the ‘legal renewal’ of Germany. The form and core of superior legal 
knowledge remained, but it could no longer be merged with contemporary polit-
ically loaded concepts. Such was the case with the idea of ‘communality,’ previ-
ously presented with the concept of Kameradschaft, both in public and scientific 
spheres. 
In the public culture of wartime Germany the concept of Kameradschaft now 
mostly signified the togetherness of and culture prevailing in the military 
troops.141 Wieacker, however, had no point of connection to this language. To 
him, serving in the military was foremost a duty, Dienst, and it did not contain 
any spiritual or higher meaning. Moreover, military service was a natural respon-
sibility, but nevertheless a “spiritually laborious duty.”142 In his letters from the 
frontline to Ernst Rudolf Huber and Hans-Georg Gadamer he never referred to 
his regiment as a Kameradschaft, nor was it even a ‘troop.’ Wieacker’s frontline 
letters to Huber contain a repertory of the emotions of disappointment, boredom, 
and cynical amusement at the bizarre reality of the war. The destruction of Ger-
man cities saddened Wieacker, and the army unit and military culture provided 
an environment which Wieacker could do nothing but wonder at with a sneer.143 
141 Kühne 2005, 113–171.
142 “geistig mühsame Dienst.”, Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.3.1945. NL Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar; cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf 
Huber 6.1.1944[1945] and 23.2.1945. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz.
143 In his letter to Ernst Rudolf Huber from 23.2.1945, after bitterly deploring the bombing 
of Freiburg, Wieacker cynically reported about his service: “Denn der gegenwärtige Zustand, 
so wichtig wie immer, ist nicht gerade der regelmässige für den Mittelpunkt meiner persönli-
chen Bestrebungen. Übrigens ist es ununterbrochen menschlich recht nett und dienstlich uner-
hört vorteilhaft.” He found constant amusement about his rank and work in the service. See e.g. 
Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.1944[1945]. After comparing himself to Corporal Gottlieb 
Köpke from Willibald Alexis’s book Isegrimm, he continued: “[D]essen so sehr erfreuliche 
menschliche (und dienstliche) Eigenschaften ich Dir also nicht erst zu [brauche] [...]; Unter 
diesen Umständen fungiere ich [als] Hilfsoffizier, was in sachlicher Hinsicht ein Expert in 
menschlich-dienstlicher aber sehr angenehm und ansprechend ist. Von den übrigen Umständen, 
der vorzüglichen Verpflegung wie der angenehmen Unterkunft, der interessanten Beschäfti-
gung zu berichten, versage ich mir heute, weil ich zu müde bin, um weitere Briefseiten zu 
schreiben.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Cf. Liebs 2011, 6 
fn.  11.
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The overall tone of the letters is melancholic and lonely. Wieacker even refers to 
actual battle as a “friend.”144 Bildung, learnedness, distanced Wieacker from 
most people, since that ability, according to Wieacker, allowed him to understand 
the common life in a larger, historical context, and to notice connections which 
were opaque to most.145 He did not perceive the Zeitgeist as a warring for strate-
gic resources, but as an eternal “clash of consciences”.146
Wieacker’s secondment and following stay in Italy, however, did produce im-
portant results with respect to his later scientific view and historical vision. The 
experience of war enabled Wieacker to further elaborate what Gewissen did or 
did not signify in modern society. Moreover, the distinction between ‘the people’ 
and the individual cultivating of Rechtsgewissen was being empirically proved. 
In a given existence people seemed to resort to different modes of understanding 
and explanation. In the harsh reality of the war, the different views could be sim-
plified with the dichotomy of superstition and ‘conscience,’ where the former 
continued to oppress the people, but the latter provided tools to understand real-
ity. In 1945 Wieacker described the Dasein, existence, of the Italian/German 
people to Gadamer as follows: 
The condition of the public of this country is so abominable. These people, without soul, with-
out conscience and destiny in the good and the bad, without humor in the proper meaning of the 
word, without sentimentality, and without the need to see a new reality that is only visibly 
transcendent of their own souls behind their own reality – these people are peculiarly a com-
forting and exhilarating form, and also likeable in the everyday world. To understand the judge-
ment “here without conscience”, I must use these words: instead of the soul, a bright cheerful-
ness, instead of responsibility, absolution, instead of the conscience, the law, instead of destiny, 
grace.147
144 See p.  111–112.
145 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 23.2.1945: In the letter Wieacker hopes that Huber 
would inform him about the latest “spiritual” matters: “Also schreibte selbst fleissig und er-
muntere auch andere dazu. Auch über Deine wissenschaftlichen Vorhaben höre ich gern und 
lasse mich gern auf ein Fachgespräch ein.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesar-
chiv Koblenz.
146 See p.  111.
147 “So abscheulich der öffentliche Zustand des Landes ist, dieser Mensch, ohne Gemüt, 
ohne Gewissen und Schicksal im Guten und im Bösen, ohne Humor im eigentlichen Sinne und 
ohne Sentimentalität, ohne das Bedürfnis, hinter seiner Wirklichkeit eine neue, nur der Einzel-
seele sichtbare transzendierende Wirklichkeit zu sehen, – dieser Mensch ist sonderbarerweise 
ein tröstliches und erheiterndes Bild, und und auch im Täglichen sympathisch. Wie das Urteil 
“ohne Gewissen hier” zu verstehen ist, muss ich doch wohl ausdrücken: statt des Gemüts die 
helle Heiterkeit, statt der Verantwortung die Absolution, statt des Gewissens das Gesetz, statt 
des Schicksals die Gnade.”, Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.3.1945. NL Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
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As elaborated, right after the war he announced to Ernst Rudolf Huber (quoting 
Goethe) that “people should be the object of our actions and thoughts!”148 In the 
preceding pages I have argued that this slogan emerged from a conviction to 
study the ambigious nature of the relation between the people, law and prevailing 
social circumstances (the state). This dynamic constellation Wieacker had al-
ready started to call Rechtsbewusstsein. Nevertheless, with respect to his quest to 
study Rechtsgewissen, the war also represented an important point of culmina-
tion. Wieacker became confident that in order to prevent such a tragedy occurring 
again, and to further repair what had been distorted, he had to promote the indis-
pensable importance of distinguished legal thinking, increasingly highlight its 
origins and different historical phases, and cultivate the art of ‘legal conscience’ 
within the people.
4. ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ (1939): The historical paragon of 
community and creativity
One of Franz Wieacker’s most celebrated articles is ‘Vom Römischen Juristen,’ 
published in the journal Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1939 
and later included in the collection ‘Vom römischen Recht’ (1944).149 The article 
was based on Wieacker’s inaugural lecture at the University Leipzig, where he 
moved in 1937. In this particular article Wieacker managed to explicate in an 
exceptionally vivid and clear way the essence of Roman jurisprudence. The con-
ventional stance, which Wieacker greatly influenced, and not least with ‘Vom 
Römischen Juristen,’ acknowledges that Roman lawyers worked in a totally dif-
ferent legal culture than contemporary legal professionals. Nevertheless, their art 
of understanding and applying the law as well as the reasoning it required was an 
admirable ability, which intrigued and continues to intrigue modern lawyers. 
Hence, in comparison to the twentieth century German legal culture, Roman law 
seemed to be an ideal both at the level of the actual work of lawyers as well as in 
their status within a society. 
The article’s influence, however, went beyond a mere description of the histor-
ical circumstances which prevailed the in Roman world. In his text Wieacker 
attempted to explain how the social conditions of the Late Republic shaped the 
148 See p.  159.
149 Wieacker himself, at least until publishing of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit in 
1952, considered this text as the most telling presentation he had come up with. Cf. Wieacker 
to Salvatore Riccobono 2.2.1940; Wieacker to Gerhard Dulckeit 14.6.1950, Nachlass Gerhard 
Dulckeit, NL Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göt-
tingen.
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thinking of lawyers, how Roman law became what it was through the interaction 
of social and cultural structures, and how Roman jurisprudence became trans-
formed into a tradition which seemed to enable lawyers (even modern lawyers) 
to reach a true and just legal decision. In the article Wieacker continued in the 
footsteps of, for example, Fritz Pringsheim, who had intended to reinterpret the 
Roman law and release the discipline from the theoretical frames created by 
among others Rudolf von Jhering and Carl von Savigny, in order to find a new 
significance for it within the changed legal system and German society.150 Like 
the scholars of the previous generation, Wieacker defended the particularity and 
genuine nature of Roman law, and sought to prove its self-standing essence. The 
bad name which Roman law had in contemporary German culture was due to a 
misunderstanding and to a twisting of the original, pure idea.151 Roman law was 
a unique craftsmanship for understanding and dealing with the immediate world, 
and it was fundamentally different from Greek scholastic and modern theories of 
law. The attachment of these theoretical frameworks to Roman law had emerged 
in its later historical development, and they had distorted the true core of Roman 
jurisprudence.
In ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ Wieacker held on to his preceding scientific 
claims, especially those concerning the idea of property in jurisprudence. Thus, 
his construction was not at odds with the official line of the Nazi regime. He was 
also able to place his argument within the field of Roman law scholarship. From 
the methodological point of view, his study was unlike the Interpolazion-
forschung or more conventional stances like those of Paul Koschaker and Fritz 
Schultz, but addressed a similar problematic as these senior scholars did in their 
research.152 However, Wieacker’s methodology and philosophical starting point 
was fundamentally original. Wieacker bypassed the earlier epistemological cus-
tom, where previous studies were challenged through a more thorough handling 
of the ancient texts, or where a particular collection was seen as more authentic 
than the sources which other scholars had focused on. Rather, he sought to under-
stand the worldview of the Roman lawyers. He tracked down the questions they 
had presented to their sphere of being, and which guided their thinking and acts 
in their task of constructing a workable society. In other words, Wieacker sought 
to understand and further analyze the meaning of the common experience shared 
by the group of Roman lawyers in the Late Republic.
Thus, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ is not significant only from the viewpoint of 
the canon of German legal and intellectual history; the text lays down the seeds 
150 Rückert 2010, 84–85.
151 Cf. Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942; Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung’ 1939.
152 Cf. Winkler 2014, 179–219.
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of Wieacker’s legal hermeneutics and was an important point of reference to, for 
example, Hans-Georg Gadamer.153 The text can also be read as the outlining of a 
perfect legal system within a political society. As such the situation of ‘Vom 
römischen Juristen’ in Wieacker’s scholarly career its relation to the develop-
ment of the political climate in National Socialist Germany is akin to the turn 
Ernst Forsthoff’s writings took at the end of the 1930s. Forsthoff, who in his 
‘Totale Staat’ of 1933 formulated a very straightforward analysis of contempo-
rary society, which included clear suggestions on the arrangement of social struc-
tures and legal practices, by the end of the decade had shifted his focus to more 
distant spheres of legal history and legal theory.154 The conservative legal schol-
ars slowly started to realize that their ideas of the contemporary society were not 
appreciated by the party or by the fascist administration. Morevover representing 
such direct claims might even be dangerous. In fact, Forsthoff’s and Wieacker’s 
texts did comment on the contemporary world, but in a mild, camouflaged and 
indirect way. In what follows I shall analyze ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ with re-
spect to the concept of Rechtsgewissen, discussing what the text tells us about 
Wieacker’s foundational idea of legal conscience, and its emergence in the Euro-
pean legal history. 
In the article Wieacker continued his study of the ancient legal world in an 
already familiar manner; in order to transmit the meaning of the bygone legal 
phenomenon to the modern world, a scholar needed to concentrate on the social 
and cultural reality on which the phenomenon was situated. He set out to repre-
sent the mentality of historical agents, the thoughts, virtues, values and beliefs 
they possessed. Accordingly, when he formulated the essence of Roman jurispru-
dence and its lasting effect on modern society, the key structure in his construc-
tion was the social constellation of ancient lawyers and their position within so-
ciety. He called this association of lawyers a Zunft (guild) or Juristenstand (the 
estate of jurists). It was thus an association solely for lawyers, which at the same 
time formed an ‘estate’ within Roman society as a whole. Wieacker considered 
the social mission of the Juristenstand to be an indispensable part of the political 
functioning of Roman society. The praetors and laymen who were responsible 
for the political leadership of society, needed to rely on the expertise of those 
who knew and understood the law. The ‘lawyer-guild’ was a natural and obliga-
tory part of society, a tool for the authorities to rule and direct the people. The 
indispensability of the ‘lawyer-guild’ was based on the one hand to the overarch-
ing significance of law to the Romans, and on the other hand to the highly differ-
entiated and sophisticated nature of this jurisdiction.
153 Gadamer 2000, 18.
154 Meinel 2012, 226 ff.
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Such specialized expertise grows out of practice and consistent tradition. It can therefore only 
be kept in shape by a group of experts. Since it requires a constant expert concern, this group 
must necessarily be dispensed from a general political executive authority.155
In formulating the notion of the Roman ‘lawyer-guild’ Wieacker compares it to 
the English inns of court, which to him and to Carl Schmitt represented a modern 
constellation where legal knowledge flourished among the like-minded.156 In do-
ing so Wieacker, albeit in an indirect way, refers the guild to a concrete order. A 
more accurate twentieth century counterpart, however, would be that of a Bur-
schenschaft (a German students’ corporation) or an exclusive Kameradschaft. 
Wieacker’s guild was a group with closed borders, and it cultivated its inner 
culture distinct from other groups within society. The acceptance of new candi-
dates into the guild was decided democratically and according to a tradition; 
participants came from different backgrounds, but all went through an “appren-
ticeship” and an established “routine” in becoming full members of the circle. 
The guiding principle in selecting new members was the “high masculine author-
ity” which those nominated were supposed to possess and express.157 The partic-
ipants were “men of spotless reputation, great in importance and reliability.” 
Such men comprised “the proficient and honorable core of the Stand,” which was 
distinguished from the “[Winkelkonsulenten] and legacy hunters” on the outskirts 
of the guild. The latter nevertheless occasionally managed to bring the whole 
Stand into disrepute with their immoral and incompetent deeds, hence the bad 
name which some ancient sources gave to jurists. 158 Wieacker’s division into 
noble and ignoble lawyers, is compatible with the one he later used in describing 
the essence of the “lawyer Stand” during the later eras of European history.159 
Such divisions enabled him to maintain his idea of the unchanging, moral and 
spiritual core of the community of legal practitioners within German (and Euro-
pean) history. The historical sources which reported the shady and illegal acts of 
lawyers, could thus be ignored in the legal historical analysis, and be seen to refer 
to ‘inauthentic material’ outside the lawyer Stand. 
155 “Solche Fachtechnik entwächst der Routine und der ständigen Überlieferung; sie kann 
daher nur von einem sachverständigen Kreis in Form gehalten warden. Und da sie ein ständiges 
fachliches Interesse voraussetzt, muss dieser Kreis notwendig von allgemeinen politischen 
Führungsaufgaben dispensiert sein.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 445.
156 See p.  103–104.
157 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 446: “Das Auswahlprinzip einer freien Zunft 
ist notwendig demokratisch […]; Zutritt hat, wen Routine und fachliche Bewährung auswei-
sen.“; 446: “Die hohe menschliche Autorität steht immer ausser Frage.”; 447: “[Ein Jurist ist] 
ein makelloser Mann voll Gewicht und Verlässlichkeit.”
158 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 447: “dem Tross der Winkelkonsulenten und 
Erbschleicher, die den tüchtigen und ehrenwerten Kern des Standes begleiten.”; cf. p.  59.
159 Cf. p.  131.
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According to Wieacker, the existence and acknowledgment of the Roman 
guild of lawyers was based on its ‘authority’. So not only was the circle a neces-
sity for the functioning of society and the administration, but the guild as a whole 
also enjoyed the respect of citizens and leaders. Authority came from the virtues 
which the members embodied and expressed. These virtues were Roman, but in 
a refined manner, since members of the legal fraternity were distinguished from 
other learned and public figures in Roman society. The lawyer Stand was a spe-
cial community of experts, which elevated lawyers to an incomparable social and 
moral status. The experience of togetherness, the acknowledgment of the bond 
which connected jurists as a distinct entity, was reinforced in their routines of 
conducting legal assignments and creating legally binding decisions. The “life-
form [of the guild of lawyers] was permeated by close male relationships” and 
the habit of consulting each other in their duty, and as such they represented the 
rational backbone of Roman society.160
[…] the free service to the community, that is practiced through expert opinion and instruction 
and of which the strictest guarantee is the predominant non-remuneration. This is the difference 
between the “honos” and the higher professions, also especially the learned but legally trained 
court speakers, on whose he [the “honos”] looks down with silent contempt of the real ex-
pert.161
Another key prerequisite for Wieacker’s construction was that the guild of jurists 
cultivated a distinct, common mentality, which he calls “common knowledge” or 
“guild-knowledge” [Zunftwesen].162 The thinking of the guild welled from 
“class-based spiritual cultivation,” “political freedom,” “interest of the legal ex-
perts” and above all the custom of “mutual assistance and collegial advice.”163 
The guild was at the same time a vital and fundamentally apolitical organ in the 
community of Rome. The bonds which attached it to society were strong ties of 
sacred duty. Essentially, members of this guild were free. They were masters of 
the cultural tradition, but not restricted by it. The guild rested on individual agen-
160 See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 443: The method of the Roman Ju-
rists “liegt in der Lebensform des consilium, die das römische, von engen menschlichen Bezie-
hung durchflochtene Leben durchwirkt.”
161 “[D]em freien Dienst am Gemeinwesen, der durch Gutachtung und Unterweisung geübt 
wird, und dessen strengste Gewähr die überwiegende Unentgeltlichkeit ist. Eben dies dies un-
terscheidet den honos vom Erwerb auch höherer Art, besonders auch vom gebildeten, aber 
rechtskundigen Prozessredner, auf den er mit der stillen Geringschätzung des wirklich Sach-
kundigen herabblickt.“, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 447. Emphasis original.
162 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 447: “Denn nur ein offenes Zunftwesen gibt 
die Bedingungen für eine solche Gruppenbildung, für die in der späteren Amtsjurisprudenz 
kein Raum mehr war.“
163 See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 446: “das ständige Interesse gelehr-
ter und praktischer, namenloser und vornehmer Liebhaber bestätigen sie.”, also 447.
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cy, but as an entity it formed a tradition. Guided by a worldview of highly spe-
cialized professionals, it also had down-to-earth convictions based on common 
virtues. Hence, it is obvious that Wieacker’s description of the inner culture of 
Roman Juristenstand managed to include all of the (sometimes contradictory) 
virtues which he and his time valued. According to Wieacker the mentality of the 
guild was not explicitly defined in terms of strict principles, code or regulations. 
It was more of a perception and horizon, founded on common virtues and a com-
mon lifestyle. Rather than norms regulating ones thinking, the defining world 
view of the Roman Jurist-estate was a vocation or conviction.
But they [the roman lawyers] are deeper connected with the religio by common rules of ideas 
which are embedded in the nature of Roman people. It is the narrow but concentrated imagina-
tive power of a rural human being with a mercantile facet and the brusque discipline of a sol-
dier.164 
The important feature with respect to jurisprudence was that this mentality was 
the starting point for the superior legal skill (Rechtskunde) of the Roman jurist. 
“Self-aware guild knowledge” formed a common ground and principle which 
knitted casuistic decisions to a coherent “legal art” and “orientation.”165 Roman 
legal culture was comprised of case law, casuistic derivation from previous deci-
sions, and the development of the form of jurisdiction. Actual jurisprudence was 
based on precedence.166 In time, with the ongoing differentiation between the 
economic and administrative spheres of Roman society, the mastering of legal 
culture became a difficult task. Moreover, the understanding and utilization of 
Roman law was more than mere political decision-making and law-giving. 
Wieacker asserts that due to its complicated and sophisticated nature, conducting 
jurisprudence in Roman culture was more a matter of “creating” than of mere 
“judging.”167 Such a creative construction of tradition without ignoring the par-
ticular nature of a given legal case, and the way in which a decision was connect-
ed to the wider orientation of legal culture, necessitated some guiding principles 
within legal reasoning. The “guild-knowledge” constituted such “pre-judice” 
164 “Aber tiefer verbindet sie mit der religio die Gemeinsamkeit von Vorstellungsgesetzlich-
keiten, die im römischen Grundcharakter ruhen. Es ist das enge, aber konzentrierte Vorstel-
lungsvermögen eines bäuerlichen Menschen mit händlerischem Einschlag und der schroffen 
Disziplinierung des Soldaten.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 450.
165 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 449: “eine selbstbewusste Rechtszunft,” 
“praktisch-traditionelle Richtung,” “Die Forderung dieser wissenschaft: der Aufbau einer geis-
tigen Welt durch die Erkenntnis und die Einfügung der Einzelerscheinung in ein übergeordne-
tes Gesetz ist der römischen Rechtskunde kraft ihres Ursprungs entgegengesetzt.”
166 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 441, 448.
167 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 441: “An bescheidenem Ort erbringt er also 
die grösste dauernde eigenrömische Schöpfung. Denn das römische Recht ist echtes Juristen-
recht.” Emphasis original.
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[Vorgriff];168 it was an orientation which directed the argumentation of Late Re-
publican lawyers. Wieacker describes the underlining stream [Grundgedanken] 
in the Roman legal thinking as follows: 
For a precedent can only be used when one recognizes the common fundamental idea: the ter-
tium comparationis. This fundamental idea can be used with unconscious contemplation or 
explicitly formulated and handed down as a rule. Such rules are not abstract major premises but 
rather guiding principles of future practice that are acquired by contemplation and experi-
ence.169
This quotation captures three essential traits in Wieacker’s article. First, Roman 
jurisprudence was a ‘praxis’ and a form of ‘practical wisdom’. Furthermore, this 
wisdom was born out of a shared ‘experience’ of jurists. And finally, this experi-
ence-based knowledge lived on as a skill of ‘legal knowledge,’ Rechtswissen. It 
is striking that the fundamental themes on which Wieacker worked throughout 
his career, are clearly expressed in a text, which was published when he was no 
more than 31 years of age. The themes of ‘practical wisdom,’ ‘experience,’ and 
‘Rechtswissen’ were lasting ontological principles in his vision concerning con-
temporary legal science and the legal history of Europe, and one can find these 
paradigms in Wieacker’s works even in the 1960s. In order to give a compre-
hensive presentation on the meaning of these themes in Wieacker’s production, 
it is important to discuss the significance he attached to them in 1939. It is also 
essential, that these foundational themes emerge as ideals in the context of 
 Roman law, and more precisely, as mental faculties within the guild of Roman 
lawyers. 
In Wieacker’s reconstruction of Roman jurisprudence, Late Republican law 
and lawyers served as a “golden age” to which he attributed features which he 
saw as lacking in the present. However, this golden age, an ideal type of society 
for scholarship, was reconstructed with the help of his contemporary acknowl-
edgment and understanding of society. The things he valued as important and 
noble remained such in his reconstruction of Roman society, only in an empha-
sized manner. In what follows I scrutinize more closely each entity of ‘Rechts-
wissen,’ ‘experience’ and ‘practical wisdom,’ acknowledging that to Wieacker 
these conceptualizations were not separate domains. Rather they marked differ-
168 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 449.
169 “Denn ein Präjudiz kann nur angewendet warden, wenn man den gemeinsamen Grund-
gedanken, das tertium comparationis erkennt. Dieser Grundgedanke kann mit unbewusster 
Anschauung angewendet, aber auch ausdrücklich als Regel formuliert und überliefert werden. 
Solche Regeln sind noch keine abstrakten Obersätze, sondern durch Anschauung und Erfah-
rung gewonnene Richtsnuren künftiger Praxis.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 
449. Emphasis original.
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ent spheres of the same phenomenon which Wieacker later called legal con-
science, Rechtsgewissen. 
Wieacker’s ‘legal experience’ [Juristenerfahrung], even on the semantic level, 
as a term within an individual text, is comprised of many particles. The social 
status of jurists played one part, as did their common education and deep rela-
tionship with each other. The process of legal reasoning, causality and translating 
recognition into exact verbal expressions were all fundamental. The existence 
and acknowledgement of a body of accumulated knowledge, tradition, enabled 
this phenomenon to rise above mere knowing. Words and their relation to reality 
was the playground in which Juristenehrfahrung performed and emerged. It was 
partly unconscious, but at the same time it was a skill which one could culti-
vate.170 Nevertheless ‘experience’ was a theme which distinguished Wieacker 
from most of the scholars working in the field of Roman law, especially in the 
way he connected it with the spheres of conceptualization and tradition. 
Wieacker was confident that the lawyers of the late Republic were exception-
ally gifted linguistically. This did not mean that they were mere public speakers, 
since he saw the rhetorical school – its most famous representative being Cicero 
– as a contributing to the fall of true Roman jurisprudence.171 Rather, lawyers 
were able to articulate with high accuracy and creativity the process by which 
they sought to decide a given case. They managed to develop a legal language 
[Rechtssprechung] which enabled them to connect the elements of a case to joint-
ly and historically created abstractions.172 In other words, Roman lawyer Stand 
conceptualized some particular spheres of beliefs and actions, which then had an 
effect on the outcome of many legal cases. This however was not at all the mod-
ern “jurisprudence of concepts.” Whereas scholars like Savigny and Jhering had 
created “another, artificial world” of concepts, “beside the real material world,” 
the legal terms of Roman lawyers were derived from life itself. The legal rhetoric 
of Roman jurisprudence had a “different logical and ontological structure.”173 
This was due to the transmission of a common experience within the tradition of 
the lawyer guild. The wisdom of the past translated into linguistic tools, which 
were fundamental in the cognitive process of decision-making. The concepts of 
Roman lawyers were: 
170 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 455.
171 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 453.
172 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 455.
173 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 451: “So schafft sie ein selbständiges System 
juristischer Beziehung, das wie eine zweite irreale Welt neben die natürlich tritt,” “lebendige 
Wesen”; on the relation between juridical expressions and reality in Roman jurisprudence: “Die 
Aussagen über juristische Bedeutungen sind nicht wie unsere logische oder ethische, auf Gel-
tung bezogene, sondern ontologische, auf eine besondere juristische Existenz bezogene.”
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Though these figures of thought have a different logical and ontological structure. [...] [T]hey 
are, incidentally, examples from fixed legal statements that formed from ancient suprapersonal 
experience and artistic tradition in terms, so to speak, of curdled jurisprudential experience 
from incontrovertible firmness, as with technical or medical specialized terms.174
So the wisdom, which pre-classical linguistic constructions contained, was partly 
‘symbolic.’175 These constructions explained reality far more comprehensively 
than later, more theoretical forms of conceptualization which effected European 
legal culture. Wieacker described Roman jurisprudence by partly juxtaposing it 
with wissenschaft, science. Here ‘science’ meant a form of theorization and a 
feature of “Greek justice theories,” “Byzantine thought” and modern “jurispru-
dence of concepts.”176 Wieacker asserted that the fundamental misrepresentation 
with respect to Roman law, which all of the above-mentioned views possessed, 
was that they treated the works of the classic lawyers as attempts to formalize the 
legal world. The later ‘scientifications’ of Roman legal practice interpreted the 
texts of the Juristenstand as expressions of some hierarchical cognitive construc-
tion or comprehensive theory. Here lay the fundamental misunderstanding, since 
– according to Wieacker – Roman law was a “practical routine,” and conducted 
“partly unconsciously.” The process of deciding necessitated “intuition.” Wieack-
er asserted that probably the Roman lawyers themselves (if asked) could not have 
been able to explain how they they found an ultimate solution in a given case.177 
The ‘art’ of mastering Roman jurisprudence was like a craft, where the skill of 
completing the process was prior to being aware of all the social and juridical 
results one’s decision brought about. The Roman lawyers embodied the world-
view and “legal skill” of the Free State of Rome; “the [guild of] expert-jurist were 
themselves their structure and method.”178 Like a doctor or experienced artist a 
Roman lawyer did not reflect on what he was about to carry out; the assimilation 
174 “Aber diese Denkgebilde haben eine andere logische und ontologische Struktur. […] im 
übrigen aber Anschauungsbilder von feststehenden juristischen Aussagen, die sich in uralter 
überpersonlicher Erfahrung und Kunstüberlieferung gebildet haben; gleichsam in Begriffe 
geronnene Juristenerfahrung von unumstösslicher Festigkeit, wie technische oder ärztliche 
Fachbegriffe.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 455–456.
175 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 456: “Die römischen Rechtsbegriffe haben 
daher auch die Fruchtbarkeit von Symbolen.”
176 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 454, 461.
177 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 456: “Die alten Juristen können uns nicht 
sagen, wie sie hier zur Entscheidung gelangten. Denn dieser Vorgang ist im genauen Sinn intu-
itiv, er verläuft wie viele produktive Schöpfungen nicht diskursiv.”
178 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 453: “[Die] Zunft […war] ein intaktes und 
dienendes Glied der res publica. Die Fachjurisprudenz behauptete sich in ihrem Aufbau und 
ihrer Methode.”
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of the tradition and solid awareness of real “existence,” enabled him to create 
laws which reproduced the Roman values and maintained social order.179 
His decision lives rather from contemplation, decision and conceptual pathways that are 
learned from his accumulated experience, and out of which the adept artist or doctor acts spon-
taneously. In this way the jurist’s own experience not only stands by precepts, but also his situ-
ational understanding becomes objective authority through the uninterrupted tradition of expe-
rience of jurists that has been consolidated to fixed concepts and principles, of which the jurist 
is absolutely certain.180
Wieacker added that the theme of social justice was foreign to Late Republican 
lawyers; what mattered was the relation between a decision and the legal tradi-
tion. This tradition, however, was not opposed to social justice. Since the “guild 
knowledge” of the lawyers was an elemental part of the Late Republic – it was a 
“limb” in the body of society – the judgments which the lawyers delivered were 
just from the point of view of the society and the Roman worldview.181 Moreo-
ver, and in time, the classical jurisprudence of Rome assimilated Greek theories 
of justice into their tradition. The Roman jurists of the second century A.D. 
equated (and correctly according to Wieacker) their legal skill with that of social 
justice. The creative power of the Juristenstand came to mean the process which 
produced just results, at the same time confirming the “productive” or pro-active 
essence of the tradition of Roman jurisprudence.182 Within the tradition previous 
intuitive decisions were actually present; the experiences of past lawyers were at 
the disposal of a Roman lawyer through his own experience while performing 
the process of reaching a correct decision.
For the connection to the endless traditional casuistry is usually also obtained with the legal 
reduction. The casuistry’s role is often used unconsciously from experience and tradition.183
Socialization to an ontological attitude towards infinitude within the guild, learn-
edness in legal subject matter, cultivating an ability to express verbally the 
179 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 451: “juristische Existenz.”
180 “Sondern seine Entscheidung lebt von den in seiner Erfahrung aufgespeicherten gelern-
ten Anschauungs- und Entscheidungsbahnen, Vorstellungswege, aus denen auch der erfahrene 
Künstler oder Arzt spontan handelt. Aber dabei steht dem Juristen nicht nur eigne Erfahrung zu 
Gebote. Sondern sein Fallverständnis wird objektive Autorität durch die ununterbrochene Er-
fahrungsüberlieferung der Juristen, die sich zu feststehenden Vorstellungen und Grundsätzen 
verdichtet hat, deren der Jurist absolut gewiss ist.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 
456. Emphasis original.
181 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 454.
182 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 456.
183 “Denn mit der juristischen Reduktion ist in der Regel auch schon der Anschluss an die 
endlose überlieferte Kasuistik gewonnen, deren rationes dem Juristen aus Erfahrung und Über-
lieferung so vertraut sind, dass er sie oft unbewusst anwendet.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen 
Juristen’ 1939, 456.
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spheres of human being and an assimilation of the craft of legal procedure, com-
prised the Roman legal tradition. Thus the individual experience of being a Ro-
man lawyer was one with the inner justice which the tradition embodied and re-
produced.
Their [The Roman lawyers] output is objective, thus creation; art not in the sense of an incon-
sequential skill, but rather of a productive, life-multiplying act of creation.184
It is fair to present such intuitive, creative legal reasoning within a circle of 
scholars as Rechtsgewissen. To Wieacker, Late Republican jurisprudence was an 
incomparable model and ancient paragon for succeeding legal cultures, not only 
in the sense that the legal terms it had produced continued to inhabit the twentieth 
century German legal rhetoric, but as material legal order [Ordnung] involving 
the intertwinement of cultural, religious, linguistic and social systems. Wieacker 
admits that Roman law as Dasein like this is unreachable to modern lawyers, but 
nevertheless its example should inspire modern jurists and legal scholars to 
search for “common knowledge” on which to base their legal system. They 
should acknowledge “the relation to their völkisch community […], be aware of 
this community’s basic values, and articulate more powerfully than the jurists of 
the high-classical times” in order to hear the “living voice of the völkisch Law”.185 
The skill (practical wisdom) and ontological prerequisites (shared experience) 
of the Roman lawyers comprised their comprehensive understanding of the legal 
application [Rechtswissen]. Their Lehre, embodiment of legal practice, was 
transmittable, learnable and applicable throughout the centuries. Thus, this trini-
ty of wisdom, experience and application comprised the custom which distin-
guished the lawyers of the Late Republican world from other legal cultures. In 
the long line of Franz Wieacker’s legal scientific works this trinity sustained its 
place as a superior paragon to all other legal practices in European legal history. 
Although not yet clearly explicated, expressions of the custom of ‘great jurispru-
dence’ as a whole, and as a part of the respected social reality, amounted to legal 
conscience, Rechtsgewissen. Thus, every given legal mentality studied by 
Wieacker, within its respected historical circumstances, was related to this legal 
culture. His construction of the legal conscience of Late Republican lawyers rep-
resented a point of reference from which legal cultures which developed later 
could be evaluated. 
Wieacker’s construction of the legal culture of ‘great jurisprudence’ was in 
line with the previous legal historical works on the division between theoretical 
184 “Seine Leistung ist objektiv, daher Schöpfung; Kunst nicht im Sinn eines beziehungslo-
sen Könnens, sondern eines produktiven, lebenvermehrenden Schaffens.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom 
römischen Juristen’ 1939, 456–457.
185 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 463.
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legal science and ‘living jurisprudence.’ Fritz Pringsheim’s writings clearly had 
an effect on Wieacker’s formulations, although he did not want to quote Prings-
heim directly, due to the restrictions on references to Jewish scholars in the Ger-
man legal academia.186 Certainly Pringsheim’s work on the differences between 
Greek and Roman legal cultures, and his claim that a theoretically overloaded 
jurisprudence could not treach a socially just result, should be taken into ac-
count.187 On the other hand Wieacker’s article echoed the legal philosophy of the 
‘New legal science’ and Lebensnähe which advocated jurisprudence’s closeness 
to the values of actual life.188 Wieacker represented the Rechtsgewissen of the 
late Republican lawyers as phronesis, practical wisdom, which connected his 
thoughts on scholars like Giambattista Vico and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Mar-
tin Heidegger.
My analysis introduces two sources of inspiration in Wieacker’ ideas of legal 
conscience or legal experience, which have not been sufficiently considered in 
the research literature: the influence of Martin Heidegger’s existentialism, and 
the togetherness experienced in the working communities of the ‘New legal sci-
ence.’ In his philosophy Heidegger exhibited a novel way of interpreting the 
European philosophical tradition, but also a new approach of understanding the 
philosophical act.189 To Heidegger understanding and questioning about the 
world were always bound to the inevitable finitude of the human mind. Science 
was only a limited way of gaining information about the world, and should not 
be equated with the truth. Philosophy, on the other hand, was a way of thinking 
which was based on robust, everyday practical knowledge on “being-in-the 
world” (Dasein).190 In describing the existentialist thinking – and Dasein’s im-
mediate relation to the world – Heidegger used the image of a craftsman who 
almost unconsciously masters his skill but might not be able to explain it to oth-
ers.191 The knowledge of a master is exhibited in what he does. Knowing how 
was always prior to knowing that. The concepts and names which people have 
given to ‘things’ served as tools in Dasein’s attempt to make sense of the tempo-
ral world it inhabits, and concepts themselves were not a sufficient passage to 
truth. Heidegger built his theory on ancient classics, but he did not attach his 
theory to any thinker too strictly. He was, however, explicit in rejecting Plato’s 
theory on ideal-world, and instead emphasized the significance of pre-Platonists 
like Parmenides. His point of departure was Aristotles’ three-level division of 
186 See p.  82–83.
187 Pringsheim, ‘Höhe und ende der Römischen Jurisprudence’ 1961.
188 Cf. Winkler 2014, 398–403.
189 Coltman 1998.
190 Heidegger 1996, 3–6.
191 Ibid., 62–67.
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knowledge, and he strongly underlined the importance of “phronesis,” practical 
wisdom.192 This he called Gewissen, conscience. Conscience was a channel in 
rethinking the complexities of one’s own and others’ Dasein. 
In 1933 Wieacker lectured at the University of Freiburg, where Heidegger was 
rector. Wieacker participated in the Todtenauberg docent camp led by Heidegger, 
and although the events in the camp were unfortunate from Wieacker’s point of 
view, Heidegger’s thoughts had a definite influence on him, as they did for a 
whole generation of young scholars working in Freiburg. In addition, Wieacker’s 
letter to Erik Wolf from 1947 show that Wieacker had personal contact with Hei-
degger even after the war, and respected him as a philosopher and thinker.193 One 
also has to take into account the indirect influence of Heidegger, via Erik Wolf 
and Hans-Gerorg Gadamer, who were close colleagues of Wieacker from the 
1930s onward. Wieacker’s letters to Erik Wolf prove that in principle he believed 
that Heidegger’s teachings could be highly beneficial in studying legal history, if 
properly adjusted.194 The image, which ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ provides of 
from the thinking of Late Republican jurists, is, in any case, very Heideggerian. 
The legal skill of Roman jurists was an ‘unconscious craft,’ beyond ‘mere defini-
tions.’ In a strange bond, the jurists were one with their tradition, whose wisdom 
was part of their ‘common knowledge’ and identity, and did not dictate their 
‘productive’ creativity. To Roman jurists legal definitons were not detached from 
‘practical life,’ but like ‘symbols’ and attached to the ‘things’ to which they relat-
ed. Their concepts had a different, ontological existence. Even the rejection of 
Greek theories in Wieacker’s article was justified on the basis that the ‘justice 
theories’ and ‘rhetorics’ devalued the essence of the craft, or praxis, of the origi-
nal legal wisdom of Roman jurists.
Nonetheless, as Wieacker himself expressed in Privatrechtsgeschichte, Hei-
degger’s theoretical guidelines did not in the end provide a foundation for con-
192 Ibid., 1–7, 9–13.
193 See p.  150 fn.  342.
194 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.11.1953: Wieacker praises the work of Werner Maihofer, and 
continues: “Das Schönste ist, dass diesem durch “Sein und Zeit” erweckten denkenden Men-
schen Gewissenhaftigkeit und Ernst ein [a greek word] zum “uneigentlichen Man” verboten 
habe. Seine Kritik hat Heidegger mit Recht als eine Hilfe empfinden können. […] Dieser un-
philosophische Kopf [Wieacker is talking about himself] möchte sich wünschen, dass das in 
den Einsichten großer Juristen obiter eingeschlossene ontologische Sachwissen von M[aihofer] 
bei einer anderen Gelegenheit ans Licht gehoben warden möge.” According to Detlef Liebs this 
letter could be, however, seen in a different light. The text embedds a veiled criticism on the 
shortcomings of Maihofer’s doctoral thesis, and Wieacker – who always attempted to keep his 
polite tone – managed to point out the flaws without affending the doctorand or his supervisor. 
Even the letter’s praise on Heidegger should be read as complimentary towards Erik Wolf. I am 
grateful to professor Liebs for bringing this tendency to my knowledge.
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structing legal thinking which might be applicable to a community of people. 
Heidegger’s Gewissen was, after all, interested in individuals. Wieacker’s own 
legal historical model for legal thinking was contextualized in a group, but not 
just any group, but a community which was bound by virtues, a worldview, and 
by ‘basic thought.’ The guild of Roman jurists was a compelling example of a 
‘circle of the learned,’ but clearly resembled some of the communities (or ideals 
of those communities) which existed in Wieacker’ time and society. There are 
indications that Wieacker did capitalize on some of his own, firsthand experienc-
es when constructing the phenomenology of the guild of Roman jurists. For ex-
ample, both the guild and the legal communities of the 1930s Germany were 
guided by a “basic thought” or “mentality.”195 A more direct point of reference 
can be found in the expressions which Wieacker used when referring to the Ro-
man guild of jurists and his own community of scholars. In his article Religion 
und Recht im römischen Stadtstaat (1935), Wieacker writes about the “harmoni-
ous and distinct way of existence of the core” of Roman jurists in describing the 
fundaments of the Roman legal thinking and the core of the guild of jurists. The 
“Stamm” (the permanent staff) was also a concept which Wieacker used from his 
circle of friends in the Dozentenakademie of the University of Frankfurt.196
So in this sense the communal working method of the 1930s provided new 
views on legal history. Insistence on Erlebnis did provide Wieacker with tools in 
his quest to trace the uncorrupted basis of legal knowledge, which would be 
transmittable, learnable and applicable throughout the centuries. To Wieacker 
‘experience’ (Erlebnis) comprised a shared spiritual property, which was 
achieved through collaborative scientific work, and a principle on which he was 
able to build the construction of legal wisdom. This ‘practical wisdom’ – later 
called Rechtsgewissen – was a construction of the ‘New legal science’ and op-
posed to the ‘old science.’
5. The articles on legal education:  
Conscience in contemporary legal praxis
By the early 1940s, Wieacker had already written on the concept of ‘property’ 
(the mentality of the people) and about the legal culture of Roman lawyers (and 
195 Cf. p.  204–205, 211.
196 Franz Wieacker, ‘Religion und Recht im römischen Stadtstaat,’ in Zeitschrift der Akad-
emie für Deutsches Recht – Sonderheft Ausland 2 (1935), 273: “spannungslos geschlossenen 
Daseinswese des Stammes”; cf. e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.4.1934 and Wieacker to Erik 
Wolf 3/1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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their infinite legal skill). From another point of view these themes dealt with the 
legal consciousness (Rechtsbewusstsein) of Germany and the superior legal skill 
(which was later conceptualized as Rechtsgewissen) of the Romans. In his three 
articles ‘Die Stellung der römischen Rechtsgesichte in der heutigen Rechtsaus-
bildung’ (1939), ‘Der Standort der römischen Rechtgeschichte in der deutschen 
Gegenwart’ (1942), and ‘Vielfalt und Einheit der deutschen Bodenrechtswissen-
schaft der Gegenwart’ (1942)197 he bound the superior example of Roman legal 
skill to the circumstances of his contemporary society. At the same time Wieack-
er took his first steps in comparing and constrasting the two jurisprudential 
spheres of Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen. This was carried out in the 
context of legal education. After receiving a professorship from the University of 
Leipzig, his responsibilities concerning practical education had enhanced. His 
interest in the subject was nevertheless genuine.198 While contributing to the ac-
ademic discussion on legal training he was able to further develop the ideas he 
had had during his stay in Kiel. These involved the more general acknowledg-
ment of the national importance of educating the youth in accordance with the 
new Studienordnung, but also the conviction of the fundamental significance of 
‘experience’ in learning and legal science. 
Wieacker’s personal feeling at the Universities of Frankfurt and Kiel had been 
that a concrete experience of togetherness and common purpose was a key for 
successful and sustaining scholarly work.199 Then the Kameradschaft of friends 
and colleagues had provided him with a premise for invoking academic work, 
whose results seemed to grow straight out of the emerging social change, and 
also in return seemed to shape the destiny of the national community. In the arti-
cles of ‘Die Stellung,’ ‘Der Standort’ and ‘Bodenrechtswissenschaft’ Wieacker 
translated his personal recollection of the revolution in education to a model 
concerning teaching and learning law in the Third Reich. Since Wieacker was not 
a pedagogist, he did not concentrate on teaching as such, but focused on the way 
of thinking which should guide the understanding of and learning from one’s 
own and other legal cultures. The articles scrutinize the premises which necessi-
tate the transmission of the creative use of law, Schöpfung, and the ways in which 
it should be applied to society. 
In the articles Wieacker’s intentions are threefold. First, he sought to secure 
the position of legal historical studies and especially the teaching of Roman law 
 
197 Franz Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit der deutschen Bodenrechtswissenschaft der Ge-
genwart. Über die Umgestaltung des Grundstücksrechts durch die heutige Bodenpolitik 
[1942],’ in Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 431–462. 
198 See p.  206–207.
199 See p.  199–200, 204–206.
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within it. Here, rather banally, he also tried to prove the significance of proper 
legal historical study to the National Socialist state.200 Second, he emphasized 
the fruitful and groundbreaking work done by the ‘New legal science’ which 
enabled the studying and teaching of tradition in a novel and useful way. From 
these standpoints he concluded his stance on the form of legal education in the 
future. The teaching, learning, and perceiving law should evolve around experi-
ence. This opening was one where legal history had a decisive role, since the 
‘experience of law’ was not an atemporal phenomenon; it was a mentality which 
connected the legal consciousness of the present to preceding scholar genera-
tions and legal cultures, enabling a multifaceted, thorough and proper under-
standing of law.
The route to a productive usage of legal knowledge proceeded from acknowl-
edging the experience which characterized the past legal cultures adjusting this 
enriched understanding of law to the ‘practical experience’ prevailing in one’s 
contemporary society. Legal history provided an entity which mediated this 
translational task and enabled the creative use of law. In the end, Wieacker saw 
such a bona fide legal scientific process – a skill in which law students should be 
educated – as a work of conscience, Gewissen.
In ‘Der Standort’ Wieacker elaborates the prevailing theories and orientations 
in the discipline of legal history. From his viewpoint the discipline as a whole 
had progressed remarkably and had been able to leave behind the unhealthy 
methodology of the Pandectists and the infiltration of the liberal worldview.201 
Wieacker gives credit to Paul Koschaker’s work, which he includes in the body 
of novel insights on legal history. Nevertheless, the prevailing orientations – and 
this also includes Koschaker’s stance – were partly bound to the old “education 
forms” and did not fully capitalize on the latest innovative improvements which 
had been introduced into the field of legal science during the recent years.202 Here 
Wieacker draws a strong distinction between him and the old generation repre-
sented by Koschaker. Later Wieacker called this “old generation” as “wilhelmin-
ian generation”, and perceived his wartime writings as a fight against that con-
stellation.203 By improvements Wieacker meant the works of his network, espe-
cially Ernst Forsthoff’s studies, and the possibilities provided by the new legal 
200 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 55.
201 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 49.
202 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 49; Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung’ 1939, 405.
203 On the theme of the “wilhelminian generation” see p.  259–260, 267.Koschaker was of-
fended by the criticism Wieacker elaborated in ‘Der Standort’ (Winkler 2014, 207). So the an-
tagonism between Wieacker’s generation and the “older generation” did to a degree take 
place. 
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Studienordnung.204 In general, the biggest failure of the old orientations was that 
they did not succeed in transmitting the wisdom of past generations to students 
of law. Since the major perversion and corruption in the German jurisprudence 
was due to the liberal era, the cultures preceding it were seen as healthy in their 
legal understanding, and learning from them would be beneficial. The lack of 
true historical contact with the past, which according to Wieacker plagued con-
temporary legal science, was mostly about the nonexistent relation of the old 
orientation with the great jurisprudence of Late Republic. 
This failure naturally did not concern Koschaker (who was a romanist), but a 
flaw in Koschaker’s use of legal history was its dogmatic understanding of his-
torical development. It assumed that a “historical form” of the past could be 
adapted as such to modern legal thinking and education.205 Legal historians, who 
in Wieacker’s article were represented by Koschaker, concentrated on the sec-
ondary aspect of history, on linguistic representations. In doing so they were 
more or less still bound to the dogmatic understanding of Corpus iuris, as had 
been the Pandectists. Wieacker admitted that the linguistic jurisprudential devic-
es of the Roman world were sophisticated, but they were a mere side-product and 
a historical expression of the true jurisprudential capability of the Romans. To 
illustrate his claim, Wieacker shows how the German reception of Roman law 
had produced disastrous results – the “scientification” of German legal culture – 
in adopting the plain rhetoric of the Corpus iuris.206 One could not merely adopt 
alien forms of education from another time and legal culture. The forms had to 
be adjusted to one’s own legal existence. The adjustment, learning from another 
culture and applying its legal thinking to contemporary society, had to focus on 
and occur through experience.
Legal history obtains this new connection to the present and its irreplaceability in legal educa-
tion not as a conventional form of education, but rather as a unique exemplary experience.207
204 Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung’ 1939, 405; Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 54.
205 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 50, 51; Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung’ 1939, 403.
206 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 51: “das recht würde nun nicht mehr erfahren, sondern 
erlernt; nicht mehr besessen, sondern erlitten”; 52: “So hat sie [the Pandectist] einer literar-
ischen Form, nicht einer Begegnung mit den ursprunglichen Kräften des altrömischen Rechts, 
also einer echten geschichtlichen Ehrfahrung, ihre Formen abgewonnen.” In binding his idea of 
the essence of German Reception to a presentation on contemporary education, Wieacker was, 
of course, able to introduce his theory of Reception. That example defended Roman law against 
Germanist accusations of the corrupting and liberal force of Roman law itself. Overall, the 
pedagogical articles show the multidimensional core of Wieacker’s idea of Roman law, and 
how it was being forged partly against dismissive claims and partly through a genuine attempt 
to have an effect on contemporary legal education.
207 “Nicht als herkömmliche Bildungsform, sondern als einmalige beispielhafte Erfahrung 
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Wieacker’s conviction – and the claim of his pedagogical articles – was that the 
new way of legal education had to be constructed around the idea of experience, 
and legal history provided the context in which this mental skill could be 
achieved and further trained. Wieacker’s idea also worked other way around; by 
means of proper ‘juridical experience’ German legal history would be able to 
study past cultures with increased insightfulness. European legal history provid-
ed a dual example of the significance of experience in people’s legal conscious-
ness. At the same time these examples offered learning spheres for future gener-
ations of lawyers. Via history it was possible to scrutinize the wrong turns taken 
by legal science and the mechanics defining the life of legal cultures, as in the 
case of the German Reception. The development and indeed the actual vitality 
of a given legal culture depended on the way it valued the meaning of legal ex-
perience. 
Second, through legal history it was possible to learn from the masters of ju-
risprudence – Roman lawyers. In their superior legal culture the “experience of 
common values” had been a phenomenon which enabled their jurisprudence to 
advance to such a high level. The “powerful concepts” and “explosive force” of 
Roman jurisprudence lay in its close connection with Roman society, for the 
values guiding Roman legal skill emerged from the community.208 The capability 
of lawyers of the Late Republic was not primarily associated with textual sophis-
tication, but based on an understanding of “the concrete conditions of situations.” 
From this “experience” the Roman lawyers constructed their jurisprudence in 
relation to the “foundational order,” the gathering ethos, of their society.209 Thus 
the “conscientious” Late Republican jurisprudence could not be replicated in the 
legal reality of the Third Reich, but contemporary scholars and students of law 
could learn from its “creative tradition.”210 The creativity of classical lawyers 
was due to their awareness, experience, of current values and the social ethos. 
This combined with their technical skills and superior knowledge of tradition 
enabled their creativity to rise above other legal cultures. With his final compar-
ison between ancient Roman jurisprudence and the society of Third Reich Ger-
many, Wieacker defends the meaning of historically oriented legal education, but 
also implicitly asserts that Roman legal skill, and indeed the creativity of con-
gewinnt die Rechtsgeschichte diese neue Gegenwartsbeziehung und ihre Unersetzlichkeit in 
der Rechtserziehung.”, Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 53.
208 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 53.
209 Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung’ 1939, 404: “konkreten Bedingungen der Lage”; 405: “Grund-
ordnung.” See also Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 55: “aus der eigenen Lebensordnung seines 
Volks Antworten gefunden.”
210 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 51, 55: “schöpferische Tradition”.
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temporary lawyers, resides in a distinguished community of those who arelegally 
trained.
Consequentely, understanding the importance of the shared horizon of thought 
behind any functioning legal culture, and comparing one’s vision to other per-
ceptions in history was the only way for legal thinking to be in touch with social 
reality and consequently produce socially relevant and consistent results. In oth-
er words, if legal reasoning attempted to make just claims which were in congru-
ence with the valuations of the present day, it had to be aware of the limits of its 
own thinking, the existence in which it was situated. Each time and place had its 
distinct way of perceiving justice; the set of communal values directed the cul-
tural mentalities and distinct ways of thinking which grew out of the material 
conditions of life in their different societies. 
“Conscientious”211 legal thinking had to be aware of and understand its rela-
tion to the prevailing mentality of the present age. Cultivating conscientious le-
gal thinking – a form of meta-level reasoning, which acknowledged the historic-
ity of mentalities – was the most important task of legal education. The historical 
understanding of law was the means which would enable students – future law-
yers – to interpret and apply law in a productive and proper way. The cultivation 
of such skills in education would raise a community of legally learned individu-
als within the national community, who, in placing their knowledge at political 
leaders to utilize, would ensure that society in general followed its ‘destiny.’ Here 
one can see an emerging conceptual distinction between the Rechtsbewusstsein 
and Rechtsgewissen, between legal consciousness and legal conscience, which 
came to be the characteristic feature of Wieacker’s later classics.
In ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ Franz Wieacker defined a novel way to approach the 
complicated legal phenomenon of land law. The text was in most parts based on 
his book ‘Bodenrecht’ (1938),212 but in ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ Wieacker derived 
from ‘Bodenrecht’s’ argument the possible effects his ‘conscientious’ view on 
law would have on education and legal practice. The purpose of the text was to 
combine the new legal scientific ethos of the ‘New legal science’ with the actual 
work of the courts; to combine theory and practice in a way which would pro-
duce just decisions from the point of view of the national community:
It encompasses three essential subjects: the question about the possibility and necessity of a 
methodical, uniform land law discipline, the question about the relationship of this science to 
legislation, legal practice and education, and finally the question about the inner structure of 
land law.213
211 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 49.
212 Franz Wieacker, Bodenrecht. Hamburg, Hanseat. Verlag 1938.
213 “Sie umschliesst drei wesentliche Gegenstände: die Frage nach Möglichkeit und Not-
wendigkeit einer methodisch einheitlichen Bodenrechtsdisziplin, die Frage nach dem Verhält-
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Like in the case of property law, the contemporary relevance of Wieacker’s text 
was based on the one hand on the incapability of the BGB to respond to the new 
kind of challenges the developing society brought about, and on the other hand 
‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ was an attempt to shape the existing legal conventions and 
customs to meet the demands of the National Socialist state. With respect to the 
first premise, Wieacker saw the complexity and disjointedness of land law as the 
result of the “bourgeois world-view” and the shortcomings of positivist legal 
science. Although the “stockpile of concepts” created by the legal positivists had 
not extended drastically to the field of land law, according to Wieacker coping 
with recent developments demanded the introduction of new legal tools from the 
linguistic and conceptual point of view.214 Wieacker’s ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ was 
connected to this ‘legal renewal’, not only in his way of referring (solely) to the 
scholars of the ‘New legal science’, but through combining the Studienordnung 
of 1935 with his construction of the future gestalt of land law. 215 Yet, the text is 
also in line with Wieacker’s other texts. Wieacker sought to overcome the inco-
herence of legislation concerning ‘things,’ and not only define a unified theory 
that could be easily applied and learned, but also prove that legislation and a ju-
dicature of ‘assets’ bore a sphere of values within it, and that sphere should be 
acknowledged when making decisions on and about legal matters. 
Wieacker considered that the reconstruction of law as a discipline was a matter 
of current urgency, and himself able to accomplish that redefinition because of 
the developments that had occured “during recent years,” that is, due to the im-
plementations of the National Socialist ideology in legislation and the theoretical 
work conducted by the ‘New legal science’.216 Wieacker was firm that the legal 
science formulated by him and his circle of colleagues would be a perfect means 
to adjust legislation to meet the requirements of ongoing social change, since the 
methods and legal thinking that the circle had cultivated had been developed 
from and within that social change.217 Translating Wieacker’s implicit conviction 
nis dieser Wissenschaft zu Gesetzgebung, Rechtspraxis und Unterricht und endlich die Frage 
nach der inneren Gliederung des Bodenrechts.”, Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 431.
214 Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 432, 433. Wieacker presented that then (1942) the 
distinction between the State and community, private and public “did not anymore bind the 
legal scholars”/“für uns nicht mehr verbindlich sind” (441).
215 On Studienordnung of 1935, Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 436; On legal posi-
tivism Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 432; On the effect of National Socialist ideas on 
legislation considering land, Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 434. 
216 Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 433, also 434: “schon vorhandene “öffent-
lich-rechtliche” Materien gewannen eine höhere Bedeutungmit dem Zwang zu einer unbeding-
teren Nutzung des deutschen Bodens und mit der Ausweitung der Aufgaben, an welche der 
neue Staat herantrat.”
217 Cf. Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung’ 1939, 404.
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of the distinct model of thinking of his circle to the terminology of the ‘New legal 
science’, we could say that Wieacker’s ‘creative’ usage of law and that of the 
Kieler Schule as well as Ernst Forsthoff’s enabled them to give “conscientious”218 
legal advice which was ‘close to reality’ and just, for the particular reason that in 
being ‘close to reality’ they were ‘conscientious’ and ‘creative.’ 
‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ is an example of a text where Wieacker attempted to put 
his existentialist understanding of the essence of law into practice. In concrete 
terms, Wieacker’s suggestion to reformulate Bodenrecht combines the existing 
legislation and conventions into an idea of Raumrecht as defined by Ernst Forst-
hoff.219 The material conditions of a given time, and the underlying ethos that 
emerged from it, should direct the legal thinking of that time. In other words the 
existence and preconditions of being (Daseinvorsorge) of a legal scholar were 
the starting point of his scholarship:
[T]he “Raumrecht” [land law] is determined by the thinking in administrative tasks and of the 
daily public services of general interest, to take up Forsthoff’s felicitous coinage with a slightly 
modified meaning.220
Wieacker’s personal emphasis in his argument in ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ is evident 
in the way he stresses that the meaning and purpose of the new theoretical open-
ings of the ‘New legal science’ – and the adjustments brought about by Studi-
enordnung – should not overrule the practical value of the previous legal conven-
tions conscerning land law. New theoretical openings such as Wieacker’s should 
instead sharpen and underline the pedagogical value and practical wisdom of the 
existing – and historical – legal praxis.221
The connection between theoretical information and practical knowledge was 
emblematic of Wieacker’s legal scientific stance. The foundational significance 
of legal practice always overrode the temporal demands for adjustments in stat-
utes and norms. The shifts in administrative or scientific styles merely supported 
the development of praxis, which to Wieacker meant a tested and evolved 
218 Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 432: “gewissenhaft.”
219 Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 438; Forsthoff had formulated his idea on “Raum-
recht” in Die Verwaltung als Leistungsträger (Stuttgart/Berlin, Kohlhammer 1938). On Forst-
hoff’s influence, see also Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 440, 458. 
220 “das Raumrecht durch das Denken in einzelnen Verwaltungsaufgaben und in der tägli-
chen Daseinvorsorge bestimmt, um eine glückliche Prägung von Forsthoff in etwas abgewan-
delten Sinn aufzunehmen.”, Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 439.
221 Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 437: “Es ist deutlich, dass bei den Vertretern einer 
systematisch zurückhaltenderen Einstellung der Sinn für die pädagogischen und rechtstechni-
schen Werte der Bodenrechtspraxis überwiegt, während die weiter gehenden Reformvorschlä-
ge stärkeres Gewicht auf systematische oder teoretische Folgerichtigkeit der Darstellung des 
neuen Bodenrechts legen.”
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knowledge, used for generations, and which resembled more a skill than an ac-
cumulated body of information.222 In other words ‘praxis’ in the context of 
‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ had its reference point in the assimilation of the tradition 
which had appeared in the legal culture of Late Republican Rome. In ‘Vielfalt 
und Einheit’ Wieacker’s continues to utilize the concept of experience as a dis-
tinguished mode and tool of legal scholarship. The ‘experience of law’ was a 
feature which connected the practical work of the courts, sound theoretical con-
tributions and the presentations of past generations of scholars. It was a device 
used in conceptualizing jurisprudential questions, but it was also a foundation 
on which legal education should be based. In ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’, while writ-
ing on the difficulty of combining theoretical presentations and a practical un-
derstanding of the subject matter, Wieacker suggests that experience should be 
used as a guiding principle. Experience did not merely signify accumulated 
knowledge or a by-product of ageing; The “experience of law” was a horizon 
which grew out of an understanding of the essence of law, and as such it provid-
ed a common ground on which attempts to combine legal praxis and legal theo-
ries could be built.223 
Nonetheless in ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ experience as a timeless cognitive asset, 
a conceptual tool of legal scholars, and a pedagogical medium, was explicitly 
combined to the demands and ethos of his contemporary world. Since Wieacker 
assumed that he, as a representative of the ‘New legal science,’ was perfectly 
aware of the demands of the Dasein – the existence where the current law was 
situated – he was able to give suggestions on the reformulation of the legal con-
ventions.224 Thus, Wieacker’s own experience of social change – shared by other 
young legal scholars – was a medium which allowed him to combine theory and 
existing legal practice in a ‘conscientious’ manner. To him, the synthesis where 
he interpreted the current law and customs from the point of view of the ‘New 
222 Thus, with respect to Volksgesetzbuch, Wieacker objected to the attempts to include land 
law under a new unifying codification. His stance was probably due to a general ideological 
resistance to any codifications, but also because the codification could not take into account the 
“distinct nature of land law” and its relation to “practice.” See Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 
6.5.1941. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
223 Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 457: “Aber auch hier kommt alles auf den prak-
tischen Versuch an. Gerade der reife Hochschullehrer, dessen Erfahrung ihn von der Wieder-
gabe eines verwickelten und unübersichtlichen Stoffs abzuraten scheint, wird die entgegenge-
setzten Erfahrung machen.”; See also 458: “Dass dieser pädagogische Vorschlag nicht mit der 
Elle messen will, dass vielmehr Umfang und Art der Darstellung der Ehrfahrung und Einsicht 
des Rechtserziehers überlassen bleiben muss, versteht sich wohl selbst.”
224 Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 458: “Wir fanden, dass das Grundstücksrecht 
überwiegend nach der richtigen Norm, das Raumrecht überwiegend nach der richtigen Lösung 
konkreter Aufgaben der Daseinvorsorge für das Ganze fragte.”
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legal science’ was a last phase in the historical continuation of true legal scholar-
ship. Like skillful scholars before him, he was applying the craft of legal think-
ing, only now in very particular circumstances. Thus in ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ he 
considered himself to be applying Gewissen, practical legal wisdom, to the field 
of German land law:
[...] it is our opinion that it [land law] requires a uniform science that, as a quasi conscience, 
unites and balances the differences with the communal function of the land. This applies to the 
relationship with administrative practice as well as to the relationship with the administration 
of justice in the area of land law.225
The way in which Wieacker used the concept of Gewissen in 1942 contained the 
idea of totally unprecedented and progressive social change. The relation be-
tween the people, the state and law had taken a novel direction which the legal 
theories of the bourgeois world could not understand or control. On one hand, 
and in comparison to most other theorists of the ‘New legal science,’ Wieacker 
constantly reflected on his ideas of legal history, and carried with him the insur-
mountable ideal of Late Republican Roman law. This separated him from schol-
ars like Karl Larenz or Ernst Forsthoff, with whom he shared many ontological 
premises about legal science. On the other hand, Wieacker’s idea of the signifi-
cance and essence of Roman law diverged drastically from the arguments of for 
example Ernst Schoenbauer, who rather one-dimensionally compared the past 
and present societies, seeking for historical justifications for the National Social-
ist regime.226 Wieacker was interested in the mentality, the experience, of the past 
lawyers. The ‘art’ in which Roman lawyers transferred their knowledge, horizon 
and perception – their existence – to legal language represented an example of 
just judgments, legal education and theories in his contemporary reality. Thus, 
Wieacker’s thought was more or less situated in between or outside of most legal 
scientific presentations prevailing in the Third Reich. It was firmly constituted on 
the ethos of young conservative lawyers of the war generation, but mostly inter-
ested in the cultural, spiritual sphere of the law.
Built on legal historical paragons and established concepts, Wieacker consid-
ered Gewissen to be the ability to read and direct the constantly evolving legal 
culture. As opposed to previous theories of Roman law, his idea of legal con-
science was connected to the experience of violent revolution in legal education 
and abrupt metamorphoses in civil society. As such it comprised the core of 
225 “[…] bedarf es nach unserer Meinung einer einheitlichen Wissenschaft, die gleichsam 
als Gewissen der gemeinschaftlichen Aufgabe des Bodens die Gegensätze zusammenfasst und 
ausgleicht. Dies gilt sowohl im Verhältnis zur Verwaltungspraxis als im Verhältnis zur Rechts-
pflege auf dem Gebiete des Bodenrechts.”, Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 442. Empha-
sis mine.
226 Cf. Schönbauer 1935.
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Wieacker’s historical vision, and his later works on legal history and hermeneu-
tics have to be read in the light of this ontological principle. In1942 the idea of 
Gewissen is not a mere synonym for the concept of Rechtsgewissen, which 
Wieacker used in Privatrechtsgeschichte de Neuzeit, since the ‘legal conscience,’ 
as elaborated in Wieacker’s classic book, had to deal with the inescapable pre-
condition of guilt.
6. Culture in Rechtsgewissen 1945–1968: Abstract guilt
The Second World War proposed an ungraspable dilemma to German Society. A 
dilemma which, explicitly or implicitly, overshadowed the public debate on the 
meaning of the national past, present and future. Unlike the discussion which 
emerged after the First World War, this time the War had been a criminal one; it 
had been launched against civilians and fought against the helpless. There was no 
“Symmetry of Death” in the Second World War or in the race war of the Nation-
al Socialism.227 The war, and along with it the warriors, were unconditionally 
marked with the “stigma of [one-sided] violence”.228 The abstract guilt experi-
enced was comparable to the vastness of the crime. Karl Jaspers formulated that 
the Schuldfrage, question of guilt, should be divided into four categories in order 
to be understandable. The categories of criminal, political, moral and metaphys-
ical guilt meant that almost all Germans were responsible with respect to the sins 
conducted in and by the Third Reich.229 Obviously the existence of such a ‘stig-
ma’ demanded treatment in order to make it manageable for both to the national 
community and for individual citizens. 
The means adopted to make the guilt bearable can be seen in three ways. First 
there were demands for the “general amnesty” of implicitly accused Germans.230 
According to this view, the acts of ordinary people should be disregarded when 
litigating the crimes of the Third Reich. After all, the Second World War was a 
war, and in wars people attempt to kill each other. If misconduct on the German 
side was under scrutiny, then one should also consider the justness of, for exam-
ple, the firebombings of German cities or Russian mass rapes on the eastern 
frontier. International justice could be seen as a political invention used for inter-
227 Kühne 2005 229.
228 M. Geyer, ‘Das Stigma der Gewalt und das Problem der nationalen Identität in Deutsch-
land,’ in C. Jansen, L. Niethammer & B. Weisbrod (Hg.), Von der Aufgabe der Freiheit. Politi-
sche Verantwortung und bürgerliche Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Berlin 1995, 
673–698.
229 Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage. Heidelberg, Lambert Schneider 1946.
230 Moses 2007.
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governmental purposes, and thus it should not be a starting point in weighing the 
justice or injustice of a particular behavior in particular circumstances. The accu-
sations of the Allied countries generated a strong and acute counter-reaction; A 
vast majority of the German people rejected the idea of “collective guilt” after 
the Second World War equating the attempts to cast the blame for the Holocaust 
on the Germans as a people to Fascism.231
In the second common view the retrospective narratives about the era of the 
Third Reich splintered the guilt, sentencing some agents to total guilt while re-
leasing some from responsibility. For example, the SS, the SA and the Einsatz-
gruppen were perceived as fundamentally and spiritually evil. These groups 
were led and participated in by corrupt and malevolent people, who managed to 
seize just enough power in society to fulfill their murderous fantasies.232 These 
organizations were perceived ambiguously as both undemocratic and political in 
nature. In the common narrative, these groups had stolen legislative and parlia-
mentary power for themselves by deception, and afterwords became affiliated 
with the political sphere where bureaucratic decisions on criminal acts were 
made, leaving common people as passive witnesses to their crimes. 
The third part comprised the redemptive republican discourse, which Dirk 
Moses attaches especially to the character of Jürgen Habermas.233 This stream of 
thought was mostly upheld by a younger generation of scholars, writers and pub-
lic figures, or communists. Although redemptive republicans were not uncondi-
tional supporters of Allied austerity and “purge” politics in German administra-
tion and education, they called for radical and decisive actions, even at the ex-
pense of sliding into social turmoil. Redemptive republicans wanted to detach 
themselves from the German tradition (which after a few decades was named the 
Sonderweg) and in more concrete terms wished to get rid of people who were 
complicit with the Third Reich, and to abolish the nationalistic sentiments from 
German culture. 
At the same time, the institutional form of the new Republic was under serious 
and bitter discussion. Konrad Adenauer’s time as the chancellor of West Germa-
ny cannot be seen as a model achievement of liberal public engagement or as a 
sign of flourishing and pluralistic exchange of opinions, although rebuilding the 
spiritual structures of society was nevertheless a discursive one. To intellectual 
231 According to Habbo Knoch, in 1947 95 percent of Germans rejected the idea of ‘collec-
tive guilt.’ Knoch, Die Tat als Bild: Fotografien des Holocaust in der deutschen Erinne rungs-
kultur. Hamburg, Hamburger edition 2001, 170, also 152–153, 212. 
232 Gudrun Brockhaus, ‘The Emotional Legacy of the National-Socialist Past in Post-War 
Germany,’ in Aleida Assmann & Linda Short (ed.), Memory and Political Change. New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan 2012, 36; Kühne 2005, 230, 245.
233 Moses 2007.
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historians this period nowadays appears to have been a discussion on the mean-
ing of the German past in relation to the present and future of the Republic.234 In 
this discussion several competing intellectual communities could be distin-
guished. However, in the discursive reconstruction process significant aspects 
were not only the past of the nation as a whole or the respective intellectual 
constellations, but the personal past and the memory of those who contributed to 
the discussion.235 As such, rebuilding the legal, cultural and social essence of the 
Federal Republic was a “struggle with one’s conscience” both at the public and 
personal level.236 There were no easy or quick solutions in dealing with abstract 
guilt. “Working through” the national and personal past was a process in which 
healing and productive results seemed to occur only with time. In addition, re-
membering the past and further assimilating it into a coherent narrative through 
which one could interpret the present and anticipate the future, was either over-
shadowed or backed up by numerous psychological mechanisms.237
For the most part coming to terms with the past on both the public and the 
personal level was impossible. People wanted to keep some concrete part of the 
past untainted, no matter what the official judgment on the past was. Around or 
on this memory one could construct continuity and an atemporal meaning in 
one’s life. Thus, public memory and private (or family) memory are never syn-
onymous.238 A positive memory of an event, acquaintance, achievement or re-
sponse usually remains significant, even though it might be devalued by the offi-
cial stance. In this task of remembering, an individual usually needs positive 
appraisal from people he or she feels close to.239 Such a mechanism also applied 
to post-war German society. Again, like after the First World War, the idealized 
234 Moses 2007, 10.
235 Dirk Moses (2007, 40) defines the situation which he calls the “dilemma of republican 
democracy in a post-totalitarian, post-genocidal society”: “On the one hand, such societies 
must distance themselves in all respects from the evil regime that they replaced in order to es-
tablish their moral credibility. On the other, they must usually integrate a substantial number of 
persons who were implicated in the crimes of that regime if the new republic is to be a stable 
entity. West Germany institutionalized this ambivalence. It was the successor regime of the 
Nazis, liable for its political crimes, while regarding itself as the legitimate representative of the 
German cultural nation (Kulturnation).” 
236 Norbert Elias, The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. New York 1996, 16.
237 Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Schuld und Abwehr,’ in Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte 
schriften 9. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 1975, 144–324.
238 Aleida Assman & Ute Frevert, Geschichtsvergangenheit: Vom Umgang mit deutschen 
Vergangenheit nach 1945. Stuttgart 1999; Edgar Wolfrun, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland: Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung, 1948–1990. Darmstadt 
1999.
239 Cf. p. 32–34.
242 IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history and in legal science
social constellation of togetherness became a tool to understand and interpret the 
common past, present and future in a way that it could bring meaning both to 
public and personal life.
An illuminating case is the afterlife of the concept and form of Kameradschaft 
in the Federal Republic. Although militant organizations were prohibited by law, 
and all kind of militant rhetoric was often treated with silence, disinterest, and 
even hostility, people continued to need symbols which carried along the positive 
meanings one had experienced in a bygone world.240 The changed social content 
to which the concept referred, no longer being equated with the militant concept 
of Männerbund, was related to the larger and shifting orientation in the policies, 
mentalities and values with respect to such questions as the family, masculinity, 
career, politics and nationality in the new Federal Republic. 
After 1945 Kameradschaft no longer referred to the organizations and hierar-
chies of Übermenschen, as had been the case in the repressive rhetoric of the 
Third Reich. In the fall of 1945 German troops were made up of individuals de-
pendent on the help and mercy of others; Kameradschaft was a community of 
prisoners of war. In the prison camps many men lost their physical and mental 
health, dignity or future prospects. Nevertheless, many soldiers survived the 
harsh conditions with, and even because of their fellow men.241 In addition to the 
concrete, life-saving help men offered to each other in the prison camps, the hope 
and expectations they had imposed on the Heimat which allegedly waited for 
them after imprisonment, were cherished and constituted within these male cir-
cles. 242 In all these the symbolic value of Kameradschaft was not lost; quite the 
opposite, it was redefined to explain the spiritual essence of the circle of men 
who now possessed a shared history as POWs, as members in a peacetime dem-
ocratic society and as members of the modern family. The heritage of this com-
mon experience of unity and of a common past circled around and often involved 
references to an ideal, geistig cause, and the theme of Kameradschaft continued 
to surface frequently in the public discourse of the new republic.243
The redefined concept of Kameradschaft, however, carried within it meanings 
of suffering and sacrifice. When this concept was deployed in post-war discus-
240 Kühne 2005, 229–270.
241 Kühne 2005, 211–212.
242 See D. Cartellieri, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion: Die Lagerge-
sellschaft. München 1967 167–169, 272; Kühne 2005, 213.; The “visits of normalcy,” in which 
men, when a rare chance for it occurred, let themselves enjoy a memory or a touch of civil so-
ciety, took place within the framework of the all-male camps. These “visits” were often “cof-
fee-breaks,” or like in the case of Franz Wieacker’s imprisonment, lectures like in university. 
On camp academias, see Liebs 2010; Avenarius 2010.
243 K. Naumann, ‘“Soldaten sind Mörder.” Erkundungen auf dem Feld der Ehre,’ in Mittel-
weg 36, Jg. 11 (2002), 65–74.
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sions, it nostalgically reminded people of the sacrifices of the past, but also of 
times when “everything was in its place.”244 In the shared mental sphere of Ka-
me rad schaft, the optimal society had been different from the one prisoners of 
war faced on homecoming. Thus, talking about the mentality of Kameradschaft, 
or the kameradschaftliche world, usually connotated a negative claim in the so-
cial reality of post-war Germany.245 Whereas in the rhetoric of the 1930s, Kam-
eradschaft had referred to the quest for national unity and dignity after the humil-
iating Treaty of Versailles, in the post-war discussions the notion was an impor-
tant part of the terminology which implied to coming to terms with the twisted 
and criminal past. This was especially due to the problematic nature of individu-
al deeds as part of a national entity, Volksgemeinschaft, which was now proved to 
be a criminal one. Thus, talking about the spiritual heritage of the old days, of 
which Kameradschaft clearly represented, was an important level in both private 
discussions and in public discourse.246 
For academics, talking and writing about the distinct social purpose and posi-
tion of the scholarly sphere was for their part a means to resolve the ‘dilemma of 
the post-totalitarian society.’ They had to both distance themselves from the ille-
gal acts, agents and thoughts of the previous years, but also defend their personal 
motives during the days of totalitarianism, and the continuing significance of 
their “learned world” in a drastically changing society. While doing so they, and 
especially the conservative scholars of the war generation, constantly experi-
enced a frustrating incompatibility between their own understanding of correct 
communality and the official direction of Germany amidst the modernizing pro-
cess. After the Second World War the legal scholars of the war generation felt 
doubly dislocated. The concrete communities of researchers that existed in pre-
War universities were no more. The denazification policy and the dividing up of 
Germany questioned and partly destroyed the notion of Heimat which the learned 
had constructed during the preceding centuries. In addition, conservative schol-
ars witnessed the eradication of values which they had found fundamental, and 
were forced to give up some of their traditional prestige, especially with respect 
to the administration of universities and the independence of jurisprudence.247 
244 Alon Confino, ‘How Nostalgia Narrates Modernity,’ in Alon Confino & Peter Fritzsche 
(ed.), The Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture. Chi-
cago, University of Illinois Press 2002, 62–84.
245 Thomas Kühne (Kühne 2005, 223–225, 228) writes how the Federal Republic became 
the “society of men’s grief,” where the war experience was the maxim around which the gen-
dered roles in families and civil society were supposed to be arranged. In the gatherings of male 
circles, such as veteran assemblies in the 1950s, the participants tried to re-enact the shared 
positive memory of the past, as opposed to everything which was wrong in the present. 
246 Kühne 2005, 215, 219, 221.
247 Cf. p.  138–142.
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Due to the compelling economic and political circumstances these social struc-
tures had no other choice but to adapt, leaving the academics with no other role 
than that of protesters against the contemporary “social state” and “mass-univer-
sity.”248
The academic culture of social sciences in post-war Germany was character-
ized by the importance of semi-official study circles arranged outside the formal 
structures of the university. In these meetings scholars attempted to understand 
and analyze contemporary social changes and connect the old theories to the 
novel circumstances as well as redefine established views to better match the 
challenges of the modern day.249 This phenomenon went beyond official academ-
ic culture, and historical research has acknowledged the need to apply anthropo-
logical and social psychological models to understand the form of “doing sci-
ence” that was typical of this time.250 Joachim Ritter spoke for many when he 
wrote that to him, these meetings of “small personal circles, like islands of per-
sonal continuity, are important for the further existence of the Geist.”251 So the 
existence of regular meetings where scholars could experience a kameradschaft-
liche mentality were important for the future and for the vitality of the scholarly 
culture (as remembered and cultivated by the learned), but also for the partici-
pants themselves in their individual task to fit their sometimes contradictory ex-
periences of totalitarianism, war and imprisonment to the larger narrative of the 
national community.
This way to dichotomizing social reality between the opposite ideals of the 
‘guilds of the learned’ and ‘barbarism’ as way to make sense of the ‘anarchy’ of 
the first years of the Federal Republic, was typical of academics, but it did not 
necessarily reflect reality. As Peter Lambert has presented, after the First World 
War the guilds of academics were not unattached ‘spiritual islands,’ for they in-
teracted with the political and social spheres of society like any other community 
within the nation. For the most part, the “unworldly” atmosphere which was 
commonly associated with the original “imagined communities” of the professo-
riat, was projected from informal gatherings between a mentor and his “school.”252 
In short, the ideal of the guild very much represents the overall mentality of Bil-
dungsbürgertum: the “lost world” to which Bildungsbürgertum wanted to return 
248 Meinel 2012, 3.
249 Dirk van Laak, Gespräche in der Sicherheit des Schweigens: Carl Schmitt in der poli-
tischen Geistesgeschichte der frühen Bundesrebuplik. Berlin, Akademia Verlag 2002; Jerry Z. 
Muller, The Other God that Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German Conserv-
atism. Princeton, Princeton University Press 1987, 316–402.
250 van Laak 1987, 11.
251 Joachim Ritter to Carl Schmitt, quoted in Müller 2003, 117.
252 Lambert 2003.
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never had existed in reality. Cultivating the ideal of a bygone absolute social 
premise to express one’s learnedness and conduct an inner journey towards per-
fection, nevertheless served as a powerful metaphor and helped historically ori-
ented scholars in their task to rediscovermeaningful phases in the course of both 
national and European history in the years following the end of the war.253
More recent historiography has underlined the moral problematic of these 
‘spiritual circles’ since little seemed to have changed in the mentality of these 
communities.254 Especially the influence and importance of Carl Schmitt behind 
the Kameradschaft of the legal scholars of the Federal Republic presents a para-
dox to a history of historiography which wants to see a drastic breach between 
National Socialist Germany and the post-war West German intellectual atmos-
phere. Schmitt refused to go through the denazification program, was excluded 
from the institutions of higher education, and rejected any possibility of remorse 
or personal apologies with regard to his actions and writings during the Third 
Reich.255 Schmitt’s intellectual legacy was of course a multifaceted and even 
fruitful point of departure for social scientific theoretizations in a permanently 
altered world, but one could not ignore the anti-parliamentary and racist world-
view behind his scientific constructions. Both the war-generation scholars and 
even the younger generation of 1945ers continued to be intrigued by the power-
ful writings and charismatic personality of this now self-proclaimed prophet and 
“Grand Inquisitor” of German social science.256 It is not accurate to claim that 
they shared Schmitt’s morals or all of his jurisprudential conclusions, rather they 
eclectically picked out some of his remarks or remained in awe of the scholarly 
superiority which surrounded the “hermit of San Casciano.”257 In other words, 
Schmitt was both a symbol which scholars were reluctant to give up and an intel-
lectual provocateur, whose ideological premises many startled, but contendly 
witnessed the challenge he posed on the disliked ‘social state’ of the Federal 
Republic.Thus, the ‘scientific Kameradschafts’, and Schmitt’s position within 
them, represents the wider process of coming to terms with the past which legal 
scholars had to undergo. 
Since the scholarly task of post-war German reparation was both official and 
personal, the key-themes of legal science were ambiguously social scientific but 
253 Conrad 1999, 81–82, 126–131.
254 Meinel 2012, 2–4, 444; Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1985, 90–93.
255 Mehring 2014, 407–428.
256 On the 45ers, see Moses 2007, 55–73; for Schmitt as Grand Inquisitor, see R. Gross, 
Carl Schmitt and the Jews: The “Jewish Question,” the Holocaust, and German Legal Theory. 
Madison, University of Wisconsin Press 2007, 85, 278 fn.  21.
257 Müller 2003, 54.
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partly intimate or confessional. The “call of conscience” and the search for sus-
taining “values” were paradigms to which the reflective and interpretative meth-
ods were most applicable and the influence of (Catholic) religion natural.258 Such 
a quest to analyze and fortify the “collective conscience” of West German socie-
ty marked the legal scientific discourse of post-war academia.259 All paradigms, 
whether one leaned heavily on the Christian and Catholic tradition, classic natu-
ral law theories or insisted on the necessity of a commonly acknowledged system 
of values guiding the practical work conducted in the courts of law, agreed in 
blaming legal positivism for the destruction of the legal order.260 The fact that 
legal positivism was commonly perceived as the root of all evil, like in the 1930s 
theories of ‘legal revewal,’ enabled legal scientists to hold on to the ontological 
premises of their constructions of justice. Hans Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’ was 
buried, and not until the reinvention of analytical philosophy in the late 1960s did 
his thoughts undergo rehabilitation. Likewise Heinrich Mitteis suggested a return 
to the “living values of legal history,” which in practice were situated in the times 
before the emergence of positivistic streams in legal science and in German his-
tory.261 Gustav Radbruch when drafting the foundations of post-war German ju-
risprudence explained the “aberration” of the Third Reich legal sphere as deriv-
ing from the corrupting effect of legal positivism.262 The first president of the 
Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Hermann Weinkauff, further applied Rad-
bruch’s theses (from even more religious foundations than Radbruch) while 
blaming the legal positivistic idea of “law is law” on the jurisdictional havoc of 
the Third Reich.263 Although most acknowledged the need to find again the core 
values of actual jurisprudence, legal scientists defended their view of essential 
values against other philosophical or political worldviews. 
But coming to terms with the past involved more personal aspects. When the 
shocking reality of the National Socialist rule and its legacy reached conservative 
academics, the experience of the catastrophe of the 1930s had to be explained in 
terms of a general historical narrative of the national community, but also on a 
more personal level. The contribution of scholars as a group to the “suppression 
of the truth” was a dilemma whose solving was far more difficult than to make 
sense of the historical narrative leading to the totalitarian regime.264 Very often 
258 Foljanty 2013.
259 Müller 2003, 70.
260 Cf. p.  73–74.
261 Heinrich Mitteis, Vom Lebenswert der Rechtsgeschichte. Weimar: Böhlau 1947.
262 Radbruch 1946.
263 Hermann Weinkauff, Die deutsche Justiz und der Nationalsozialismus. Stuttgart, 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1968.
264 Conrad 1999, 146–149.
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the questioning of one’s personal narrative about the twelve years of the Third 
Reich had to wait until the more material structures of life were repaired. When 
the immediate conditions affecting on one’s everyday reality – with respect to for 
example nutrition, housing and employment – had been secured, people were 
able to rethink their life from a wider perspective. The war years brought about 
traumas, disabilities and disturbing memories, which prevented any self-reflec-
tion. With regard to academics, immediate self-reflections mostly remained in-
side their own networks and group of friends.
There was no immediate Damascus or revelation in the self-understanding of 
legal scholars if one considers public statements and texts dealing with their re-
lation to the Nazi regime and ideology. The personal and vocational coming to 
terms with the past of legal scholars, at least in the ranks of the more conservative 
part of the Stand, included clinging very strongly to the abstract and more distant 
past when things had seemed brighter and the virtuous foundations of society 
were in their place. Thus, scholars hung on to the sphere which still belonged to 
them, in other words they concentrated on teaching and “spiritual rebuilding,” 
like their predecessors had done before them within the Humboldtian tradition.265 
In the early years of the 1960s the memory of recent years resurfaced when 
the legal process against Adolf Eichmann was broadcast all over the world. In 
1963 the Auschwitz trials began in Frankfurt. Along with increased media atten-
tion, public interest turned towards the years of Third Reich years, and when 
questions of guilt were given practical definition in the courts, in more informal 
settings discussions on individual responsibility within a criminal nation (re-)
appeared. The fragile continuity in German universities was interrupted by a 
generational revolt, which again constituted an inescapable objective for the 
consensual culture of German academia. The smoldering discontent among the 
young in the Federal Republic flared into violent protest in 1968. Throughout 
West Germany students demonstrated against the conservative goverment, the 
conditions of studying and political leaders whose Nazi-past did not seem to 
disturb their involvement in the political life of the Republic. Much of the protest 
was targeted against politicians and publishers, but the most dramatic action of-
ten took place in universities. Students demanded that those university staff who 
had connections with totalitarian past should immediately be dismissed. During 
the late years of the Adenauer regime and the student riots of the late 1960s 
many academics were forced to rethink their personal histories, the premises of 
their scholarship and the relation which their work had with the mentality of the 
nation.
265 See e.g. Fritz Pringsheim to Arthur Schiller 3.3.1946. Columbia University archives, 
Arthur Schiller papers, Uncatalogued correspondence, Box 5, Columbia University, New York.
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7. Affections in Rechtsgewissen 1945–1968:  
The community and creativity in the Federal Republic
Franz Wieacker perceived that everyday reality of the immediate years following 
the “collapse” was marked by both “resentment” and practical difficulties, which 
made scholarly work almost impossible.266 Although Wieacker himself found an 
academic safe haven, first in Göttingen and then inFreiburg, he felt far from hap-
py. Living conditions were marked by scarcity and many previously important 
landmarks and symbolic landscapes had been destroyed or contaminated in the 
events following the 1930s Machtergreifung. Some of his friends were not as 
lucky as him, and were ousted from the academia. Wieacker, like many others, 
tried to construct a meaningful new life in a world where previous common ap-
preciations no longer mattered. To Wieacker the physical ruins were a symbol of 
the inner spiritual wreckage of the nation.267 It was the duty of scholars to rebuild 
the spiritual structures of Germany in order that the nation could again rise from 
its sad demise. Again, and increasingly after the war, Wieacker connected the 
physical environment to the spiritual work of a scholar:268
I feel more apt to intellectual work than ever, since the decades of impending threat have 
changed to a clear, sober suffering above the ruins.269
The process of reconstructing legal science’s core and direction was as necessary 
(and demanding) as was the rebuilding of the physical structures of society. In 
their response to the fundamental dilemma regarding the necessity of a sound 
new base for legal science, many scholars leaned on theories of natural law. 
Wieacker reacted to these accounts with relative understanding. Especially in 
266 Wieacker to Karl Larenz in 15.5.1951: “Zusammenbruch”. NL Karl Larenz, Universi-
tätsbibliothek Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität zu München, München; Wieacker to Ernst Ru-
dolf Huber 12.5.46: “Ressentiment.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz.
267 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946: “Aus der äusseren Zerstörung hebt sich be-
sonders deutlich und mit starker symbolischer Wucht die Zertrümmerung der meisten größeren 
Städte hervor, deren Wirkung Du in einer mir sehr vertrauten Weise beschreibst. Ich hing nach-
dem an den alten Stadtbildern und werde deren Vernichtung nicht verwinden; wir werden ja 
wohl auch das Wiederstehen wirklicher Stadtorganismen aus den Trümmern nicht mehr erle-
ben.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
268 In his letter To Huber from 6.1.1944 Wieacker mourned the fate of the city of Freiburg: 
“das Gesicht der Stadt, in der ich mich heimisch fühle, und die als Wohnställen eines des Geis-
tes, der mir lieb geworden war, verschwunden.” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.1944[1945]. 
NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
269 “Ich fühle mich, nachdem an die Stelle der jahrzehntelagen, lemurartigen Drohung das 
klare, nüchterne Leid über den Ruinen getreten ist, zur geistigen Arbeit rüstiger wie je.”, Wie-
acker’s letter to Forsthoff from 1945, quoted in Meinel 2012, 306.
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Erik Wolf’s texts he found familiar aspects.270 After all, the natural legal search 
for suprapositive principles beyond positive law was an orientation in which 
Wieacker had distinguished himself and continued to engage himself in the Fed-
eral Republic. Nevertheless, Wieacker was reluctant in linking his view of legal 
history to fashionable theories of natural law. There were many theoretical obsta-
cles, which will be dealt with in detail in section IV.8, but on the ideological 
level the main reason was the original contradiction between casuistic Roman 
law and Greek theories of social justice. Wieacker’s historical ideal, the jurispru-
dence of the Late Republic, presumably had been free from any influence of 
systemization and theory building. According to the same legal historical stance, 
the later “corruption” of Roman law was due to the excessive emphasis and as-
similation of the theories which assumed the existence of some kind of perennial 
natural justice.271 Moreover, modern natural law theories came too close to the 
religious worldview. In the end ‘conscience’ and the religious vocation repre-
sented two distinct ways of perceiving the world, and whereas the former had 
subsumed the superstitious human nature, the latter had not.272 On the other 
hand, many natural law theories leaned too much on “calculative” reasoning and 
were as such (according to Wieacker) closer to legal positivism than sound juris-
prudence.273
The stance adopted by Wieacker can be elaborated by comparing it to two 
other major lines of “existentialist” legal science, namely to Carl Schmitt’s and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s post-war production.274 The last letter sent by Wieacker 
to Carl Schmitt is from 1944. Although the two later most certainly met, for ex-
ample in the “Ebrach seminars,” Wieacker seemed to have kept a healthy dis-
270 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 23.4.1959: “ich [habe] zu meiner grössten Freude die zweite, so 
sehr veränderte und erweiterte Auflage Ihres »Naturrechtsproblems« vorgefunden. […] Es ist 
ein unerlässlich [Berichtigung] für die Orientierung in die gewaltige Kaltenrealität “Natur-
recht”, und es ist mehr als das. Mir fällt bei dieser Aufgabe auf, wie eigenartig gebildet solche 
Objektivationen sind und wie ungeeignet die üblichen Wekzeuge des Rechtshistorikers für ihre 
“Erfassung” (im eigentlichen Sinne) sind.”. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau.
271 Cf. p.  166–168, 216–228.
272 Cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 1.9.1946: “Ich wiederspreche Dir nicht – bis auf der 
Notwendigkeit einer Reformation der Gemüter. Dass ich nur diese wahrscheinlich dienstlich 
aber nicht kirchlich denke, wird Dich nicht wundern. Auch über das Museale und das “säkula-
risierte” Naturreich denke ich etwas anders.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundes-
archiv Koblenz; See also p.  151, 215–216.
273 Cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 23.4.1959: “Kaltenrealität ‘Naturrecht.’” NL Erik Wolf, Al-
bert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
274 To label Schmitt and Gadamer as “existentialists” is highly tentative, but that was never-
theless the category in which Wieacker himself situated them. Wieacker, A History of Private 
Law 1995, 469 fn.  13.
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tance towards Schmitt. He rarely refers to Schmitt in Privatrechtsgeschichte der 
Neuzeit nor does he mentione him in his letters. In the Federal Republic it was 
possible to work on Schmitt’s ideas, actually quite a few distinguished scholars 
did, but in doing so, the author had to be prepared for vocal resistance and public 
resentment.275 In the 1950s Schmitt altered his previous “institutional turn,” 
which had intrigued Wieacker, to an orientation which dealt mostly with interna-
tional law.276 He also retreated into a kind of adapted isolation outside academia 
– mostly because he was not allowed to return, although he himself preferred the 
story in which his retreat was a deliberate personal choice – bitterly commenting 
on the political life of the Federal Republic and maintaining his own shadow 
academy for young scholars.277 In his works Schmitt combined older themes 
with contemporary circumstances in order to give a presentation of the (alleged-
ly unjust) ontology of his current reality. Thus, he chose the metaphor of the 
Grand Inquisitor from Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form (1923), by 
which he illustrated the ambiguous relation of the Catholic Church and the com-
mon awareness of justice. In short, the Catholic Church as an institution repre-
senting justice, had the right to act against what was commonly held as just or 
against individual ethical purposes: it was the Grand Inquisitor.278 After the war 
the metaphor slightly altered. Now it was Schmitt himself who is equated with 
the Grand Inquisitor. Schmitt was neither willing to reconsider his ideas nor 
question their moral superiority with respect to the scientific paradigms prevail-
ing in the Federal Republic.
Wieacker used the same Grand Inquisitor metaphor when giving a presenta-
tion in 1949. 279 To Wieacker, Roman law in European history was like the Grand 
Inquisitor. Even when contrary to public opinion in any given historical moment, 
Roman law had managed to retain the connection to atemporal justice. The tradi-
tion of Roman law had went through different phases during European legal 
history, but nevertheless continued to provide a source for correct and moral le-
275 Cf. Jürgen Habermas’ critique of Reinhard Koselleck’s Kritik und Krise (1959), which 
Habermas saw as an heir to Carl Schmitt’s thinking. Jürgen Habermas: ‘Zur Kritik an der 
Geschichtsphilosophie,’ in Jürgen Habermas, Kultur und Kritik. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 
1977, 355–364.
276 Mika Ojakangas, ‘A terrifying world without an exterior: Carl Schmitt and the meta-
physics of international (dis)order,’ in Louiza Odysseos & Fabio Petito, The International Po-
litical Thought of Carl Schmitt. London, Taylor & Francis 2007.
277 Cf. Müller 2003, 51–62, 91.
278 Cf. Alfons Motschenbacher, Katechon oder Grossinquisitor?: Eine Studie zu Inhalt und 
Struktur der Politischen Theologie Carl Schmitts. Marburg, Tectum Verlag 2000, 314, 330–
333.
279 The presentation was later truened into a book. Franz Wieacker, Vom römischen Staat als 
Rechtsordnung. Freiburg, Zähringer 1949. The Grand Inquisitor metaphor is on page 6.
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gal decisions, even though they might have appeared unjust to the general public. 
Here the conceptual distinction between Rectsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen, 
based on Wieacker’s war time experience, is evident. On closer scrutiny, it is 
clear that Wieacker emphasizes the meaning of tradition more than Schmitt. 
Wieacker held on to the principles that Roman lawyers had managed to com-
bine the necessities of their social being with their legal method, to relate their 
Rechtsgewissen to the prevailing Rechtsbewusstsein. Their jurisprudence had 
been ‘conscientious,’ a form of legal wisdom, and thus their texts provided price-
less examples for modern legal scholarship. In addition, the correct understand-
ing of the tradition had to be derived from and was situated in the community of 
legal scholars. Although in historical comparison society as a whole was con-
stantly evolving, the common culture of the learned provided a premise from 
which these changes could be evaluated, coordinated, and analyzed. To Wieack-
er the question was whether the methods deployed in the research process were 
appropriate and solid, for not only was the truth reachable only through certain, 
correct methods, but the question of methodology extended to the notion of the 
morality of science.280 
From the mid 1950s onwards Wieacker engaged himself ever more deter-
minedly in discussions on legal hermeneutics, and was fascinated by the thoughts 
of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Wieacker’s idea of legal conscience, although there 
were several points of connection, was difficult to translate into Gadamer’s her-
meneutical model. To Gadamer true interpretation existed in dialogue. When 
scholars engaged themselves in a discussion or reading, the quest for understand-
ing was a dialectic one. Both the understanding of the phenomenon at hand, and 
the scholars’ own prejudices changed. The core of Wieacker’s historical view 
was that a distinguished model of just interpretation had existed in European 
history, and should be studied and applied to contemporary society in order to 
correct “the crisis of justice.”281 Gadamer was ready to abandon historical knowl-
edge as überzeitlich; it had no pregiven direction. Written history was a series of 
acts of interpretation where people tried to understand their past and present. 
Clearly there were some consistent elements in human beings that had stayed the 
280 Cf. Wolf 2007, 78.
281 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 482; Wieacker to a degree accepted Gadam-
er’s view, but held on to the assumption that Roman law as practiced by the ancient lawyers 
themselves represented the truth. Their virtuous judgments presented a model to modern legal 
theorists in their quest for just legal decision: “[D]en alten römischen Texten (für die dogma-
tische Auslegung) mit zunehmenden Zeitenabstand wirklich ein neurer, gerechterer Sinn sich 
entfalten kann; (wie im Abstand Hochgipfel hinter den vorgrelagerten Hügelketten aufstei-
gen).” Wieacker to Hans–Georg Gadamer 14.7.1965, Nachlass Hans–Georg Gadamer, Deut-
sches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
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same through time, but to Gadamer, historical narrative was more about the pres-
ent than the past. Wieacker’s idea of history was, on the other hand, and as Rein-
hard Zimmerman rightly asserts, distinctly constructive in nature.282 According 
to Wieacker, and in distinction to Gadamer, the post-war ‘crisis of justice’ was a 
result of actual historical events and development. A side-effect of this historical 
development was the incorrect interpretation of the law, which legal science (or 
more precisely, legal positivism) had disoriented in its methods. He wrote to 
Gadamer: 
[…] for the modern law does not seem to make such an experience for today’s lawyer. I cannot 
think of any other reason for this very peculiar phenomenon at the moment, than particular 
disrespect of today’s interpretation teaching [Auslegungslehre] against the authority which ap-
pears in the words of law. This [crisis] could be related to the generally accepted discrediting 
and “unmasking” conducted by legal positivism. These things [methodology] are now so in 
disarray that the old fundamental relations of law and dogma today appear only in turbidity.283
Wieacker linked his idea of Rechtsgewissen to the European tradition of law, but 
it was ‘experience,’ which enabled the lawyer or scholar to make a sound inter-
pretation of law. So in Wieacker’s theory there was a connection between feeling 
and interpretation, or to be more precise, a just understanding could not be 
reached by means of pure reason.284 Justice involved such emotions as respect, 
modesty and dignity, and law had to be authoritative in the eyes of those whose 
actions it sought to guide and regulate. This dimension had a correlative in the 
actual premises of academia. The community of legal scholars was also affected 
by the values of law, and, in Wieacker’s conviction, law was supposed to reflect 
this distinct, virtuous being in its reality.285
a) The guild of scholars
During the War, while serving on the frontline, Wieacker had pondered about the 
possibility of scientific work after the war was over. In his letter to Ernst Rudolf 
282 Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Foreword,’ in Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, v–xiii.
283 “[…] für die modernen Gesetze scheint der heutige Jurist eine solche Erfahrung nicht zu 
machen. Ich wüsste für diese sehr eigentümliche Erscheinung im Augenblick keinen anderen 
Grund anzugeben als die besondere Respektlosigkeit der heute herrschenden Auslegungslehren 
(Interessen- oder Wertungsjurisprudenz; teleologische, selbst ”verfassungskonforme” Ausle-
gung) gegen die im Gesetzeswort erscheinende Autorität; diese könnte zusammenhängen mit 
der allgemein akzeptierten Diskreditierung und ”Entlarvung” des Gesetzespositivismus. Diese 
Dinge sind heute so in Unordnung, dass die alten Grundverhältnisse von Gesetz und Dogmatik 
heute nur in Trübung erscheinen.”, Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.7.1965. Nachlass 
Hans–Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
284 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 619. 
285 Wolf 2007, 78.
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Huber on 6. January 1945, he referred to the constant and pervasive public de-
mands to “keep on trying and stay together.” Wieacker’s view on the wellbeing 
of the nation was not congruent with the public stance. As always, in his thoughts 
the national destiny was tied to the structures of academic work, and from that 
viewpoint a return to normalcy was no longer possible. In Italy he heard news 
about the destruction of German universities and the relocation of his former 
colleagues. Thus, he confessed to Huber: 
[T]hat in an intellectual and dispositional connection an exterior organization [the university] 
is not necessary, and that one ideed must stay in touch with regard to a national godsend of an 
immediate lasting restoration, [we must], although it would be sad, to keep a constant local 
connection and thus to withheld the best personnel from the other already dreadfully depleted 
universities.286
The future of the ‘spiritual well-being’ of the nation was not dependent on the 
concrete structures or bureaucracy, but on the ‘togetherness’ of the learned. In-
deed, the cultural core of Germany, the tradition of Bildung, would do even better 
without the ‘weakened’ universities. In his letter Wieacker is explicit about the 
importance of learned ‘togetherness’ in the ‘recovery’ of the national community, 
but implicitly his claim also presents the personal need to keep in contact with 
the common culture of his circle of friends. After the war Wieacker indeed had to 
start from scratch, without the structures and premises which had previously de-
fined the routines and everyday reality of the scholar. His 1945 anticipation of the 
indispensability of the close communities of scholars proved to be right, both on 
the general level, since many scholars shared Wieacker’s opinion, but also per-
sonally when he had to face the physical relocation and the changed political 
climate of the Federal Republic. While starting “afresh” he tried to both visit 
spaces and companies which still carried a positive significance and was afraid 
that the experiences he had gathered would become obsolete. In his letter to Ernst 
Rudolf Huber he expressed his fear that the “catastrophic decomposition of 
memory”287 would slowly eradicate the meaningful emotional bond between him 
and his friend. On the other hand, the circle of close comrades was a mental 
286 “[D]ass es im geistigen und gemutsmässigen Zusammenhang etwa uns, solche Organi-
sation [the University] nicht bedarf, und dass man zwar im Hinblick auf den nationalen Glücks-
fall einer alsbaldigen dauernden Wiedergewinnung in Verbindung bleiben müsse, […] sich in 
dauernden örtlichen Zusammenhang zu halten und dadurch die besten Kräfte der ohnedies 
furchtbar geschwächten übrigen Hochschulen zu entziehen.”, Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 
6.1.1944[1945]. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
287 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.10.46. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz.
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space in which he among others was able to deal with difficult memories and 
disturbing experiences.288 
In his need for scholarly togetherness Wieacker was not alone. Many scholars, 
which before the war would have mostly been categorized as representing the 
war generation and conservative revolutionary thoughts, acknowledged the ne-
cessity to cultivate their common culture beyond the walls of the university. A 
good example of the semi-private discussion circles of conservative legal schol-
ars, and an attempt to retain the memory and experience of the past Kamerad-
schaft, were the seminars arranged by Ernst Forsthoff. Forsthoff organized regu-
lar “summer academies” in the town of Ebrach, which were attended by Franz 
Wieacker, but also many other distinguished scholars of the Federal Republic, 
ranging from Carl Schmitt and Arnold Gehlen to Niklas Luhmann.289 At the same 
time, the Ebrach seminars were an “intitation experience” into the worldview of 
the conservative mentors for many students participating in the annual gather-
ings.290 Depending on the view of the given contemporary historian, the Ebrach 
seminars either presented a latent academic threat to the parliamentary establish-
ment, or acted as an essential premise for conservative legal scholars in their 
scientific endeavors, since many of them still felt themselves to be outsiders 
within the academic community of post-war Germany.291 The seminars did result 
in some noteworthy academic outcomes. For example, Carl Schmitt first intro-
duced his theory of the “tyranny of values” in Ebrach, and later dedicated his 
book on the subject to “the Ebrachers.”292 Like the Dozentenlager of the 1930s, 
the ‘spiritual Kameradschafts’ of the Federal Republic served many purposes, 
and were not merely a kind of academic holiday. However, to the contributors, 
the togetherness and experience of belonging to the same-minded group of schol-
ars descending from an abruptly ended world of bourgeois learnedness and vir-
tues, which the regular reunions offered, were more important than the possible 
scholarly significance of the seminars. In 1960 Joachim Ritter wrote to Ernst 
Forsthoff about his experience of the Ebrach seminar:
288 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.10.46: Wieacker describes how he had traveled to 
the coast with Hellmut Becker, (who used to be Huber’s assistant) and “mich in meiner seit 
mehreren Jahren sich verdichtenden Überzeugung bestätigt sah, dass er […] Richtung und 
»Substanz« (um dieses Schlagwort zu brauchen) gut seinen Kriegserfahrungen beständig ge-
winnt. […]die angesammelten Beschaulichkeit zu kommen.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 
1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
289 Meinel 2012, 3–4; Müller 2003, 73.
290 Cf. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Constitutional and Political Theory: Selected Writ-
ings. Oxford, Oxford UP 2017, 375.
291 Meinel 2012, 306; Müller 2003, 68; Habermas 1977.
292 Müller 2003, 73.
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The circle of young, open-minded and bright, thinking people that you gathered there around 
yourself quite encouraged me and gave me hope that that which we have to do will not be lost 
in the current mass universities and will eventually find those who will pass it on. Maybe it is 
always the fate of the reasonable intellect in the historical world to be limited in its esoteric 
influence on the small group, and we let ourselves be deceived about what is normal by the 
education of the 19th-century middle classes.293
To the participants the image of the bourgeois order of bygone Germany repre-
sented a golden age, whose absence they bitterly acknowledged in the Federal 
Republic. The learnedness, social order and virtues that the past world seemed to 
them to possess, were absent in their contemporary world, but nonetheless of-
fered a mental position from which they were able to analyze the post-war soci-
ety. Although in the Federal Republic Bildungsbürgertum had turned into Bür-
gertum without the social respect which its monopoly in higher education had 
previously provided it, the conservative scholars desperately clung to the Bil-
dung part of the word in order to achieve some understanding and sense of sig-
nificance in a world they no longer felt to be their own. Franz Wieacker, who 
naturally also participated the Erbrach seminars, shared this nostalgic yearning 
for the past, which he tried to regularly re-enact in the reunions of the scientific 
Kameradschafts. Moreover, the standpoint that the experience within these com-
munities offered provided a mental tool to “know right” and evaluate different 
values in a blurry modern world.294 In a complex modern world, Wieacker prior-
itized the loyalty between the Kameraden of these ‘spiritual circles.’
The importance of togetherness between scholars and the loyalty between cir-
cles of friends in scholarly practices became evident when Wieacker arranged 
Ernst Rudolf Huber’s return to academia. After the Second World War Huber 
was not allowed to teach nor was he able to obtain a position in institutions of 
higher education. Wieacker felt that the treatment of his friend was part of the 
293 “Der Kreis junger, weltoffener und kluger, denkender Menschen, den Sie dort um sich 
gesammelt haben, hat mich recht ermutigt und mir Hoffnung gegeben, dass das, was wir zu tun 
haben, nicht ganz in der gegenwärtigen Massenuniversität untergehen und schliesslich diejeni-
gen finden wird, die es weitergeben. Vielleicht ist es ja immer in der geschichtlichen Welt die 
Bestimmung des vernünftigen Geistes, in esoterischer Wirkung auf den kleinen Kreis be-
schränkt zu sein, und wir lassen uns nur durch die bürgerliche Bildung des 19. Jahrhunderts 
über das täuschen, was an sich normal ist.”, Quoted in Meinel 2012, 3.
294 In his 1945 letter Wieacker wished a “prosperous academic stay” to Ernst Rudolf Huber, 
who had to flee from Strasbourg to Heidelberg. In this respect the most important factor was to 
find a suitable community of scholars: (“Hoffentlich hast du in Heidelberg vernünftige Verhält-
nisse vorgefunden”). Such an assembly was in contrast to the “spiritually ill statesmen and 
military leaders” whom “history will judge” (“geistige Erkrankung der verantwortlichen feind-
lichen Staatsmänner und Militär erscheint und über der die Geschichte richten wird”). Wiea-
cker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.1944[1945]. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesar-
chiv Koblenz.
256 IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history and in legal science
political theater of post-war Germany and was fundamentally unjust.295 Thus, 
Wieacker was the initiator and central figure in arranging an official teaching 
post for, and at the same time rehabilitation of, Huber at the Albert Ludwig Uni-
versity in Freiburg im Breisgau, where Huber was accepted as an honorary pro-
fessor in 1952.296 Wieacker was not alone in promoting Huber’s rehabilitation, 
but the opposition was also marked. Fritz Pringsheim, who had now returned 
from exile to Freiburg, found it unacceptable that a scholar who had been “one of 
the leading figures in perverting the law” could be granted acceptance at Freiburg 
University.297 He wrote to Erich Weniger:
Contented looking back and turning around is not allowed. Germany is preparing itself to play 
a meaningful role, and I very much doubt if it is really ready to do that or even has the will to 
mature [...] When I take a look at the people here, the very real fear comes upon me that they 
do not know at all and do not wish to know what they still do not recognize.298
In the personal sphere Wieacker missed the togetherness, friendship and com-
mon culture of the circles in which he had been a member. Thus, writing to Ernst 
Rudolf Huber in 1947, he referred to Kiel University as “our earlier [and] com-
mon academic homeland.”299 To Wieacker the memory of the “good old days” 
comprised friendship, scholarly culture and the fatherland, Heimat, which to him 
meant national places of symbolic value. In one way or another, the war had 
displaced all of these elements. The occasions when he could briefly enjoy the 
company of his friends thus appeared in stark contrast to the prevailing mentality 
and circumstances of the Federal Republic. Or conversely, the marked loss of 
values in the post-war time and society was compared to the experience of Kam-
eradschaft and togetherness. Writing to Huber in 1946, Wieacker grieved over 
the pitiful nature of the post-war academic culture and the witch-hunt of denazi-
295 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.10.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
296 Grothe 2005, 320–322; cf. Wieacker’s letter to Erik Wolf 9.5.1952, where he forwards 
Huber’s request to Wolf. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breis-
gau.
297 Grothe 2005, 322.
298 “Das behagliche Züruckschauen und Zurückdrehen ist nicht erlaubt. Deutschland 
schickt sich an, eine bedeutende Rolle zu spielen, und ich zweifle sehr, ob es dazu innerlich 
schon reif ist oder auch nur den Willen zur Reife hat […]Mir kommt manchmal, wenn ich mir 
die Leute hier ansehe, die Furcht sehr nahe, dass sie garnicht wissen und nicht wissen wollen, 
was von ihnen verkannt wird.”, Fritz Pringsheim to Erich Weniger 21.9.1952. NL Erich Weni-
ger, Cod. Ms. E Weniger, 1:676, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttin-
gen.
299 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.8.1947: “Unserer gemeinsamen frühere academi-
sche Heimat.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
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fication.300 He contrasted the contemporary turbidity to his and Huber’s stay at 
the University of Leipzig in the late 1930s: 
It is safe to say that what most pains me is that I cannot be in the old circle in Leipzig. Here in 
Göttingen one learns to appreciate the inner freedom and sovereignty of one’s group doubly. In 
Göttingen we have countless stimulating people with whom I am completely of one mind: 
Grewe, Raiser, Scheuner (who lives here in a transitory state), Aubin, even Smend, and of 
course Felgentraeger, and I don’t have anything to say against any of the others, but we’re not 
(yet?) forming a republic of letters.301 
In the post-war conditions the previous ideal of virtuous academic work conduct-
ed within a group of fellows, united by their common mentality and shared des-
tiny, was felt as a twofold loss. The ‘inner freedom’ and ‘sovereignity’ of the 
guild no longer existed. The idea of the ‘Republic of the learned,’ combining 
academic learnedness with the ethos of the restructured German society, was to 
Wieacker both strange and very distant. To Franz Wieacker the ideal of the guild 
nevertheless had a very concrete realization. The ‘old circle’ in Leipzig was a 
constellation which he dearly missed. His own experiences of the Dozentenaka-
demie at the University of Frankfurt and the communality of the Kieler Schule 
and the “scientific community” of Leipzig, were times when he had participated 
in scholarly circles which had enabled him to conduct insightful and fruitful ac-
ademic work. Although the colleagues with whom he worked in Göttingen were 
by no means unworthy scientists, the sense of togetherness which he had experi-
enced before was lacking. The community of scholars, or guild, represented a 
material context for just legal reasoning. Thus in 1956 Wieacker wrote to Erik 
Wolf, who had extended his research on ancient legal history: “And so, I send 
you my most sincere thanks and best wishes for the present you have given to 
my, or rather our, guild.”302
300 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber (beantwort 21.2.1946): “Noch einiges Faktische aus 
Göttingen: man liest dort bis Mitte Februar; vorige Woche wurden wieder mehrere Ordinarien 
und viele andere Lehrkräfte aus unbekannten, doch mannigfachen Gründen entlassen; Ein-
spruchsverfahren laufen jedoch; monströse Denunziationen eines leider aus dem Gleichge-
wicht geworfenen (Schnorr v. Carolsfeld) erstaunen und setzen nicht nur die davon Betroffenen 
ausser Fassung.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
301 “Mit Sicherheit jedenfalls ist zu sagen: es ist für mich das Schmerzlichste, dass ich nicht 
in Leipzig im alten Kreise sein kann. Hier in G[öttingen]. lernt man die innere Freiheit und 
Souveränität jenes Kreises doppelt schlägen. Wir haben in G[öttingen]. unzählige anregende 
Leute, mit denen ich vollkommen eines Sinns bin: Grewe, Raiser, Scheuner (der hier abwar-
tend lebt), Aubin, Smend selbst, auch wohl Felgentraeger, und über keinen der anderen habe 
ich irgend zu klagen: aber eine Gelehrtenrepublik bilden wir (noch?) nicht.”, Wieacker to Ernst 
Rudolf Huber (beantwort 21.2.1946). NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz.
302 “Also noch einmal meinen aufrichtigsten Dank und Glückwunsch für das Geschenk, das 
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b) The Damascus of 1968 and the conscience of a scholar
The organic relation between tradition, and those deriving decisions from that 
tradition as the root of ethical jurisprudence, provided a simple explanation for 
the ‘collapse’ of 1930s German legal culture. Legal positivism had distorted the 
core of law, allowing political forces to take over the legal system.303 On the 
other hand, the retrospectively suspicious actions one had conducted in collabo-
ration with the National Socialist administration, could be reasoned away with 
the help of the fundamental historicity of both law and legal scholars. This did 
not mean that the process of explaining and narrating the recent past was an easy 
one. Self-examination was, to most, a difficult task. Likewise, Franz Wieacker 
also acknowledged the vastness of National Socialist crime and understood that 
the projects which he had participated in were now highly suspect and should be 
subjected to serious reconsideration. The situation caused him emotional dis-
tress. He wrote to Ernst Rudolf Huber:
I am, as you probably are, somewhat tired of torturing myself over how it came to this. I have 
(as you and every respectable and more or less informed person) completely had my fill since 
1933 of the inner torment that one, because of the abomination of the brown shirts [the Nazis], 
belately wishes the Germans to suffer in presumption of them being hardened, to the point that 
I am somewhat weak.304
It was, however, difficult to admit that the views one had believed in and the 
actions one had sincerely participated in, had proved to be twisted. In his letters 
to Ernst Rudolf Huber from 1946, Wieacker argued against collective guilt. How 
should one have taught, written and lectured about law in a totalitarian country 
where public opinion was undoubtedly unanimous on the justness of the national 
cause?305 Wieacker had a deep emotional tie with Huber, and had experienced 
nothing but loyalty and good intentions from him.306 It was impossible to think 
 
Sie mir, das Sie unserer Zunft bereitet haben.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 6.9.1956. NL Erik Wolf 
Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. Emphasis original. 
303 Cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 1964, on Radbruch, legal positivism and “political monstros-
ity.”
304 “Ich bin, wie auch Du selbst wohl, etwas müde mich damit zu martern, wie es bis zu 
diesem Punkt gekommen ist. Die inneren Qualen, die man den Deutschen in Vermutung ihrer 
Hartgesottenheit nachträglich über die Scheußlichkeiten der Braunen kranken will, habe ich 
(wie Du und jeder Anständige und leidlich Unterrichete), seit 1933 so gründlich ausgekostet, 
daß ich etwas matt bin.”, Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, 
Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
305 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz.
306 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber (beantwort 21.2.1946). NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Be-
stand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
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that Huber, as a person, would have been a representative and an archetype of a 
scholar who had participated in National Socialist crimes. In his letters to Huber, 
Wieacker comforted his friend (who did regret his involvement in the ‘legal re-
newal’ of Germany), pointing out that Huber’s public exclusion was due to the 
resentment that plagued post-war German academia.307 Wieacker explained Hu-
ber’s (and his own) actions with the help of the same existential concepts he had 
used in his post-war works to illuminate the historicity of law. Huber’s collabo-
ration was the result of “requirements of the time” [Daseinsnöte] and the deeds 
he had done then could not be judged retrospectively.308 
And where I encounter such [accusations of collaboration]- which, after all happens frequently, 
I remember with horror, how little I knew – in 1933 – how to pass over the crowd. But, these 
[the accusations] litters of muted vanity and suppressed self-esteem seem to me so human, that 
I can leave them be.309
Wieacker saw his and the Kieler Schule members’ acts from the generational 
point of view. The 1930s fight against legal positivism and the university elite 
was just one stage in the longer disagreement between the commonly held and 
contemporary false prejudices, and Wieacker’s scholarly devotion which he 
shared with his in-group. Wieacker resented those who, in hindsight, easily 
judged the Kieler Schule’s complicity during the Nazi era. Wieacker insisted that 
the primary target of these young scientists had been the dethronement of the 
educational elite, and to judge someone for trying to do that was doubly hypocrit-
ical if it came from those who did not have to do anything and had not done an-
ything. Those who accused Huber (and himself) of amorality represented the 
original anonymous nemesis of the Kieler Schule, the “old generation” of legal 
science: 
Certainly we had it essentially just as difficult as the others, whether those who where left in 
their positions or those who have been retired in peacetime; but to them it always appeared, as 
we fought against them in the shadows of power, viz. fought unfairly; it was such a rooted 
preconception, that I was almost never able to overcome it, althought I during the later years 
condemned much more explicitly and radically than the wilhelmian generation.310
307 Cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
308 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz.
309 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. “Und wo ich solches begegne – was immerhin häufig vorkommt, den-
ke ich mit Schrecken danach, wie wenig ich gewusst habe, wie den damals – 1933 – beiseite 
Gedrängten zu überzugehen;  aber diese Würfen der gedeckten Eitelkeit und des unterdrückten 
Selbstgefühls scheinen mir doch zu menschlich als dass ich darüber ausser mir geraten 
könnte.”
310 “Gewiss hatten wir es im Grunde ebensoschwer wie die anderen, sei es ganz in ihren 
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Moreover, the post-War Spruchkammeries were not “authoritative” or “con-
scientious” enough to judge Huber (or Wieacker) according to his 1930s and 40s 
activity.311 Admittedly, one can see here a blind spot in Wieacker’s reasoning. 
Wieacker had devoted his career to searching for the timeless bases of social 
justice around which the legal foundations of European history had been ar-
ranged. According to his correspondence in the 1940s he believed he had at least 
a hunch what such an idea would look like and of what it might be constituted. 
Yet with respect to his own writings (and his friend’s representations) he was 
inclined to compromise due to their temporal context. To Wieacker, the biased 
legal reasoning of the 1930s was in general valid, and the “flaws” should be ex-
cused on account of the contemporary circumstances.
When the temporal distance towards the totalitarian era and the Second World 
War grew, Wieacker had to rethink his narrative. After the chaotic immediate 
years following the end of the war, life in the Federal Republic entered a relative-
ly peaceful era. Everyday life was no longer characterized by continuing crises 
and turbulence. One’s view of law and legality was not overshadowed by a con-
stantly looming catastrophe. Although the legal system of the Federal Republic 
did not seem to be based on a correct understanding of law, nor founded on 
common values – it was ungebildet – it produced social harmony and was in 
general respected by people.312 Moreover, when going ever deeper into the 
realms of legal hermeneutics and theories of interpretation, Wieacker had to set 
his historical vision against more far-reaching and contesting thoughts of histo-
ricity. If law was fundamentally historical, and its understanding was due to the 
necessities brought about by one’s historical situation and temporal perception, 
how could one suggest that there was only one correct point of reference from 
which an individual view of justice could be derived? And even if there was a 
true tradition, how could one be certain that one’s personal interpretation was 
comprehensible within the true meaning of that tradition?
Ämtern Belassenen, sei es im Frieden Emeritierten; aber für die sah es immer so aus, als ob wir 
im Schatten der Macht gegen sie kämpften, also unfair kämpften; das war ein so eingewurzeltes 
Vorurteil, dass ich es, obwohl ich in den letzten Jahren weit klarer und radikaler verurteilte als 
die wilhelminische Generation, fast nie habe brechen können.”, Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Hu-
ber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
311 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber (beantwortet 21.2.1946): “Zum gewissenhaften Nach-
richtenorgan bin ich aber zu unordertlich, und zum Erteilen guter Ratschläge eine gar winzige 
Autorität […] In Dein und der Deinen Ergehen mich mit naiven Fragen oder Ratschlägen mit 
dem ersten Wort zu mengen liegt mir nicht […].” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz.
312 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 22.4.1961. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz.
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In 1964 Wieacker received the new edition of Erik Wolf’s Große Rechts den-
ker. Again the book stimulated Wieacker to reflect not only on the essence of 
legal scientific research in general, but also on the premises of his personal schol-
arly identity. In 1964 Wieacker was a renowned legal scholar in the Federal Re-
public who had contributed to and further developed the theoretical understand-
ing of many subfields of legal science. Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit was 
widely held to be a foundational work in the legal history of modern times. 
Among Romanists and in the field of Roman law his “third way,” which empha-
sized the intellectual history of Roman law as well as its sustaining ideas, types 
and mentalities which explained its relation to the general historical develop-
ment, was a strong theoretical stream between the “neo-pandectists” (Paul Ko-
schaker) and the “neo-classicists” (Max Kaser).313 He had experimented with 
Hegelian theories and published important works dealing with the problem of 
hermeneutics and interpretation. He worked as a respected professor with his 
friends Ernst Rudolf Huber, Karl Michaelis and Friedrich Schaffstein at the Uni-
versity of Göttingen. To sum up, Wieacker had established his status in the Fed-
eral Republic and workwise things could have not been better. At the same time, 
however, the Auschwitz trials had began in Frankfurt, and earlier Adolf Eich-
mann had been sentenced to death in Jerusalem. 
In his correspondence with Erik Wolf, Wieacker does not state why in January 
1964 he started to rethink the meaning which legal science had in shaping the 
‘consciousness’ of society, and his own position as a scholar with respect to com-
mon public values. Probably the rethinking was due to the above-mentioned his-
torical events and development, but in any case Wieacker again processed his 
scholarly identity by comparing himself to the legal scholars of the past. He 
wrote to Wolf about the feelings which reading the new edition of Wolf’s book 
had evoked in him:
I have endeavored late to acquire the inner maturity that one needs to fully dignify the bio-
graphical reference to life and the ancestry of a great person tardily; to this extent the relevance 
of books for my personal life and research increased. We have all gotten too used to the sorting 
in the great drawers of the humanistic categories due to an overbred and surely promotional and 
deepening historicism; today I sometimes feel uncomfortable when I contemplate the swift 
classification, the Hegelian everything-matched-just-perfectly-to-the-Weltgeist of the found-
ers: Dilthey, Troelsch, M. Weber, let alone their epigones. In contrast to that the task, that your 
book has rightly taken up: how “legal thinkers” have interacted with the moral culture of their 
time and further continue to have an effect, has become increasingly important to me.314
313 Winkler 2014, 173.
314 “Die innere Reife, die dazu gehört, auch den biographischen Lebensbezug und die Her-
kunft eines großen Menschen aus einem sittlichen Klima ganz zu würdigen, habe ich erst spät 
zu erwerben mich bemüht; in diesem Masse wuchs auch das Gewicht des Buches für mein 
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First, Wieacker admitted that he had lately ‘matured’ in his thinking and aware-
ness, meaning that to a certain extent he had found his previous explanation of 
the relation between ‘great men’ (scholars) and their ‘moral climate’ not entirely 
accurate. Thus, this suggests that his historical vision had undergone a shift; his-
torical events and developments were now being measured in the light of ‘mature 
experience.’ He continues by expressing his tiredness at the theoretical construc-
tions which were now being used to illuminate different aspects of law. They 
were useful, but in the end they might well conceal what was really important, 
namely how a given scholar ‘has interacted with the moral culture of his time and 
further continues to rework it.’ So although Wieacker himself discussed contem-
porary methods, and in one way Wolf’s book was about different perceptions of 
legal matters, to Wieacker reading Große Rechtsdenker raised questions about 
the morality and meaning of scholarly work. He continued: 
I know of no book that takes this question more seriously and answers it from the calm, mature 
perception of the inner values of the person. What gives this effort flesh and blood, however, is 
the [...] gift of connecting the biographical with the well-being and sorrow, the ups and downs 
of the living cultures of the smaller and larger centers; also the luckiest twist of pointing atten-
tion, which we sometimes encounter in the shape of a serene medisance, to the personal move-
ment of a person within the community – I mean, the luckiest twist of this gift in the education-
al manner.315
The metalevel understanding of a personal path within a set of cultural meanings, 
where ‘personal values’ were in constant interaction with cultural ‘centres’ both 
‘large and small,’ was at the core of the scholarly activity of a historian. This was 
the key to understanding past people (as in Große Rechtsdenker), and to ac- 
 
persönliches Leben und Forschen. Wir haben uns durch einen hochgezüchteten und sicherlich 
fördernden und vertiefenden Historismus allzusehr an die Einordnung in die großen Schub-
fächer der geisteswissenschaftlichen Kategorien gewöhnt; heute wird es mir manchmal beden-
klich zumute, wenn ich schon bei den Begründern Dilthey, Troeltsch, M. Weber, geschweige 
denn bei ihren Epigonen das hurtige Einordnen, das hegelische Alles-ganz-genau-zum-Welt-
geist-zuordnen erneut betrachte. Demgegenüber ist die Aufgbe, die mit Recht Ihr Buch auf-
gegriffen und immer bedacht hat: wie nämlich “Rechtsdenker” auf die moralische Kultur ihrer 
Zeit gewirkt haben und noch fortwirken, mir immer wichtiger geworden.”, Wieacker to Erik 
Wolf 12.1.1964. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
315 “Ich kenne kein Buch, dass diese Frage ernster nimmt und sie vom stillen reifen Wahr-
nehmen des inneren Wertes der Person aus beantwortet. Was aber erst diesem Ziel Fleisch und 
Blut gibt, ist die […] Gabe, das Lebensgeschichtliche mit dem Wohl und Wehe, dem Auf und 
Ab von Lebenskultur der kleinen und der größeren Zentren zu verbinden; auch die glücklichste 
Wendung der uns gelegentlich als heitere Medisance begegnenden Aufmerksamkeit auf den 
persönlichen Zug eines Menschen in der Gemeinschaft zu achten – ich meine, die glücklichste 
Wendung dieser Gabe ins Pädeutische.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.1.1964. NL Erik Wolf, Al-
bert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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knowledge this intertwinement was the purpose of scholarly maturation. To 
Wieacker, reading Große Rechtsdenker was like ‘no other book’ a path towards 
a moral approach to scientific work. Furthermore, while Wolf’s book sparked an 
inquiry into the morals of legal science, it also clarified the meaning of scholarly 
work. A metalevel understanding of constantly evolving personal values within a 
cultural frame, could ‘educate’ one towards ‘virtues’ (Pädeu tische). The histori-
cal worth of ‘examining’ the ‘personal examples’ of the past scientist was shown 
in the manner in which the examination offered insights into the ‘correct and 
wrong ways for the nation.’ The idea that a scholar’s devotion would bring harm 
to the national community and in the end prove to be unethical, was not a new 
idea in Wieacker’s thoughts. To him the worldview (and along with it the texts) 
of legal positivists was a consistent example of the wrong way. A new dimension 
was nevertheless evident in the attempt Wieacker made to understand the reasons 
which had led to such a situation. In this sense he wrote about Gustav Radbruch: 
You have done well not to predate Radbruch’s “conversion” to adventist backwards in time, but 
rather accepted him in his earlier phase as himself. There is a level on which relativism and 
even positivism are strict requirements for the decision for the good side; Savigny’s words al-
ways remain dear to me, that it is not the function of the law to cause morality, but instead it has 
to guarantee the conditions of moral action (he says it with very different words). On the other 
hand, your acknowledgement counteracts the always a bit painful feeling of uncertainty [...] in 
the ambigious political experience: as if he [Radbruch] himself had to endure the terrible con-
sequences of relativistic positivism and experience a natural-law Damascus. Again, the correct 
understanding of the nature of things goes hand in hand with your habit of seeing personalities 
fully as lived, concrete and moral entities.316
This excerpt reveals both the continuities and the discontinuities of Wieacker’s 
view. The principle that legal positivism was to blame for the legal havoc of 
Germany was an explanation which he saw no reason to rethink, but he was 
nonetheless ready to soften his former view: to some scholars and in some situa-
tions even legal positivism was an approach that could decide what was ‘good.’ 
 
316 “[W]ie gut, dass Sie nicht Radbruch von seiner “Konversion” aus adventisch nach rück-
wärts vordatieret haben, sondern ihn gerade in seiner früheren Stufe als ihn selbst gelten lassen. 
Es gibt eine Ebene, in der Relativismus und selbst Positivismus konsequente Bedingungen für 
die Entscheidung zum Guten sind; mir ist immer Savigny’s wort lieb [geblieben], dass das 
Recht nicht das Sittliche selbst herbeizuführen, sondern die Bedingungen sittlichen Handelns 
zu garantieren habe (er sagt es mit sehr anderen Worten). Andererseits begegnet Ihre Würdi-
gung dem immer etwas schmerzlichen Gefühl der Unklarheit […] an der ungeheuerlichen po-
litischen Erfahrung: als habe er etwa die fürchterliche Konsequenz eines relativistischen Posi-
tivismus selbst erfahren müssen und nun ein naturrechtliches Damaskus erlebt. Der richtigen 
Auffassung der Dinge kommt wiederum Ihre Art entgegen, die Persönlichkeiten ganz als geleb-
te, konkret, sittliche zu sehen.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.1.1964. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Lud-
wig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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The law was not in itself moral but it did guarantee the conditions that enabled 
moral deeds. But as a legal scientist, how was one supposed to measure the sus-
taining ethicalness of one’s claim on the nature of justice? The evaluation of ju-
risprudential ideas, which might have been drafted amidst an ‘ambiguous politi-
cal experience,’ seemed to be possible only in retrospect, in experiencing the 
consequences of one’s former view. To Wieacker, that had been the sad fate of 
Radbruch. Moreover, Wieacker was impressed how the ‘consequences of [Rad-
bruch’s] relativistic positivism,’ which Radbruch himself had to ‘experience,’ 
resulted in a ‘natural law Damascus.’ In Radbruch’s later perception of justice, 
which was deeply influenced by his trust in in natural law, his previous convic-
tion conflicted with the actual social experience. This gave Radbruch’s character 
a ‘lived, concrete and moral’ dimension. One’s historical vision could be one in 
which different perspectives, which had all been correct at one time, although 
some later proved to be incorrect, coexisted. This was not indecisiveness, but 
maturation. Wieacker concluded that Wolf’s book would clearly have an effect 
on the second, revised version (1967) of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit: 
Your book comes just in time for the revision of my Privatrechtsgeschichte [der Neuzeit]. I will 
still need to consult your book at every turn (I have to thoroughly revise some parts, e.g. Savi-
gny).317
What had begun as a self-reflective historical reading of autobiographies, devel-
oped into existential doubt during the student riots of 1968. One of the most no-
table victims of the accusatory campaign was Ernst Forsthoff, who decided to 
resign after considerable pressure as early as 1967.318 To Wieacker accusations 
and a violent atmosphere was a shock. He wrote to Wolf of the “horror” when 
“our most illustrious colleagues” where attacked and stripped of their “dignity.” 
The “swarms grasped” even those who showed some understanding of their 
cause.319 To Wieacker, these developments were heartbreaking.320 He hoped for 
a harmonious society and the authority of law, but a return to such times was not 
possible before leading politicians and administrators started to make a genuine 
 
317 “Ihr Buch kommt sehr zur guten Stunde für die Neuauflage meiner Privatrechtsgeschich-
te; ich werde es dort noch auf Schritt und Tritt zu Rate ziehen müssen (so wie ich auch, z. B. bei 
Savigny, ohnedies gründlich neuern muss).”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.1.1964. NL Erik Wolf, 
Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
318 Meinel 2012, 478. 
319 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 21.8.1968. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau. Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff were partly satisfied by the student 
partisanship. The militarization of society backed up their theories of the structural emptiness 
of the Federal Republic. Meinel 2012, 479–478. 
320 Liebs 2010.
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attempt to understand the student revolts. However, there was nothing from the 
government but “a lot of [blaming others for] bad conscience, but little percep-
tion, that it would be human and dignified even for the students, to show some 
attitude against them and set an example.”321
Most importantly the protesting students reminded Wieacker of his own youth. 
Their accusations against the scholars of the war generation, although not direct-
ly pointed at Wieacker, compelled him to reevaluate his life history in a “mature 
autobiographical manner.”322 Amidst the “chaos” of 1968, and in an attempt to 
understand what was happening, Wieacker recollected how he as student had 
talked about Große Rechtsdenker, at that point still an idea, with Wolf: 
The best [...] memories have persisted since the winter semester (29/30 or 30/31), since I heard 
your “Große Rechtsdenker.” I see and hear them still even today, as they were guests, and I have 
always followed their longer, inner path and could thankfully benefit from it. Being reassured 
in such ways of consistencies in these times belongs to the best gifts that one can receive. It is 
unearned, like all that is truly good, as I have found with surprise a kind of a certain religious-
ness (if the word is permitted) developing while thinking about my life.323
The time when Wieacker had first discussed about the ‘inner path’ of the great 
legal thinkers with Wolf was also a turbulent time, and the society as well as the 
public moral discourse seemed be at odds with what young scholars thought of 
as just. Wieacker and Wolf had chosen their path and revolted against the old 
generation. Their revolution had felt justified in the light of legal tradition, and 
the fight was accompanied by an unquestionable sense of an unprecedented re-
mediation of the moral structures of society. But, although their intentions were 
sincere, was the fight which Wieacker and Wolf had engaged themselves in any 
more justified than that of the students of 1968? Was there something good in the 
generational revolution itself which would provide a covering ethical entitlement 
321 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 21.8.1968: “viel schlechtes Gewissen für andere, aber wenig 
Empfindung, dass es human und menschenwürdig gerade auch gegen die Studenten ist, Haltung 
zu zeigen und vorzuleben.”. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im 
Breisgau.
322 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 21.8.1968: “wenn ich an reife autobiographische denke.” NL Erik 
Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
323 “Die besten […] Erinnerungen haben angedauert seit den Wintersemester (29/30 oder 
30/31) seit ich Ihre “großen Rechtsdenker” hörte; ich sehe und höre sie noch heute, als wäre es 
gestern gewesen, und habe dann immer Ihren weiteren inneren Weg begleiten und dankbar 
davon Frucht ziehen dürfen. Auf solche Weise in diesen Zeiten der Beständigen versichert zu 
sein, gehört zu de besten Gaben, die man empfangen hat – übrigens unverdient wie alles wirk-
lich gute, wie ich beim Nachdenken über mein Leben mit Überraschung und der daraus hervor-
gehenden Art einer gewissen Frömmigkeit (wenn das Wort erlaubt ist) gefunden habe.”, Wiea-
cker to Erik Wolf 21.8.1968. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im 
Breisgau.
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for the revolution and excuse the unintended effects? On this Wieacker had no 
clear answer. He tried once again to understand the moral and historical paradox 
with the help of Gustav Radbruch’s experience. Expressing his “own poetic-mor-
al feeling,” he wrote to Wolf: 
I agree with the better part of “the whirl to save as fixed, what must be maintained and passed 
on,” as you write.324
The ‘whirl’ which Wieacker and Wolf discussed was a concept which Radbruch 
used in Biographische Schriften. In a section named Innere Weg (the inner path), 
Radbruch characterized his experience of the time following the German Revo-
lution of 1919 as a “romping whirl.”325 Radbruch’s experience of the revolution 
was one which Wieacker could identify with, and reading about it awoke recol-
lections of the years of ‘legal renewal.’ Radbruch wrote about his experience 
thus:
It was truly the time of political unrest [...] It was the time when multifarious political ideas 
fought amongst one another passionately and demanded response. For the first time my dislike 
reached its end to give up the wealth of possibilities for a bounded reality, to give up the rich-
ness of contradiction for a solid conviction [...] From then on I won a series of friendships of a 
new kind in which one person did not reveal himself to the other, but both found to each other 
through a common thing, conviction or task. Idem velle adque idem nolle ea demum firma 
amicitia. (Agreement in likes and dislikes—this, and this only, is what constitutes true friend-
ship. Lucius Sergius Catilina quoted by Gaius Sallustius Crispus).326
To Radbruch, out of the revolt had emerged lasting and noble experiences, 
friendships, the questioning of social injustices, and passionate scholarly pres-
entations. But to Wieacker and Wolf – still conservative enough not to identify 
with the socialist revolution – it was obvious that the insight of a rebel was not 
reality per se. Wieacker could understand the emotions that emerged from the 
324 “[I]ch willige mit dem besseren Teil darin ein, in “den Wirbeln festzustehend zu retten, 
was bewahrt und tradiert werden muss,” wie Sie schreiben.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 21.8.1968. 
NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
325 “Welch anderes Bild zeigte sich mir, als ich den tollen Wirbel eintrat, den Berlin in den 
ersten Revolutionsmonaten darstellte.” Gustav Radbruch, Biographische Schriften, C.F. Müller 
Juristischer Verlag, Heidelberg 1988, 243.
326 “Es war ja die Zeit der politischen Unruhen [...] Es war die Zeit, wo mannigfache politi-
sche Ideen leidenschaftlich miteinander kämpften und Stellungnahme verlangten. Damals erst 
nahm meine Abneigung ihr Ende, den Reichtum der Möglichkeiten für eine begrenzte Wirk-
lichkeit, die Fülle der Widersprüche für eine feste Überzeugung dahinzugeben [...] Von jetzt an 
gewann ich eine Reihe von Freundschaften neuer Art, in denen nicht der Mensch unmittelbar 
dem Menschen sich erschloss, sondern beide über einer gemeinsamen Sache, Überzeugung 
oder Aufgabe einander fanden. Idem velle adque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitia. (Dassel-
be wollen und dasselbe nicht wollen, das erst ist zuverlässige Freundschaft. Catilinia bei Sal-
lust).”, Radbruch 1988, 243.
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revolt, but the ‘whirl of revolution’ as such was not desirable to him. Even a 
sincere interpretation of social justice, constructed in a battle against a stagnant 
and unjust social system, might in practice lead to disastrous results. This had 
happened in 1919, in 1933 and now in 1968. The intoxicating movement of rev-
olution had to be halted, scrutinized for what was worth saving, and the noble 
elements handed over to subsequent generations.
In hindsight, this should have been the case with ‘legal renewal.’ Wieacker 
acknowledged that the “fight against the Wilhelminian generation” was mostly a 
call to action of him and his peers, rather than a definite feature of 1930s legal 
science.327 The conviction which he had had on the relation between the timeless 
principles of justice and the legal science produced during the Nazi regime now 
seemed inadequate. What in concrete terms was left from those days were the 
crimes, whereas the good intentions and learned theoretical constructions had not 
stood the test of time.
8. Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1967):  
Rechtsgewissen and the modern state
Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit is a masterpiece of European legal history, 
which perhaps more than any other text written by Franz Wieacker continues to 
bring praise to its author. There Wieacker connected his decades-long learned-
ness of law to a coherent representation of the essence and state of European le-
gal science. On one hand, the book mirrors the larger tendency in post-war Ger-
man legal science, where scholars attempted both to explain the immediate past 
of the Nazi regime and reconstruct new solid foundations for jurisprudence.328 
On the other hand, Privatrechtsgeschichte was the end result of a project which 
Wieacker had started in the last years of the 1930s, and which aimed at represent-
ing European legal history from the point of view of the modern world, Neuzeit. 
As such it belonged to a scientific paradigm which explicitly took history as a 
tool to define the confusing social (and legal) development of the twentieth cen-
tury.329 In what follows I concentrate on a substantial aspect of the book: the 
manner in which Wieacker explained the concurrent ‘crisis of justice’ with the 
help of the concept Rechtsgewissen. In this task I build on the analysis of the 
previous pages of this study, and seek to show how Wieacker used this concept, 
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which signified an ability to achieve just legal reasoning, a notion he had devel-
oped for years, to make sense of the legal reality of post-war Germany and Eu-
rope. 
Privatrechtsgeschichte was published in two editions; the first appeared in 
1952 and the second in 1967. Wieacker made significant revisions to the second 
edition, but in this section I will look at the editions side by side in support of my 
argument that Wieacker’s thoughts on the relation between justice and society in 
principle remained the same. Later developments, as discussed in the second 
edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte, lie more in the domain of legal interpretation, 
and the passages concerning the concept of Rechtsgewissen are more or less 
identical in the two editions. However, the 1967 edition is far more reflective in 
one important sense: there Wieacker, for the first time in a public text, comment-
ed on his involvement with the “legal renewal” of the 1930s and his relation with 
National Socialist legal science. Since this feature is of great importance in my 
work, it is reasonable to start the analysis from that theme.
It is possible to treat Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit as a whole as a kind 
of indirect apologia.330 Wieacker did not provide a very thorough or explicit re-
port of his personal participation in the Rechtserneuerung, or give much space to 
that phenomenon in Privatrechtsgeschichte. However, where he does touch upon 
these times, his tone is humble. Wieacker writes in the second edition:
It is difficult enough for the distant observer, let alone those who were involved in it at the time, 
to reach a balanced judgement on private law scholarship between 1933 and 1945. Sensible 
reforms which had been thought out long before had to defer to a government completely con-
temptuous of all principles of the rule of law. Sometimes the alliance was superficial and tacti-
cal, sometimes corrupt. In the prevailing atmosphere of the utter contempt of law, ideological 
prejudice, and abuse of power for political ends, private law scholarship, which perhaps could 
in any case not have stood firm in that decade, proved unable to remain in critical control of its 
method and social role. Racialism in statutory form engendered dreadful injustices in the law 
of persons and marriage; and if other parts of the private law were less affected this was perhaps 
more because of the nature of the material than because the specialists were any more resistant 
to the warped fallacy and brutal perversion of legal ideas. Nevertheless, one can perhaps say 
that thanks to the professionalism of the practitioners and professors involved in the ‘Academy 
for German Law’, much of the reform work done by its committees in the area of private and 
commercial law was, on sober appraisal by those better qualified than the author, both well 
thought out and appropriate. This is true despite the painful tactical or naïve accommodations 
to Nazi terminology and ideology which readers today must find offensive.[…] They [Wieack-
er and his generation] had some of the false assurance of the graduate in Faust Part II ((6770 
‘Admit that what was ever known/Is not the knowing worth’ or at 6794: ‘The world until I 
made it, wasn’t there.’ Compare also 6807: ‘You may be hurt by what I say, /But nothing stupid, 
330 Rückert 1995.
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nothing smart,/ Can be imagined that has not/Already been conceived’) and were insufficiently 
respectful and mindful of their predecessors’ scholarship under the rule of law.331
Although Wieacker was in the above excerpt open about the “failings” of the 
lawyers of his generation and himself, he maintains that the era of National So-
cialist ‘legal renewal’ itself was not a reason or source for the contemporary 
‘crisis of justice,’ which is the coherent theme in Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neu-
zeit.332 Rather, the writings of his generation of scholars were attempts to resolve 
the more general dilemma in legal science: the incompatibility between social 
reality and legislation, and the latent possibility of legislation being unjust from 
the point of view of society as a whole.333 The injustices embedded in legislation, 
legal decisions and applying the law was the result of centuries old developments 
in European legal history, where the law was no longer in accordance with what 
people considered to be just, and the methods of legal science were no longer 
able to overcome that breach. Modern legal science theories further widened the 
gap and enabled the legislator to make laws which oppressed some for the bene-
fit of the powerful. Wieacker posited the work of the ‘New legal science’ within 
this larger narrative as follows:
The criticism directed at the traditional constructions of Pandectism and private law by the 
younger generation of private law scholars [of the war generation] is another matter, in which 
the author was also involved. Although their reasons were predominantly sound in substance, 
they were at fault, especially in the early years, in embracing the tendentious terminology and 
ideology of the time. […] For a period after 1945 these faults or failings naturally but regretta-
bly cast a blight over their perfectly legitimate criticism of doctrine or system, matters which 
had nothing at all to do with Nazi ideology but had been discussed by the great Pandectists of 
the nineteenth century or by jurists in other legal systems.334
The perennial incompatibility was partly due to the fact that lawyers were no 
longer in charge of the legislative process. Modern democracy prevented lawyers 
from being in charge of legislation. Wieacker asserts that the massive crimes 
against humanity of the twentieth century would have not been possible in an era 
when jurisdiction was in the hands of the “representatives of this legal culture, 
scholars and jurists with scholarly training.”335 In the modern world the process 
of legislation was dictated by the “general will” of the people, which as a concept 
331 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 409–410 fn.2.
332 See e.g. Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 482.
333 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 481–482: “All the main problems of private 
law today, namely the conditions of private autonomy, substantive contractual justice, the re-
striction of private rights and powers by social law, and above all the extent of judges’ freedom 
to develop the law, all of these lead back to the central question of the relationship between 
justice and reality.”
334 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 409–410 fn.  2.
335 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 443.
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and concrete entity was a vague constellation, vulnerable to outer influence and 
the pursuits of corrupt politicians and “demagogues.”336 As senators had no un-
derstanding of the law, and since such an understanding could only be obtained 
through “juristic-experience,” even at its best parliamentary legislation did not 
achieve a proper approach to the relations between law and justice, and one could 
not trust its ability to provide just laws.337 This double-bind formed a permanent 
‘crisis of justice’ whose resolution seemed impossible 
Wieacker did not suggest that the essence of democratic society should be re-
versed and the lawyers again be given the dominant position in creating the law, 
but strongly emphasizes the latent dangers of the contemporary system. Like 
other conservative legal scientists, such as Ernst Forsthoff,338 Wieacker was sus-
picious of the idea that the state, meaning the people, decided and regulated in a 
parliamentary process on social justice and the realization of individual rights in 
society.339 In practice, the ‘crisis of justice’ was a symptom of the havoc of the 
common and shared values on which laws had previously rested, and from which 
they had been derived: 
Indeed the legitimacy of enacted law depends in the long run on such integration [of law and a 
shared value-base], and such legitimacy is lost if the continuous reassertion of the general will 
is frustrated by the disappearance of any common sense of values [.]340
In Wieacker’s view the modernization process, in practice, had occurred in two 
distinct, but similarly challenging, tendencies. First, the modern state had turned 
into a social state (Sozialstaat) which regulated the actions of its citizens with the 
help of statutory system. This system for its part was legislated from the point of 
336 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 444–445: “The crisis of positivism is in truth 
the crisis of the legitimating power of the general will in a democracy.”
337 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, “[S]tatutes could be passed which were no 
longer in harmony, or were indeed grossly out of harmony, with the principles of law which had 
long been founded in religion, philosophy, or history.”
338 Cf. Meinel 2012, 318–352.
339 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 443: “This risk is inherent in modern democ-
racies.” Embedded in Wieacker’s argument is a strange twist, given that the conservative “war 
generation” had not succeeded very well in defending human rights during an era when they 
perceived that jurisprudence, “the jurists’ law,” was being given the status it was entitled to. 
Nevertheless, Wieacker’s, as well as Ernst Forsthoff’s and even Carl Schmitt’s, claim about the 
antinomy within the democratic theory and legislation is not without significance in the light of 
recent developments in Western democracies. One need only take a look at the difficulties 
which European countries are facing in dealing with populism and anti-democratic movements, 
or the enthusiasm which scholars, politicians and writers show in explaining the global order 
and Western democracies using Schmittian concepts and theories in a “post-truth world.” 
340 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 443. See also 443: “[The] moral quality [of 
law] […] was true only so long as the legislative organs, government and parliament continued 
to respect the traditional axioms of law.”
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view of purposes. That is, laws were drafted in order to produce desirable eco-
nomic, social or political effects in society.341 Even if one supposed that parlia-
mentary legislation worked unattached to economic influence and political ideol-
ogies, of which Wieacker was highly suspicious, the chances of such a system 
bringing justice were negligible. Wieacker was confident that a sound legal sys-
tem had to work from its own inner dynamic. With respect to his previous works 
and to his scientific context, he coherently maintained that an autonomous judi-
cature within a democratic nation meant not only independent judgments made 
in courts of law, but judges’ privilege to create the law: 
The strongest and most durable legal systems have always claimed such autonomy, as in an-
cient Rome, in England, in the Middle Ages, and in general in well ordered societies with 
pre-scientific legal systems. They all presume the immanent justice of the actual law and rely 
on producing just results by applying their own standards, such as the maintenance of tradition, 
of authority, of logical argument and concepts.342
Second, although the legal system of the Federal Republic acknowledged the 
need for a “law above laws,” a “transcendental” basis for jurisprudence, such 
beyond-legal principle(s) had not been thoroughly reasoned and explicated. The 
constitution of the Federal Republic, the courts in their practical work as expli-
cated in their verdicts, and recent theories of legal science, all adhered to and 
strove to apply some kind of “call to conscience.”343 It was not, however, irrele-
vant which kind of conscience one turned to, and on which bases it was built. 
Referring to a religious vocation while conducting operations in the basically 
secular spheres of law and administration did produce space for critical questions 
and comments.344 Likewise, a mere remark that one should follow one’s con-
science in deciding issues regarding the whole population, did not result in any 
ethical commitment or general guideline. Again, Wieacker called for an autono-
mous, mental tool for ruling and deciding justly, which would derive its legitima-
cy from ethical principles beyond individual experience, but nonetheless would 
be applicable in a wide range of practical and moral dilemmas brought about by 
the rapidly developing modern society: 
Basic law, […] lays down that Members of Parliament are bound only by their own conscience, 
though this is hard to reconcile with the reality of political parties such as we have. When vot-
ing on laws, the conscience of the member should include legal conscience, a less subjective 
matter!345
341 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 427–428, 432–434.
342 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 348; On the resentment which the old students 
of Carl Schmitt had on Sozialstaat, see Müller 2003, 86.
343 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 440, 470–472.
344 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 473.
345 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 444 fn.2, emphasis original.
272 IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history and in legal science
Hence the mental tool Wieacker suggested for creating and upholding justice in 
society was one situated in the sphere and tradition of legal reasoning. Such a 
tool could even be used in a society like the Federal Republic, where the scope 
of the legal system, in comparison to the preceding legal cultures, was somewhat 
restricted. In 1967 Wieacker was more at ease with the social state and gave 
credit to its durability from the point of view of the rule of law, and acknowl-
edged that in the legal consciousness, Rechtsbewusstsein, of the German people 
the contemporary form of administration and jurisdiction were accepted.346 In 
1952, however, in the first edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte, he still struggled to 
welcome the post-war order with all the changes in its relations between law, 
politics and legal science.347 At that time he perceived the legal system of the 
Federal Republic to be an heir to the intellectual streams which achieved their 
notorious high point in the mindset which he so much despised, namely legal 
positivism:
This pre-clarification of reality has become as indispensable as ever since the will to power of 
modern consciousness has brought to awareness, discussed and finally destroyed the old, invi-
olable conditions of the order of human life that were once pre-given in the subconscious, just 
as it occurred after the destruction of the old western Hellenistic-Christian-reason-oriented 
value system by the scientific positivism.348
The old European value system was being destroyed by scientific positivism, and 
that value system was being destroyed through bringing it under public discus-
sion and subjecting it to twisted (positivist) theoretical conceptualizations. In the 
1952 edition Wieacker saw “recent answers” in legal science to be particles in a 
long line of causal explanation theories. In the end, causal theories had achieved 
the status of a “layman religion” and an authoritative position in “the public con-
sciousness”.349 Thus, positivist reasoning had not merely remained within the 
intellectual circles of the legal theorists, for its concepts had been assimilated as 
axioms which guided administrative decisions leading to a “conscienceless dis-
dain” for justice in the legal reality.350
346 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 438, especially fn.  4.
347 Cf. p. 145–162.
348 “Ja diese Wirklichkeitvorklärung ist unentbehrlicher geworden als je zuvor, seitdem der 
Machtwille des modernen Bewusstseins die alten, einst im Unterbewusstsein vorgegebenen 
und dort unverletzlichen Bedingungen der Ordnung des menschlichen Lebens bewusst 
gemacht, diskutiert und schliesslisch zerstört hat, wie es nach der Zerstörung des alten abend-
ländischen hellenisch-christlich-vernunftrechtlichen Wertsystem durch den wissenschaftlichen 
Positivismus geschehen ist.”, Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 338.
349 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 335: “Laienreligion”, “öffentliche Bewusst-
sein”; see also 333. 
350 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 332: “gewissenlose Verachtung des Rechts.”
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The roots of this decline go a long way back. The scientific positivism of the 19th century had 
for the first time fulfilled not only the demands of the Cartesian concept of science and the law 
of reason for the jurisprudential method with the development of a closed system of civil law 
and a general civil law theory, but at the same time it scientifically expressed and intellectually 
legitimized the legal picture of the civil society of its time.351
Both editions of Privatrechtsgeschichte are built on the same “degradation nar-
rative” of European legal culture. Wieacker’s book is quite unusual since the 
preceding works on the same subject had mostly concentrated on legal institu-
tions and the history of statutes. He narrates the phases and development in the 
European way of perceiving legal phenomena side by side with the more general 
changes in the intellectual history of the continent. The text proceeds from the 
Glossators to natural law theories and to the Age of Reason, which are succeeded 
by legal positivism, textual formalism, and finally legal naturalism. Each of the 
epochs carry within it the seed of the subsequent paradigm, and the legal culture 
evolves like an “organism,”352 but the story as a whole can be reduced to a di-
chotomy between two views on social phenomena: causal theories and practical 
wisdom. Wieacker is not hesitant to equate the juridical naturalism of the twenti-
eth century with the scholasticism of the ancient world, which in contemporary 
Romanist discourse was seen as the nemesis of Roman legal thinking.353 His 
vehement opposition to forms of causal explanations in humanities and legal 
science was not only a consistent element in his texts, but also a feature which 
irreversibly connected him to thinkers like Hans-Georg Gadamer and Martin 
Heidegger. 
Since it was juridical naturalism which seemed to dominate the public con-
sciousness in post-war Germany, it is understandable that Wieacker’s narrative 
turned out to be a history of spiritual degradation and its subsequent effects on 
modern society. Privatrechtsgeschichte is far from being a one-sided declaration, 
but its underlying message is clear: causal theories rip the law from its substan-
tive moral binding force, and open up possibilities for modes of apparently legit-
imate injustice in society. Ultimately, causal theories treat people as “species” 
not as “free men,” and laws as “vehicles for gaining certain purposes” rather than 
“expressions of values.”354 Thus, scholars who were prejudiced by the principles 
351 “Die Wurzeln dieses Niederganges reichen weit zurück. Der wissenschaftliche Positivis-
mus des 19. Jhs. hatte mit der Ausbildung eines geschlossenen Privatrechtssystems und einer 
allgemeinen Privatrechtstheorie zum erstenmal nicht nur die Forderungen des cartesianischen 
Wisssenschaftsbegriffs und des Vernunftrechts an die Methode des Jurisprudenz erfüllt, son-
dern zugleich das Rechtsbild der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft seiner Zeit wissenschaftlich ausge-
drückt und geistig legitimiert.”, Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 317.
352 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 447.
353 Cf. p.  227.
354 Cf. Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 446–450.
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of legal naturalism were unable to define ‘the conscience’ in a balanced way, 
where it would be bound by law, in connection with tradition as well as with re-
ality, and usable in a multitude of legal cases. Thus, Rudolf von Jhering, the 
Freirechtsschule and the jurisprudence of interest did enrich the field of legal 
science with their contributions on the essence of legal reality and interpretation, 
but with respect to the question of ‘legal conscience’ their works deepened the 
‘crisis of justice’ rather than offered any solutions in reconnecting the spheres of 
social reality and justice:355 
Inquiry into causes and analysis of motives of individuals or groups are perfectly good ways of 
apprehending the reality to which the norms are to be applied, but they do not of themselves 
provide us with the standards we need in order to apply law properly, to legislate rightly, or to 
adopt apt legal policies: the values of justice are related to social reality but they are not infer-
able from it.356
In the second edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte Wieacker’s tone was not as cyn-
ical and disenchanted as in his first edition, and succeeding research on legal and 
intellectual history has in general focused not on comparing his idea of Rechts-
gewissen to his previous texts, but on other streams of legal theory current in the 
first decades of the Federal Republic.357 It is obvious that Wieacker’s Rechts-
gewissen, the “supralegislative legitimation” as he represented it in the second 
edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte,358 has been constructed both in relation to the-
ories of natural law and to substantive legal values. As such it mirrors the larger 
tendency in post-war German legal science, where scholars attempted to both 
explain the immediate past of the Nazi regime and reconstruct new solid founda-
tions for jurisprudence. The extent to which scholars admitted or realized these 
arguments as part of the post-war Vergangenheitspolitik varied. Nevertheless the 
“turn to natural law” was being acknowledged, and most understood this as a 
counter-reaction to the injustices of the previous decades. As a result, the attempt 
to go beyond positive law and find a transcendent justification for law was a de-
fining feature of post-war German legal science. 359 
355 As a whole, juridical naturalism “knowing no justice but the purposes of the party in 
power, is perhaps the greatest threat to the idea of law in Europe in recent centuries.” (Wieack-
er, A History of Private Law 1995, 458). On the other hand, Wieacker, A History of Private Law 
1995, 458 fn.  20 states: the jurisprudence of interests “rates the demands of individual con-
science above the requirements of any objective and binding rule” and further, 455: “the rift is 
due to the fact that the jurisprudence of interests can offer no suprapositive reason for prefer-
ring one competing interest over another, and therefore like every related form of naturalism 
must make a leap from what is in fact to what should be in law.”
356 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 450.
357 See Avenarius 2010; Foljanty 2013.
358 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 445.
359 Foljanty 2013, 327–329.
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In Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit Franz Wieacker also contributed to dis-
cussion on natural law, though opinions vary as to what extent Wieacker’s texts 
can be situated under this label. As Lena Foljanty shows, however, Wieacker’s 
argument in Privatrechtsgeschichte certainly comes very close to natural law 
theories.360 Wieacker’s friendship with Erik Wolf, one of the most notable friend-
ships in natural law discourse, and the extent to which he was influenced by 
Wolf’s view on legal theology, makes it easy to take Wieacker as a proponent of 
natural law. In addition, especially in the second edition of Privatrechts-
geschichte, Wieacker frequently discusses Rechtsgewissen in light of the argu-
ments of renowned natural lawyer Hans Welzel.361 But having said that, Wieack-
er himself never agreed to be a “natural law man.” Quite the contrary. He stuck 
with his original idea that in the end natural law theories were not “practical,” as 
jurisprudence was supposed to be, and had been for example in ancient Rome.362 
Wieacker upheld his own view on the “route to justice,” and although he was 
impressed by the works of Leo Strauss and Hans Welzel, they did not alter his 
vision of the relation between reality and justice in the decades following the end 
of the Second World War.363 Wieacker concludes:
[W]e shall avoid the hasty impression […] that no transcendental justification of law is possi-
ble, while realizing that any absolutist and doctrinaire natural law with authoritarian ‘conclu-
sions’ is unacceptable.364 
A more difficult task is to distinguish Wieacker’s view from Nicolai Hartmann’s 
and Max Scheler’s theories on the substantive ethical values of law, Theodor 
360 Foljanty 2013, 188–190. Nevertheless, the theme can be read through the dispute be-
tween the “Smend school” and the “Schmitt school.” Wieacker does not seem to be interested 
in taking part in this dispute. He gives credit to both “Protestant” and “Catholic” readings of the 
law and its substantive value. Furthermore, in his review on contemporary trends in searching 
for the “superlegislative” basis for law within democratic society, he treats different tendencies 
in a sober manner, not preaching about the “tyranny of values.” What is emblematic, however, 
is the long-standing dislike of natural law theories and his personal emphasis on the synthesis 
of tradition and experience as a means to read and apply law. Cf. Müller 2003, 70 fn.  27.
361 E.g. Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 466, 469, 476.
362 Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.7.1965. Nachlass Hans–Georg Gadamer, 
Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar; cf. p. 216–229.
363 “The way back to material justice” was the topic of the concluding chapter of the first 
edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 348). 
Wieacker gave credit to Strauss in illuminating the critical question of the historical nature of 
any given formulation of justice (Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 451, fn.  12; 478, 
fn.  34). He also discussed Strauss’s ideas in his letter to Hans-Georg Gadamer, see Wieacker to 
Gadamer 1965: “Strauss hat mir übrigens fürs Naturrecht viel gegeben; ich denke, in den Punk-
ten, wo Sie mit ihm übereinzustimmen bekennen.” NL Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Lite-
ratur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
364 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 472.
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Viehweg’s work on “topoi” of legal arguments, and existentialists like Werner 
Maihofer (who was both a student of Erik Wolf and a friend of Wieacker).365 
Scheler’s work was highly appreciated in the Federal Republic. He seemed to 
offer a philosophically solid system, detached from Catholic theories of natural 
law, in weighing the necessary values guiding legislation and the judicature.366 
Thus, Wieacker in an apparently explicit statement, though on closer inspection 
it is somewhat ambiguous, conceded: “For Scheler justice is a personal virtue, 
the individual’s insight into competing values, that is, legal conscience.”367 
Wieacker did not propose a similar system and hierarchy of values as a founda-
tion for legal reasoning as Scheler. Scheler’s and the existentialists’ scrutiny of 
the way people had tried to find the basis for the absolute transcendental princi-
ples of law were to Wieacker the different approaches to “legal anthropology”.368 
Thus, Wieacker shared with them a common task in revealing the forms of think-
ing, and the mentalities of different legal cultures and jurisprudential practices, 
in order to comment on the “superstatutory means” of European legal culture: “A 
knowledge of the legal imperative of a person without knowledge of the human 
reality, that is, without a legal anthropology, is not possible.”369
Wieacker’s Rechtsgewissen necessitated knowing the society in which the law 
was situated, and, contrary to the legal positivists, from the material conditions 
of that given society derive the form of legal thinking which marked the particu-
larity of this society or community. To Wieacker, legal communities had their 
distinctive virtues, customs, beliefs and norms, which were not merely institu-
tional or “materialistic” in a way that they could be reduced to symptoms of a 
battle for some resource or social psychological purpose.370 Privatrechts-
365 Cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.11.1953. NL NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsar-
chiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
366 Foljanty 2013, 178.
367 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 466. Here Tony Weir’s translation of Privat-
rechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit is inaccurate, since he translates Wieacker’s concept Rechtsgewis-
sen as “consciousness of law,” although the original text (Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 
1952, 353) says: “Als das Wesen der persönlichen Gerechtigkeit ist damit die Werteinsicht der 
Person in das Recht, d. h. das Rechtsgewissen gewonnen.” Emphasis mine.
368 Cf. Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 451, 468, 469. The turn towards “legal 
anthropology,” and concurrently the acknowledgment of the necessity of an existentialist view 
of legal historical study, was emphasized by Wieacker as early as 1941 in ‘Zum System des 
deutsche Vermögensrechts.’ 
369 “Ein Wissen vom rechtlichen Sollen des Menschen ohne Kenntnis des menschlichen 
Seins, d. h. ohne eine juristische Anthropologie, nicht möglich ist.” Wieacker, Privatrechts-
geschichte 1952, 338.
370 In post-war German legal science it was not uncommon to include Carl Schmitt among 
the “existentialists” (Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 469 fn.  13). Given that Wieack-
er included many different approaches to his “legal anthropology,” and the way he combined 
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geschichte der Neuzeit, especially its second edition, shows that in the quarrel on 
the ‘tyranny of values’ between the Schmitt school and the Smend school, 
Wieacker cannot be clearly connected to either school. Like the Smend school, 
Wieacker appreciated Scheler’s and Hartmann’s attempt to define a system of 
values on which legislation should be based, he even calls Scheler’s result 
Rechts gewissen.371 Nevertheless, a hierarchy of values which does not grow out 
of the practice of legal thinking, or of the domain of understanding the law per 
se, cannot truly reflect justice. It lacked the connection between Rechtsbewusst-
sein and Rechtsgewissen, the people’s consciousness of law and the experts un-
derstanding of it, thus it embeds the possibility of eradicating the authority of the 
law, something which had plagued natural law theories, legal positivism and ju-
ridical naturalism. Scheler’s and Hartmann’s system of values had not been built 
on the correct kind of (legal expert’s) experience of law.372 Here Wieacker was 
closer to the opinions of the Schmitt school (though maybe not Schmitt himself). 
A system of values in itself was arbitrary if it was not preceded and backed up by 
a homogenous common sense notion of legal values.373 
With respect to Viehweg’s work on the basic principles of judicial deci-
sion-making, Wieacker appreciates Viehweg’s attempt to develop “open systems 
consistent with the factual structures” in legal doctrines.374 In other words, Vieh-
weg invoked the sphere of scholarly dialogue within the legal culture one was 
studying, and emphasized the importance of learned practical wisdom in legal 
reasoning. According to Wieacker, Viehweg “transmitted the understanding of 
sensus communis” to modern legal science.375 
“concrete order” thinking with Martin Heidegger’s idea of Dasein, (cf. Wieacker, ‘Vom römi-
schen Juristen’ (1939), it seems that to him both Schmitt’s and Heidegger’s ideas were legiti-
mate paths in discovering the dominant mentality of a legal community.
371 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 478 fn.  34.
372 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 477 fn.  31: “When Max Scheler placed justice 
before aesthetics and intellectual values but after the ‘values’ of mercy and love of God, he was 
speaking from personal experience; we might well agree with him, but that is no basis for in-
ference.” Emphasis mine.
373 Cf. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Entstehung und Wandel des Rechtsstaatsbegriffs’ in 
Recht, Staat, Freiheit. Studien zu Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte. 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 1991.
374 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 469.
375 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 469. To Wieacker, Viehweg’s work dealt with 
past legal thinking and saw theories as “‘sensible drafts’ […][which] constitute topics for dis-
cussion of what solution would be just, for a debate in which we would gradually learn what 
justice requires.” Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 481. The fundamental significance 
of the concept of “sensus communis,” and its meaning to Wieacker’s legal hermeneutics, is a 
theme which unfortunately does not fit within the scope of this work.
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Within his contemporary scholarship on the history of European private law, 
Wieacker’s search for ‘supralegislative legitimation’ was comparable to other 
theories, though it was nevertheless highly original. He acknowledged other 
works in analyzing the “call of conscience,” but perceived Rechtsgewissen as 
fundamentally different from individual vocation, since it occurred within the 
sphere of legal tradition.376 It belonged to a specific world of thinking, arguing, 
learning and presenting, which could only be achieved through its own methods: 
[L]aw is a social phenomenon which has its own way of developing through time, like ‘species’ 
in biology or humanity in positivist sociology. If law is a manifestation of life then the subjec-
tive aspects of its validity which outlast the individual, such as consciousness of law, sense of 
justice, and conviction of legitimacy, are the results or superstructure of secondary effects in 
consciousness of a causally determined development of psychological qualities in Homo sapi-
ens[.]377
In Rechtsgewissen, and with its help, it was possible to connect the spheres of 
values, tradition, and personal experience in jurisprudence. As a ‘subjective as-
pect’ of the ‘validity’ of the normative system, and as an exclusive human attrib-
ute, Rechtsgewissen was traceable throughout the European legal tradition, only 
sometimes being more hindered in one era than another. Legal conscience 
emerged from the mentality, Dasein, of a given legal community. The distinctive 
awareness of a group of people sharing virtues, values, ways of life, social prac-
tices and understanding their culture as successors of previous generations, nev-
ertheless positing their own questions with regard to the boundaries of their 
knowledge, formed a mental community which created its own conscience. 378 
376 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 477: “Legal conscience differs from other 
instances of ethical insight in that it has consciousness of what is required in one’s conduct to-
wards other men. This distinctiveness of the experience of law is the foundation of the autono-
my of justice: if we see the question of what is legally due in this light, there is no higher value 
into which justice can be absorbed (such as ‘cultural norm’, ‘public benefit’ or love) and there 
is no priority of ranking among such values. A person thinking about law as it really is must 
accept that justice does not directly serve any other absolute good (such as religious ardour, 
enjoyment of God, pity, truth, beauty, or the general welfare)[.]”
377 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 447. In the text of the 1952 edition (Wieacker, 
Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952) this part is explicated as follows: “Dann aber erscheinen die sub-
jective Elemente der Rechtsgeltung, die das Leben der Individuen als kollektive psychologi-
sche Phänomene überdauern, wie Rechtsgfühl, Rechtsüberzeugung und Rechtsgewissen, als 
determinierte Resultate einer biologischen Entwicklung psychologischer Eigenschaften der 
Gattung “Mensch” [.]”
378 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 348: “These methods of finding law [relying 
on the standards of one’s own legal culture] […] certainly depend on shared beliefs about the 
existence of some law superior to all positive law, beliefs of the kind that existed in Rome and 
in the High Middle Ages[…], guaranteed principles endorsed by the legal conscience of the 
community.”
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To be conscious of and appreciate this mentality of the communal bond, whether 
in one’s own time, or while studying other cultures or eras, was to “experience” 
law.
It follows that by justice we must understand the superior mandate of which a person becomes 
aware when he experiences a sense of the obligatoriness of law. It is not some general obliga-
tion severable from individual experience, but a distinctive and spontaneous behest to every 
individual in every decision he has to make.379
The legal thinking of the past provided a ‘stock’ of ‘experiences of law,’ thus it 
provided the modern world with both a vehicle in cultivating one’s legal con-
science, and a treasury to further learn from past experience.380 Since, from 
Wieacker’s point of view, the modern world suffered from the ‘crisis of justice’ 
it was crucial to understand and utilize legal conscience. In conducting peaceful 
co-existence in a modern society mere application of norms or subjecting the 
rules of communal being solely to parliamentary procedure, was not enough. The 
‘authority’ of the law needed to be reinstalled, and such a task had to be carried 
out by making people aware of the value-based nature of law: “The art of living 
together calls for longer and deeper experience than the application of the laws 
of nature.”381 Such ‘longer and deeper experience’ was provided by assimilating 
the past legal thinking, the tradition of understanding the law. 
The Rechtsgewissen as elaborated in Privatrechtsgeschichte signified all the 
aspects Wieacker held fundamental after the ‘point Zero’ of post-war Germany, 
but in reference to the contemporary discourse of searching for ‘metajuristic 
moral values’, and it was constructed on his previous scholarly works. It meant 
that a legal scholar had to be like the learned ones in history – who had guarded 
and applied the European legal tradition – asserting that the experiences and 
understanding of the learned ones were vital and necessary in order to steer the 
modern legal system, indeed the whole society, in a healthy direction.
379 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 477.
380 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 481.
381 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 482.
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Franz Wieacker’s scholarly production offers an invaluable case study concern-
ing the history of historiography. During his life he personally experienced two 
world wars, served as a soldier in battle, witnessed three abrupt changes of social 
systems, lived under a totalitarian rule, saw his home country divided and united 
again, was accused of supporting fascist crimes and celebrated as the reinventor 
and highest authority of European legal history. These different phases all sur-
faced in his scholarly texts. Thus, to study the intertwinement of his personal 
experiences in the historiography he produced, brings forth results, not only from 
a biographical point of view, but for the history of ideas in general. These results 
show the dynamic relationship between personal vision, scientific tradition and 
social circumstances in historical writing.
My attempt has not been to study the extent to which Wieacker’s texts were 
embodiments of any political ideology. It is important to analyze the “politics of 
history” and reveal the function historiography in general had, and has, in sup-
porting and legitimizing political ideologies. In this study, however, I intended to 
go beyond such questions as whether Wieacker’s 1930s texts can be seen as an 
extension of National Socialist ideology. I consider, in fact, that historiography is 
always political in the sense that it is produced within a political framework set 
by the society of the time, and the historian’s aim is to have an effect on the pre-
vailing common opinion. The actual audience might just occasionally be more 
restricted and comprised of other scientists. I have also wanted to refrain from 
analyzing Wieacker’s texts solely in relation to other texts and only within scien-
tific discourse. While analyzing the meaning of a given text, one should not for-
get the agency of a scholar, and the continuous interpreting and reinterpreting of 
both the social context and the scientific tradition in which authors are more or 
less always engaged. Thus, the relevant question in the context of this book and 
of Franz Wieacker’s texts is why does a scholar choose a particular message in 
any given moment, which he/she then further presents to the audience in a polit-
ical act of writing history.
I consider this approach to be a fruitful way of making sense of historiograph-
ical texts, at the same time avoiding the caveats of overemphasizing either the 
influence of the prevailing ideology on the text or the text’s descent from the 
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preceding tradition. This is also a natural stance towards Franz Wieacker’s works, 
since his intentions to have an impact with his writings are explicit, but he just 
was not interested in political ideologies. His writings took part in politically 
oriented disputes over the fate of the nation, and especially in the 1930s clearly 
supported some sides of the National Socialist ‘legal renewal.’ But to explain 
Wieacker’s intentions through the ideological principles upheld by the National 
Socialist party, or after the Second World War, by Konrad Adenauer’s CDU, 
would be very artificial. Wieacker mastered the field of Roman law, and was 
quick to pick up and adapt new theoretical openings from another fields of sci-
ence. Nevertheless, and despite his political ambiguity and scientific eclecticism, 
Wieacker had a strong personal understanding of the essence of social justice, 
which was the prior point of departure for his writings.
This further underlines the ambiguity of his texts. Although they reveal an 
exceptional knowledge of previous and contemporary legal scientific contribu-
tions, and some of them seem to be steeped in a political ideology, they neverthe-
less always speak of the commitment to consistent, atemporal values. In addi-
tion, Wieacker was among the few legal historians who explicitly admitted the 
effect of political discourse on his historiography, but at the same time insisted 
that this was not opportunism. Franz Wieacker was a charismatic teacher and a 
loyal friend. His colleagues remember him as a kind and polite man, with impec-
cable manners, but as a researcher he never ceased to be interested in new things 
and fresh approaches. Although an active and social member in the scientific 
community, his personal world was virtually impermeable to others.1 
Above all Franz Wieacker was a scholar. Like any historian of the modern 
world, Wieacker saw political changes and new scientific ideas in the light of his 
own moral standpoints about society, his personal understanding of historical 
development, and his idea of the role of scholarship in relation to the national and 
public good. From the viewpoint of the twenty-first century, Wieacker was ex-
ceptional in his unquestionable belief in the value and social relevance of scien-
tific work and higher education, and in the significance which he gave to histori-
cal examples in the construction of his contemporary world. His scholarly iden-
tity was molded by a conviction of the uncorrupted essence of Bildung. This 
conviction gave added weight to the concepts which he used in his attempt to 
transmit the lessons of history to the present day. In this work I have analyzed the 
concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein (legal consciousness) and Rechtsgewissen (legal 
conscience).
1 I am deeply grateful to Detlef Liebs, Michael Stolleis, Laurens Winkel, and Geoffrey 
MacCormack for sharing their personal recollections of Franz Wieacker with me.
283V. Conclusion
In the early texts of Franz Wieacker which I have analyzed in the book, there 
is no distinction between Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen. Indeed, in 
these texts Wieacker did not use precisely these concepts to elaborate the features 
of a common understanding of the rule of law and justice. However, it is evident 
that these two major entities were often seen by Wieacker as synonyms. If we 
reflect on the textual devices which Wieacker later deployed to his 1930s texts, 
the result is obvious. The concepts of Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein 
overlapped, and with respect to the larger claim which Wieacker intended to 
make with his writings, their separate existence was not a matter of importance 
to him. This was still evident in 1944, when Wieacker for the first time intro-
duced precisely these two concepts in the same article. The hierarchy and differ-
ences between them were fuzzy. 
During the years following the National Socialist Machtergreifung, the com-
mon understanding of the rule of law and justice were often perceived to be the 
same thing. This was the case with the National Socialist rhetoric – which further 
subordinated the common understanding to the will of Führer – but also in legal 
scientific discourse. Rechtsbewusstsein was the source for social justice. Deploy-
ing this at the time fashionable idea in a legal scientific text could have been ex-
perimental and a scholarly mind-game, but Wieacker went further. The convic-
tion that the ‘New legal science’ had indeed uncovered something scientifically 
sound and relevant, continued to occupy his texts until the early 1940s. 
That this idea of the identical nature of the common understanding of the rule 
of law and justice inspired Wieacker is explained by his socialization to the val-
ues attached to Bildung and Stand. Wieacker’s personal experience during the 
early years of the 1930s was that the social appreciation given to the higher, hu-
manistically oriented education and learnedness as well as to the estate of the 
legally skilled, was becoming violently degraded. In Wieacker’s view, learned-
ness, and the virtues of responsibility and honor annexed to it, was a way to make 
sense of the relation between people, the state and law. In an authentic national 
culture, the Stand of the legally skilled should be acknowledged as a vital “limb” 
in the body of society. 
Paradoxically, the social context of the years following the National Socialist 
Machtergreifung seemed to rehabilitate this socially conservative ideal. The le-
gal Studienordnung of 1935 – or to be more precise, Wieacker’s interpretation of 
it – highlighted the importance of a historical, general understanding of law. The 
working communities in which Wieacker participated, had apparently been as-
signed the task of redefining the relation between legal education and society, 
and in their ethos the communities stressed the meaning of a wider, culturally 
constituted meaning of law. Not only was the ‘aberration’ of the Weimar Repub-
lic being fixed, but Wieacker was in the vanguard of the task of novel restoration. 
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In Wieacker’s texts on the concept of ‘property,’ the idea of Berufstand, ‘voca-
tional estates’ as the foundational structures within society, gave old ideals new 
social significance. The ‘lawyer estate’ was again, like in Roman times, at the 
disposal of the political order when refining its own virtuous culture and advising 
in administrative decisions concerning the national destiny.
During the war years, at the latest, Wieacker along with many other legal sci-
entists and historians realized the vagueness of the legal ideology of new regime. 
From the point of view of the National Socialist state, the function of legal rea-
soning was to serve as a respectable façade for the crimes and destructive poli-
cies carries out in the totalitarian nation. While finding the racial premises of the 
National Socialist laws incomprehensible and irrelevant, Wieacker at the same 
time furthered his existentialist approach to jurisprudence. Concentrating on the 
history of definitions given to the material “things” which existing laws spoke 
about enabled the scholar to deal with the non-contemporaneous, abstract level 
of law, but also to contemplate the more general – and acute – dilemma of the 
liaison between scholarly ideas and administration. 
The war experience brought empirical evidence to Wieacker’s understanding 
of human affairs and his legal scientific stance. The political domain of society 
and its rhetoric could no longer be used to describe his personal experiences. 
Kameradschaft and ‘concrete order’ became mere slogans which existed in a 
realm detached from Wieacker’s view of the world. Rechtsbewusstsein and Ge-
wissen did nevertheless appear in his writings and personal letters. Wieacker, 
who as a representative of the ‘New legal science’ had committed himself to re-
defining the existing legal concepts in order to meet the social “revolution” and 
to detach legal science from the twisted old theories, returned to the concepts of 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny in order to explain legal phenomena. The irony of 
this turn reveals that it was not a mere textual choice, but a more basic shift in the 
historical vision of Wieacker as a scholar. 
The newly-adapted old concepts were, however, precise in explicating the tur-
bulence of the late years of the Second World War as well as the period of scar-
city in post-war Germany, a time to which Wieacker struggled to bring historical 
meaning. It was obvious that the legal scientific equation of legal consciousness 
and justice had been a mistake. The Rechtsbewusstsein of the people was misin-
terpreted, mistaken and unable to understand the deeper historical reasons behind 
current events. During his service on the frontline, Wieacker realized that not 
only did the people blindly participate in the war effort, but the study of their 
historically and culturally constituted set of beliefs would help prevent such a 
destructive illusion from occurring again. The scholar’s duty was to provide in-
formation on the origins and development of the awareness with which people 
explained their existence. 
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Wieacker maintained that due to one’s social status and education there was a 
significant difference in how one understood the meaning of time. To ordinary 
people the tragic play of historical forces was hidden, but Wieacker and the 
‘learned’ in general could interpret the larger picture, placing the ‘collapse’ with-
in a historical context. Furthermore, the ‘learned’ could teach future generations 
to use the law in a proper way. To contextualize himself (and his group of friends) 
within a rapidly altering society, Wieacker again resorted to historical examples. 
Consequently, the legal scientist needed to be the ‘Glossators’ of the Federal 
Republic, to humbly cultivate tradition, educate, and ward off ‘barbarism.’ The 
constant and continuous historical reflection between the past and the present in 
order to bring meaning into one’s social context indicates Wieacker’s learned-
ness, but also the significance which humanistic education along with the virtues 
of Bildungsbürgertum had in his identity. Bildung was a value in itself, but it also 
provided means to understand one’s being. 
To rebuild meant to write and engage in scholarly activity. Due to the wide-
spread destruction and scarcity brought about by the war, people, according to 
Wieacker, were separated from their cultural heritage and character and were 
deprived of their ‘destiny.’ The reconstruction of the nation necessitated an 
awareness of the historicity and particular nature of the German people, that is, 
an acknowledgment of legal consciousness. Only after Germany had understood 
its destiny – which meant a path that respected the social structures and values 
important to the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie – in relation to historical exam-
ples and the European tradition, could it (re)construct a just society. In this pro-
cess, necessitated by the collapse of the common culture, it was, according to 
Wieacker, perfectly human to lean on superstitious explanations, ideologies, and 
religion. Nevertheless, only after a true awareness of the material values, princi-
ples and virtues comprising the common legal culture had been achieved was it 
possible to apply conscience, Gewissen, to jurisprudence, legislation and court 
decisions. In his works following the end of the Second World War, Wieacker set 
about reinstating the legal culture in such a way that the law could be used in a 
‘conscientious’ manner. In reconstructing the legal foundations of Europe, the 
scholar’s task was to spread an awareness of the true causes leading to the ‘col-
lapse,’ and to highlight the distortions in common thinking which had enabled 
legal havoc to take place. Thus, it was necessary to write on the history of the 
German and European legal consciousness. 
In this task of historiographical reconstruction, Wieacker used the methodolog-
ical stance he had absorbed during his stay at the University of Leipzig. In Vul-
garismus und Klassizismus, instead of tracing the concrete reality and structures 
of past legal culture, he sought to understand the mentality and thinking of the 
people inhabiting that time. He tried to understand the common experience of the 
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post-Roman legal culture. Thus, Wieacker’s approach to the phenomenon of vul-
garization was novel, but it also enabled him to construct a solid historical con-
tinuation of the particles which he appreciated in Roman culture, outside concrete 
temporal structures and institutions. Such immaterial assets had survived the col-
lapse of the Roman culture; they would survive another collapse, and secure the 
continuation of the essence of legal tradition. With his psychological approach to 
the distortion of the ancient world, Wieacker also explained the more recent “ir-
rational” aberration of the legal culture, and further emphasized the importance 
of virtuous, historical structures in the material context of the present. In other 
words, he reminded his audience of the essential value of Stand and Bildung 
within the legal culture. Vulgarismus und Klassizismus was more than just a his-
torical case study, it was a framework which Wieacker developed further in ‘Ur-
sprünge und Elemente’ to explain the wider narrative of European legal history. 
In addition, in the years following the end of the Second World War, Wieacker 
had to adjust his scholarly identity with respect to the abstract guilt brought about 
by the public attempt to come to terms with the totalitarian past. In the beginning 
this process was overshadowed by the material obstacles which scholars faced in 
their everyday lives. It seemed that law academics had lost their previous re-
spected position as the mediating civil servants between the people and the state. 
During the denazification of the German academia, Wieacker, along with his 
close colleagues, was charged with supporting the National Socialists in their 
oppressive restructuring of Germany. To Wieacker, denazification was a mani-
festation of the lack of a ‘conscientious’ legal culture, and an expression of the 
takeover of superstition in society. Nevertheless, the compelling need to redefine 
a sound legal scientific device in order to come to terms with the past as well as 
finding a solid base for the legal culture of the future, remained. Such conceptu-
alization had to be in touch with tradition, meaning both legal historical exam-
ples and modern elaborations on past examples. It also had to address wider 
questions on the role of scientific work in society and the responsibility of a 
scholar within historical development. Wieacker’s solution was a more precise 
definition of the old concept of Rechtsgewissen.
In defining Rechtsgewissen Wieacker again called upon his scholarly knowl-
edge accumulated during the preceding decade. Although he used the same terms 
as some other scholars, his concept was in essence existential. The resemblance 
between Wieacker’s Rechtsgewissen and, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
sensus communis is evident. Very important in constructing the concept were, 
however, Wieacker’s personal experiences during the ‘legal renewal.’ Wieacker 
was confident that within a community of scholars, sharing the same set of vir-
tues and bound by a common purpose, it was possible to find a ‘basic thought’ 
from which to derive ‘truthful’ decisions and through which the sustainability of 
287V. Conclusion
other claims could be evaluated. That had been his experience from the lecturer 
academy of Frankfurt and the Kieler Schule as well as the faculty of law at the 
University of Leipzig. Moreover, it was an enduring principle that such commu-
nities of the learned could conduct ‘elastic creativity’ in their thinking. It enabled 
legal scholars to unchain themselves from restrictive dogmatism and shift their 
thinking towards legal wisdom. By means of these axioms in his historical vi-
sion, achieved through personal experience, Wieacker had already elaborated the 
exceptional legal culture of the Late Roman Republic in ‘Vom römischen Juris-
ten.’ Furthermore, that historical example of Late Republic jurisprudence legiti-
mated the distinct nature of Rechtsgewissen as a morally unflinching way of legal 
thinking in modern society. When I describe here Wieacker’s historical reflec-
tion, which took the shape of a circle, my attempt is not to prove his claim inac-
curate, nor devaluate the idea of Rechtsgewissen as a jurisprudential tool. Rather 
I intend to elaborate how Wieacker, like all historians, researched the past from 
the premises of his own context and through writing intended to have an effect 
on the present day 
To Wieacker, Roman law never lost its place as a superior historical example. 
The ‘conscientious’ use of law by the ‘great lawyers’ was due to their ‘creative’ 
ability and awareness of the tradition of law. Tradition both in Rome and in twen-
tieth-century Germany signified both an understanding of the historical develop-
ment of law, but also of its historicity; every epoch had its distinct manner of 
applying and conceptualizing legal matters. In his pedagogical articles Wieacker 
argued that the ‘great jurisprudence’ of Late Republican lawyers was not only the 
starting point of the European legal science, but that the Roman Stand of jurists 
had mastered and developed the law in a way which could serve as a perfect ex-
ample for contemporary European legal scholars and lawyers. Being one with 
their tradition, the Roman lawyers had been able to further develop their legal 
culture to meet the challenges of a developing society and technological change. 
Their legal ‘art’ had been ‘creative,’ schöpferische, in the true meaning of the 
concept. Moreover, the legal art of Roman lawyers stemmed from an absolute 
awareness of their existence. Roman lawyers were not only able to carry out 
exceptional legal thinking, they were firmly rooted in the mentality of their soci-
ety, and had assimilated the social values which defined the cultural horizon of 
the Romans. To translate this into Wieacker’s own concepts, the Rechtsgewissen 
of Roman lawyers was in touch with the Roman Rechtsbewusstsein. Thus, Ro-
man law and Roman lawyers represented a consistent paragon for modern law-
yers in their task to keep up with the modernization process as well as find again 
the untainted core of jurisprudence after the ‘collapse.’
In Privatrechtsgeschichte Wieacker also defined Rechtsgewissen in elaborat-
ing what it was not. It was not based on religious conviction or on dogmatic in-
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terpretation in the context of previous theoretical constructions. Thus, as a legal 
form of Gewissen (legal conscience), phronesis or atemporal wisdom was consti-
tuted on the temporal, common understanding of the rule of law, but it managed 
to avoid the ideological and psychological caveats which haunted the legal con-
sciousness. Thus in Privatrechtsgeschichte the two concepts of Rechtsgewissen 
and Rechtsbewusstsein were related, but the distance between them was a feature 
which defined the moral quality of a given legal culture. Such a conceptual 
change in Wieacker’s historical vision was a result of decades of scholarly work, 
learnedness, and dramatic personal experiences. 
The most drastic change with respect to Wieacker’s understanding of con-
scientious scholarship, however, took place after the second edition of Privat-
rechtsgeschichte had been published. Following the student riots of 1968, he had 
to reevaluate his scholarly identity with respect to the morals and meaning of 
scholarly work. As a result, he reviewed his old article ‘Wandlungen der Eigen-
tumsverfassung’ and admitted that the original text was not at all in line with 
what he, and the society in which he lived in 1976, considered to be ethical. One 
is compelled to ask why did his scholarly identity, and along with it his historical 
vision, change so slowly? One reason was the wider social context. In general, 
German legal scholars did not publicly reflect upon their involvement in the legal 
havoc of the Third Reich. Wieacker was one of the first of the few who did so. 
The other aspect relates to the sustaining premises through which Wieacker per-
ceived the law, the world and history. Wieacker believed in the distinct and to a 
degree separate dimension of the academic world, whose culture changed ac-
cording to its own rules and schedules. Only when the past intruded into the 
universities in the form of the student revolt, did the principles of scholarly work 
have to be reevaluated. The third explanation is elaborated in the theoretical 
framework of this study.2 It is fundamentally human to avoid any drastic reeval-
uation of an explanation one has earlier given about the world and previous ex-
periences. This is one of the reasons why historical writing is so important in 
modern cultures. The certainty of both a personal life script as well as a cultural-
ly upheld “significance” in history, the sense of continuity, are essential in order 
to gain individual meaningfulness for one’s story, the “I” among others. Thus in 
some sense to criticize historians for their lack of interest in rewriting their nar-
ratives is unfair. That is not how historiography or historical vision works.
To conclude, and to summarize my response to the research questions raised 
at the beginning of this book: Franz Wieacker was first and foremost a scholar. 
His view on social change and society was deeply influenced by his belief in the 
values of learnedness and higher education. He firmly believed in the necessity 
2 Cf. p. 30–35.
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of the distinct social position of the legally skilled, and maintained that the work 
conducted by that ‘estate’ was vital for achieving social justice in a given society. 
He shared that conviction with his closest colleagues, whom he met in the lectur-
er academy of the University of Frankfurt and in the Kieler Schule. In their cul-
ture, within a network of colleagues, social changes were evaluated against an 
ideal type of social order. The network cultivated their culture in practice in the 
form of working communities, since in 1933 the National Socialist Macht ergrei-
fung provided the network with a possibility to enrich their ideas as models for 
legal education and jurisprudence. The collaborative method and the resulting 
academic works of the young scholars represented, for a short period of time, a 
revolutionary stance against the allegedly dogmatic academic culture. The end 
of the war and the consequent denazification process was a drastic disappoint-
ment to both Wieacker and his network of colleagues. Wieacker, however, found 
a new, reconstructive direction from the ‘collapse’ and by means of his personal 
experiences – of communality as the context of legal scholarship and elastic 
creativity as the aim of legal science – and accumulated, multifaceted scientific 
capital, established himself as a leading Romanist and legal historian in Europe. 
Wieacker explained the diverse social breaches and recent crises through a vast 
narrative of European legal culture, which he constructed by means of concepts. 
After the war the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen were of 
great importance, but they were only one dimension of his production. Neverthe-
less, and despite the radical changes that the Machtergreifung and 1945 brought 
about, the core of his scholarly identity remained untouched. So it is not entirely 
accurate to analyze to what extent Wieacker’s texts in the latter part of the twen-
tieth century are the results of either the National Socialist era or the post-war 
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Schönwälder, Karen. 1997. Historiker und Politik. Geschichtswissenschaft im Nationalsozial-
ismus. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
Schubert, Werner. 1988. ‘Volksgesetzbuch. Teilentwürfe, Arbeitsberichte und sonstige Materi-
alen.’ In Akademie für Deutsches Recht. 1933–1945. Protokolle der Ausschüsse Bd.  III, 1, 
edited by Werner Schubert. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
303VI. Bibliography
Schulz, Fritz. 1934. Prinzipien des römischen Rechts. München and Leipzig: Duncker & Hum-
blot.
Schulze, Winfried, Gerd Helm and Thomas Ott. 1999. ‘Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozial-
ismus: Beobachtungen und Überlegungen zu einer Debatte.’ In Deutsche Historiker im Na-
tionalsozialismus, edited by Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle, with the assistance 
of Gerd Helm and Thomas Ott. Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag.
Shore, Marci. 2014. ‘Can We See Ideas?: On Evocation, Experience and Empathy,’ In Rethink-
ing Modern European Intellectual History, edited by Darrin M. McMahon & Samuel Moyn. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Siegrist, Hannes. 1988. ‘Bürgerliche Berufe. Die Professionen und das Bürgertum.’ In Bürger-
liche Berufe: Zur Sozialgeschichte der freien und akademischen Berufe im internationalen 
Vergleich, edited by Hannes Siegrist. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Simon, Dieter. 1989. ‘Die deutsche Wissenschaft vom römischen Recht nach 1933,’ In Rechts-
geschichte im Nationalsozialismus: Beiträge zur Geschichte einer Disziplin, edited by Mi-
chael Stolleis and Dieter Simon. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.
idem. 1994. ‘Franz Wieacker,’ In Rechtshistorisches Journal 13: 1–5.
Skinner, Quentin. 1969. ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.’ History & The-
ory 8: 3–53.
idem. 1988. ‘Motives, Intentions and Interpretations.’ In Meaning and Context: Quentin Skin-
ner and His Critiques, edited by James Tully. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
idem. 1999. ‘Rhetoric and Conceptual Change.’ In Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought, ed-
ited by Kari Palonen. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto.
Smith, Anthony D. 2003. Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Smith, Denis Mack. 1976. Mussolini’s Roman Empire. Madison: Longman.
Spengler, Oswald. 1923. Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Welthistorische Perspektiven. 
München: C. H. Beck.
Stammler, Rudolf. [1902] 1964. Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte. Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Stein, Peter. 1999. Roman Law in European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stolleis, Michael. 1974. Gemeinwohlformen im nationalsozialistischen Recht. Berlin: J. 
Schweitzer Verlag.
idem. 1989. ‘Die Rechtsgeschichte im Nationalsozialismus: Umrisse eines wissenschafts-
geschichtlichen Themas.’ In Rechtsgeschichte im Nationalsozialismus: Beiträge zur 
Geschichte einer Disziplin, edited by Michael Stolleis and Dieter Simon. Tübingen: J. C. B. 
Mohr.
idem. 1998. Law under the Swastika. Studies in Legal History in Nazi Germany. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press.
idem. 2003. ‘Prologue: Reluctance to Glance in the Mirror. The Changing Face of German Ju-
risprudence after 1933 and post-1945.’ In The Darker Legacies of Law in Europe and Fas-
cism over Europe and its Legal Traditions, edited by Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh 
Ghaleigh. Oxford: Hart.
idem. 2004. A History of Public Law in Germany, 1914–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
idem. 2008. Rechtsgeschichte schreiben. Rekonstruktion, Erzählung, Fiktion? Basel: Schwabe 
Verlag.
idem. 2016. ‘Methode der Rechtsgeschichte.’ In Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechts-
geschichte, Band 3, edited by Albrecht Cordes, Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Heiner Lück and 
Dieter Werkmüller. Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1475–1483.
304 VI. Bibliography
Stolorow, Robert D. 2007. Trauma and Human Existence: Autobiographical, Psychoanalytic, 
and Philosophical Reflections. New York: Routledge.
Strote, Noah Benezra. 2017. Lions and Lambs. Conflict in Weimar and the Creation of Post- 
Nazi Germany. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stråth, Bo. 2000. ‘Introduction. Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of Communi-
ty.’ In Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community: Historical Patterns in Europe 
and Beyond, edited by Bo Stråth. Bruxelles: Peter Lang.
Tajfel, Henry. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Tellenbach, Gerd. 1946. ‘Zur Selbstorientierung der deutschen Universität.’ Die Sammlung 1: 
530–543.
Theweleit, Klaus. 1987. Male Fantasies. Volume 1: Women, Floods, Bodies, History. Minneap-
olis: University of Minnesota Press.
idem. 1989. Male Fantasies. Volume 2: Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Tosh, John. 1991. The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods, and New Directions in the Study of 
Modern History. New York: Longman.
Träger, Marion. 2012. ‘Methode und Zivilrecht bei Franz Wieacker (1908–1994).’ In Methodik 
des Zivilrechts – von Savigny bis Teubner, edited by Joachim Rückert and Ralf Seinecke, 
2. Auflage. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Tucker, Aviezer. 2004. Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vollnhalls, Clemens. 1991. Entnazifizierung: Politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den 
vier Besatzungszonen 1945–1949. München: DTV.
Walkenhaus, Ralf. 1997. ‘Totalität als Anpassungskategorie. Eine Momentaufnahme der Den-
kentwicklung von Carl Schmitt und Ernst Rudolf Huber.’ In Totalitarismus, Eine Ideenge-
schichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, edited by Ralf Walkenhaus, Alfons Söllner, and Karin 
Wieland. Berlin: Akademia Verlag.
Weber, Max. [1919] 1988. ‘Politik als Beruf.’ In Max Weber: Gesammelte politische Schriften, 
edited by Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.
idem. 2003. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Mineola: Dover Publications.
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. 1995. Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. 3. Band: Von der “Deutschen 
Doppelrevolution” bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges 1849–1914. München: C. H. 
Beck.
Weinkauff, Hermann. 1968. Die deutsche Justiz und der Nationalsozialismus. Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
Welzel, Hans. 1966. An den Grenzen des Rechts: Die Frage nach der Rechtsgeltung. Wies-
baden: Springer.
White, Hayden. 1996. ‘Auerbach’s Literary History: Figural Causation and Modernist Hhistor-
icism.’ In Literary History and the Challenge of Philology: The Legacy of Erich Auerbach, 
edited by Seth Lerer. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
idem. 2010. ‘The Practical Past.’ Historein 10: 10–19.
idem. 2010. ‘Writing in the Middle Voice.’ In The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, 
Literature, and Theory, 1957–2007, edited by Hayden White. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press.
White, Stephanie A. 2001. ‘Learning to Communicate.’ Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11: 
510–520.
305VI. Bibliography
Wickham, Glynne. 1969. Shakespeare’s Dramatic Heritage: Collected Studies in Mediaeval, 
Tudor and Shakespearean Drama. London: Routledge.
Wieacker, Franz. 1932. Lex commissoria. Erfüllungszwang und Widerruf im römischen Kauf-
recht. Berlin: J. Springer.
idem. [1934] 2000. ‘Zum Wandel der Eigentumsverfassung.’ In Franz Wieacker. Zivilistische 
Schriften (1934–1942), edited by Christian Wollschläger. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
idem. 1935. ‘Religion und Recht im römischen Stadtstaat.’ Zeitschrift der Akademie für 
Deutsches Recht – Sonderheft Ausland 2: 273–277.
idem. [1935] 2000. ‘Eigentum und Eigen.’ In Franz Wieacker. Zivilistische Schriften (1934–
1942), edited by Christian Wollschläger. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
idem. [1935] 2000. ‘Eigentum und Enteignung. Ein Versuch zur Neufassung der Grundfragen.’ 
In Franz Wieacker. Zivilistische Schriften (1934–1942), edited by Christian Wollschläger. 
Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
idem. [1935] 2000. ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung.’ In Franz Wieacker. Zivilistische 
Schriften (1934–1942), edited by Christian Wollschläger. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
idem. [1936] 2000. ‘Das Kitzeberger Lager junger Rechtslehrer.’ In Franz Wieacker. Zivilis-
tische Schriften (1934–1942), edited by Christian Wollschläger. Frankfurt: Vittorio Kloster-
mann.
idem. 1938. Bodenrecht. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlaganstalt.
idem. 1939. ‘Die Stellung der römischen Rechtsgeschichte in der heutigen Rechtsausbildung.’ 
Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht 6: 403–406.
idem. 1939. ‘Vom Römischen Juristen.’ Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 99: 440–
463.
idem. 1940. ‘Privatrechtsgesetzgebung und politische Grundordnung im römischen Freistaat.’ 
Die Antike 16: 176–205.
idem. 1941. ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögensrechts. Erwägungen und Vorschläge’. 
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